Printer-friendly versionElection Monitoring
EDA 's Long-Term Campaign to Restore Election Integrity
EDA works to defend the vote not only at election time, but full-time, year-round. We understand that restoring transparency and public accountability to the electoral process is a major social policy change that will require long-term, sustained commitment.
Election Verification Polling
EDA has conducted and commissioned numerous independent exit polls and voter surveys in counties across the nation during the 2006 midterm and 2008 presidential election cycles, providing an independent means of evaluating the validity of official election returns generated by trade-secret software owned by private corporations. In the absence of direct citizen observation of the vote-counting, or credible election auditing practices, these polls provide a valid means for independently assessing the veracity of intrinsically unverifiable electronic voting results. We continue to refine these methods and will, with your volunteer participation and funding support, continue to conduct exit polls and voter surveys in strategically selected locations in forthcoming elections.
Election Forensic Analysis
In computerized elections, citizens are denied access to the very evidence --ballots marked by voters-- necessary to confirm or deny the validity of officially reported election results. EDA has developed methods for independently assessing reported election results by comparing official precinct and county election returns to historical election baseline data, voter registration figures, pre-election tracking polls, and independently commissioned exit polls on election day. This multifactor analysis comparing reported election results to independently verifiable external measures can identify suspect patterns and internal contradictions in the election results indicating probability of accidental mistabulation or deliberate fraud to a very high degree of statistical certainty.
Media Messaging and Public Education
The unacceptable risks of computerized voting are rising into public awareness, but much more public education and advocacy will be needed to institute change in the U.S. electoral system. EDA is building media messaging capacity to provide consistent, corrective information and to issue alarms as necessary on a national scale.
Legal Action
Election Defense Alliance advocates a proactive, pre-emptive response to pervasive breaches in election security and obstruction of the public's right to know. We are devising legal tactics and assembling evidence to support legal intervention before, during, and after elections to enforce effective security procedures and uphold the public's right to monitor electoral processes and inspect public documents without obstruction.
Support for Local Organizing
Because we recognize that all elections are local, Election Defense Alliance emphasizes electoral integrity action at the level of local electoral jurisdiction. We support those efforts by developing research, fundraising, and publicity capacity on a national level and then channeling those resources where they can be applied most effectively: at the county and township level where elections are conducted.
Legislative Policy
Although we regard decentralized electoral administration and local citizen vigilance as the best prescription for election protection, EDA recognizes the present opportunity to repair damage wrought by HAVA (the Help America Vote Act of 2002) and avert similarly misguided and harmful federal legislation now and in the future. We will warn against ill-advised nonsolutions, recommend effective measures to counter electronic voting dangers, and promote handcounted paper ballots and manual audits as the solutions necessary to restore electoral integrity.
These and other actions are carried out by an EDA staff of volunteers who depend on your support to continue and expand these protections. Please invest in electoral legitimacy.
Click here to return to donation page
Riverside RoV Concedes, DREs Are on the Way Out
Riverside County Board of Supervisors
September 29, 2009
(Partial transcript of board meeting)
Re: November 2008 Election and Electronic Voting – Item 3.66
Supervisor Buster: It [decertification] was a big blow to many of us who invested in this [$30+ million for e-voting machines] and I think to the public to see most of the use snatched away from us now. And as I pointed out to her now, somewhat inconsistently, if the touchscreens are so potentially dangerous or so potentially unreliable then why is it that the Secretary of State continues to allow one, one per voting place resulting in our 72,000 voters using it as a matter of fact. And then having to do the extra manual tally with all its extra costs and then not getting reimbursed for that. It seems to me there’s a big gulf between the county voters here a growing proportion of them and the representation they are getting from our Secretary of State. She should have come down here and talked to us before she rescinded the use of these machines. And she should be more responsive to the numerous voters, the thousands of them who want to use these machines and she should be explaining to us what now can we do with these thousands of machines that are sitting on the shelf. Shouldn’t we be using those as voters demand and ask for them as evidenced by those 72,000 people crowded in at the one sole machine they were allowed to use? Shouldn’t we try to rework the old system in whatever fashion so we can satisfy this voters’ urge?
”…and they continue to be used because the voters choose them in large numbers here in Riverside County. So I think we ought to extend an invitation to Secretary Bowen to come to the county, particularly around election time or during the election and get an idea of what are issues are regarding the continued use of our touchscreen machines, if only to reimburse us for the extra cost of the manual tally.
ROV Dunmore: “…so the further contradiction is you can only have one per polling place but you can have an unlimited amount at early voting sites. And that early voting program is what really cost the county the majority of the $400,000. In May we did not have early voting sites and I believe that our tally, of course it was a lower turnout, was about $29,000 for which we billed Sequoia also and have not received any payment. But it’s getting more difficult in the arena of electronic voting, and if I may expand for just a moment, what we do for early voting is that we cut up the receipts so we can do a stack and sort method. All these are for one candidate, all these are for another candidate, and then we can count them. New recount regulations that are set to go into effect very soon do not allow us to cut up the tapes anymore. That we have to keep them on a single roll, which will make the 100% manual tally of any early voting unit take much longer than it did in November. I brought this up with the Chief Deputy Secretary of State Evan Goldberg and he said well I’ll make a note of that but it ended up in the recount regulations in any event. So it is getting more difficult for us to use electronic voting in an early voting venue.
Supervisor Buster: Sometimes you have to balance these risks that experts may correctly conclude you face with the public’s desire to try to come up with some kind of a compromise on these machines and that’s what I don’t see occurring here and that disturbs me. Particularly when we’re going to other countries and we’re trying to encourage democracy there and encourage people to vote – it seems to me uh, uh, it’s a real sore spot with me that these machines were I think were peremptorily jerked and banned almost totally from our county, and then, and then to keep our interest whetted in the issue, doled out one of them completely inconsistent too with their scientific findings of a high risk involved. So it doesn’t – what the actual results of the state actions by the Secretary of State’s office don’t make sense from any standpoint if you want to look at them.”
Chairman Stone: “…What is Sequoia doing as our vendor to adapt their software to the mitigation measures the Secretary of State would like to see implemented in software so we can begin using these machines again? Are they actively engaged with the Secretary of State, are they actively engaged in modifying the software so that we can begin utilizing these machines again?”
ROV Dunmore: “Well the trend of the industry seems to be moving away from electronic voting. I was at the nationwide conference in San Diego in July or August and they have all the vendors out there ES&S, Premier, Sequoia, there’s one other one that is escaping me, Dominion voting was there and they are all moving to precinct-based scan counters similar to what Sequoia now has on the market which is the Insight where you vote your paper ballot, you slide it into a slot, and it counts the marks on that right there, and they are recorded onto a cartridge, similar to our DREs, and the cartridge is brought back to our office and counted, uh, processed.
Now, the twist that the industry is going in right now is that all the new precinct-based optical scanners are taking a picture of the ballot. So not only do you have the ballot, but now it’s taking a picture of the ballot and you have the cartridge and that is Sequoia’s new product, how Dominion Voting is coming at it, and also Premier. And so I think that they have saturated the market with electronic voting units, um, there is no more market for them. I talked with Jack Blain, the president of Sequoia at that particular conference – he was trying to sell me on their new product which is this precinct optical scanner that takes a picture. I said well how much will you give me for my DREs if I take this to my board? He said well there’s not much of a market for those these days. So, so, um, I hope that answers your question. I don’t not believe they have anything in Federal testing at this point to um remedy the software that is currently on them and I believe it’s because across the nation the doors are really being shut toward electronic voting. It’s not – to go through the certification process is a very very expensive process
Chairman Stone: But they’re already certified by the Federal government. Has the Federal government expressed the issues the Secretary of State has with respect to Sequoia software?
ROV Dunmore: Uh, with regards to that, our Secretary of State requires that they go through the federal testing and get a federal cert number before she will even test it here. Any issues that were brought up at the federal level, and I’d have to go research those, if there were any, have been remedied and they were given a cert number for the current software that we’re using. But they don’t have anything, I don’t believe, in the testing at the federal level right now. Again, it’s very expensive and if there’s not a market for it they’re likely not willing to invest in putting that forward.
Chairman Stone: “—the federal government didn’t have any issues with the integrity of the Sequoia voting system, otherwise they would not have given a certification for it. So here we have one person in the state of California that stands in the way of comprehensive, accurate voting devices that have never had any legal challenges that have resulted in a fraud. We’ve had machines that have cut costs, expedited results to the electorate so they can see the results of elections, so because of ONE PERSON we are withheld from using these machines that are federally certified. So, if we have a new Secretary of State, and I believe she’s up for reelection at this time, those machines could be recertified by a new Secretary of State, and we could utilize those machines without any problems, is that correct?”
ROV Dunmore: Yes
Chairman Stone: Thank you Barbara.
Riverside Elections Department Heeds SaveRVote for Big Improvements
But County Gets Negative Marks for Pushing DREs
Coverage from Riverside Press Enterprise
Voter Advocacy Group Praises Special Election
By DUANE W. GANG
The Press-Enterprise Wednesday, May 20, 2009
A watchdog group critical of how Riverside County has handled past elections said Wednesday that Tuesday's special election vote went smoothly with added accountability.
Temecula-based Save R Vote monitored Tuesday's election and praised Registrar Barbara Dunmore for putting a series of safeguards in place to maintain the integrity of cast ballots.
"This was the most improved, smoothest election that I have seen in seven elections," said Tom Courbat, the group's founder.
The safeguards came from an audit led by former district attorney Grover Trask.
The measures include adding a redesigned ballot statement that precinct workers fill out to account for ballots and signatures, adding a form at ballot collection centers for workers to report if there is something wrong with ballot boxes and installing two computer monitors at the registrar's headquarters for observers to monitor ballot counting.
"This proves they could do it in a big election. It didn't result in that much additional work," Courbat said. "It gives a higher degree of accountability."
Dunmore said Wednesday that the light turnout made the election a perfect time to unveil the new measures.
"We wanted to put them in place as quick as possible," she said. "We worked very hard on that."
Dunmore said she is pleased to hear that Save R Vote found the improvements well executed.
Still, the group remains critical of Riverside County for what it sees as the over use of electronic touch-screen voting machines.
"There's an agenda here, to prove people like electronic voting when given the choice.
It is not about liking. People like to drive 120 on the freeway, but it is not safe.
You cannot adequately secure these machines."
Secretary of State Debra Bowen decertified the use of touch-screen voting machines in 2007, citing security vulnerabilities. She then set conditions for their limited use.
In Tuesday's election, poll workers asked voters whether they wanted to use a paper ballot or an electronic machine.
"There's an agenda here, and the agenda here is to prove people like electronic voting when given the choice. It is not about liking," Courbat said. "People like to drive 120 on the freeway, but it is not safe. You cannot adequately secure these machines."
Courbat criticized the county for not informing voters at polling sites that there have been issues surrounding the machines.
Dunmore said her office must offer voters the choice. She said poll workers can't provide a history of the machines to each voter, and if voters have questions, they can contact her office. The use of electronic voting machines on Tuesday complied with election rules, she said.
"We did see precincts where there were more votes cast on the electronic voting unit than on paper ballots," Dunmore said. "That is a choice made by the voter." On Tuesday, there were 28,148 votes cast on electronic machines, about 41 percent of the ballots cast a precincts, Dunmore said.
Riverside County had at least three precincts, two in Corona and one in Murrieta, where all the votes were cast on the electronic machines, Dunmore said. Fifty-seven precincts didn't have any votes cast on electronic machines.
Reach Duane W. Gang at 951-368-9547 or dgang@PE.com
Election Monitoring Report, Riverside County CA, May 19 2009
The following photos were taken on the night of the May 19, 2009 special election in Riverside County by Tom Courbat, as he made his rounds observing election procedures and conditions.
This photo guide to election monitoring explains the purpose of each election document or item pictured, commenting on recent improvements in election procedure, contrasted to the lax practices of the past, and pointing out where problems still persist.
Tom and the SAVE R VOTE group he founded have been thoroughly monitoring Riverside County elections for the past four years. Their repeated reports documenting serious breaks in the Riverside election system finally move the county Board of Supervisors to commission a countywide elections audit. Tom served as citizen advisor to the accounting firm hired to carry out the $300,000 review, which resulted in the Riverside County Elections Department finally implementing many of the procedural safeguards SAVE R VOTE had been advocating for years.
In the May 19th election, Tom was pleased to find Riverside's election procedures vastly improved as a result of the new policies adopted following the recommendations of the election auditing consultant and SAVE R VOTE.
Tom notes: "Many documents now contain the date and type of election on every page for the first time, as recommended by SAVE R VOTE (SRV). Previously, when pages were removed from a document for copying or scanning, there was no way to categorically state the page was from a specific election on a specific date."
Ballot Statement Instruction Sheet and Ballot Statement (left and right respectively).
Vastly improved from prior versions. The Ballot Statement is an official form required to be accurately completed by election workers following the close of polls and prior to sending all voting materials to collection centers. This form accounts for all regular and provisional paper ballots – blanks received, ballots spoiled, voted ballots, and unused ballots. It also accounts for all regular and provisional electronic ballots cast. SAVE R VOTE (SRV) had recommended numbering each line and constructing instructions accordingly. This was accomplished for the first time in the May 2009 Election.
HOWEVER, this form omits critical information, previously recorded in prior elections until a procedural change starting with the November 2008 election. The information that should be recorded on this form, but that is now missing, would compare information from the Voter Roster about how each voter cast their ballot, with the numbers of each type of ballot cast: electronic, electronic provisional, paper, or paper provisional. Without this comparison, there is no way to confirm that the voters who signed the roster as having cast a provisional electronic ballot, for example, actually did cast an electronic provisional ballot. The signature counts from the Voter Roster are simply “grossed up” to the total number of ballots cast, with no reference to the numbers of each type of ballot cast. So, for example, if more people voted on paper than signed up to do so, and fewer voted electronically than signed up to do so, the numbers could “balance” (one error offsets the other) but the discrepancy will not be noted, investigated, or reconciled. This is a step backwards. 
Left side is the Certificate of Completion to be signed by all precinct board members and in the center is a small box to enter the number of voters who voted in that precinct. No changes were made to this form. Right side is a new Inspector’s Election Checklist for the precinct captain (inspector) to use to make sure all functions are performed. This is a great improvement and appears to be instituted by the ROV independently. 
Precinct Posting Form. Compliance with completion and posting of this form in past elections had been very poor. This form reports critical information that enables citizens to check against central tabulator reports of ballots cast per precinct. The change for the May 19, 2009 Special Election was the addition of printed instructions on the form stating where/how to post the form and where the second copy is to go. Equally important was the insertion of letters (i.e. K, T, C & D) referring to the boxes on the Ballot Statement where the information is to be taken from. For the November 2008 Election, a color-coded sample was designed, as can be seen here. Although this sample of how to complete a precinct posting form seems clear enough, compliance in the November 2008 Election was still very poor. SRV believes the lettering of the boxes in May 2009 as recommended by SRV made the biggest difference by making it explicit where
information was to be taken from.
Illustration and instructions on how to complete the Voting Equipment Security Log. Another excellent improvement, this one recommended by the Management Review firm of Best, Best & Krieger (BB&K). The use of lettering lines and boxes, recommended by SRV, makes it much easier to follow the instructions. The form on the right side of the photo contains several checkmarks, indicating the seal may have been inspected at various points during Election Day. There should be some instructions or explanation for the multiple check marks and perhaps signing with initials should be required.
The electronic Results Cartridge (memory card) is placed in an unsealed clear plastic pouch and placed in the Voted Ballot carton along with the voted ballots and the carbon copy of the Ballot Statement. The Voted Ballot Carton is then sealed for delivery to the central counting location.
Save R Vote Report Rips Riverside County for Mishandling 2008 Election
PRESS RELEASE
Contact
Tom Courbat, Founder, SAVE R VOTE
Cell: 951-536-6091
__________________________________
Save R Vote Delivers Critical Review of Riverside County Election Procedures
Report details election law violations, miscounts, security breaches in 2008 election
WHERE: Riverside County Board of Supervisors chambers, 4080 Lemon Street, Riverside, CA
WHEN: Tuesday April 14, 1:30 p.m. Live Video at 1:30: http://bosvideo.co.riverside.ca.us/ppportal/agenda/webcast.aspx
"Missing Pieces," a devastating citizen review of the 2008 presidential election conducted in Riverside County, CA, will be presented to the Riverside County Board of Supervisors and the press today at 1:30 p.m. by SaveRVote founder and EDA Election Monitoring Coordinator Tom Courbat.
The presentation will be streamed live over the Internet via this URL: http://bosvideo.co.riverside.ca.us/ppportal/agenda/webcast.aspx
The report, prepared by Courbat and the citizen volunteers of the Save R Vote election monitoring organization, documents violations of election law and egregious failures by the Riverside County Registrar of Voters, Barbara Dunmore, and her departmental staff, to secure, track, or even properly count the ballots in the November 2008 presidential election.
Save R Vote volunteers on election day and night photographed evidence of election law violations, logged missing memory cards ("electronic ballot boxes"), and in their subsequent 5-month examination of Riverside County election records, found vote counting and ballot auditing errors in official county election reports numbering in the tens and even hundreds of thousands.
The exhaustively documented Missing Pieces report, presented in its entirety on the Election Defense Alliance website, consists of an executive summary, findings and recommendations, a slideshow of photographic evidence, and a spreadsheet analysis of oversized precincts exceeding legal limits.
SaveRVote concludes its report urging the Riverside County Board of Supervisors to commission an independent auditing firm to conduct a true forensic audit of the county's election canvass process, as well as a computer systems security audit of the county's Sequoia voting system by independent qualified experts. More than 120 citizen volunteers with SaveRVote examined 20,000 election documents in what is believed to be the most comprehensive forensic review ever performed on a single county election system.
_________________________
SOURCE LINKS
SaveRVote Report Fills in Missing Pieces of the 2008 Election
April 14, 2009
"Missing Pieces," a devastating citizen review of the 2008 presidential election conducted in Riverside County, CA, will be presented to the Riverside County Board of Supervisors and the press today at 1:30 p.m. by SaveRVote founder (and EDA Election Monitoring Coordinator) Tom Courbat.
(Proceedings will be streamed live over the Internet via this URL: http://bosvideo.co.riverside.ca.us/ppportal/agenda/webcast.aspx ).
Download Photographic Slideshow
The report, prepared by Courbat and the citizen volunteers of the SaveRVote election monitoring organization, documents violations of election law and egregious failures by the Riverside County Registrar of Voters, Barbara Dunmore, and her departmental staff, to secure, track, or even properly count the ballots in the November 2008 presidential election.
SaveRVote monitors on election day and night photographed evidence of election law violations, logged missing memory cards ("electronic ballot boxes"), and in their subsequent 5-month examination of Riverside County election records, found vote counting and ballot auditing errors in official county election reports numbering in the tens and even hundreds of thousands.
The exhaustively documented Missing Pieces report, presented in its entirety here on the EDA website, consists of an executive summary, findings and recommendations, a slideshow of photographic evidence, and a spreadsheet analysis of oversized precincts exceeding legal limits.
SaveRVote concludes its report urging the Riverside County Board of Supervisors to commission an independent auditing firm to conduct a true forensic audit of the county's election canvass process, as well as a computer systems security audit of the county's Sequoia voting system by independent qualified experts.
More than 120 citizen volunteers with SaveRVote examined 20,000 election documents in what is believed to be the most comprehensive forensic review ever performed on a single county election system.
Save R Vote Report Prompts Audit of Riverside Co. Election Department
Riverside County (CA) Board of Supervisors today ordered
an immediate probe of the Riverside County election department
after recently hearing the SAVE R VOTE report on the June 3, 2008 election deficiencies.
This is a sweeping victory for SAVE R VOTE and the Election Integrity movement and an opportunity to learn much more about the election process and to help us to help others.
My thanks to all the members and supporters of SAVE R VOTE, many who have worked tirelessly for three and a half years. We are finally being heard. This has the potential to be a model for other counties in CA and throughout the U.S.
But then, we need to see how comprehensive and sweeping the audit will be. I suspect there will be a lot more revealed than SAVE R VOTE could have EVER uncovered on our own.
-- Tom Courbat
Executive Director, Save R Vote
EDA Coordinator for Election Monitoring
=========================
NEWS COVERAGE Announcing Audit
California News Service (CANS): A County Launches Election Probe Of Registrar Of Voters Office
LISTEN to CANS radio story
READ CANS news article
The Desert Sun – Former DA Hired to Oversee Audit of County’s Registrar of Voters Office www.mydesert.com/article/20081007/NEWS01/81007040/-1/rss
The Press Enterprise – Former DA to Oversee Vote Audit
http://www.pe.com/localnews/inland/stories/PE_News_Local_S_audit08.3de8db1.html
ABC Ch3 – KESQ-TV – Palm Springs – Election Probe Begins During Early Voting
http://www.kesq.com/global/story.asp?s=9141827
=========================
Download the Save R Vote Report on the CA June 08 Primary Election that Prompted the Audit:
CA News Service Report on the Riverside Audit: Audio download and Print Report
http://www.publicnewsservice.org/index.php?/content/article/6673-1
Read More About the Save R Vote Election Monitoring Project:
http://electiondefensealliance.org/SaveRVote
Save R Vote Poll Watcher's Guide -- an Election Monitoring Training Manual
http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/SaveRVote_Election_Monitoring_Guide_2008.pdf
Citizens for Democracy - Temecula Valley (CA)
Save R Vote
A Project of Citizens for Democracy-Temecula Valley*http://www.savervote.com/
32204 Calle Resaca Dr.
Temecula, CA 92592
951-694-6582
*Note:
Democracy for America-Temecula Valley
changed its name in late 2007 to
Citizens for Democracy-Temecula Valley (CfD-TV)
but remains the same organization.
Resolution of Affiliation with Election Defense Alliance
Whereas the effectiveness of the EDA is directly proportional to the number of organizations affiliated with it, and
Whereas a primary purpose of EDA is to promote and support open, fair, legal, transparent and auditable elections, and
Whereas EDA has requested that as many organizations as possible with concerns about election integrity affiliate themselves with EDA, and
Whereas the goals of Democracy for America-Temecula Valley (DFA-TV) include open, fair, legal, transparent and auditable elections, and
Whereas the DFA-TV has an election integrity project entitled SAVE R VOTE, and
Whereas the goals of the EDA and the goals of DFA-TV are closely aligned,
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT
Democracy for America-Temecula Valley hereby officially affiliates itself with Election Defense Alliance.
Passed this 20th day of September, 2006 in Temecula, CA.*
______________________________
Maxine Ewig -- Coordinator
_______________________________
Jerry Ewig -- Coordinator
_____________________________________________
-- Tom Courbat, Executve Director of SAVE R VOTE
A Brief History of Citizen Election Monitoring in Riverside County, CA
___________________________________________
SAVE R VOTE
Accomplishments to Date, and Goals for November '08
Accomplishments
1. Formed EOP 2. Precinct results posted at precincts
3. Stopped illegal transmissions over Internet
4. Monitored & reported on 5 elections
5. Trained about 100 volunteer observers
6. Required “Paper Ballots Available” posters
7. Motivated BOS to appoint Blue Ribbon group
8. Memory cards & ballots come in front door
9. Brought Hursti from Finland for Blue Ribbon
10. Enhanced chain of custody thru video evidence
11. Video surveillance now in warehouse
12. Stopped ROV entry of paper votes into DREs
13. 1% tally random draw same day as tally
14. Halogen lights now at collection centers
15. Wider voting booths for wheelchairs
Goals for November ‘08
1. Video of any element except voter i.d. 2. HCPB or DIOS scanners in precincts
3. Observers in central tabulator room
4. Full viewing of EVERY election part
5. Criminal background checks - inspectors
6. Exit polls at select locations
Riverside County, CA Election Monitoring by SAVE R VOTE
This project demonstrates the power of organized citizen action in the movement for election integrity. In Riverside County near San Diego, CA, a group of more than 60 citizens involved in the Temecula Valley DFA took steps to observe, record, and report on every aspect of their county's election system and functioning during the June 6, 2006 primary.
The process revealed many alarming problems, all of which are documented in their 13-page report linked below.
Since then, SAVE R VOTE has continued to expand and refine their monitoring procedures, and most recently fielded over 100 volunteers on Super Tuesday 2008 monitoring 50 precincts in sprawling Riverside County, CA.
SAVE R VOTE has compiled and updated their thorough training manual, which you can download from this link: http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/SaveRVote_Election_Monitoring_G...
One of the group's leaders, EDA Election Monitoring Co-coordinator Tom Courbat, spoke at DemFest in San Diego, 2006 (see EDA TV clip linked below).
Tom has some jaw-dropping revelations about the ways Riverside election officials reinterpret the election code at their convenience; for example, making an "administrative decision" to disregard the state law requiring posting of precinct totals, and inventing another administrative fiat resulting in exposure of individual voters' ballot choices.
Unfortunately, such violations breaching election security are common practice, not rare exceptions, and will only continue unless citizens call election administrators to public account.
Please read about this powerful citizen effort and then take a stand for fair elections by systematically monitoring the election procedures in your county. This is a big job-- so form a group! Joining the EDA Election Monitoring Working Group is a good way to learn from others with experience.
Election Monitoring
Description: Until we have secure and verifiable voting systems under public rather than private control, it will be necessary for citizens to closely monitor all phases of the voting process and to conduct independent checks of official election results.
The Election Monitoring Group studies all aspects of the electoral process with emphasis on opportunities for public observation, then organizes and trains volunteers at the precinct level to monitor and record all phases of voter registration, elections, and recounts, before, during and after, covering every form of voting on every voting and counting occasion.
Voting monitors will be trained how and when to file public records requests for every relevant item of election data.
Other volunteers will be trained to conduct "parallel elections" in which voters voluntarily cast unofficial paper ballots that duplicate their official ballots cast on electronic voting systems. The paper ballots afford a basis for statistical comparison with the official vote count, and may provide indication of suspicious official vote results warranting further investigation, including recounts.
The Election Monitoring Group will be involved in the planning and execution of EDA exit polls of selected target precincts and contests around the country, and will arrange for wide and timely publication of the exit poll data in comparison to officially announced voting results.
Co-Coordinators:
Tom Courbat CA
Ramon Sevilla CA
Members:
Judy Alter CA
Albert Zepeda TX
Chuck Garner CA
Chandra Friese CA
Lewis Miller NJ
Ron Watt CA
Sharon Mullen MA
Suzanne Warden CA
Ellen Brodsky FL
Max Prejean PA
Michelle Gabriel CA
Francene Blanchard CA
John Belmonte NY
Mark Hardin CA
Conrad Sieber OR
GO TO THE FORUM (Forum access requires Working Group registration)
