Printer-friendly versionRiverside County
Riverside Elections Department Heeds SaveRVote for Big Improvements
But County Gets Negative Marks for Pushing DREs
Coverage from Riverside Press Enterprise
Voter Advocacy Group Praises Special Election
By DUANE W. GANG
The Press-Enterprise Wednesday, May 20, 2009
A watchdog group critical of how Riverside County has handled past elections said Wednesday that Tuesday's special election vote went smoothly with added accountability.
Temecula-based Save R Vote monitored Tuesday's election and praised Registrar Barbara Dunmore for putting a series of safeguards in place to maintain the integrity of cast ballots.
"This was the most improved, smoothest election that I have seen in seven elections," said Tom Courbat, the group's founder.
The safeguards came from an audit led by former district attorney Grover Trask.
The measures include adding a redesigned ballot statement that precinct workers fill out to account for ballots and signatures, adding a form at ballot collection centers for workers to report if there is something wrong with ballot boxes and installing two computer monitors at the registrar's headquarters for observers to monitor ballot counting.
"This proves they could do it in a big election. It didn't result in that much additional work," Courbat said. "It gives a higher degree of accountability."
Dunmore said Wednesday that the light turnout made the election a perfect time to unveil the new measures.
"We wanted to put them in place as quick as possible," she said. "We worked very hard on that."
Dunmore said she is pleased to hear that Save R Vote found the improvements well executed.
Still, the group remains critical of Riverside County for what it sees as the over use of electronic touch-screen voting machines.
"There's an agenda here, to prove people like electronic voting when given the choice.
It is not about liking. People like to drive 120 on the freeway, but it is not safe.
You cannot adequately secure these machines."
Secretary of State Debra Bowen decertified the use of touch-screen voting machines in 2007, citing security vulnerabilities. She then set conditions for their limited use.
In Tuesday's election, poll workers asked voters whether they wanted to use a paper ballot or an electronic machine.
"There's an agenda here, and the agenda here is to prove people like electronic voting when given the choice. It is not about liking," Courbat said. "People like to drive 120 on the freeway, but it is not safe. You cannot adequately secure these machines."
Courbat criticized the county for not informing voters at polling sites that there have been issues surrounding the machines.
Dunmore said her office must offer voters the choice. She said poll workers can't provide a history of the machines to each voter, and if voters have questions, they can contact her office. The use of electronic voting machines on Tuesday complied with election rules, she said.
"We did see precincts where there were more votes cast on the electronic voting unit than on paper ballots," Dunmore said. "That is a choice made by the voter." On Tuesday, there were 28,148 votes cast on electronic machines, about 41 percent of the ballots cast a precincts, Dunmore said.
Riverside County had at least three precincts, two in Corona and one in Murrieta, where all the votes were cast on the electronic machines, Dunmore said. Fifty-seven precincts didn't have any votes cast on electronic machines.
Reach Duane W. Gang at 951-368-9547 or dgang@PE.com
Election Monitoring Report, Riverside County CA, May 19 2009
The following photos were taken on the night of the May 19, 2009 special election in Riverside County by Tom Courbat, as he made his rounds observing election procedures and conditions.
This photo guide to election monitoring explains the purpose of each election document or item pictured, commenting on recent improvements in election procedure, contrasted to the lax practices of the past, and pointing out where problems still persist.
Tom and the SAVE R VOTE group he founded have been thoroughly monitoring Riverside County elections for the past four years. Their repeated reports documenting serious breaks in the Riverside election system finally move the county Board of Supervisors to commission a countywide elections audit. Tom served as citizen advisor to the accounting firm hired to carry out the $300,000 review, which resulted in the Riverside County Elections Department finally implementing many of the procedural safeguards SAVE R VOTE had been advocating for years.
In the May 19th election, Tom was pleased to find Riverside's election procedures vastly improved as a result of the new policies adopted following the recommendations of the election auditing consultant and SAVE R VOTE.
Tom notes: "Many documents now contain the date and type of election on every page for the first time, as recommended by SAVE R VOTE (SRV). Previously, when pages were removed from a document for copying or scanning, there was no way to categorically state the page was from a specific election on a specific date."
Ballot Statement Instruction Sheet and Ballot Statement (left and right respectively).
Vastly improved from prior versions. The Ballot Statement is an official form required to be accurately completed by election workers following the close of polls and prior to sending all voting materials to collection centers. This form accounts for all regular and provisional paper ballots – blanks received, ballots spoiled, voted ballots, and unused ballots. It also accounts for all regular and provisional electronic ballots cast. SAVE R VOTE (SRV) had recommended numbering each line and constructing instructions accordingly. This was accomplished for the first time in the May 2009 Election.
HOWEVER, this form omits critical information, previously recorded in prior elections until a procedural change starting with the November 2008 election. The information that should be recorded on this form, but that is now missing, would compare information from the Voter Roster about how each voter cast their ballot, with the numbers of each type of ballot cast: electronic, electronic provisional, paper, or paper provisional. Without this comparison, there is no way to confirm that the voters who signed the roster as having cast a provisional electronic ballot, for example, actually did cast an electronic provisional ballot. The signature counts from the Voter Roster are simply “grossed up” to the total number of ballots cast, with no reference to the numbers of each type of ballot cast. So, for example, if more people voted on paper than signed up to do so, and fewer voted electronically than signed up to do so, the numbers could “balance” (one error offsets the other) but the discrepancy will not be noted, investigated, or reconciled. This is a step backwards. 
Left side is the Certificate of Completion to be signed by all precinct board members and in the center is a small box to enter the number of voters who voted in that precinct. No changes were made to this form. Right side is a new Inspector’s Election Checklist for the precinct captain (inspector) to use to make sure all functions are performed. This is a great improvement and appears to be instituted by the ROV independently. 
Precinct Posting Form. Compliance with completion and posting of this form in past elections had been very poor. This form reports critical information that enables citizens to check against central tabulator reports of ballots cast per precinct. The change for the May 19, 2009 Special Election was the addition of printed instructions on the form stating where/how to post the form and where the second copy is to go. Equally important was the insertion of letters (i.e. K, T, C & D) referring to the boxes on the Ballot Statement where the information is to be taken from. For the November 2008 Election, a color-coded sample was designed, as can be seen here. Although this sample of how to complete a precinct posting form seems clear enough, compliance in the November 2008 Election was still very poor. SRV believes the lettering of the boxes in May 2009 as recommended by SRV made the biggest difference by making it explicit where
information was to be taken from.
Illustration and instructions on how to complete the Voting Equipment Security Log. Another excellent improvement, this one recommended by the Management Review firm of Best, Best & Krieger (BB&K). The use of lettering lines and boxes, recommended by SRV, makes it much easier to follow the instructions. The form on the right side of the photo contains several checkmarks, indicating the seal may have been inspected at various points during Election Day. There should be some instructions or explanation for the multiple check marks and perhaps signing with initials should be required.
The electronic Results Cartridge (memory card) is placed in an unsealed clear plastic pouch and placed in the Voted Ballot carton along with the voted ballots and the carbon copy of the Ballot Statement. The Voted Ballot Carton is then sealed for delivery to the central counting location.
Save R Vote Report Rips Riverside County for Mishandling 2008 Election
PRESS RELEASE
Contact
Tom Courbat, Founder, SAVE R VOTE
Cell: 951-536-6091
__________________________________
Save R Vote Delivers Critical Review of Riverside County Election Procedures
Report details election law violations, miscounts, security breaches in 2008 election
WHERE: Riverside County Board of Supervisors chambers, 4080 Lemon Street, Riverside, CA
WHEN: Tuesday April 14, 1:30 p.m. Live Video at 1:30: http://bosvideo.co.riverside.ca.us/ppportal/agenda/webcast.aspx
"Missing Pieces," a devastating citizen review of the 2008 presidential election conducted in Riverside County, CA, will be presented to the Riverside County Board of Supervisors and the press today at 1:30 p.m. by SaveRVote founder and EDA Election Monitoring Coordinator Tom Courbat.
The presentation will be streamed live over the Internet via this URL: http://bosvideo.co.riverside.ca.us/ppportal/agenda/webcast.aspx
The report, prepared by Courbat and the citizen volunteers of the Save R Vote election monitoring organization, documents violations of election law and egregious failures by the Riverside County Registrar of Voters, Barbara Dunmore, and her departmental staff, to secure, track, or even properly count the ballots in the November 2008 presidential election.
Save R Vote volunteers on election day and night photographed evidence of election law violations, logged missing memory cards ("electronic ballot boxes"), and in their subsequent 5-month examination of Riverside County election records, found vote counting and ballot auditing errors in official county election reports numbering in the tens and even hundreds of thousands.
The exhaustively documented Missing Pieces report, presented in its entirety on the Election Defense Alliance website, consists of an executive summary, findings and recommendations, a slideshow of photographic evidence, and a spreadsheet analysis of oversized precincts exceeding legal limits.
SaveRVote concludes its report urging the Riverside County Board of Supervisors to commission an independent auditing firm to conduct a true forensic audit of the county's election canvass process, as well as a computer systems security audit of the county's Sequoia voting system by independent qualified experts. More than 120 citizen volunteers with SaveRVote examined 20,000 election documents in what is believed to be the most comprehensive forensic review ever performed on a single county election system.
_________________________
SOURCE LINKS
SaveRVote Report Fills in Missing Pieces of the 2008 Election
April 14, 2009
"Missing Pieces," a devastating citizen review of the 2008 presidential election conducted in Riverside County, CA, will be presented to the Riverside County Board of Supervisors and the press today at 1:30 p.m. by SaveRVote founder (and EDA Election Monitoring Coordinator) Tom Courbat.
(Proceedings will be streamed live over the Internet via this URL: http://bosvideo.co.riverside.ca.us/ppportal/agenda/webcast.aspx ).
Download Photographic Slideshow
The report, prepared by Courbat and the citizen volunteers of the SaveRVote election monitoring organization, documents violations of election law and egregious failures by the Riverside County Registrar of Voters, Barbara Dunmore, and her departmental staff, to secure, track, or even properly count the ballots in the November 2008 presidential election.
SaveRVote monitors on election day and night photographed evidence of election law violations, logged missing memory cards ("electronic ballot boxes"), and in their subsequent 5-month examination of Riverside County election records, found vote counting and ballot auditing errors in official county election reports numbering in the tens and even hundreds of thousands.
The exhaustively documented Missing Pieces report, presented in its entirety here on the EDA website, consists of an executive summary, findings and recommendations, a slideshow of photographic evidence, and a spreadsheet analysis of oversized precincts exceeding legal limits.
SaveRVote concludes its report urging the Riverside County Board of Supervisors to commission an independent auditing firm to conduct a true forensic audit of the county's election canvass process, as well as a computer systems security audit of the county's Sequoia voting system by independent qualified experts.
More than 120 citizen volunteers with SaveRVote examined 20,000 election documents in what is believed to be the most comprehensive forensic review ever performed on a single county election system.
Save R Vote Report Prompts Audit of Riverside Co. Election Department
Riverside County (CA) Board of Supervisors today ordered
an immediate probe of the Riverside County election department
after recently hearing the SAVE R VOTE report on the June 3, 2008 election deficiencies.
This is a sweeping victory for SAVE R VOTE and the Election Integrity movement and an opportunity to learn much more about the election process and to help us to help others.
My thanks to all the members and supporters of SAVE R VOTE, many who have worked tirelessly for three and a half years. We are finally being heard. This has the potential to be a model for other counties in CA and throughout the U.S.
But then, we need to see how comprehensive and sweeping the audit will be. I suspect there will be a lot more revealed than SAVE R VOTE could have EVER uncovered on our own.
-- Tom Courbat
Executive Director, Save R Vote
EDA Coordinator for Election Monitoring
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NEWS COVERAGE Announcing Audit
California News Service (CANS): A County Launches Election Probe Of Registrar Of Voters Office
LISTEN to CANS radio story
READ CANS news article
The Desert Sun – Former DA Hired to Oversee Audit of County’s Registrar of Voters Office www.mydesert.com/article/20081007/NEWS01/81007040/-1/rss
The Press Enterprise – Former DA to Oversee Vote Audit
http://www.pe.com/localnews/inland/stories/PE_News_Local_S_audit08.3de8db1.html
ABC Ch3 – KESQ-TV – Palm Springs – Election Probe Begins During Early Voting
http://www.kesq.com/global/story.asp?s=9141827
=========================
Download the Save R Vote Report on the CA June 08 Primary Election that Prompted the Audit:
CA News Service Report on the Riverside Audit: Audio download and Print Report
http://www.publicnewsservice.org/index.php?/content/article/6673-1
Read More About the Save R Vote Election Monitoring Project:
http://electiondefensealliance.org/SaveRVote
Save R Vote Poll Watcher's Guide -- an Election Monitoring Training Manual
http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/SaveRVote_Election_Monitoring_Guide_2008.pdf
EDA Serves Public Records Lawsuit on Riverside County, CA
County Responses to Election Records Requests "Not Responsive, Evasive, and Unusable"
Download EDA Complaint (PDF)
After repeated attempts to obtain election records through public records procedures were denied and evaded by the Riverside County elections department, Election Defense Alliance has filed a lawsuit in Riverside County, CA, to compel the county's registrar of voters and election department to produce all public records used to compile the officially reported voting results for the November 2008 general election.
These laws and requirements include provisions guaranteeing the public access to observe election processes and verify election results.
Members of the EDA PREP team collectively have experience monitoring elections and filing records requests in Riverside, Santa Cruz, and Monterey counties in California, and Pima and Maricopa counties in Arizona.
Lawsuit Claims and Relief Sought
EDA Complaint is Served on Riverside County Elections Department
Riverside election integrity activist Paul Jacobs accompanied Tom Courbat
to the Riverside County Elections Department on Dec. 12, 2009
to serve the summons forthe EDA lawsuit, Case No. RIC-541239.
__ requiring the payment of fees not permitted by law;
_ failing in their mandatory duties to respond to public information requests;
__ abusing their official discretion, by failing to respond properly to public information requests;
__ failing to provide requested records in useful form; and by
__ denying requests for public records without justification.
__ deliver all records responsive to the EDA CPRA requests
__ comply with all such election-related records requests by citizens in the future
__ pay EDA reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of the suit pursuant to Government Code Section 6259, the Code
of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, and other relevant statutes; and
__ such other and further relief as the court deems just and proper.
Below are a listing and description of election records EDA requested in the initial CPRA letter of April 24, 2009, and descriptions of the Riverside elections department response to each request.
EDA Opens Sequoia Voting System Source Code to Public Exam
Election Defense Alliance Opens Public Review of Sequoia Voting System Source Code
By Jim MarchElection Defense Alliance, a nonprofit organized to review and improve voting system technology and operations, has come into possession of thousands of lines of software written by Sequoia Voting Systems as part of a public records response from Riverside County, California. (Sequoia is the third-largest E-voting vendor in the nation, whose secret proprietary software counts the votes for approximately 17% of the U.S. electorate).
Because the files were obtained from a government agency in an above-board fashion, for the first time the analysis process and actual code can be released to the public and studied in a public and transparent fashion.
The entire analysis project and associated files to study are available at a new wiki:
http://studysequoia.wikispaces.com/
How You Can Help Shine Light on Sequoia
Previous voting system software analysis has been in secret, either due to non-disclosure agreements, court ordered secrecy or the review of code from legally questionable sources.
In this case, no such restrictions exist and the analysis process will be open, online and public as is proper when looking at the engine of our democratic process. “What was done in the dark will be brought to the light” as Johnny Cash put it.
The software was buried inside of data files used to store the tabulation of votes from the November 2008 general election. This practice of blending data and software has been long suspected and even alluded to in documents from Sequoia; however, the details had been obscured under “trade secrets” claims. Sequoia asserted and exercised an alleged “right” to strip the data files of anything proprietary before Riverside County turned the files over to EDA.
Although Sequoia attempted to redact their proprietary code from the election database files, they failed to strip out thousands of lines of software buried in the electon data.
The software appears to control the logical flow of the election, and is detailed enough to name the authors and dates of modifications along with what the code is actually doing to our votes. Some of it might actually have been stripped out, but we strongly suspect not due to the volume of code present.
EDA is expressing concern that such human-readable and “field modifiable” software has been banned by the federal rulebook on voting system design and testing.
Pending a detailed review, we expect to do a legal analysis of the structure of the Sequoia system thus revealed and file complaints with the proper state and federal authorities.
EDA is concerned about other known cases of failure in the certification of voting systems in which legally flawed products were allowed into the market, a trend noticed recently by NIST (National Institute of Science and Technology) in a formal letter throwing one of the authorized test labs out of the voting system test business.
Of the four labs ever credentialed for voting system testing, three have at various times been thrown out for misconduct or incompetence, only to be let back in under “restrictions.”
We believe that the source code analysis from Sequoia will document yet another such case of test lab failure along with a failure at Sequoia.
================
Shine Light on Sequoia
This Sequoia code review is one part of a larger EDA Public Record Election Project (PREP), based on public records freedom of information law. We have convened an expert group of investigators and are filing public records requests for voting system database records in a number of counties.
If you can lend your software programming skills to the Sequoia code analysis, we invite your participation at the SequoiaStudy wiki.
