Foreign Contributions and the Supreme's Overdue Decision on Campaign Funding

Michael Collins

The Supreme Court of the United States will soon announce a major decision on our lightly controlled system of campaign funding.  Will it retain some limitations on corporate influence or will the court blow the lid off and cause a perpetual flood of unrestricted corporate contributions?

An additional outcome may surprise and shock the public.

If the Supreme Court overturns the lower court's decision, foreign nationals, corporations, and governments with partial ownership of U.S. corporations will, in effect, end up contributing to and influencing U.S. candidates in federal elections.

The Supreme Court surprised many when it agreed to hear an appeal of a lower court ruling that enforced key sections of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (McCain-Feingold) -- Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission (FEC).

In January 2008, the Federal District Court, District of Columbia upheld an FEC action that barred Citizens United, a right wing nonprofit corporation, from airing an extended attack on Hillary Clinton called Hillary: The Movie. Citizens United is headed by David Bossie, a well known political enemy of the Clintons.  Citizens' lead counsel, Ted Olsen, is an alumnus of the infamous 1990's Clinton bashing Arkansas Project.

The lower court found The Movie violated provisions of McCain-Feingold since some funding for the movie came from the general treasury of Citizens United, rather than a segregated account for political action, e.g., a Political Action Committee (PAC).  The Movie had the sole purpose of convincing viewers that Clinton was unfit for office, making it an example of electioneering communications -- the overriding purpose of which are to advocate for the election or defeat of a candidate.  And The Movie was planned for broadcast both 30 days prior to Democratic primaries and 60 days prior to the general election (had Clinton won the nomination), blackout periods for electioneering communications.

In its appeal, Citizens argued that broadcast restrictions in McCain-Feingold should be overturned to allow unrestricted electioneering communications funded directly from corporate treasuries.

But the appeal also served as a vehicle for lifting virtually any ban on corporate giving.  In 1990, the Supreme Court ruled that corporate funding of campaigns from general funds could be restricted.  The heart of the decision is found here:

"they (the Michigan laws) are justified by a compelling state interest: preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption in the political arena by reducing the threat that huge corporate treasuries, which are amassed with the aid of favorable state laws and have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas, will be used to influence unfairly election outcomesJustice Marshall, Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Comm., 1990

Lead counsel for Citizens United, Ted Olsen, argued that "Austin was wrongly decided and should be overruled."  He counters with another case that claimed,"First Amendment’s protection against governmental abridgment of free expression cannot properly be made to depend on a person’s financial ability to engage in public discussion.”  Ted Olsen, Merits Brief, p. 30, Sept. 9

This challenge to the Austin decision is the true threat within the Trojan horse argument over broadcast restrictions on political hit pieces.  The goal of this appeal is nothing less than the legal treatment of corporations as the equal of individual citizens and lesser groups in the political process resulting in an even greater advantage for corporations to control elections.

Sequoia Announces Open-Source, Open-Architecture "Frontier Election System"

Source:  http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Sequoia-Voting-Systems-bw-1072912684.html/...

* Press Release
* Source: Sequoia Voting Systems
* On 8:00 am EDT, Tuesday October 27, 2009
____________________________________

Sequoia Voting Systems Announces the First Transparent Election System with Fully Disclosed, Freely Available Source Code and Open Architecture Developed to Meet Federal Voting System Guidelines


Sequoia’s Frontier Election System Source Code Will Be Available for Public Download Through the Company’s Website Beginning November 2009

System Slated to Enter the Election Assistance Commission’s Federal Voting System Certification Program in Mid-2010  

DENVER--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Today, Sequoia Voting Systems officially introduced its latest revolutionary new offering – the Frontier Election Systemtm – the first transparent end-to-end election system including precinct and central count digital optical scan tabulators, robust election management and ballot preparation system, and a tally, tabulation, and reporting applications based on an open architecture with publicly disclosed source code developed specifically to meet current and future iterations of the federal Voting System Guidelines.

“Security through obfuscation and secrecy is not security,”
said Eric D. Coomer, PhD, Vice President of Research and Product Development at Sequoia Voting Systems. “Fully disclosed source code is the path to true transparency and confidence in the voting process for all involved. Sequoia is proud to be the leader in providing the first publicly disclosed source code for a complete end-to-end election system from a leading supplier of voting systems and software. Sequoia’s Frontier Election System has been designed to comply with all the current Election Assistance Commission’s Voluntary Voting System Guidelines.”

Frontier is a comprehensive election system centered around digital scan Optical Mark Recognition (OMR) tabulators with patent-pending triple-relatable-records, open data formats, and publicly disclosed source code.

Sequoia’s Frontier Election System has been in active development for 18 months and has been demonstrated at various state, national, and international election conferences over the past 12 months to positive feedback from election officials and all facets of the election community. The company expects the system to enter the federal Voting System Certification Program during the first half of 2010.

“Frontier is a new system developed from the ground up with the full intention of releasing all of the source code to any member of the public who wishes to download it - from computer scientists and election officials to students, security experts and the voting public,” said Dr. Coomer. “While we are extremely confident in the quality of the software that our skilled team has developed, no software is perfect. Transparency and collaborative review will yield the most robust and secure product with the highest voter confidence.”

To this end, Sequoia will begin releasing fully functioning modules of Frontier’s systems with all source code on the company’s website at www.sequoiavote.com beginning in mid-November, 2009.

Seeing Through Sequoia's Transparent Election System

Staying Focused on the Real Solutions


10.27.09

Today's announcement of the Sequoia Frontier open-source E-voting system is a significant fork in the trail to election integrity, but it would be a mistake to confuse this half-way mark for our destination.

I had thought ES&S would be first to market with an all-open-source E-voting system. No doubt, they're not far behind. The dwindling number of E-voting vendors still in business are now obliged to follow suit or be expunged from the marketplace, and for that we should be glad.

Although Sequoia's press release is essentially good news, the operative reality is that between now and sometime after 2012 when the open-source voting system announced today is certified for use,  there will be another federal election  conducted with the same batch of secretly programmed black boxes that hijacked the U.S. government in 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006, and skewed the 2008 primaries, and whose predecessors, more likely than not, have been manipulating elections since shortly after their introduction in 1965.

Even if it weren't so dangerous, misapplied technology would still be an unnecessary distraction from the philosophical and practical issues that are properly the core issues of electoral democracy.

It's up to the EI movement to explain to the voting public, that even though open-source code, open data schema, and human-readable data formats are undeniably improvements over the secret, closed voting software currently in use,  these features do not and can not address these fundamental civil rights principles  on which democracy depends:

1. All aspects of the electoral process (except the casting of secret ballots) should be transparently observable and accountable to the citizenry,  without the intermediation of secret actors or unobservable software processes.

2. Public elections should be a wholly public exercise, free of dependence on for-profit corporations or any technological priesthood.

Even as the E-voting industry as a whole follows Sequoia in a transition to open-source platforms, the public will remain  dependent on private contractors, costly equipment, expensive upgrades, and even more expensive maintenance and service fees in perpetuity, so long as the institution of software-mediated voting is allowed to supplant the appropriately low-tech, citizen-mediated election model based on voter-marked paper ballots hand-counted in the precincts on election night, by the citizens themselves.

EDA Opens Sequoia Voting System Source Code to Public Exam

10.20.09

Election Defense Alliance Opens Public Review of Sequoia Voting System Source Code

By Jim March

Election Defense Alliance, a nonprofit organized to review and improve voting system technology and operations, has come into possession of thousands of lines of software written by Sequoia Voting Systems as part of a public records response from Riverside County, California. (Sequoia is the third-largest E-voting vendor in the nation, whose secret proprietary software counts the votes for approximately 17% of the U.S. electorate).

Because the files were obtained from a government agency in an above-board fashion, for the first time the analysis process and actual code can be released to the public and studied in a public and transparent fashion.

The entire analysis project and associated files to study are available at a new wiki:
http://studysequoia.wikispaces.com/

How You Can Help Shine Light on Sequoia

Previous voting system software analysis has been in secret, either due to non-disclosure agreements, court ordered secrecy or the review of code from legally questionable sources.

In this case, no such restrictions exist and the analysis process will be open, online and public as is proper when looking at the engine of our democratic process. “What was done in the dark will be brought to the light” as Johnny Cash put it.

The software was buried inside of data files used to store the tabulation of votes from the November 2008 general election. This practice of blending data and software has been long suspected and even alluded to in documents from Sequoia; however, the details had been obscured under “trade secrets” claims. Sequoia asserted and exercised an alleged “right” to strip the data files of anything proprietary before Riverside County turned the files over to EDA.

Although Sequoia attempted to redact their proprietary code from the election database files, they failed to strip out thousands of lines of software buried in the electon data.

The software appears to control the logical flow of the election, and is detailed enough to name the authors and dates of modifications along with what the code is actually doing to our votes. Some of it might actually have been stripped out, but we strongly suspect not due to the volume of code present.

EDA is expressing concern that such human-readable and “field modifiable” software has been banned by the federal rulebook on voting system design and testing.

Pending a detailed review, we expect to do a legal analysis of the structure of the Sequoia system thus revealed and file complaints with the proper state and federal authorities.

EDA is concerned about other known cases of failure in the certification of voting systems in which legally flawed products were allowed into the market, a trend noticed recently by NIST (National Institute of Science and Technology) in a formal letter throwing one of the authorized test labs out of the voting system test business.

Of the four labs ever credentialed for voting system testing, three have at various times been thrown out for misconduct or incompetence, only to be let back in under “restrictions.”

We believe that the source code analysis from Sequoia will document yet another such case of test lab failure along with a failure at Sequoia.

================

Shine Light on Sequoia


This Sequoia code review is one part of a larger EDA Public Record Election Project (PREP), based on public records freedom of information law. We have convened an expert group of investigators and are filing public records requests for voting system database records in a number of counties.

If you can lend your software programming skills to the Sequoia code analysis, we invite your participation at the SequoiaStudy wiki.

If you'd like to research and develop election integrity legal tactics for election code enforcement and protection of citizen observer rights, please join the EDA Legal Working Group. (You don't have to be an attorney, but if you know any, invite them!).

If you can contribute financially, we need tax-deductible donations for court and attorney fees and to pay a living wage to our irreplaceable investigators who have long been working without pay, on your behalf, for election integrity.

You can designate your designations for the Public Record Election Project at the EDA donation page.
Look for the donation earmark dropdown box, located below the donation premium offers, as shown in this screenshot:

[Illustration]
Donation selection box
Your contributions are fully tax-deductible and will be securely transmitted by the Groundspring/DonateNow donation service.
Election Defense Alliance is a program of International Humanities Center, a nonprofit organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the IRS Code.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION:
Read about (and join) the Sequoia code study at http://studysequoia.wikispaces.com/

Project technical lead: 
Jim March

EDA general information:
Dan Ashby 
EDA Director
Toll free: 877.375.3930


A Censored Headline and Why It Matters

A Censored Headline and Why It Matters:

German High Court Outlaws Electronic Voting

Justices of the German Federal Constitutional Court.  Image

Michael Collins

(DailyCensored.Com)  The justices above are clearly the most rational group of high level functionaries in the industrialized world.  They did what no other court would do in Europe or the United States.  They effectively outlawed electronic voting.  On March 3, 2009, the German Federal Constitutional Court declared that the electronic voting machines used in the 2005 Bundestag elections for the German national parliament were outside of the bounds of the German Constitution.

They reasoned that electronic voting is not verifiable because citizen votes are counted in secret.  It  obscured a technology inaccessible to all but a very few initiates.  Most importantly, the German high court noted, electronic voting machines don't allow citizens to "reliably examine, when the vote is cast, whether the vote has been recorded in an unadulterated manner" Mar. 3, 2009.

The written opinion effectively bars electronic voting in future elections based on the complexity of voting machines and the inability of voters to watch their vote being counted.  This raises the bar of acceptability well above the meaningless solutions offered by "paper trails" for touch screen voting or the so-called "paper ballots" for computerized optical scan voting machines, the most popular form of voting in the United States.

Germany's 2009 Bundestag elections were conducted with hand counted paper ballots.

Have you heard that one of the world's leading economic powers, the fourth largest economy in the world, banned electronic voting;  said it was undemocratic?  Given the multitude of problems encountered in the U.S. and the number of questionable election results, wouldn't it make sense that when Germany banned electronic voting and replaced it with paper ballots, there would be at least a days worth of national coverage in the United States?

Nothing like that occurred.  The Associated Press (Times of India) story on the verdict danced around the periphery of the world media market with coverage in Turkey, India, Australia, and Ireland.  But there were no major media takers for the AP story in the United States.

There was every reason to carry the story.  In a 2006 Zogby poll, 92% of the 1028 registered voters surveyed said they agreed with this statement:

Citizens have the right to view and obtain information about how election officials count votes - 92% agreeNew Zogby Poll On Electronic Voting Attitudes  Aug. 21, 2006

That's exactly the proposition that the German court upheld.  Surely there was an audience for the German decision but there was hardly a word from corporate media.

Why did this happen?

VoterGA Considering U.S. Supreme Court Appeal

VoterGA, the Georgia election integrity coalition that carried a landmark, constitution-based challenge to computerized voting through the Georgia court system, only to have the Georgia Supreme Court dismiss the case in disregard of undisputed points of evidence, has issued the following public letter to outline case issues and prospects, and to gauge public support, as they consider whether to file an appeal with the U.S. Supreme Court. VoterGA is seeking pledges of financial commitment to see this case through. Initiating the appeal will cost $20,000 to $25,000.

U.S. Supreme Court Appeal Considerations

VoterGA Supporters,

We now are at the most significant crossroads in the history of our landmark voting rights case.  We must quickly make a decision whether or not to appeal the Constitutional arguments of the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. I have tried to assemble the facts with as little bias as possible for your consideration. Some major areas for your consideration are:

    ·    The Georgia Supreme Court Ruling
    ·    The Basis for a U.S. Supreme Court Appeal
    ·    Appeal Costs
    ·    Appeal Benefits
    ·    Appeal Risks
    ·    Other Federal Alternatives
GA Supreme Court Ruling:
In considering whether or not to appeal, it is important to have an understanding of the Georgia Supreme Court decision. The decision had no dissenters and was slightly more substantial than the state superior court ruling but it still had the same basic flaws:

    ·    The court denied our normal right to a trial on all 13 counts of the lawsuit although we factually disputed 41 assertions made to the court by the Attorney General’s office and cited 17 lower court conclusions that had no basis in case evidence;

    ·    The court defied all U.S. Supreme Court case law for ballot counting and recounting by refusing to apply strict scrutiny to our fundamental right of voting;

    ·    The court instead applied a minimal standard of scrutiny and ruled that the former Secretary had a rational basis for implementing the machines in spite of the evidence we presented showing:

    a.    The machines do not have an independent audit trail of each vote cast as the law required. That law was in effect when the machines were procured, evaluated, allegedly certified and purchased;

    b.    The office of the Secretary of State was warned in advance of the need for voter verification, recount retention and audit controls by numerous governmental and public sources including a State Senate Committee, the head of Fulton County Elections and the 21st Century Voting Commission Report;

    c.    There was no compelling need for the Secretary to commit $54 million of taxpayer funds to replace many auditable voting machines with a statewide implementation of voting machines that cannot be properly audited.

    ·     The opinion written by Justice George Carley was cleverly worded to ignore nearly every shred of evidence that we presented, just as the lower court order did.

    ·    The opinion made conclusions with no basis in fact such as: “However, the undisputed evidence shows that the touch screen machines accurately record each vote when they are properly operated.” No such evidence was ever submitted in the case and it is technically impossible to produce the evidence without an independent audit trail.

    ·    The opinion made unsubstantiated conclusions that were in direct conflict with the facts in the case record such as:  “…uncontroverted evidence shows that the Secretary of State has properly certified the DRE voting system pursuant to O.C.G.A. 21-2-379-2.” That code section requires the Secretary of State to produce a “report."  We explained that the certification reports were never produced for the current equipment. Only certificates were provided for them.

In addition, no reports or certificates of any kind were produced for machines used in the 2001-2002 time period. Thus it is impossible for the evidence to be uncontroverted. Furthermore, we showed that the tabulation servers can never be certified according to federal guidelines, as secretary of state policy requires, because the servers cannot prevent fraudulent vote manipulation as the guidelines require.

 In summary, we did everything we needed to do to win this case in the Georgia Supreme Court:

·    Our briefs clearly presented the evidence and case law while refuting all material assertions made by the opposition;
·    Walker did what we believed to be a very good job at the GA Supreme Court oral arguments;
·    Todd followed up with a letter at the request of the Court that clearly applied all U.S. Supreme Court case law to our case and refuted the exact case law presented by the opposition because it was unrelated to ballot counting and recounting.

The court had everything it needed to make a decision based on the merits of the case but chose to ignore those merits. Since the case law and evidence we presented was never refuted by either court, I can only assume that the courts made a biased decision to protect state interests or those involved.

Why German High Court Ruled E-Voting Unconstitutional

Originally published at OpEdNews
October 15, 2009

E-Voting Ruled Unconstitutional in Germany: An Interview with Dr. Ulrich Wiesner

Dr. Wiesner Filed a Lawsuit in Germany Claiming E-Voting Unconstitutional, and Won

By Kathleen Wynne

The very word secrecy is repugnant in a free and open society;
and we are as a people inherently and historically opposed to secret societies,
to secret oaths and to secret proceedings.
 
-- John F. Kennedy

No words were ever more relevant than these are when it comes to our elections and the counting of our votes. When did secrecy take precedence over transparency in the counting of our votes in America through the use of electronic voting systems and, more importantly, why? What the majority of Americans have NOT heard about, but most election reform advocates are already aware of, is the German Constitutional Court's recent decision to ban electronic voting in Germany by ruling it “unconstitutional.”

Let's think about this for a minute. By using a Constitution, similar to our own, and which had to be approved of by the U.S. after World War II, Germany has, through its High Court, determined that computerized, secret vote counting does not subscribe to the democratic standards of their country! Yet, still here in America, 95% of us are using some sort of computerized voting system to cast and/or count our ballots---completely government sanctioned, corporate controlled, using software protected from public scrutiny by trade secret laws. NO ONE can guarantee even a single voter that their vote is being counted as cast. What's wrong with this picture?

It is, indeed, encouraging that support is growing for a return to public hand-counts here in the U.S. and, as a result, we may someday soon reach a “critical mass” of support largeenough to put pressure on our courts to also recognize this fundamental right and “persuade” them to rule in a similar fashion as the German Court. When that day comes, we will be forever indebted to our German counterparts.

Obviously, the significance of the German Court's ruling is not only a sea change in how elections will be administered in Germany , which are now to be done by properly administered public hand-counts, but I see it as a powerful new tool that can be used by election reform advocates in achieving similar reform in the U.S.

Bev Harris, Founder of Black Box Voting.org, and Paul Lehto, an attorney from Washington State and election reform advocate, have both written excellent articles analyzing the Court's decision to ban electronic voting and are must reads.

Harris' article, Let's Get Off The Hampster Wheel, was featured in Democracy For New Hampshire (as well as on other websites). Lehto's article, Germany Bans Computerized Voting, Will Hand Count in 2009, was featured in OpEdNews (as well as on other websites).

Georgia Supreme Court Rejects Challenge to DRE Machines

Source: AJC
http://www.ajc.com/news/georgia-politics-elections/court-upholds-touchscreen-voting-148666.html
Court Upholds Touchscreen Voting

By BILL RANKIN
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution    10:51 a.m. Monday, September 28, 2009

The Georgia Supreme Court on Monday upheld the use of touch-screen voting, rejecting claims the machines violate the right to vote.
GA-DRE In a unanimous ruling, the court turned back a challenge by a group of citizens who filed suit three years ago in Fulton County Superior Court. A judge had previously dismissed the suit, ruling in favor of state officials.

The group claimed their fundamental right to vote is harmed because the recording, counting and retention of their votes, unlike paper ballots, are not being properly protected, which can prevent fraudulent manipulation of the results.

But the state high court, in a ruling written by Justice George Carley, found the use of touchscreen voting systems does not severely restrict the right to vote. 

Download the Court Ruling
 
 
photocredit: eyspahn
Georgia's Supreme Court upheld a lower court ruling
affirming state's right to use electronic voting machines

VoterGA Response to Today's Ruling

VoterGa Supporters,

The Georgia Supreme Court ruled today that our current form of un-auditable voting does not infringe upon the fundamental right to vote and to have our vote counted. This ruling essentially gives the state a license to pretend to conduct elections.

Not one of the 100+ million votes that have been cast on the machines since 2002 can be audited for accuracy and correctness of vote recording. Georgia  law in 2001 and 2002 required that any new machines have an independent audit trail of each vote cast.

The state’s own witnesses have acknowledged that the specific type of electronic voting machines we purchased and use do not have such an independent audit trail. The machines can only internally recreate selections that may or may not have been shown to voter. Without an independent audit trail, it is impossible to determine whether the actual ballots cast on Election Day were recorded correctly. Auditable electronic voting machines were available for purchase in 2002 as they are today.

When one or two officials can commit the state of Georgia to a $ 54 million purchase of voting equipment that was illegal at the moment of purchase, there must be some mechanism of accountability. Otherwise, public officials can operate above the law.

In this particular case, the previous boss of former Secretary of State Cox, who signed the purchase agreement, was the lobbyist for Diebold, the voting machine vendor. When the people have no recourse even for a standard trial of evidence , they become slaves to their government rather than the masters of it.

The Georgia Supreme Court also upheld the remarkable lower court decision that no trial is warranted on any count of the 13-count legal suit. The Georgia Supreme Court declined to overturn that lower court decision in spite of 17 disputes of facts cited in lower court conclusions and 41 disputes of facts cited against claims made by the state to Georgia Supreme Court.

Several of these disputes involved claims that were directly contradicted by the evidence in the record and clearly cited. Summary judgment dismissals, such as the one that the Georgia Supreme Court has just upheld, are rare in this type of case because standard procedures for any court in America require the court to hear the evidence in order to determine the facts before reaching a conclusion.

Now that the state has proven not to  be unable to rule against itself on any count, some Constitutional parts of the case could be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. While offering a more substantive decision than the lower court, the Georgia Supreme Court did not cite U.S. Supreme Court rulings related to ballot counting and recounting to corroborate its decision. All such U.S. Supreme Court rulings confirm that ballot counting and recounting requires strict scrutiny.

On the contrary, the Georgia Supreme Court decided that the state need only have a rational basis for implementing the voting systems. Even so, there is no rational basis for implementing a voting system that violates the law.

--Garland Favorito
www.voterga.org

P.S. I will send a follow-up e-mail on possible  next steps once we have had time to analyze the decision.

Download the Court Ruling

.

NJ Federal Court TRO Hearing on ESS-Premier Merger

Source: BLT, The Blog of Legal Times
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/09/judge-to-consider-blocking-mer...

Judge to Consider Blocking Merger of Two Voting Machine Makers

September 28, 2009

Tomorrow morning, a New Jersey federal judge will hold a hearing to decide whether to block the merger of the nation's two largest vote counting companies.

Jonathan Rubin, a Washington-based Patton Boggs partner who represents Hart InterCivic Inc., a smaller voting-machine maker, has asked Judge Robert Kugler of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey to issue a temporary restraining order, alleging that the merger of the voting division of Ohio-based Diebold and Election Systems & Software poses a "threat of irreparable harm" to voters.

The combination of the two voting-machine giants would give ES&S control of election systems used in nearly 70 percent of the country's voting precincts.

Rubin said that jurisdictions across the country, which select voting machines based on competitive bids, would have little choice but to use the systems offered by ES&S if the acquisition goes through.
“As our economist says, we’re not talking about shampoo. These companies are in the business of something that is essential to the function of democracy,” Rubin said.

Rubin said his client is seeking to have ES&S divest Diebold Inc.'s Premier Election Solutions, the company’s voting division, but would also accept having the judge order ES&S to keep Premier Election Solutions as a separate, standalone company.

The merger has also drawn the attention of Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.), who has asked the Justice Department to review the acquisition.

A spokesman for ES&S did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
===============
Posted by Jeff Jeffrey on September 28, 2009 at 04:13 PM

'Return-Oriented Programming" Exploit Foils Voting Machine Defenses

Source:  EurekAlert! 
Public release date: 10-Aug-2009
Contact: Daniel Kane
dbkane@ucsd.edu
858-534-3262
University of California - San Diego

Computer Scientists Take Over Electronic Voting Machine
with New Programming Technique

Voting machines must remain secure throughout their entire service lifetime, but this new study demonstrates that return-oriented programming can be used to execute vote-stealing computations by taking control of a voting machine designed to prevent code injection.

'The computer scientists showed that an attacker
would need just a few minutes of access to the machine
the night before the election
in order to take it over and steal votes the following day'


http://video.google.com/videosearch?q=Hovav+Shacham&hl=en&emb=0#

Computer scientists led by Hovav Shacham, a UC San Diego professor, hacked an electronic voting machine and stole votes using a malicious programming approach that  had not been invented when the voting machine was designed. The team of scientists from University of California, San Diego, the University of Michigan, and Princeton University employed “return-oriented programming” to force a Sequoia AVC Advantage electronic voting machine to turn against itself and steal votes.
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