Alabama Voter Registration Information

Alabama Voter Registration

Attached below is a downloadable PDF copy of Alabama Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls—and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted—will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day—including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond. Information was current as of November 2005.

IMPORTANT:  Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

Alaska Voter Registration Information

Arizona Elections Report Submitted to EAC

The following report submitted to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission on Dec. 8, details findings about elections in Maricopa County, Arizona, resulting from a year-long investigation conducted by the Arizona Tansparency Project, a collaborative project of AUDIT-AZ, Election Defense Alliance, and election integrity activists from a variety of Arizona political parties. The report was jointly written by principal investigators and coalition organizers, John Brakey and Jim March.

Download the PDF report [136]

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MISSION: We are nonpartisan organization whose mission is to restore public ownership and oversight of elections, work to ensure the fundamental right of every American citizen to vote, and to have each vote counted as intended in a secure, transparent, impartial, and independently audited election process.

Monday, December 08, 2008 4:06 p.m.

Chair Rosemary E. Rodriguez
Election Assistance Commission
1225 New York Avenue, N.W. - Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20005

Sent via e-mail to HAVAinfo@eac.gov [137]

Dear Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Board of the EAC:

Now after spending more than 4 years full time understanding how elections work, first in Pima County on Diebold equipment, then in Maricopa County on Sequoia equipment we at AUDIT-AZ can conclude that elections are unverifiable and are "faith-based" for the most part.

Our Election Integrity Movement in Arizona continues to work to discover more of the flaws built into the election process that been made even more abundantly evident during current general election. It is now time to use all the information that has been gleaned to date to work on solutions to put safeguards in place to assure transparent and auditable counting of the 2010 Election working with Election Defenses Alliance and our other national partners. The court case in Pima County, Arizona of the Pima County Democratic Party vs. Pima Board of Supervisors set a precedent that the databases produced by electronic voting equipment -- whether individual machines, or in the central tabulators -- is public record and belongs to the people. With the release of 800 databases this case lead to the largest release of databases in the history of electronic voting in the United States.

Last July we submitted to the EAC the story of Pima County, (Tucson, AZ).

Today we present Maricopa County, (Phoenix, AZ) which is the 4th largest county in the United States.

For the sake of keeping this short here are the highlights of what we found and learned: [click Read More link]
Or Download the PDF report [136]

1. AS BAD AS DIEBOLD/PREMIER IS, SEQUOIA AND ES&S ARE WORSE! The equipment Maricopa has was ES&S and in early 2006 converted over to Sequoia. In California ES&S wouldn’t even submit their products for review and was disqualified to be used in California.

2. NO SIGNATURES ON POLLTAPES, WHICH AREN'T POSTED AT THE POLLS. Unsigned polltapes allow the creation of duplicate tapes with fake values after the fact, and are a vital component of any election fraud which seeks to alter both the paper and electronic records of the vote simultaneously.

Polltapes weren't signed as a matter of county policy and instructions to pollworkers. Neither are they posted publicly at the polling place on election night to create an independent record of the precinct vote.

Legality: posting of polltapes isn't required in Arizona (yet). But signing them is – the Arizona SecState's election procedures manual carries the force of law. The latest edition (Oct. '07) is online:

http://www.azsos.gov/election/Electronic_Voting_System/2007/Manual.pdf [138]

At page 142 we find:
• follow the procedures for printing the totals,
• tear off the tape,
• sign the tape,
• place the tape in the appropriate container or envelope
...
Maricopa County stopped signing the end of day pollworker result tape from the precinct’s optical scanner at the same time that the new hand count audit law that we passed in 2006.

3. ATTACKING THE DATA EN ROUTE (“MAN IN THE MIDDLE” ATTACKS). We learned in Maricopa County election-night that the 22 satellite receiving stations phone modem in the result using a laptop computer and that the election results are not encrypted. This mentored is totally prohibited in California by the Secretary of State. Link to full report:
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/sequoia/system40/2008-10-... [139]

“7. No network connections to any device not directly used and necessary for voting system functions may be established, Communication by or with any component of the voting system by wireless or modem transmission is prohibited at any time. No component of the voting system, or any device with network connectivity to the voting system, may be connected to the Internet, directly or indirectly, at any time.”

Maricopa Vulnerabilities And System Components

B.1.5 MPR, MEMORYPACKS, AND CABLES

Maricopa uses laptops to send results.

Power cable, memory pack, and communications cable.

System Description and Components February 2006 California report
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/sequoia_proposed_use_proc... [140]

Excerpt: System Description and Components California Report:

Voting Systems
• MPR: Is a desktop device, which is plugged into a PC (usually at the election central site), and developed specifically to work in conjunction with WinEDS, which is installed on a PC. The MPR performs the following functions (via MemoryPack).
• Burns election data, from WinEDS, onto MemoryPacks, to be used during the election.
• Is used by the Optech Insight to tabulate ballots.
• Transfers the ballot totals to WinEDS, for processing.

• MemoryPack: A removable MemoryPack containing the following information is inserted into the rear of the Optech Insight:
• Election parameter data
• Precinct totals

The Optech Insight [ed: also used in Maricopa] uses the Election Parameter data programmed into the Memory Pack, using WinEDS to obtain Precinct Totals, during the election.

The memory pack may be removed at the end of the election and transported to the Central Counting Location for rapid transfer of precinct totals to the central counting location for inclusion into the canvass reports, by WinEDS.

KEY SECURITY FLAW: Sequoia doesn’t provide a system to modem results from the memory pack reader straight up to the central tabulator. Instead, data is pumped into laptops from memory pack readers at the 22 regional processing facilities, and then the laptops modem results in. First issue is that no independent audit of what Maricopa loads onto those laptops has been performed. We do know that the memory pack data contents aren’t encrypted, so “auto manipulation software” at that laptop would be childishly simple to implement. Second, and possibly worse, is that we don’t know how many people know the phone number and access codes into the central tabulator station that receives those phone calls. Clearly a standard PC can connect in (as that’s what the county uses) – could somebody launch a systematic attack on the central tabulator from anywhere in the world? For all of these reasons and more, California completely banned the use of modems for these purposes as well as Pima County, Arizona. The rest of the problems we note where seals and ballot box security are inadequate, poll-tapes are unsigned and the hand-audits can be subverted make these problems worse; when combined, these security flaws add up to a total “solution” for vote hacking – BOTH the electronic and paper records can be subverted in lockstep with minimal staff.

4. MARICOPA HAS A BADLY BROKEN CHAIN OF CUSTODY - MULTIPLE SEALS, ALL THE SAME NUMBER, NO AUDITING OF HOW MANY ARE USED.

Maricopa purchases their seals in packs of 20 – all 20 bear the same number. At the post-election hand “audit”, we observed that the serial number for the seal on both the main ballot bag and the touchscreen “audit” trail pack for precinct Ironwood 400 were 0080400. Other containers holding the provisionals and dropped-off mail-in votes would have been in other containers (the laughable plastic ones pictured) each with two more of these numbers. That's six seals needed. Different precincts received different numbers of seals – some pollworkers report getting 10, or 15, or all 20. According to testimony on a courtroom witness stand under oath by election director Karen Osborne, no check is made of how many unused seals come back in from the field – apparently pollworkers and anyone else involved in handling precinct materials on election night or after are allowed to tamper with ballot containers to whatever degree they like.

We learned of the number of duplicates by accident – the elections office gave their unused seal stash to the county sheriff's office, who used them to secure the lockers that hand “auditors” and observers put our stuff into. Jim March noted that the seals were the same type and same series (starting with “008”) as the elections office seals, and photographed a pile of 20-packs. We later confirmed the sheriff's office received these from the elections department.

Legality: this isn't illegal – yet. Nobody ever considered that an elections agency might reject all basic election security processes in this bald-faced a fashion.

Here we see dedicated volunteers checking seals on a ballot box, not realizing that a simple centerpunch and hammer renders their dedication absolutely useless.

Each side of the box has a single steel "hinge pin" which stays in place due to a "curl" on one end only.

Drive the steel hinge pin out from the end opposite the "retaining curve." The plastic is easily flexible enough to bend around the steel "bump" without leaving a mark.

Spot the problem yet?

With the hinge-pin removed, it's ballot piracy ahoy, matey. . .
Note that the pin goes back in as easily as it came out, with zero evidence of tampering
We've left the "Fry's" price tag intact in case Karen Osborne tries to clap us in irons for "ballot box theft."

Here's why. 1% of the mail-in vote is supposed to be “audited”. The counties (led by Maricopa) fought tooth and nail to avoid having to sort the mail-in vote by precinct. Instead, counties are supposed to create “audit batches” selected by the political parties. Most of the proponents of the bill were from Pima County and familiar with Diebold gear.

In a Diebold-based system, when you're scanning mail-in votes pre-election the software doesn't track how many votes are in a “batch” of mail-in votes just fed in. So to create an “auditable batch”, the system operator (observed by political parties or other observers) prints out a complete “who's winning and losing” report (called a “summary report” in Diebold-speak), scans up to 500 or so ballots, then prints another summary report. Without anybody looking at them, the two summary reports are supposed to be boxed up with that “audit batch” of ballots, sealed away and then made available for hand count later. To get the total votes that should be in the stack, you subtract the first report from the second for any race or candidate. It's clunky but it does work.

But not in Maricopa, where they use Sequoia gear!

Here's how Maricopa works: The county scans one of a pre-selected set of “batches” (generally under 200 votes) into the machine, tracking it (like every other such batch) with their own batch tracking number – as an example, “24-119” might be a valid batch number.

They then box up the votes for batch 24-119 and ask the scanner station computer to print out the vote totals for batch 24-119. The totals are put in a manila envelope, sealed and put in the same “silly box” you can see pictured throughout being center-punched open. Both the county and the political observers note which batch numbers are in which numbered and sealed box, writing down seal numbers.

After the election but before the “hand-audit”, election staff has the ability to ask the computers a critical question: “What vote totals for each candidate or issue are supposed to be in any given batch?”

And that means they can peek into the sealed manila envelope without breaking the seal. They can produce a duplicate of the report that's in that envelope, after the fact.

If it's not clear yet: that in turn means they can check to make sure the “audit batches” come out perfectly, covering up either fraud, database glitches, or poor quality scanners.

Legality: quality boxes and seals that come from sources that guarantee seal uniqueness would help, but the real cure is to force sorting the mail-in vote by precinct. “Audits” would happen by precinct on a true random pick without worry about “audit batches”, printing of pre-election vote totals or any similar stupidity.

6. TAMPER-FRIENDLY PRECINCT BALLOT BAGS

The ballot bags holding the main precinct ballot stacks are literally duffel bags of cordura nylon. Instead of the usual zipper lengthwise across the top as in a typical “gym bag”, these are cut more square and have a zipper around the upper edge. To “seal” it, a heavy-duty zip tie with a serial number tag connects the two “pull ties” of the standard zipper. It's not that hard to put both zippers near a corner and “turn the bag inside out” enough to get ballots in and out. In the process you'll put stress on the zipper pull-tabs.

During the hand-"audit" Jim March was able to look at the zippers of about 20 bags. About half were missing the pull-tabs, which were replaced by standard key ring snap-rings.

First issue: Were the pull-tabs missing because people were regularly bypassing the seals?

Second, and even more obvious: once a snap-ring is on there, it can be removed easily in seconds, bypassing the seal. Since this was so common (50% of bags), any ballots you wanted into could have it's pull-tab snipped off with wire cutters and replaced with, you guessed it, a snap-ring as this was the common “fix”. We pleaded with Election Director during the lottery drawing to allow us to put additional seals on the 23 ballot bags that were picked out of the 1,142 precinct ballot bags. Link to audio is below in point 7):

Physical box security for the mail-in and provisional votes left at the polling places was even dumber – the county uses flip-lid boxes of a very cheap type that are easily opened as pictured.

We found the same exact make/model of ballot box for $12.99 at the local Fry's Electronics outlet, and tested it's tamper “resistance”. It's the translucent box with the blue lids in pictures scattered throughout this document.

Legality: it's actually not illegal in Arizona to use ballot boxes that are tamper-friendly. This will be the subject of urgent legislation this year.

7. A SUBVERTIBLE HAND “AUDIT” PART TWO – THE PRECINT VOTE The morning after the election, the county insisted on immediately having the parties pick the precincts and races to “audit”...even though not all of the initial precinct results were in as required by law. At the moment when they picked the precincts and races to audit, the count wasn't fully “in” - over 300,000 ballots remained to be processed overall including 10 precinct ballot memory packs still missing or not yet reported. Those votes wouldn't be included in any potential audit. Audio excerpts of our complaints that morning are online at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9oAczDmbWww [141]

Legality: they were specifically barred from beginning the hand “audit” process until the entire “unofficial” precinct totals were in and publicly committed.

Election day was of course Tuesday. The “hand-audit” selection was Wednesday around 9:00am. The hand count didn't start until Thursday morning – across town at the sheriff's Joe Arpaio training facilities who happens to be the most controversial sheriff in the United States. Wednesday afternoon the ballots were moved over to the sheriff's training classrooms, away from camera monitoring for approximately 20 hours until the hand “audit” started.

THIS WAS BLATANTLY ILLEGAL. AZ statutes require holding the ballots under camera scrutiny until they're “audited”.

Ballot boxes with dubious security bought on the cheap with duplicate seals available were hauled offsite to offices under the control of the sheriff's staff – the same sheriff who was himself running for re-election in this race, along with some of his key political allies including the county attorney. We have no idea if this triggered abuse, but at a minimum it gave improper appearances.

And all of this was contrary to state law.

Let's recap: would we allow any other candidate's staff to take sole control of ballots for almost a whole day? If the ballot boxes and bags were physically secure with tamper-resistant seals, if polltapes were signed or if chain of custody was otherwise respected we wouldn't be so concerned. With ballots so easy to alter by anyone with physical access, this offsite removal was in our opinion a horrific risk.

8. HOW TO BUILD A BALLOT DUPLICATING STATION THAT FITS IN A CLOSET
Maricopa County contracts with a company called Runbeck Election Services for ballot printing and processing. More on them in the next chapter. One of Runbeck's services is the rental of a complete ballot printing “solution” called “Sentio”: http://runbeck.net/?v=sentio [142]

The idea is that a computer supplied by Runbeck holds encrypted copies of the ballots in .PDF format and prints them to a large Okidata color laser printer “on demand”. This seems like a good idea for walk-in early ballots: you don't know what precinct the voter is until they walk in, at which time you print the right ballot for them rather than have stacks of different types and languages. The attached computer is supposed to track how many ballots it prints of each type, as an anti-fraud measure.

The problem is, anybody with the original ballot images (accessible by far too many people) can put them on a laptop, walk up to the “Sentio,” unplug the printer from the Runbeck-supplied computer, plug the laptop in, and print an unlimited number of extra ballots.

There would be one risk: the printer has an internal page count, and if somebody “audited” that (tracked how many ballots printed, page count pre-election, page count post...) they might catch the fraud. Well that's no problem. Okidata laser printers aren't hard to find. This one costs about $6,000 and would fit in a decent-size closet. Smuggle the original PDF ballot image files out on a memory card no bigger than your thumbnail crammed into your cell phone and print as many counterfeit ballots as you want. Runbeck has simply created a blueprint for counterfeit ballot fraud. The ability to make fake ballots makes the day-long visit to the sheriff's offices more frightening – so many of these issues “interact” so that on their own they're of modest interest, together they're a blueprint for fraud.

The only good news is that for some reason, the ballots these Okidata printers generate work OK on a Sequoia scanner but not on Diebold scanners – there was a horrendous failure rate in Pima County and they're likely going to give up on the concept. One theory is that heating the paper in the laser printer's fuser section is stretching it, making the timing marks on the edges fail when Diebold scanners read them. So counterfeiting attempts of this class would be harder in a Diebold county and with more risk of discovery.

9. EXCESSIVE OUTSOURCING

Runbeck Election Services prints the ballots in Maricopa County – mostly on big professional offset printers but also using some “Sentio” systems in-house. Mostly normal enough – but they also mail out the ballots to mail-in voters, receive them back in from the voters, scan the signatures, process them by batch for the county and only then ship them off to the county elections office.

The Runbeck mail facilities are monitored by sheriff's deputies, but let's remember the sheriff was running in this election. IF the sheriff is corrupt, finding corrupt deputies would be no problem at all.

At the central tabulator facilities, outsourcing continues. The primary operator for the central tabulator and at least half the staff are Sequoia employees on-site, rather than county employees.

The level of outsourcing is such that a full vote manipulation could be carried out without a single county elections staffer or officer being involved.

10. SUBVERTIBLE ELECTRONIC BALLOT BOXES (“MEMORY CARTRIDGES”)

Recent studies at Princeton University examined a Sequoia voting system of slightly older vintage than what's used in Maricopa. There are however similarities: the “Advantage” pushbutton system in New Jersey runs on a Z80 processor and stores data on EEPROMs – Electrically Erasable Read Only Memory. The Optech optical scanner stations in Maricopa that record 98% of the precinct vote also use Z80 processors and EEPROM memory packs.

A standard EEPROM chip--something like this--is inside the Sequoia memory pack.

The Princeton study showed that data on the memory pack could be altered by a device as small as a pack of cigarettes, or easier still a laptop or “palmtop” computer of almost any sort. Electronic alteration is simple because there is no encryption of the data in the pack – also known as an “electronic ballot box”. See YOUTUBE 07:12 minutes: Sequoia Part 5: Manipulating Sequoia Results Cartridges could be easy in Maricopa County, AZ. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3bZvqTKOtjI [143]

The Diebold optical scanners are roughly the same vintage and shared the same flaw. In the HBO documentary “Hacking Democracy”, Black Box Voting and their consultant Harri Hursti went to Leon County FL and proved you could alter the contents of their memory cards, rigging them before election day so as to have negative votes for one candidate and positive votes for another yet still show “no votes entered” if you check it on election morning by running a zero tape. Such an electronically pre-stuffed ballot box will take votes from one candidate and give them to the other, while printing an end-of-day tape at the close of polls that will look correct.

In a state such as Arizona where at least a small hand-count happens, one would think this would be too risk – unless of course the county has made undetectable access to the paper ballots trivially easy....

The Diebold memory card physical format was very obscure and the BBV team had to search hard for an effective reader, buying a device online normally involved in measuring moisture in cornfields. The EEPROM technology used by Sequoia doesn't have that problem: while the connectors used for the memory pack are proprietary, the internal memory chip is a standard device. Given access to just one pack and a few minutes quality time with a screwdriver and continuity tester, it's possible to trace the pins from the standard EEPROM chip holder to the connections Sequoia creates. From there, making an adapter between a writer device for such chips and the Sequoia connector means about $10 worth of Radio Shack parts and half an hour with a soldering iron. Build just one and it could hack as many cartridges as you'd like in rapid order.

As a final insult, while state law requires these memory packs to be brought in from the field by two people (one from each party), that clause is routinely ignored. While at a receiving station watching them come in, a number of pollworkers attempted to hand these off to us. The cartridges were in plastic bags with paper seals that can be peeled open if you do it slow enough, and can be re-sealed with no evidence of tampering.

11. “TRANSPORTING THE MEMORY PACK” from Secretary of State Procedures manual page 143 Approved October 2007

In precincts where transmittal is not done by modem:

* place it in the container provided along with the tape,
* for accessible voting units with a paper receipt, place the receipt in the container
* seal the container,
* the inspector and judges sign the seal, then
* at least two designated election officials representing voters of different political parties shall deliver the container to the designated receiving site.

NO SEALS, 1 PERSON DELIVERING
Here is a video we shot that proves that the above procedure was not done: http://blip.tv/file/1437202/ [144]

12. CENTRAL TABULATOR SOFTWARE AND SEQUOIA ISSUES IN GENERAL

Sequoia has broken a number of rules regarding voting system certification in general. Some of these are specific to the central tabulator (WinEDS) and ballot preparation software (BPS). Voting system software is supposed to be reviewed at the Federal level and then in AZ again (barely) at the Secretary of State's office. Sequoia has very deliberately avoided oversight on several key components.

HERE ARE THREE KEY POINTS WHERE SEQUOIA HAS VIOLATED THE LAW:

1. Sequoia uses Windows CE ("Compact Edition") on one component (the "HAAT", "Hybrid Activator, Accumulator & Transmitter") yet didn't declare Windows CE's customized code to the Federally qualified test labs. The National Institute of Science and Technology recently de-certified one of the three original labs (Systest) and in their letter stripping Systest of the ability to test voting systems, NIST says:

The Windows CE customizing files were not reported as being reviewed as non-COTS source files. [ed: "Commercial Off The Shelf" or COTS software doesn't need full test lab review where custom stuff does.] An open question exists of how to report these files but the presence and review of these Windows CE customizing files needs to be reported to identified [sic] that they were missed.

In other words, NIST is blaming the lab for not catching on that WinCE is heavily customized by design - this "mini version" of Windows is a "kit" Microsoft puts out that the hardware vendor needs to complete rather than a complete system. However, the rules say the vendor such as Sequoia has to declare what's custom and what's not...so the sin is on both the labs for stupidity (three labs blew it in this fashion) and on Sequoia for fraud.

See also NIST's letter at: http://www.eac.gov/extlnk/lnkframehead.htm?http%3A//vote.nist.gov/NVLAP/... [145]
...on page 18 (as Acrobat numbers pages) section 5.10.1.

2. For their next trick, Sequoia has claimed that BPS is passing "software" from that uncertified system (BPS) and pumping it into a certified system (WinEDS). After our February analysis of the Maricopa operation we received a public records response to our query for the Sequoia database (including BPS data) drafted by Sequoia's vice president of certification. That letter says that the BPS data being transferred into WinEDS contains “proprietary software”. Even if you accept that BPS doesn't need certification, there's no possible way a court will support an uncertified program pumping software into a certified system. Nobody can be allowed to do that if the system is to retain any credibility whatsoever.

3. Sequoia claims BPS doesn't need cert under the 2002 federal standards . . . and so far the EAC and AZ SecState's office has backed that concept. However, that flies in the face of the federal definition of "voting system" as codified in HAVA:

SEC. 301 42 USC 15481.(6)(b) VOTING SYSTEM DEFINED — In this section,the term "voting system" means—

(1) the total combination of mechanical, electromechanical, or electronic equipment (including the software, firmware, and?documentation required to program, control, and support the equipment) that is used—
(a) to define ballots;
(B) to cast and count votes;
(c) to report or display election results; and
(D) to maintain and produce any audit trail information;

BPS "DEFINES BALLOTS" as the Maricopa County elections office knows. Given federal law in this area, and the AZ legal requirement to follow the federal standards, it seems likely a court would say BPS needs certification – which it doesn't have.

We even have some reason to suspect why BPS wasn't submitted for certification: It needs MS-Access present in order to run. Microsoft Access is well known for it's ability to get people into election databases and let them make alterations without leaving the normal “audit” lot traces . . . it's basically a burglary tool for elections. Even the worst of the test labs would have choked on having it present in the field, required to make BPS work.

13. LACK OF ACCOUNTING DETAIL BY BALLOT TYPE

True auditing of an election involves tracking where each vote and block of votes came from by category. Each category of vote (mail-in, precinct optical scan, precinct touchscreen, provisional and more) has it's own set of risks as to how it could be subverted. Knowing what the totals are for each category by date allows identification of unusual "spikes" or variances between categories.

Arizona is among the majority of Western states in which it is easy to sign up as a mail-in voter. As with other such states, the rate of mail-in voting hovers near 50% or so. If a candidate wins big at the precincts but loses big in the mail-in vote, the possibility arises that one or the other was subverted in some fashion - the bigger the discrepancy, the more attention should be paid.

Maricopa has made such analysis difficult bordering on impossible by "blending" vote categories. We consider this a serious failing.

On election night at 8:03 p.m., the county published vote totals for the mail-in vote to date. This made perfect sense as those were the only ballots scanned and processed; they had printed the "who's winning and losing" report at the first legal moment they could (one hour post polls close).

From that moment forward, no additional "mail-in vote numbers" were published, even though well over 300,000 ballots were remaining to be scanned. All of those votes were piled into the precinct totals - as were provisional votes, mail-in votes dropped off a the precinct and the military absentee votes processed through the AZ Secretary of State's site.

Jim March wrote:
“It's as if all parts of your dinner were run through a blender before being poured onto your plate. The results are about as palatable but in the case of the Maricopa elections process, the result isn't nausea: it's an inability to track what's going on and spot problems that may be related to security risks to one class of vote versus others”.

Other AZ counties including Pima break their numbers out in much more detail. Maricopa's process needs to be reviewed against that of other agencies in and out of Arizona.

14. PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER IN MARICOPA: A BLUEPRINT FOR A HACK?

All the pieces are present (and then some) to pull of the “immaculate hack” - alter both the paper and electronic records to match in a vote tampering attack that can never be detected.

A. The paper records are vulnerable due to duplicate seals, poor quality ballot boxes (or bags) and storage in insecure locations. Altering the paper records for all ballots on a county-wide race might be possible if you just “shave” ten or so votes per precinct. Doing so for a race that doesn't cover the whole county, such as one of the smaller city councils or any of the various board positions would be easier. Extra ballots are available through via one of the same printers Runbeck's “Sentio” uses, or just deliberately overvote a candidate position when the voter votes “incorrectly” for a certain candidate.

B. You wouldn't need to alter the central tabulator record at all. Best approach would be to hack the memory cartridge, print out a new results tape (unsigned same as the original) and re-feed that into the central tabulator.

C. You can do anything you want to the mail-in votes at the central tabulator, because you know which batch numbers CAN be “audited”. You'd be taking a minor risk that the scanners might have malfunctioned on the “audit” batches and the counts might not come out right – but that's OK, subverting the hand “audit” ahead of time by making sure the mail-in hand “audit” batch counts come out perfectly is child's play: find out from the computers what votes are supposed to be in the “audit” batches, open the box either with the centerpunch stunt or your handy spare seals and make sure they're right. When hand “audits” come out perfect, you can be sure nobody will dig deeper.

IT WOULD BE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO DESIGN A SYSTEM END-TO-END THAT WOULD FACILITATE FRAUD BETTER THAN WHAT WE'VE FOUND IN MARICOPA COUNTY.

The day after the election when the parties were picking precincts and races to “audit”, we raised these concerns and asked the county to put extra seals of the “sticky” type at the four corners of the mail-in vote “audit” batches and to allow us to put additional seals on the 23 precinct’s ballot that were picked out of the 1,142 precincts. This was met with angry refusal. Link to audio excerpts of our complaints that morning are online at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9oAczDmbWww [141]

At every step, this department in general and Ms. Karen Osborne in particular displayed a lack of concern for real security while ensuring that “security theater” involving metal detectors, rules about “no cellphones, no laptops” and other such silliness was the rule.

While that was going on, she actively worked to make sure she could tamper with the vote at any time. A classic example involved the mail-in vote “audit” box seals. They were always ceremoniously taken out two at a time, each individually numbered (two seals to a box) – neglecting to mention they had an additional 19 seals of each number in the back room in case they needed to get into those boxes.

That was a bitter insult to all of the volunteers from the Republican, Democratic and Libertarian parties who put in long boring hours to make sure this process went smoothly and fairly. For our effort, we were treated to a meaningless show, a Potemkin Village of an election, barred from going anywhere else in the building or inspecting what goes on behind their closed doors and layers of secrecy.

Sadly, on top of everything else, on November 4th, 16 voters out of 100 that voted at a precinct in Maricopa County (Phoenix) had to vote a provisional or a conditional provisional ballot.

15. SO WHAT'S THE CURE?

Last December 19th the headline in the Tucson Citizen read “Pima County to spend up to $10 million to improve ballot security”. That included the purchase of an entirely new voting system for about $5 million.

Immediately after hearing this Jim March and I opposed this idea due to the fact we know there is nothing else out there at this time or for the next 2 to 4 years that’s any better. We know that we’re voting on a fatally flawed system and the only solution at this time is transparency, transparency and more transparency. As I’ve stated above, as bad as that Diebold system is, it’s better than many other voting systems that exist at this time, it's better for all of us to work with the devil we know rather than the devil we don't. So please help us get more transparency.

BUT WHO WILL DELIVERER THAT TRANSPARENCY?

In Arizona we had to learn through litigation in Pima and Maricopa County that NO ONE REPRESENTS THE PUBLIC when it comes to verifying that elections are honest. We know this from our work and the deposition of Jan Brewer’s State Election Director Joseph Kanefield:

Testimony in a deposition of the Arizona Secretary of State’s office under Rule 30 (b) (6) designee was Joseph Kanefield, State Election Director, April11, 2008. Stated on the record that his office doesn't have the authority to examine election databases, how could this be?

IMPORTANT EXCERPT OF DEPOSITION:

Q. BY Attorney William ‘Bill’. RISNER: First, can we clearly establish that your office never has gone in and examined a database to see if there's been any fraud or manipulation?

A. Mr. Kanefield: Our office doesn't have the authority, under law, to do such an examination. Our -- the extent our office has oversights over a potential fraud investigation would be pursuant to the statute we discussed earlier, where a copy of the election software and database structure is filed with our office. And at that point, we would make that available to the Attorney General. THAT'S ONE OF THE REASONS IT HAS TO BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL. So are we going in and are we examining county databases and computer programs? We don't have the authority to do that. I mean, the Secretary of State's authority is prescribed by law, AS SET FORTH IN THE CONSTITUTION, and she's been given oversight over a number of election-related activities, including logic and accuracy testing and other related issues. But when it comes to the administration of the elections at the county level, what you're talking about, if you're -- IF YOU'RE ALLEGING THAT WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DOING THIS AND HAVEN'T, THEN YOU'RE WRONG. We just simply don't have the authority to do that. If we were provided that authority, then, of course, we would do that. But we think that the process works and that if those allegations are made, then those with authority -- including the County Attorney, Attorney General -- can undertake such review, as was done by the Attorney General at your request.

Q. BY MR. RISNER: Are you aware of any county in Arizona that has ever conducted a post-election examination of the database for evidence of fraud or manipulation?

A. MR. KANEFIELD: I am not aware, other than what's occurred in Pima County. But that doesn't mean it hasn't happened. It's just that I'm not aware.

Q. BY MR. RISNER: Okay. So the result, then, is that the Secretary of State, because it has no authority to, does not examine and has never examined an election database after an election in any county in Arizona; correct?

A. MR. KANEFIELD: That is correct.

Two-minute video on KOLD TV Tucson 4/21/08, “WHO CHECKS THE VOTE COUNTERS?"

It is NOT the Secretary of State! Not the Attorney General! Not the County!

http://ca.youtube.com/watch?v=fqlefIQVkrk [146]

From the process of discovery in Pima Co. several important bodies of work have been produced that have within them the potential that could help with creating trustworthy elections. These elements are:

1. We’re making a documentary called “Fatally Flawed” to be issued as a DVD/video that will:

a. Review the nationwide implications of the precedent-setting Pima Co. court case that reaffirmed and established that the databases are public records to be available for public scrutiny.

b. William ‘Bill’ Risner Esq. will be laying out the facts of the RTA bond election and making a case to the public that election fraud is real, thus assisting us by whipping up public pressure to demand a proper criminal investigation.

c. From the examination of the databases comes the possibility to detect and verify databases manipulation. (Vote flipping and hacking) in other election.

d. Explain a number of ways the vote can be hacked or manipulated from inside the machines

1. Company preprogrammed memory cards to influence the manner that votes are counted.  
2. Use of uncertified software.  
3. Physical manipulation of the databases using the Microsoft Access program.

2. We designed a special computer program to analyze the Diebold computer logs and databases of the central tabulations to see whether manipulation has occurred.  Tampering at the memory cards may show up in this software depending on the type of manipulation.  Automated reports on patterns of voting throughout an election cycle will be part of the program and will allow for fast "sanity checks” of an election cycle in time to file legal challenges.  Currently a software program is in beta testing.

3. Maricopa Project - We have started a detailed examination of the Maricopa County election process along with the Sequoia gear it runs on.  As you know now from above there are major flaws.  A key concept that we believe will be valid in most states is "electronic voting must include effective electronic observation". When state observation laws rely on human eyeballs alone in this electronic age the ability to fully observe the process and results will never be thorough, and complete.  This concept can be used to push for reforms WITHOUT a total legislative overhaul, by taking a functional approach to existing legislation.

4. LEGISLATION TO GRAPHICLY SCAN THE VOTE --  Voting is a secret process, counting the vote is a public process. The idea that ballots can be graphically scanned and then distributed to any interested party could be the main breakthrough we need to ensure accurate elections.  A systematic model is established in each county where a certain percentage of the ballots are photo scanned with graphic scanners and put on the Internet for public transparency and scrutiny, which can be checked against a physical audit. However, at present SoS Jan Brewer is blocking it with spurious legal arguments. Sen. Johnson prepared and sponsored legislation at least allowing the scanning of ballots in standard commercial graphic scanners ("white boxes") after they come out of the standard voting machines ("black boxes").  Given this opportunity Pima will jump at the opportunity and others will follow. Graphic scanners are far cheaper than changing from one unreliable set of "black boxes" to another (Diebold to Sequoia, etc.). 

This is how it would work. On election day, 10% of the precincts shall be randomly selected by drawing. That evening as the polls close, a special group of pre-selected pollworkers will travel to those precincts with a laptop computer and small scanner and at the close of polls will scan those paper ballots plus the various end-of-day reports, printouts and the like.  

Like the larger scanners used to process the mail-in and provisional votes, these smaller systems and scanners must not have optical character recognition ability and must write the output scans to write-once media.

Copies of this media will be made available at the polling location to those interested, and made available later by the same means as the larger graphic scan collections on the Internet, marked as to the precinct they came from and method of scanning. The rest of the precinct paper vote, as it arrives at the jurisdiction's main election processing scanner, shall be scanned on the same large graphic scanners that process mail-in and provisional votes, handled in the same manner but identifiable as to precinct and scan type.

5. EDUCATION, EDUCATION, EDUCATION of election personnel, legislators, and grass roots people to put the pressure on their officials and become the auditors of a transparent system that assures every vote is counted accurately as intended.  We at AUDIT-AZ and EDA work with all groups from the sincere Right and Left.

Regarding The ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION

The EAC, formed in 2002, to date still acts as if it were a steering committee with no real power to enforce security standards. This model, influenced by vendors who control the certification process, permits the establishment of voting systems like the one described in Maricopa County with no built-in security, which appears designed to allow wholesale vote-tampering. When votes are counted by insecure systems in secret, the public interest that votes be counted accurately and transparently can be easily subverted, and we no longer have a democracy.

Too much is at stake. This needs to change! A democracy must be built on transparency and verification, not blind faith.

Elections are just too important.

I thank you for your consideration.

Respectfully yours,

John R. Brakey,

Co-founder of AUDIT-AZ (Americans United for Democracy, Integrity, and Transparency in Elections, Arizona) and Co-Coordinator Investigations for Election Defense Alliance
http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/about_john_brakey [147] ?
5947 S Placita Picacho El Diablo  ?Tucson, AZ  85706?
520-578-5678
Cell 520 551 5492

Arizona Voter Registration Information

Attached is the Arizona Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT:  Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

Comprehensive AZ Election Monitoring Manual

EDA is pleased to present for general public access, possibly the most thoroughly detailed election monitoring manual [149] in the country. The primary author, Mickey Duniho, is a member of the Arizona Election Transparency Project and of AUDIT-AZ, an EDA affiliate organization co-founded by EDA Investigations Co-Coordinators John Brakey and David Griscom.

This manual was commissioned and published by the Election Integrity Committee of the Arizona Democratic Party.

Although prepared with specific reference to Arizona election law and procedure, this manual can be recommended as a guide to election monitoring anywhere in the US. This is because the electronic voting systems in use in the vast majority (well over 90%) of U.S. electoral jurisdictions overwhelmingly determine the conduct of elections, and vary only in slight details between the various E-voting vendors.

Whether or not every voting system feature or electoral procedure described in this manual correlates to a feature or procedure in your local electoral jurisdiction, this manual identifies the kinds of voting process information that must be checked and shows you where, when, and how to find and monitor these points in any computerized election process.

We present the table of contents of this manual to give you an idea of the depth of detail.

Please download and distribute the entire manual [149] (in PDF format) to your local teams of citizen election monitors.

We recommend that local groups modify sections of this manual to reflect election law and procedure that may differ in your state, and then upload these modified state editions to the appropriate state folder in this 50 State Directory.

Table of Contents

Chapters

1. Introduction to Election Systems

a. Components of the elections process
i. Voter registration
ii. Voter ID
iii. Casting the ballot
iv. Counting the vote
b. Party roles and election integrity structure
c. Risk assessment

2. Breaches of Election Integrity

a. Bureaucratic problems
i. Inadequate physical security
ii. Inadequate bookkeeping
iii. Inadequately trained poll workers
iv. Lack of transparency

b. System failures
i. Registration errors
ii. Ballot errors
iii. Early voting problems
iv. Polling place problems
v. Counting problems

c. Vintage intentional methods
i. Deny poor people the opportunity to register
ii. Purge valid voters from the registration rolls
iii. Direct voters to the wrong polling places
iv. Require ID at the polls
v. Prepare false early ballot entries
vi. Stuff the ballot box at the polls
vii. Render valid ballots unreadable or unacceptable
viii. Replace batches of valid ballots with fake ones

d. Modern technological intentional methods
i. Program computer to count incorrectly
ii. Change the totals in the computer after scanning ballots
iii. Report fraudulent results from polling places

3. Your rights and responsibilities

a. Statutory rights and responsibilities
i. Review voter registration lists
ii. Conduct logic and accuracy tests
iii. Appoint Election Board members
iv. Appoint observers to watch every step of ballot processing
v. Randomly select precincts and races to be audited
vi. Appoint audit workers to hand count some of the ballots
vii. Supervise the audit

b. Actions not legally specified but desirable and useful
i. Obtain copies of computer logs, election department reports, databases
ii. Analyze all the data collected by observers and from the Elections Department
iii. Ask questions about any procedure that seems incorrect or insecure

4. People involved in ensuring election integrity

a. Election Boards-paid employees of the County elections department
i. Accuracy Certification Board
ii. Poll workers-Inspectors, Marshals, Judges, Clerks
iii. Early Boards
iv. Duplication Boards
v. Receiving Boards
vi. Inspection Boards
vii. Provisional Boards
viii. Write-in Boards
ix. Audit Board

b. Election Observers – for every Board

c. Other election integrity people
i. Recruiters
ii. Coordinators
iii. Planners
iv. Liaisons
v. Researchers

5. Ensuring election integrity at the polls
a. Voters rights and likely problems
b. Poll watchers’ limitations
c. Getting help
d. Recruiting and training poll watchers

6. Ensuring election security

a. Security of ballots
i. Accounting for ballots printed and delivered to the County
ii. Accounting for ballots used
iii. Accounting for ballots not used
iv. Transporting ballots from one location to another
v. Other chain of custody issues
vi. Tamper-revealing seals

b. Security of election machines
i. Physical Security
ii. Checking the software on the election machines

c. Security of the central count system
i. Early ballot counting computer security
ii. Computer audit logs
iii. Security camera monitoring and logs
iv. Party observers’ role in maintaining security

d. Security of vote-total reports printed before the end of Election Day
i. Being alert to anything and everything coming out of the printer
ii. Sealing early reports and recording seal numbers
iii. Checking all seal numbers after Election Day

e. Security of the audit
i. Sealing early ballots selected for audit and recording seal numbers
ii. Checking all seals after Election Day
iii. Precinct-level report of votes BEFORE selection of precincts for audit
iv. Selecting the precincts and races to be audited
v. Selecting the early ballots to be audited
vi. Checking precinct-cast ballot bag tamper-revealing seals
vii. Checking seals on touch-screen voting machine cartridges

7. Ensuring election integrity-data collection and analysis

a. Collecting data
i. Recording ballots at every step of the process
ii. Recording seal numbers on boxes of ballots
iii. Recording times
iv. Recording names of people performing different tasks
v. Recording seal numbers used on computers, storage containers, rooms

b. Analyzing the data
i. Comparing numbers of ballots at different stages of the election
ii. Comparing seal numbers from different stages of the election
iii. Looking for odd events (e.g., extra early reports, unneeded database actions)
iv. Comparing early ballot numbers with precinct-cast ballot numbers
v. Checking the database after the election is over

Appendices

A. Arizona Election Day Manual
B. Consolidated Arizona Election Calendar
C. Count Chair Election Integrity Checklist
D. Observer Guidelines
E. Sample log forms for observers

Lawsuit Exposing Vote-Rigging in Pima County

URGENT: Action Alert

Help Pima County Democratic Party Attorney Bill Risner
Make the Case for Election Integrity

Attend Hearing 9AM Tuesday June 12th
Pima County Superior Court 110 West Congress, 6th Floor

The Pima County Democratic party lawsuit vs the Board of Supervisors is about the broader issue of Election Integrity not to change the outcome of a single election.

o The County in its latest filing continues to claim rights to secrecy and charge that our technical representatives, Jim March and Mickey Duniho are NOT experts.

* The County is asserting that election insiders, despite evidence of misconduct not yet explained, are the experts who have rights not to be challenged by any outsiders.

* The County filed for a stay to stall the lawsuit citing that the evidence of county election department employee misconduct had been turned over to the Attorney General's Office for investigation.

* The lawsuit would be on hold indefinitely until that investigation was complete even though election problems need a remedy before any more elections are conducted.

* Fifty people attended the last hearing on short notice. We must pack the courtroom June 12 to support Bill Risner. This case was featured last Friday on Arizona Illustrated
http://kuat.org/misenplace.cfm?ID=625 [150]

* During Last weekend's interviews with John C Scott on 1330 AM and Emil Franzi on KVOI 690 AM Bill Risner and Party Vice-Chair Jeff Rogers convincingly educated the general public about why every citizen should understand that it is vigilance and public oversight of all political parties during every election is what makes our votes matter in Arizona.

For more on this investigation, see http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/arizona_election_wars [151]

Arkansas Voter Registration Information

Attached is the Arkansas Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT:  Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

E-Vendors Dominate "Future of California Voting" Hearing

California's Electronic Voting Booths Need An Upgrade But It Won't Be Cheap

Sacramento, CA -- California elections officials say their computerized voting booths are in need of upgrades, but they can’t afford to make big improvements. Capital Public Radio's Steve Shadley reports: Listen [154]

Premier Exacts Revenge on Humboldt County

The following article was first published at http://parke.dreamhosters.com/s9y/a/ 5 [158] and subsequently distributed to the California Election Protection Network [159] and published as a featured guest post at Bradblog.com at:  http://www.bradblog.com/?p=7016 [160]  on 3.25.09. The original article is reprinted here by permission with appreciation to Parke Bostrom, and to Brad Friedman of Bradblog.com. 

Diebold Nukes Humboldt!

by Parke Bostrom

At the California Secretary of State's public hearing regarding the possible decertification of GEMS 1.18.19 related to the Deck Zero covert deletion of 197 ballots in the November election, the audit log's magical "clear" button, and the GEMS's audit logs failing to show when ballots were manually deleted by the operator, Diebold/Premier representatives tried to shift blame for the 197 deleted ballots onto Humboldt County Registrar of Voters Carolyn Crnich.

Crnich responded, "If you're saying that your system needs to be checked every damn time we turn it on, I agree with you."
Crnich's use of an expletive seems to have pushed Diebold/Premier's legal counsel over the edge, causing them to reach for and firmly press the "nuke" button.

Several days after returning to Humboldt, Crnich received two letters from Premier. Both letters arrived in a single envelope, but unlike Premier Khrushchev's two letters to President Kennedy, Crnich did not get to choose which letter to respond to.

'Apparently, section 25 allows Diebold/Premier

to terminate Humboldt County's annual license

. . . on 90 days' notice'

The first letter, dated March 17th, was regarding section 25 of the DIMS [161] license agreement. The license agreement was signed on April 27th, 1999. Apparently section 25 allows Diebold/Premier to terminate Humboldt County's annual license to use the DIMS voter registration system on 90 days notice. Additionally the letter went on to revoke all of Humboldt County's licenses to use any Diebold/Premier election systems and software following the May 19th statewide special election. Diebold/Premier also required that many pieces of equipment would have to be returned.  (Click READ MORE to continue)

Related Coverage

3.27.09: California News Service [162] radio story: PLAY AUDIO [163] (1 min.)

3.20.09: http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/Finley_Makes_Case_Against_Premier [164]

3.17.09: http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/CA_Premier_ZeroDeck_Hearing_031709 [165]

7.16.08: Election Defense Radio interview [166] with Humboldt Election Transparency Project and Registrar Carolyn Crnich

Humboldt Election Transparency Project [167] 

The second letter, dated March 18th, asked for confirmation that Registrar Crnich had declined Diebold/Premier's offer of a free hardware and software upgrade to GEMS version 1.18.24. Such an upgrade would also require that Humboldt County's fleet of eighty precinct-based AccuVote optical scan machines receive a hardware retrofit.

Previously, Premier had offered to perform the upgrade at a cost of $324 per AccuVote (a total cost of $26,000), but they generously offered to throw in a free upgrade of the software part of GEMS. A week after Crnich rejected that deal, Premier offered a complete free upgrade of hardware and software, that Crnich also rejected. Instead of retrofitting Humboldt's current AccuVotes, Premier offered to provide refurbished retrofitted machines direct from Texas. According to Crnich, Santa Barbara and San Louis Obispo counties have accepted a free hardware and software upgrade to GEMS 1.18.24, including retrofitted and refurbished AccuVote optical scanners.

Apparently, after "every damn time", all offers were off the table and the nukes were launched.
I asked Crnich if Premier was taking back all the AccuVotes, too, or if Premier were merely taking all the "brains" and leaving us with "just the useless pieces". After pausing for a second, she replied, "they are leaving us with the rest of the useless pieces." I asked her if she really wanted me to quote her saying that. Crnich's reply: "What else can they do to me at this point?"

Back in December or January, when Crnich was discussing the transition to Hart InterCivic equipment, she did say that she was planning on continuing to use Premier's DIMS voter registration system. But now she has to scramble to switch to another system:

May 19th is the special election. After that, Crnich will have to take delivery of the replacement Hart equipment, test it, be trained on it, train voters and poll workers to use it, conduct a test election on it, and then start preparing for the November statewide election. At the same time, she will have to return Premier's equipment. And now, additionally, she will have to transition Humboldt's entire voter registration database to a new system. I think the voter registration system transition needs to be done within 90 days, meaning by June 17th-ish. In other words, the entire voter registration transfer will need to be done during the preparation for and post-election canvassing of the May 19th special election.

I asked Crnich for copies of the two letters so I could post them here. Absurdly, Crnich claimed that after having read both of the letters to members of the public at a public meeting, the letters are still attorney-client privileged because she had sent copies of the letters to county council. These are letters from Premier to Crnich terminating contracts between Premier and Humboldt County. (If there are any lawyers out there who think this claim is not absurd, and that the letters are indeed privileged, please let me know.)

And here is some free advice to any Premier public-relations types who may be reading this post and thinking about trying to do some damage control. Call up your corporate lawyers and get them to apologize to Crnich for terminating all the contracts in the middle of an election cycle. Then have them politely request that Crnich propose a schedule for discontinuing the use of DIMS at her convenience. It may take a little longer than 90 days, but I am pretty sure that at this point in time she is very eager to stop using any products that carry the Diebold/Premier name.

==============

About Parke Bostrom:

Parke Bostrom became a poll worker in 2004 due to concerns with paperless voting machines (which are not used in Humboldt County). He became involved as a volunteer with the local Voter Confidence Committee, the Humboldt Election Advisory Committee, and Humboldt County Election Transparency Project over the course of 2008. Parke has also served as an election night election observer, most recently on behalf of the Humboldt County Republican Party. His professional background is in software and programming.

E-mail contact [168]

Blog:  http://parke.dreamhosters.com/s9y/a/ 5 [158]

CA Deputy SoS Finley Makes the Case Against Premier

Source: Scoop news http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0903/S00218.htm [169]

California Hearing on Premier Voting Systems

Stateside With Rosalea Barker, Wednesday, 18 March 2009

In Sacramento Tuesday morning, 17 March, the California Secretary of State’s Office held a public hearing on SoS Bowen’s report about a software problem that resulted in 197 votes being erased from an election tally in Humboldt County with no record of such deletion showing in the audit log. Tuesday's public meeting was made available via a listen-only phone link.

Background material, including a brief Staff Report to the SoS, and the Secretary of State’s earlier report to the Election Assistance Commission, is available here [170]. A transcript of today’s hearing will later be available from the CA SoS website [171].

'In summary, Finley pointed to four main concerns, which were included in the SoS’s report to the federal Election Assistance Commission: a software error leading to deletion of ballots; failure of audit logs; the presence of the clear button on audit logs; and inaccurate timestamps on audit log entries.'

 The first speaker was Lowell Finley [172], the Deputy Secretary of State of California for Voting Systems Technology and Policy, who outlined how the missing votes were brought to the secretary of state’s attention as a result of an independent audit of voting in the November 2008 election.

 Video will take about a minute to load. Runtime: 1:22:09.

This video of the entire public hearing runs 1.5 hours and includes Deputy Secretary of State Lowell Finley delivering a 30-minute summary of investigation findings, a response by Justin Bale of Premier Election Solutions, and remarks by 10 citizen activists and Humboldt County Registrar Carolyn Crnich.

Note: There is a loud low-level hum in the recorded audio, and the final half of Crnich's remarks are lost when the microphone audio drops out.

Video provided by The California Channel.

Video URL: http://www.calchannel.com/channel/viewvideo/179 [173]   

The Humboldt County Election Transparency Project [174] had convinced that county’s registrar of voters to invest $25,000 in off-the-shelf optical scanning equipment, provided open source software to tally the results of their independent scan of ballots, and then proceeded to re-scan every ballot as well as handcount them if there was a discrepancy between the official and independently counted totals.

In summary, Finley pointed to four main concerns, which were included in the SoS’s report to the federal Election Assistance Commission: a software error leading to deletion of ballots; failure of audit logs; the presence of the clear button on audit logs; and inaccurate timestamps on audit log entries. (The “clear” button is the equivalent of using “delete” on a Windows system with the important difference that there is no backup of what was deleted.)

Finley pointed out that had any of these problems been discovered by the federal laboratory that certified the software, it would have required denial of federal approval of that version of the software. He said the federal lab didn’t report any such flaws, nor were the software error and audit log problems detected by the California Secretary of State’s testing processes.

One of the concerns Finley had was that back in October 2004, Premier—then known as Diebold—was aware of the problem, and failed to notify both the federal and state entities involved in certifying software and voting equipment, instead sending an “informal” email directly to the county elections officials with equipment running on that version, giving a workaround.

Finley said that at no time did Diebold update its operating manuals to include the workaround, and with a change of Registrar of Voters in Humboldt County between 2004 and 2008, the undocumented problem was not dealt with.

In his presentation this morning, Premier’s General Manager, Western Area, Justin Bale, said that the lack of proper handoff between the Humboldt County registrars, and a lack of vendor reporting protocols required by states back in 2004 were key to the loss of the votes in November 2008. Bale also said it was inaccurate to say that the email was the only contact. The software problem was discussed many times directly with county elections officials, he said. There are only three counties in California still using this old version of the software, and his company has repeatedly encouraged them to update. Premier also now distributes official Product Advisory Notices.

On the question of the work put in by the Humboldt County Election Transparency Project, Bale said he welcomed the fact that their independent audit had shown how accurate the electronic tally had been in all the other precincts where the chain of events had not taken place which led to the wiping of those 197 votes in one precinct. Questioned by one of the panelists about whether Premier has addressed a different problem—that of audit logs being wiped with no trace, or showing inaccurate timestamps—Bale replied, “No, not yet.” He said there was no malicious intent, but it was simply not addressed in the initial programming. “We’re now looking at it as a priority,” he said.

The public comment portion of this morning’s meeting allowed two minutes per speaker—down from the three minutes advertised in the agenda because of the number of people who wanted to have their say. Most of the speakers were from election protection advocacy groups and favored the use of open source software but differed on whether handcounting votes was a good thing.

Judy Alter [175] of the Project to Protect CA Ballots, who lives in Los Angeles, and Gail Work of the San Mateo County Democratic Party, both spoke on the lack of access given to election observers, despite there being laws saying they should have that access, and called on Secretary of State Bowen to be more proactive in promoting the rights of credentialed observers.

Kevin Collins of the Humboldt County Election Transparency Project [174] and Judy Bertelson of the Voting Rights Task Force emphasized that the solution put in place in Humboldt County—of using an independent scan and audit of the vote—is both cost-effective and efficient, and could be emulated throughout the country at the precinct and/or county level.

Kim Alexander of the CA Voter Foundation felt that discussions to date seem to suggest that the problem with the audit log is limited to only this one system. “But it’s not. Up to this point, everyone working on election integrity assumed the audit logs were reliable. The Secretary of State should make audit logs a priority.” Alexander noted that election integrity activists were in Sacramento in 2004 protesting the use of uncertified software, and now “we’re here because of certified software” despite the state’s best efforts to adopt more stringent certification.

Tom Pinto of the Humboldt County Election Transparency Project said that “What I’ve learned is that we need to conduct a 100 percent audit throughout California.” He pointed out that the first time they monitored an election, in June 2008, “we discovered boxes of absentee ballots that hadn’t been counted. That was before certification [of the election results]. Doing citizen audits we can correct problems before certification. . . . When you’re doing something important, you need to go back and count it twice.”

A full transcript of the Tuesday hearing will be made available here [171] by the Office of Secretary of State.

CA Hearing on ES&S Uncertified Machine Violations, 9/20/07

PUBLIC HEARING

LOCATION

Office of the Secretary of State
1500 11th Street
First Floor – Auditorium
Sacramento, California 95814

HEARING DATE AND TIME

September 20, 2007, 10:00 a.m.

NOTICE

Elections Code section 19213 provides that a voting system or part of a voting system which has been approved by the Secretary of State shall not be changed or modified until the Secretary of State has been notified of the change in writing and has determined that the change or modification does not impair the accuracy and efficiency of the voting system or part of a voting system sufficient to require a reexamination and re-approval of that system or part of a system.

Elections Code section 19214 authorizes the Secretary of State to seek injunctive and administrative relief when a voting system has been compromised by the addition or deletion of hardware, software, or firmware without prior approval. Elections Code section 19214.5 authorizes the Secretary of State to seek monetary damages and other relief for an unauthorized change in hardware, software, or firmware to any voting system certified or conditionally certified in California.

Election Systems & Software, Inc. (ES&S) has violated Elections Code section 19213 by deploying for use in polling places in several California counties hundreds of units of a version of the AutoMARK ballot marking device that was changed and modified from the version approved by the Secretary of State, without notifying the Secretary of State and without a determination having been made by the Secretary of State that the change or modification does not impair the accuracy and efficiency of the AutoMARK sufficient to require a reexamination and re-approval of the AutoMARK or the voting system of which it is a part.

Accordingly, pursuant to Elections Code section 19214.5(b) and Government Code section 6064, notice is hereby given that a public hearing will be held to give interested persons an opportunity to express their views regarding the intention of the California Secretary of State to seek administrative relief against Election Systems & Software, Inc., pursuant to Elections Code sections 19214 and 19214.5(a), seeking any or all of the relief specified in section 19214.5(a), including the following:

(1) Monetary damages from the offending party or parties, not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per violation. For purposes of this subdivision, each voting machine found to contain the unauthorized hardware, software, or firmware shall be considered a separate violation. Damages imposed pursuant to this subdivision shall be apportioned 50 percent to the county in which the violation occurred, if applicable, and 50 percent to the Office of the Secretary of State for purposes of bolstering voting systems security efforts.

(2) Immediate commencement of decertification proceedings for the voting system in question.

(3) Prohibiting the manufacturer or vendor of a voting system from doing any elections-related business in the state for one, two, or three years.

(4) Refund of all moneys paid by a locality for a compromised voting system, whether or not the voting system has been used in an election.

(5) Any other remedial actions authorized by law to prevent unjust enrichment of the offending party.

Premier Elections Goes to CA Hearing Over "Zero Deck" Failure

Findings Could Result in Vendor Decertification

Today (March 17) the Office of Secretary of State, California, held a voting systems review hearing on the "Zero-Deck Anomaly" of  the Premier (formerly Diebold) Elections System Ver. 1.18.19, a known flaw that can (and has) resulted in the erasure of votes without leaving any trace of miscount in the voting system's audit log.

The disappearance of 197 votes from Humboldt County election results in the November 2008 presidential election was discovered only through the monitoring effort of a local citizen group, the Humboldt Election Transparency Project (HETP), using a ballot-imaging scanner that made a separate record of the ballots available for independent citizen review.

This instance of the "Zero Deck" failure illustrates a fundamental problem with electronic voting systems in general: Namely, the poor-to- nonexistent quality assurance provided by the federal voting machine certification process. The programming flaw in the GEMS ver. 1.18.19 voting system evaded detection in all federal and state certification reviews. The software remains widely in use by electoral jurisdictions throughout the U.S.

'These standards would have required failure of the voting system containing the GEMS version 1.18.19 software had the flaws found in this investigation been identified and reported by the Independent Testing Authority (ITA) that performed the federal testing. . . .

The ITA testing of the system discovered no such flaws. The National Association of State Election Directors (NASED) approved GEMS version 1.18.19 in three voting system configurations between February 2004 and September 2004.'

-- Staff Report of the Secretary of State Office of Voting Systems Technology Assessment

At today's hearing, citizens opposed to the continued use of Premier Election Systems in California, testified for the public record, calling for the decertification of Premier voting systems.

Under the California Election Code, the secretary of state has the authority to decertify a voting system "if the Secretary determines that the system is defective or unacceptable." The secretary also has the authority to completely ban an E-voting vendor from doing business in the state for repeated failure to comply with election laws or meet minimal performance and reliability standards.

The secretary of state is expected to issue a finding within a matter of weeks that will determine the future of Premier Election Systems in California.

=======================

CA Elections Division Staff Report

DIEBOLD/PREMIER GEMS VERSION 1.18.19
Premier Election Solutions’ Global Election Management System (GEMS)
Software Version 1.18.19

Staff Report Prepared by: Secretary of State Office of Voting Systems Technology Assessment
March 13, 2009

I. Investigation & Findings

The attached California Secretary of State Debra Bowen’s Report to the Election Assistance Commission Concerning Errors and Deficiencies in Diebold/Premier GEMS Version 1.18.19 (“Report”) identifies software flaws in the GEMS version 1.18.19 software that led Humboldt County to initially inaccurately certify results (which were subsequently corrected) for the November 4, 2008, General Election.

The flaws also led to inaccurate or missing audit trail information that was pertinent to the investigation into the cause of the inaccurate results. The Secretary of State’s investigation identified the following errors and deficiencies in GEMS version 1.18.19, all of which are discussed in the Report:

1. The “Deck 0” software error caused the deletion of 197 tallied ballots.
2. GEMS version 1.18.19 audit logs fail to record important events.
3. “Clear” buttons on the GEMS Poster Log and Central Count Log permit deletion of important audit records.
4. Date and time stamp on audit trail entries are inaccurate.

 II. Adherence to State & Federal Requirements

A. Federal Standards

As described in the Report, the investigation identified multiple failures to adhere to the 1990 Performance and Test Standards for Punchcard, Marksense, and Direct Recording Electronic Voting Systems, the federal voting system standards that the GEMS version 1.18.19 software was required to meet.

These standards would have required failure of the voting system containing the GEMS version 1.18.19 software had the flaws found in this investigation been identified and reported by the Independent Testing Authority (ITA) that performed the federal testing.

The ITA testing of the system discovered no such flaws. The National Association of State Election Directors (NASED) approved GEMS version 1.18.19 in three voting system configurations between February 2004 and September 2004.

B. State Testing and Review

The California Secretary of State’s office tested the three voting system configurations that include GEMS version 1.18.19 in June 2004, July 2004 and September 2004, respectively. The testing did not detect the “Deck 0”or audit trail problems. Between August 2004 and October 2004, the systems were approved for sale and use in California.

This Secretary of State investigation falls under the purview of California Elections Code section 19222, which states:

The Secretary of State shall review voting systems periodically to determine if they are defective, obsolete, or otherwise unacceptable. The Secretary of State has the right to withdraw his or her approval previously granted under this chapter of any voting system or part of a voting system should it be defective or prove unacceptable after such review. Six months’ notice shall be given before withdrawing approval unless the Secretary of State for good cause shown makes a determination that a shorter notice period is necessary. Any withdrawal by the Secretary of State of his or her previous approval of a voting system or part of a voting system shall not be effective as to any election conducted within six months of that withdrawal.

III. Conclusion

Elections Code section 19222 authorizes the Secretary of State to withdraw approval for use of any voting system if the Secretary determines that the system is defective or unacceptable. In the event the Secretary decides that withdrawal of approval is appropriate, the minimum period provided by statute before that decision could take effect is six months.

Download this Report [176]

Download Hearing Agenda [177]

 Related Documents from the Office of California Secretary of State

Public Announcements and Hearings

Premier (formerly Diebold) GEMS 1.18.19 (Humboldt Deck 0 Anomaly)

    * Public Hearing Agenda [177] - March 17, 2009
             Staff Report [176] - March 13, 2009 (.pdf, 19 KB)
             Secretary of State Debra Bowen's Report to the Election Assistance Commission [178] - March 2, 2009 (.pdf, 154 KB)
             Letter to Election Assistance Commission Chairwoman Gineen Beach [179] - March 2, 2009 (.pdf, 26 KB)
             Response from Election Assistance Commission Chairwoman Gineen Beach [180] - March 10, 2009 (.pdf, 60 KB)
             Election Assistance Commission Voting System Testing and Certification Manual [181]
             Public Hearing Notice [182] - February 11, 2009 (.pdf, 87 KB)

Source: http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/hearings.htm [171]

Reporting on March 17 hearing by GovTech Magazine

http://www.govtech.com/gt/627337 [183]

Electronic Voting Flaw Eyed by California

Mar 17, 2009

By Matt Williams, Assistant Editor

The California Secretary of State's Office held a public hearing Tuesday to gather testimony about a software flaw in electronic voting systems that erased 197 vote-by-mail ballots in the Nov. 4, 2008, general election in Humboldt County, Calif. The ‘Deck 0" flaw automatically deletes the first batch of tallied votes from optical scan paper ballots after they are scanned into Premier Elections Systems' Global Election Management System (GEMS) version 1.18.19, according to the Secretary of State's Office. (Premier was formerly known as Diebold.)

The Secretary of State's Office also found problems with audit logs of version 1.18.19. It doesn't log important system events, records inaccurate timestamps, and contains a "clear" button that deletes logs.

Justin Bales, western region general manager of Premier, testified Tuesday that 16 California counties are using an updated version that fixes many of those problems. Premier isn't opposed to California Secretary of State Debra Bowen decertifying the flawed software version, he said. The deletion of ballots was inadvertent and election security is of paramount importance to Premier, Bales said.

Premier issued a workaround for the Deck 0 problem in 2004, but the Humboldt County elections worker who was informed about it left the county prior to the Nov. 4, 2008 election. Humboldt County Registrar of Voters Carolyn Crnich testified that the county has decided to move to a new vendor for its electronic voting, but will have to use Premier systems for its next election in May.

Crnich and her office oversee an innovative program called the Humboldt County Election Transparency Project that relies upon volunteers to use a high-end scanner in order to produce digital images of all ballots. The images are uploaded to the Internet and are also available on DVD.

Kevin Collins, a volunteer for the transparency project, testified Tuesday that the vote tally inaccuracies in Humboldt County beg the question of many other elections in the U.S. have been unknowingly impacted by flaws in version 1.18.19. The software version is federally and state-certified.

According to California Elections Code, the Secretary of State has the authority to withdraw approval of an electronic voting system if it's defective. The decision would go into effect after a minimum of six months.

McCormack, Former LA County Registrar, Subject of $1 Million Corruption Suit

The following article is borrowed with attribution from BlackboxVoting.org

http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/board-auth.cgi?file=/8/79618.html [184]

Black Box Voting » News Headlines » (CA) 3/09 Los Angeles:

Lawsuit alleges corruption of Conny McCormack, former elections chief

McCormack has been the subject of corruption investigations before, in Dallas County TX, where the state attorney general was investigating charges of election-rigging by shorting ballots in Black districts. She moved out of state to take a position in San Diego, from an election official who had been indicted. Neither McCormack's Texas investigation nor the San Diego official's corruption investigation stuck, but she's back under fire again now with this lawsuit. McCormack abruptly resigned last year.

The Associated Press - March 16, 2009

http://www.mercurynews.com/breakingnews/ci_11927059 [185]

LA County board considers $1.1M settlement

LOS ANGELES—The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors will consider a proposal to pay $1.1 million to settle a lawsuit alleging corruption among former senior county employees.

The proposed settlement was approved Monday by a county claims board, sending the measure to supervisors for final consideration.

The lawsuit filed in February 2007 alleges former county Registrar Conny McCormack discriminated against elderly and nonwhite employees and provided favors for friends.

The plaintiffs include Alvarez Lecesne, his wife Desnee, and their co-worker, Kristen Heffron, who all formerly worked for McCormack's office.

The lawsuit alleges McCormack discriminated against elderly and nonwhite employees and managed the department by "dispensing favors; helping friends, often at the public's expense; and circumventing established procedures and rules, rather than serving the public good."

Lecesne alleges McCormack tried to persuade him to boost test scores for a friend's promotion and to participate in an attempt to defraud an insurance company on behalf of another friend, then retaliated against him when he refused.

McCormack retired at the end of 2007 following a battle with Secretary of State Debra Bowen over electronic voting machines. The state had decided to temporarily pull the plug on electronic voting machines that McCormack helped place in 5,000 precincts.

The county's former chief administrative officer, David Janssen, is also a defendant in the lawsuit.

Bev Harris comments:

"And guess who gets to pay the million dollar settlement? Not McCormack who, due to the settlement, will never appear in court, but the taxpayers--the same people who thought they were voting for people who would represent them.

Although I have no evidence of any such thing, it would seem likely that if anyone on the Board of Supervisors had been fraudulently elected with a little help from McCormack, they would probably find it preferable to bilk the taxpayers of a million bucks rather than risk the possibility of McCormack being cross-examined under oath in a court of law.

By the way, I learned many years ago that federal Civil Service test scores are frequently manipulated and I see no reason it would be any different at the State level.

One can find on this site scattered instances that would add up to an instructive list of cases where folk hired for illegal functions whose investigations are derailed, as well as those convicted of crimes, then get hired elsewhere for the same function they were so adeptly illegal about. It's in fact a long-standing, much used, US political and bizness tradition."

ES&S Settles $3.25 Million CA Lawsuit for Uncertified Machine Sales

Source: Capitol Alert report, Sacramento Bee

http://www.sacbee.com/static/weblogs/capitolalertlatest/020851.html [186]

Bowen Settles Voting Machine Lawsuit

by Andrew McIntosh, Capitol Alert, March 19, 2009

Secretary of State Debra Bowen said today the state will get $3.25 million after she settled her department's lawsuit against Election Systems & Software Inc., the electronic voting machine manufacturer.

After paying for attorneys' fees, the remaining $2.93 million the state will get from Election Systems & Software will be used to improve and strengthen the integrity of California's electoral system, Bowen said.

"Californians have the right to know the systems they use for voting have met the legal standards for security, accuracy, reliability, and accessibility," Bowen said in a statement announcing the settlement.

Bowen filed a lawsuit against the voting machine manufacturer in November 2007, amid allegations that the company had sold 972 AutoMARK Model A200 ballot-marking machines to several counties that contained hardware changes that had were not authorized by the Secretary of State, as required by law.

Five California counties bought the modified Model A200 machines believing they were buying voting equipment exactly like the AutoMARK Model A100 machines the Secretary of State had actually tested and approved. The counties included: San Francisco (558 machines), Solano (160), Marin (130), Merced (104), and Colusa (20).

Manual Tallies in California: An Observor Checklist

California voters have the right to observe manual counts, which take place after the election and before the results are certified.  The purpose of the manual count is to publicly verify the accuracy of software vote
counts.  Counties comply with the manual count law by publicly counting a subset of ballots selected by hand and comparing the hand-counted totals to the software vote counts.

Under state law, counties must conduct their manual counts within a four-week period after Election Day.  In smaller counties, the entire process is often completed in one day, and usually occurs shortly after the election.  In larger counties, the process can take several days and sometimes does not begin until a week or two after Election Day.

I. SIGN UP AS AN OBSERVER

Contact the county elections office [187]
and inform the staff that you want to observe the manual count.  Be sure to provide your name and contact information so the staff can easily notify you.  (You do not have to reside in the county whose
manual count you wish to observe.)

  Ask the county to provide you with any written procedures in advance of the manual count.

Q: 
Did the county election staff fulfill your request to be
notified?  How far in advance of the manual count start date and
time were you notified?

Q:  Were you provided with written procedures for the manual count?

II. RANDOM SELECTION PROCESS

California law requires each county to select one percent of its precincts at
random and manually recount the ballots from those precincts (Elections
Code Section 15360).

  Ask the county staff what method the counties will use to select precincts to count at random.

  Ask when and where the random selection process will take place so you  can observe it.

Q: 
What method did the county use to randomly select precincts (i.e.
a  software program, rolling of dice, drawing numbers, etc.)?

Q:  Did you find the selection process to be random?  Were you able to observe this process?

III. GETTING STARTED

  Bring a notebook for taking notes.  Some counties will also allow you to photograph the manual count while it is in progress.  A calculator may also be useful.

Take note of which precincts were selected for the manual count.

Ask the county to provide you with a statement of the vote tallies in the precincts so you are able to compare those numbers with the hand-counted totals.

If any forms are used to facilitate the manual count, ask if you can be provided with a copy.

Q: When you arrived at the manual count location, were you asked to sign in?
Did you have to provide any identification?
What security requirements or restrictions, if any, were in place?

Q: Who was your contact person at the election office who facilitated your manual count observation?

Some counties hand count all types of ballots cast in a precinct, including absentee and provisional ballots.  Other counties exclude absentee and provisional ballots from the hand count.

   Ask the county staff if absentee and/or provisional ballots are included in the manual count.

Q: Did the county include all ballot types in the manual count?  If not, what kind of ballots were included?

IV. THE MANUAL COUNT IN ELECTRONIC VOTING COUNTIES

State law requires that results from electronic ballots must be verified
during the manual count using the voter-verified paper audit trails.
(Election Code Section 19253).

Q: Did the county use the voter-verified paper trails to perform the manual count?

Q: If the paper records were stored on one long spool, did the county use
any special devices to help manual counters manage and scroll through
the paper records?

According to state law, the purpose of the manual count is “to verify the accuracy of the automated count.” (Election code section 336.5).  With electronic voting, some interpret this to mean that the voter verified paper records should be compared to the electronic results recorded by the electronic voting machines.  Others interpret this to mean that the paper record tallies should be compared to the results generated by the software that produces the overall vote totals.

Q: In your observation, were the paper records compared to results from electronic voting machines (such as printouts of vote-totals produced from the machines at the close of polls) or results generated by the software that produces the overall vote totals (such as the semi-official canvas)?

Q: How much time did you spend observing the manual count?

Q: Can you give an estimate of how long it took the county to manually count a single precinct?

 

V. VERIFYING THE VOTE COUNT

Q: Did you witness any discrepancies between the manual count and the automated count? 

Q:If there were discrepancies, was the cause determined?  If so, what caused the discrepancy?

Q: Overall, based on what you saw, how confident are you that the county’s vote count is accurate?

Please share any other observations you made during the day.  The California Voter Foundation values your input.  Please send your manual count observations via email to kimalex@calvoter.org [188], or via fax, 530-750-1799.  Thank you!

Alameda County Actions -- Voting Rights Task Force

Bowen Decertifies Premier GEMS Ver. 1.18.19 in California

Source: California Secretary of State

Download Press Release [205]

Secretary of State Debra Bowen Withdraws State Approval of Premier Voting System
Legislation to Require Disclosure of Product Flaws Clears First Hurdle

SACRAMENTO – Secretary of State Debra Bowen today announced she has withdrawn state approval of Premier Election Solutions’ Global Election Management System (GEMS) version 1.18.19, which contains serious software flaws.  

Premier GEMS 1.18.19 contains the “Deck Zero” anomaly, a software error that can delete the first batch of optically scanned ballots under certain circumstances without alerting elections officials to the deletion. 

In addition, the system’s audit logs fail to record important events and  “clear” buttons permit deletion of key records, both of which violate federal standards.

The Secretary of State’s office conducted an independent investigation into the GEMS 1.18.19 system and held a public hearing on the matter March 17, at which a Premier representative said the company had no objection to discontinuing the system’s use in California.  Secretary Bowen reached her decision after analyzing the investigation findings and evaluating the written and oral public testimony on the system.   

“Clearly, a voting system that can delete ballots without warning and doesn’t leave an accurate audit trail should not be used in California or anywhere,” said Secretary Bowen, California’s chief elections officer. 

“I am putting together a comprehensive plan to examine the audit logs of other voting systems to determine if they suffer similar problems.  Having a reliable audit log is critical to ensuring that every Californian’s vote is counted as it was cast.”

The “Deck Zero” flaw caused 197 ballots to be inadvertently deleted from Humboldt County’s initial results in the November 4, 2008, General Election.  Humboldt County corrected its election results when it discovered the software error.  Two other California counties, San Luis Obispo and Santa Barbara, used the same software for the November 4 election but encountered no similar problems in counting ballots.

Of the three counties that used Premier GEMS 1.18.19, Humboldt County has decided to switch to another vendor. 

San Luis Obispo and Santa Barbara counties have accepted Premier’s offer to upgrade their systems to a newer GEMS version that is approved for use in California.

DOWNLOAD the Decertification Order [206]

CA Secretary of State Race is a Contest for Election Integrity

Original article published by California Progress Report [210]

Debra Bowen: A Powerhouse California Secretary of State Rather Than an Appointed Placeholder

CA Voting Systems: Overview of Red Team Reports

1.0. Executive Summary

The California Secretary of State entered into a contract with the University of California to test the security of three electronic voting systems as part of her top to bottom review.
Each “red team” was to try to compromise the accuracy, security, and integrity of the voting systems without making assumptions about compensating controls or procedural mitigation measures that vendors, the Secretary of State, or individual counties may have
adopted. The red teams demonstrated that, under these conditions, the technology and security of all three systems could be compromised.

Click these download links to retrieve Red Team reports on each vendor system reviewed:

For news accounts of the CA Voting System Top to Bottom Review ("TTBR") click here: TTBR News Stories [220]

[Overview, continued]

2.0 Goals

In May 2007, the California Secretary of State began a study of all electronic voting systems currently certified in California. This “top to bottom review” (TTBR) was to determine whether the systems currently certified should be left alone, or specific procedures required to provide additional protections for their use, or the machines simply decertified and banned from use.

As part of this study, the Secretary contracted with the University of California to conduct a “red team” review of the systems. The specific goal of the Red Team study was “to identify and document vulnerabilities, if any, to tampering or error that could cause incorrect recording, tabulation, tallying or reporting of votes or that could alter critical election data such as election definition or system audit data.” ([1], p. 5).

A red team study, also called a penetration study, examines a system from the point of view of an attacker, and analyzes the system to determine how secure it is against an attack. Such a study requires establishing several parameters:

• The specific goals of the system: what is it to do?
• The threat model: with whom or what are the testers concerned?
• The information to be made available to the testers: how much do they know at
the start?
• The environment in which the system is used: what policies and procedures are to
be applied?
• The specific “rules of engagement”: what are the team members allowed to do?

For this TTBR, the specific goals of each system are to record, tabulate, tally, and report votes correctly and to prevent critical election data and system audit data from being altered without authorization. The threats were taken to be both insiders (those with
complete knowledge of the system and various degrees of access to the system) and outsiders (those with limited access to the systems). As a result, all information available to the Secretary of State was made available to the testers.

The testers were told to assume that the environments in which the systems were used would vary, and that the testers could do whatever they thought necessary to test the machines. The testers therefore assumed the attackers would include anyone coming in contact with the voting systems at some point in the process – voters, poll workers, election officials, vendor employees, and others with varying degrees of access [18].

In developing attack scenarios, the red teams made no assumptions about constraints on the attackers. We recommend that future Red Teams should adopt a similar attitude. The testers did not evaluate the likelihood of any attack being feasible. Instead, they
described the conditions necessary for an attacker to succeed. This approach had several benefits:

• The testers could focus on the technology rather than on the policies procedures, and laws intended to compensate for any technological shortcomings.

• In California, specific procedures for controlling access to the election systems and for setting up, using, and storing the election systems is a local matter. As there are 58 different counties, there are at least 58 different sets of procedures. It was impractical for the red team testers to evaluate them.

• If a problem is discovered, the people who know the law and election policies and procedures can modify their policies and procedures appropriately to attempt to address the problem.

• Finally, the effectiveness of the policies and procedures used to control and protect the election systems depends on their implementation. Policies and procedures that look effective on paper may be implemented poorly, rendering them ineffective. It was impractical to evaluate this aspect of the policies and procedures.

Therefore, the results of this study must be evaluated in light of the context in which these election systems are used. This emphasizes a key point often overlooked in the discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of electronic voting systems: those systems are part of a process, the election process; and the key question is whether the election process, taken as a whole, meets the requirements of an election as defined by the body politic.

The participants in this study hope our work contributes in some measure to answering that question. . . . [Continued]

California Election Reform News, February 11, 2007

California:

- Symposium with Steven Freeman, Paul Lehto & others, Oakland, Feb. 17, 2007
- Debra Bowen sworn in as California Secretary of State
- Lowell Finley appointed Deputy Secretary of State

National:

- Sen. Feinstein holds hearing on Election Integrity
- Rep. Holt's election protection bill, H.R. 811
- Diebold - security key reproduced from photo on website!
- Sequoia - easy to pick the lock.

===================================================================

California:

- Symposium with Steven Freeman, Paul Lehto & others, Oakland, Feb. 17, 2007

The Election Defense Alliance is sponsoring a symposium Sat., Feb. 17
at the Rockridge Library, from 10:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. It is titled:
"Are We a Democracy? Vote Counting in the United States"
Speakers will include Dr. Steven Freeman, author of "Was the 2004
Presidential Election Stolen?", Attorney Paul Lehto, Dr. Joshua
Mitteldorf, and others.

http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/Oakland_Symposium [223]

- Debra Bowen sworn in as California Secretary of State

Videos of the ceremony at:
http://www.debrabowen.com/inauguration [224]
Also included in a video, "Inaugurating Change", by Eon Productions (27
min.):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TYUv0-_oxCU [225]

- Lowell Finley appointed Deputy Secretary of State

Debra Bowen has appointed Lowell Finley as Deputy Secretary of State
in charge of voting system certification. He is the cofounder of
Voter Action, which is involved in suits in 10 states, including
the suit in Sarasota, Florida over the 18,000 undervotes in the
Congressional race.

http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2007/1/9/22729/17873 [226]
http://www.bradblog.com/?p=3999 [227]

National:

- Sen. Feinstein holds hearing on Election Integrity

Senator Diane Feinstein is now chair of the U. S. Senate
Committee on Rules and Administration, which has jurisdiction
over elections. The committee had a hearing titled:
"The Hazards of Electronic Voting: Focus on the Machinery of Democracy"
ON fEB. 7. For a list of witnesses and statements, see:

http://rules.senate.gov/hearings/2007/020707hrg.htm [228]

The committee is accepting comments from the public.
To send comments to the committee, send them to:

Adam_Ambrogi@rules.senate.gov [229]
Natalie_Price@rules.senate.gov [230]

Send them by Monday, Feb. 12 (sorry for the late notice).

- Rep. Holt's election protection bill, H.R. 811

Rep. Holt's bill is titled the "Voter Confidence and Increased
Accessibility Act of 2007". It already has 183 cosponsors. In the
previous Congress, Rep. Holt's H.R. 550 had 222 cosponsors (215
votes needed to pass a bill), but the House leadership would not
let it come to a vote. H.R. 811 is a lot better than H.R. 550 was,
but still has problems. Common Cause, People for the American Way,
and others are promoting it without regard for the problems, or
possibly hoping they will be fixed in committee. The best description
of the problems is at:

http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/board-auth.cgi?file=/1954/46667.... [231]

Scroll down past the cosponsors, and you will see links to the list
of problems with Rep. Holt's staff answers, plus other people's
comments.

- Diebold - security key reproduced from photo on website!

Diebold electronic voting machines use a memory card to store programs
and vote totals. This card is locked. However, Diebold had a picture
of the key on its web site which a blogger used to create an actual
key, which worked when tested on a real Diebold voting machine!
(Actually, since Diebold uses only one key model, the key would open
any Diebold voting machine anywhere in the country).

http://www.computerworld.com/blogs/node/4438 [232]

- Sequoia - easy to pick the lock.

A Princeton professor bought five Sequoia voting machines from
a government auction for $82, and a student picked the lock in
7 seconds!

http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/index.ssf?/base/news-11/1171172999136630.x... [233]

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California State Election Laws

Click here for a searchable compilation of California State Election Laws. [235]

California Voter Registration Information

California and Federal Legal Research Guide

http://www.publiclawlibrary.org/links.html [237]

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Research [245] links connect you to several websites that are
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legal research [246] and Federal legal research [247].
See the Mini Research Class [248] page
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Local links [249]. If you are looking for
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Forms and Rules [251] links.

General Legal Research:

Cornell Law School's Legal Information Institute
This
site is useful for researching your legal issues. The site contains
many "Law About" topic entries with general background information on
different legal subjects and a few "Topical Libraries" on issues such
as social security and legal ethics. The site is especially useful for
searching for United States Supreme Court opinions, Federal Circuit
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http://www.law.cornell.edu/ [252]

FindLaw
This site contains
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lawyers, and law related news and information. For California users,
the site contains California judicial opinions from 1934 forward. The
site is a product of Thomson/West, a legal publishing company.
http://www.findlaw.com/ [253]

California Resources:

California Legislature
Find your California senator or assemblyperson by zipcode. Links to all member's webpages.
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/yourleg.html [254]

California Constitution
Keyword
searchable version of the text of the California Constitution. Users
may also view the Constitution in a table of contents format.
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/const.html [255]

California Codes (statutes) online

Unannotated version of the current text of California's state
statutes. Users may display the text in a table of contents
or search by keyword.

http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/calaw.html [256]

California Code of Regulations-the laws from California's state agencies
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text of the regulations of California's state agencies. Users may view
a listing of state agencies, view contents, or search the entire 28
titles (with the exception of Title 24, the building codes).
http://www.calregs.com/ [257]

Updates to the California Code of Regulations/Regulatory Notice Register

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in the California Code of Regulations.

http://www.oal.ca.gov/notice.htm [258]

California state homepage-many links to law and government information sources
Includes
links to all California State administrative agencies, courts, and the
legislature. Use the state phone directory to contact any state
official.
http://www.ca.gov/state/portal/myca_homepage.jsp [259]

California Legislative Information (bills, analysis, committee reports)
The
official site of the legislative branch of California enables users to
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http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/ [260]

California Courts and case law finders-California
judicial opinions from 1850-to the present. Click on the opinions link
from the Judicial Council's site. On FindLaw, navigate to US Law: cases
and codes and select California.
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov [261] 
http://www.findlaw.com/ [253]

California Secretary of State
Find
many forms used in business filings and a wealth of information on
California businesses by accessing the site's Business Portal. Find the
forms and fees for forming a California corporation, limited liability
partnership, and more. Search for the status of a business entity to
find out who owns the business and who to serve as the agent for
service of process. Obtain access to UCC filings.
http://www.ss.ca.gov/ [262]

California Courts Self-Help Center
Site
contains forms, rules, links to courts, and the self-help center for
all California courts. Fill out forms on line for various types of
cases. Get detailed information on how to proceed with your case. Find
links that will help you complete your case without an attorney.
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp/ [263]

California state agencies-link to the state agency index
http://www.ca.gov/state/portal/myca_homepage.jsp [259]

California Attorney General opinions
California
Attorney General opinions from 1986 to the present. The attorney
general provides advisory opinions to state, local officials, or
government agencies on matters of law that arise in the course of their
duties.
http://caag.state.ca.us/opinions [264]

Federal Resources:

Federal Legislators-Senate and House Member Search
Identify and contact federal officials using this website.
http://www.congress.org/congressorg/home/ [265]

United States Constitution

Online text versions of the United States Constitution.
The GPO version has additional analysis and interpretation
done by the Congressional Research Service.

http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/constitution.table.html [266] 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/constitution/ [267]

United States Code

These sites provide searchable versions of the United States
Code. Codes can be searched by keyword, title, or section
number.

http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/ [268] 
http://uscode.house.gov/about.htm [269] 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/uscode/search.html [270]

Thomas (federal legislative information)

Congressional bills, Congressional Record, committee
reports and more. Users may track bills as they move through
the House and Senate, read and download the text of pending
bills and see how their representatives and senators vote.
The search feature allows users to look for bills by name,
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Record from 1989 to the present; committee reports from
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documents and presidential nomination information.

http://thomas.loc.gov/ [271]

GPO Access (access to federal administrative law and information)
Code of Federal Regulations, Federal Register

Full text of the Federal Register from 1994 forward. Full
text of the Code of Federal Regulations from 1996 to
the present.

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/index.html [272] 
http://www.regulations.gov/ [273]

Federal Agency index
http://www.washlaw.edu/doclaw/executive5m.html [274]

Federal administrative agency opinions
Search for federal agency opinions by agency or by subject.
http://www.lib.virginia.edu/govdocs/fed_decisions_agency.html [275]

Supreme Court of the United States
Access
the official site of the United States Supreme Court. Find information
on cases pending in front of the court, schedules for argument on
various pending cases, and the full text of the court's rules. The site
also contains opinions of the court from 1991-2001 in their bound
volume format; a case citation-finder; and the slip opinions of the
2001-current terms.
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ [276]

Federal Judiciary Homepage
Detailed links to all federal courts, federal court publications, and information on the federal judiciary.
http://www.uscourts.gov/ [277]

Federal Case law
FindLaw
contains United States Supreme Court opinions from 1893-current. Users
may search by name, citation, or keyword search the text. Federal
Circuit court opinions may be accessed through Cornell's Legal
Information Institute.
http://www.findlaw.com [278] 
http://www.law.cornell.edu:9999/USCA-ALL/search.html [279]

Pacer (Public Access to Court Electronic Records)
Electronic (for fee) access to U.S. District, Bankruptcy, and Appellate court records.
http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov [280]

Local Law:

Seattle Public Library site linking to municipal law-nationwide
Links to city and county codes available online from municipalities across the nation.
http://www.spl.org/default.asp?pageID=collection_municodes [281]

UC Berkeley Institute of Governmental Affairs-links to California local law resources
Local codes, ordinances, and charters from California local governments.
http://www.igs.berkeley.edu/library/calcodes.html [282]

Legal Directories:

California State Bar website-attorney finder and records of attorney discipline
Link
to California attorney information using the member search feature.
Also the site provides links to attorney referral services statewide,
and lists of state certified specialists.
http://www.calsb.org/ [283]

Martindale Hubbell Lawyer Locator
Find
attorneys by location, area of practice, and many other criteria such
as the language they speak, where they went to school, etc. This site
provides rating information for attorneys.
http://www.martindale.com/xp/Martindale/home.xml [284]

West's Legal Directory
Online attorney directory.
http://lawyers.findlaw.com/ [285]

Finding Law Schools, Law Library Catalogs Online, and California Public Libraries
http://www.washlaw.edu/lawschools.html [286] (law school finder)
http://www.washlaw.edu/lawcat/ [287] (law library catalogs online)
http://www.library.ca.gov/html/main.cfm [288] (California Library Directory)

Forms and Rules links:

LexisOne
LexisOne provides
many links of use to the legal researcher. Among those links provided
are some to free legal forms and also forms for purchase. LexisOne
allows users to purchase access to Shepard's to update their legal
research. The site also provides access to free case law (five years of
state and federal court opinions; United States Supreme Court opinions
from 1790). This site is operated by LexisNexis, a legal publishing
company.
http://www.lexisone.com [289]

I-CAN! Legal Modules
I-CAN!
is a web-based system that helps users create court paperwork and
educate themselves about how to proceed in their own legal matters. The
site contains a video guide that helps the user select and fill out
appropriate court forms in civil matters such as Domestic Violence,
Unlawful Detainer, Paternity, and more. I-CAN! is free of charge and is
available in English, Spanish, and Vietnamese. I-CAN! was developed by
the Legal Aid Society of Orange County and was sponsored by
organizations including: Legal Services Corporation, Judicial Council
of California, State Bar of California, Orange County Superior Court,
Orange County District Attorney, Orange County Public Library System,
Disneyland, City of Irvine, and the City of Fullerton.
http://www.icandocs.org/newweb/ [290]

State Judicial Council Forms-California
Official site for California's Judicial Council forms. Fill out online or print.
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/forms/ [291]

Forms from the Feds
Links to
downloadable federal agency forms, listed by agency. Useful place to
access forms from the INS, Copyright Office, and more.
http://exlibris.memphis.edu/resource/unclesam/forms.html [292]

USCourtforms.com
Links to
over 60,000 court forms nationwide. Some free forms are available and
many are interactive forms that may be filled in online.
http://www.uscourtforms.com [293]

California State Court Rules
Links to California Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal, Trial Court and Local court rules.
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/rules/ [294]

Court Rules-Law Library Resource Xchange
Links to over 1,400 sources for state and federal court rules. Browse or search by keyword.
http://www.llrx.com/courtrules/ [295]

Contract Provision for Public Disclosure of Voting System Software

The following contract provision, recently approved by the County of San Francisco
in negotiation with Sequoia Voting Systems, is presented here as an
example for implementing similar full software disclosure clauses in any contracts
with vendors providing electronic voting systems for public elections.

EDA does not endorse electronic voting systems; we're in favor of a complete transition
to hand-counted paper ballots (HCPB). But we do believe that full disclosure of any software
in any voting system is necessary, and must be paired with concurrent code verification
for the disclosure itself to constitute any meaningful public check on software-mediated voting processes.

Electronic voting is an existing fact; full-disclosure of voting system software is a minimal starting point--not a final solution-- for restoring some degree of public accountability and transparency to the privatized, secret-software voting systems that are already installed and operating in more than 96% of U.S. voting jurisdictions.

The following document was provided by Brent Turner.

Brent Turner is a California voting activist who works with Open Voting Consortium and The San Francisco Election Integrity League (SFEIL.org)
and was directly involved in getting the San Francisco County Board of Supervisors to approve this contract provision in their negotiations with Sequoia for an optical scan voting system for the City and County of San Francisco.

Brent is also an active participant in the Legislative Working Group of EDA.

Form Contract Provision for Public Disclosure

Section ___: Public Disclosure of Technology Required.

Prior to the delivery of any products, Vendor shall submit proof of
Public Disclosure in a form satisfactory to the City. At a minimum,
Vendor will affirm that it (1) has entered into an agreement for a
term concurrent with this agreement with the California Secretary of
State, the Open Voting Consortium, or other similar third party for
public access to the technology used in the subject products; (2) that
the disclosure is freely available through that third party to the
public at no cost; (3) the disclosure contains complete documentation,
including software source code of all hardware and software components
created or modified for the voting application; (4) the disclosure of
commercial off the shelf (COTS) components by manufacturer, model, and
revision; and (5) the disclosure of all product data sheets, manuals,
and other publicly available documentation for unmodified COTS
components.

Vendor is not required to provide hardware to the public for testing
purposes; however, the technology disclosure package shall be
sufficiently detailed such that competent engineers with the correct
tools can fully recreate the hardware and software systems.

In the event that the Public Disclosure Service becomes unavailable
from Vendor's provider, Vendor shall provide City proof, within 30
days of unavailability that Vendor has contracted with another third
party public disclosure service provider for disclosure as provided
herein for the remainder of the term of this agreement.

*************************

The following is a policy statement from the Open Voting Consortium, sent to the San Francisco County Elections Commission members, in advocacy for inclusion of the above software disclosure clause in the pending voting systems contract between San Francisco County and Sequoia.

DRAFT FROM OVC, JAN 22, 2007

SAN FRANCISCO POLICY ON DISCLOSURE OF VOTING SYSTEM TECHNOLOGY

Citizens have the right to know how their votes are counted. Technology
shall not be used in a voting system that interferes with this right to
know.

"Publicly Disclosed" technology refers to hardware and software whose design
details have been made public, freely available for public inspection. In
addition, the vendor of publicly disclosed technology grants the right to
the public to test the technology and publish the test results.

The technology disclosure package is an electronic file that contains all
the documents required to show exactly how the system works.

Voting system technology includes components specifically designed or
modified for the voting application, as well as components that are general
purpose commodity items (sometimes called COTS for
"commercial-off-the-shelf"). The vendor is not expected to reveal the inner
workings of unmodified COTS components. However, all unmodified COTS
components must be identified by manufacturer, model, and revision. In
addition, all product data sheets, manuals, and other publicly available
documentation should be included for unmodified COTS components in the
technology disclosure package.

All hardware and software components created or modified for the voting
application must have complete documentation, including software source
code, in the technology disclosure package.

"Open Source" technology refers to Publicly Disclosed technology where
additional rights have been conferred to the public. These additional rights
that go with open source software include the right to [1],

- Run the program for any purpose (not just testing)

- Adapt the program for your needs

- Freely redistribute copies

- Make improvements and release the improvements to the public

Open Source has additional features and benefits compared to Publicly
Disclosed source. Open Source enables [2]:

- Ensure interoperability

- Avoid vendor lock-in

- Avoid imposing technology decisions on the citizenry

- Drive cost effectiveness

- Enhance efficiency and service levels

- Ensure future access to information

- Ensure a level playing field for competition

- Maximize freedom of action, ensure flexibility

The City and County of San Francisco prefers "Open Source" -- and will
support efforts to reach this goal -- but requires, at a minimum, Public
Disclosure of all voting technology. The vendor is not required to freely
provide hardware to the public for testing purposes, but the technology
disclosure package shall be sufficiently detailed such that competent
engineers with the correct tools can fully recreate the hardware and
software systems.

All contracts that include the purchase of voting equipment executed by the
City and County of San Francisco shall include provisions for Public
Disclosure of Technology; specifically, the vendor must make arrangements to
have a complete technology disclosure package available for free public
download on Public Disclosure website, such as Open Voting Consortium, or
the California Secretary of State, or any other third party offering to make
publicly disclosed technology available for free download to the public. In
the event that the Public Disclosure service becomes unavailable from the
vendor's provider, the vendor agrees to make arrangements for Public
Disclosure with another entity within 30 days from the time the service
becomes unavailable from the original Public Disclosure service provider.

[1] Definition from Free Software Foundation

http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html [297]

[2] IBM presentation on Open Computing, Open Standards and Open Source
Recommendation for Governments

">http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/ad/ibm-oss.pdf [298]

Guide to CA Election Monitoring

Michelle Gabriel of the Voting Rights Task Force of Alameda County, CA
has compiled a training handbook for election monitoring based on CA
election code, and borrowing ideas from the BlackboxVoting Toolkit, the SAV R VOTE
(Riverside Co.) Election Monitoring Report, the DFA-NH report "We're Counting the Votes,"
other sources -- and her own experience as a pollworker and election observor.

You can view and open, or download and save the Election Monitoring Guide by clicking on the
file links you see immediately below, under the heading Attachments.
The guide is available in Word and PDF versions.

This is a work open to revision, and your comments and suggestions are welcomed and encouraged.
See below for the Table of Contents, and below that, click the attachment link to open the whole file.

Michelle is seeking monitors for the CA 11th Congressional District.
The 11th District covers portions of four counties in CA and is shaping up to be one of the most
contested House races in California this November 7.

Michelle is on the EDA Election Monitoring E-mail list.
You can communicate with her and other members of the EDA Election Monitoring Working Group
by subscribing to the E-mail list for this Working Group.

Look for the Discussion List heading in the top left corner of pages
in the Forums section of the EDA website.

Follow that link to the subscription page for the EDA working Groups.
Select Monitoring from the displayed list of EDA Group lists,
and follow the subscription instructions.

CA Election Monitoring Guide

TABLE OF CONTENTS

What can I observe -- summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Who can observe -- summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
What can I reconcile -- summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Pre-observing preparation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
What can I observe -- detail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Before the Election:

Observing preparation and operation
of tabulation devices programming, and testing . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Observing logic and accuracy testing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Observing absentee ballot processing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Pollworker training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Observing poll set up. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

During the Voting

Observing voting at the polls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Observing poll close. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
After the Polls Close
Observing chain of custody . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Observing central counting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Observe 1% manual tally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
What can I reconcile -- detail. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Prioritizing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Election Codes for Observing and Monitoring. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Election Codes for Reconcile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Examples of problems caught. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
How do I report an incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Joint Legislative Panel Hears of Widespread Failures in CA Primary

In response to widespread election breakdowns across California during the February 5th Primary Election, an unprecedented Joint Legislative Hearing heard testimony for more than five hours in Los Angeles Friday, March 7 concerning error-ridden voter registration rolls blocking eligible voters from voting, shortages of provisional ballots disenfranchising thousands, lax or nonexistenct ballot custody measures, and most notoriously, a completely avoidable, known ballot design issue that ended up voiding the candidate choices of 12,000 voters.

VIDEO: Tom Courbat, director of Save R Vote (and also EDA Coordinator for Election Monitoring) addressed the Joint Legislative hearing in Los Angeles, March 7, about problems he observed in Riverside County in the Feb. 5 primary election.
In addition to photo-documented evidence of election security violations, Tom told the panel that the state is failing to allocate adequarte resources to enforce existing election laws, and that the EI advocates who are doing the state's work to identify and document election problems need to be accorded more direct participation in investigatory hearings, instead of being relegated to the end of the agenda and limited to 60 seconds of speaking time.
Joining Secretary of State Debra Bowen on the hearing panel were the chairs of three California State Senate and Assembly committees charged with oversight of elections: Assemblymember Curren Price, Chair of the Assembly Elections and Redistricting Committee; Senator Ron Calderon, Chair of the Senate Elections, Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments Committee; and Senator Jenny Oropeza, Chair of the Senate Select Committee on Integrity of Elections. Two other senators, Mark Ridley-Thomas and Dean Flores rounded out the panel.

Foremost in the witness role were the Acting Registrar of Voters for LA County, Dean Logan, and former Registrar Conny McCormack, who hand-picked Logan as her successor. Other invited speakers were Contra Costa County Clerk Steve Weir, President of the California Association of County Elections Officials (CACEO), and representatives of the League of Women Voters, Common Cause, and California Voter Foundation.

More than 50 election integrity advocates turned out to give their testimony, but were scheduled at the very end of the hearing and in all but a few cases were allotted only 30 to 60 seconds each to speak.

The largest (known) disenfranchinsing incident in the state was the "Double Bubble" problem in Los Angeles County that initially threatened to disqualify the votes of nearly 60,000 "independent" voters (those not registered with any political party) who had voted for candidates in the California Democratic primary.

Not until EI advocates such as the LA Election Protection Task Force, Protect California Ballots [301], and the Courage Campaign raised public protest did the acting registrar of voters for LA County, Dean Logan, reverse his position and arrange to have the non-partisan ballots counted by hand.

In the end, there were still 12,000 ballots that went uncounted because of the double bubble problem.

The problem arises because the Inka Vote ballot cards have no candidate names or propositions printed on them. The only feature of these op scan ballots are the voting positions (bubbles) corresponding to candidates or propositions, to be marked by the voters.

Some of the ballot positions are keyed to the "double" bubble for either the Democratic or American Independent Party candidates. Cross-referencing precinct pollbooks with the ballots enabled determination of the voter intent in most of the cases, but only because of human hannd-counting, and even then, 12,000 ballots could not be resolved.

This arrangement of ballots without human-readable printing is wholly for the convenience of the scanners, and either difficult or impossible for purposes of human counting.

The scanners were programmed not to count any non-partisan ballots without the double bubble marked -- but they could have been programmed to kick back any such ballot for the voter to correct.

But that would have posed another problem, for the voters were not informed about the double bubble requirement as they went to vote at the polls and the pollworkers were not informed or trained to provide this crucial information to the voters.

For no good reason, LA has been using a ballot form designed 6 years ago [302] by recently retired Registrar of Voters Conny McCormack that requires non-affiliated voters to not only mark their choice for candidates, but also to fill in an additional ballot item, the "double bubble," indicating they are a non-partisan voter casting their vote in a political party primary. (The Democratic and American Independent parties are the only two of California's seven registered political parties that allow non-partisan voters to vote in their primary elections.)

The "Inka Vote" optical scanners that count Los Angeles ballots were programmed to disqualify non-partisan ballots that lacked a mark in the "double bubble" indicating a non-partisan voter's intent to cast a vote for a Democratic or American Independent candidate.

Election officials of Los Angeles County -- which accounts for one-fourth of the state's 30-million registered voters -- have known about the double bubble problem for four consecutive elections spanning the previous six years, and in each of those elections the bubble issue has resulted in the routine and predictable voiding of tens of thousands of votes.

A Los Angeles Times editorial of Feb. 18, 2008 [303] noted that: "Election officials are calling this a glitch, but the outcome was entirely foreseeable. In fact, it has happened before. In the March 2004 election, 44% of crossover ballots were unusable, and in June 2006, it was 42%."

Yet at the hearing, incredibly enough, McCormack testified that "no one could have foreseen" the double bubble problem this year.

Kim Alexander of the CalVoter Foundation had three solid recommendations that state and county officials should take immediate action to fulfill:

1. There needs to be a full accounting of all of the Decline-to-State ballots;

2. There needs to be a thorough, outside investigation; and

3. Los Angeles needs to move to a paper ballot voting system where the candidates and choices appear directly on the ballot.

Senator Jenny Oropeza indicated there is a likelihood of passing “urgency legislation” that would take effect immediately

Brad Friedman has published a chronology of the "Double Bubble" fiasco [304] that includes numerous links to LA-area press accounts and video of the Los Angeles hearing [305] shot by BradBlog contributor Alan Breslauer.

Marin County Election Integrity Progress Report 10/30/06

[A model example of what concerted citizen action at the local county level can accomplish]

Date: October 30, 2006 3:04:59 AM PST

Subject: Marin County election integrity update
This update is going out to folks interested in Marin County election integrity issues. I wanted to keep you abreast of the progress we are making in securing our local elections and ask you to please take action (see item 2, below).

CONTENTS:
1. Progress Since May 2006
2. Take Action
3. Election Integrity Volunteers Needed
4. Remaining Issues of Concern
5. Learn More About Election Integrity Issues

1. Progress Since May 2006

With help from many of you who wrote emails and attended Board of Supervisors meetings, the Registrar of Voters office has implemented many of our requested reforms:

- Reduced recount costs, though they are still high. In November 2004 a recount of the Marin Healthcare Board race was quoted at about $160,000, or about $1.49 a ballot. In November 2005 a recount of the Fairfax Town Council race was quoted at about $15,500, or about $4.06 a ballot. However, after recount costs were reduced, a recount request for the Secretary of State primary race (Marin County ballots only) in June 2006 was quoted at $31,931, or about $0.47 a ballot. This is a notable improvement, though it is still high and unaffordable in some cases. For example, the entire No on Measure R campaign (SMART) is being done under $35,000. The new recount pricing would be unaffordable for them. (I estimated a countywide recount assuming a 70% turnout would cost approx. $49,000.)

- Posted recount costs on the web. These can be found in the Recount Procedures at http://co.marin.ca.us/depts/RV/main/Documents/Recount_Procedures.pdf [307], although it is vague.

- Expanded the hand-count audit to 3%. The California Election Code requires a 1% hand-count audit of the ballots as a check on the accuracy of the voting machines, but mathematicians have determined 1% is not sufficient to detect fraud. We asked the Registrar, Elaine Ginnold, to increase the percentage audited. She has asked a researcher at U.C. Berkeley to study the issue of what an optimal percentage for a manual tally would be. The researcher has also agreed to study the issue of what percent spread between winning and losing candidates should trigger a recount of the contest. In the meantime, Elaine has agreed to expand the audit to 3% of precincts for this November's election, a temporary measure until the study is completed. To give you a feel for the degree to which this is a safeguard, election integrity advocates have calculated that if a hypothetical 15% of precincts had fraud, a 3% audit (6 or 7 precincts) would have a 63-69% probability of finding it.

- Absentees will be audited in same manner as poll site ballots. Elaine Ginnold has agreed to include absentees in the 3% hand-count audit, auditing all races by precinct. Auditing by precinct is important so the public can compare the results of the hand tally with the official election results, which are reported by precinct.

- Randomly select precincts for audit. The county has a set of 10-sided dice they are using to select which precincts will be included in the post-election hand tally audit. The public is notified in advance of the date and time of the selection, so we can attend and observe. For the November 7 election, the random selection of precincts is tentatively scheduled for Monday, Nov. 20 at 8:30 a.m. at the ROV's office, rm. 121 of the county Civic Center, with the hand-tally audit to commence afterward. The 10-sided dice method was developed by a team of researchers at UC Berkeley.

- Established a Marin County Election Advisory Committee so the public can give input to the elections process. Members are: Greg Brockbank, Linda Bagneschi Dorrance, Susan Clark, Shirley Graves, Julie Grantz, Richard Hill, Mark Kyle, Anne Layzer, Donald Linker, David O'Connor, Donald Pino, Sherry Reson, Carlos Sanchez, Cat Woods, Patrick Connally, John Young, Carl Carter, Jeanne Leoncini, and Barbara Gaman. Two subcommittees have been formed: 1) Election Integrity and Voter Confidence and 2) Voter Outreach and Education. Members of the public are welcome to attend all meetings. The next meeting of the full advisory committee will be Dec. 8, 9:30-11:30 a.m.

Close races: Elaine also said she will consider doing an automatic machine recount during the canvass period if the percentage spread between a winning and losing candidate is equal to or less than 0.5%. The recount would be done on a different machine than the one used on election day, and the ROV (Registrar of Voters) will consider hand counting additional precincts in the contest if time permits.

Reforms we requested but did not get are:

" A public hand recount of recent close races, including the Nov. 2005 Fairfax Town Council race and the Nov. 2004 Marin Healthcare Board race.
" Expansion of the post-election hand-tally audit to 5%.
" Charge at most a nominal cost for recounts, and build recount costs into the cost of an election, to be paid for by the agencies requesting the election services.

2. Take Action:

Email the ROV and Board of Supervisors thanking them for implementing many of our requested election integrity reforms, and ask them to further reduce recount costs. Below is suggested text you can cut and paste. It's important to send a "thank you" to let them know we appreciate their responsiveness and encourage them to follow through on their commitments.

Send it to: EGinnold@co.marin.ca.us [308], MBriones@co.marin.ca.us [309], sadams@co.marin.ca.us [310], hbrown@co.marin.ca.us [311], CMcGlashan@co.marin.ca.us [312], skinsey@co.marin.ca.us [313], cmurray@co.marin.ca.us [314], eplinda@aol.com [315].

Suggested text:

Ms. Elaine Ginnold, Marin County Registrar of Voters:

I recently learned about the various actions the County is taking to enhance election security and wanted to thank you for your responsiveness to community concerns. Measures such as expanding the hand-tally audit to 3% of precincts, auditing absentees by precinct, randomly selecting precincts for the audit, and establishing an elections advisory committee are very encouraging.

Please consider further reducing recount costs in time for the upcoming election. I appreciate that you have already reduced recount costs considerably compared to the past. However, at approximately $0.47 per ballot for a countywide race, recounts are still unaffordable in some cases. For example, the entire No on Measure R campaign (SMART) is being done under $35,000. A representative from that campaign confirmed the new recount pricing is entirely unaffordable for them. (At approx. $0.47/ballot a countywide recount assuming a 70% turnout would cost about $49,000.)

Please let me know what you plan to do. Thank you again for the positive steps you are taking to secure our elections.

Best Regards,
(your name and city)

3. Election Integrity Volunteers Needed

" Marin County election monitors: Email eplinda@aol.com [315] if you would like to help observe: the processing of absentee ballots, the polls on election day or evening, the post-election canvass, or the 3% hand tally audit. If you are working on behalf of a candidate or measure in a close race, you might be especially interested in observing the 3% hand tally, which begins at 8:30 a.m. on 11/20 (tentative) at the ROV's office.

" Phone bank for Debra Bowen, Sec. of State campaign: Sign up for phone banking at www.debrabowen.com/ [213]. Electing Debra Bowen to CA Secretary of State is the most important thing we can do right now to enhance election security across the state. Watch her debate against Schwarzenegger-appointed Bruce McPherson at http://cbs5.com/ [316], click on CBS5.com Voter Guide.

" California Election Protection Network: CEPN has a host of different committees you can sign up for. Register at http://www.CAprotect.org/ [317] or email eplinda@aol.com [315].

4. Remaining Issues of Concern

Following are some remaining election integrity issues that still need to be resolved (partial list). Some of these issues are being discussed via the County's Election Integrity and Voter Confidence Subcommittee:

" Security of absentee ballots - Voting by absentee ballot has additional vulnerabilities that poll site voting does not. For example: it is difficult for election monitors to observe all aspects of the absentee process since it occurs over several weeks; insufficient/unknown security at post office, post office subcontractors, and mail houses; possibly en-route ballot disappearances/add-ons; concern about the possibility of selling votes; etc.
" Implement recommendations of the Brennan Center Task Force on Voting System Security - See http://www.brennancenter.org/presscenter/releases_2006/pressrelease_2006... [318].
" Need to trust the insiders - The method of administering elections in California requires that we trust the insiders (the county ROV and elections staff). While we hope we can trust the elections staff in most counties, it would naïve to think we can trust all elections staff in all counties all the time. Many election integrity advocates want a return to hand-counting paper ballots at the poll site, and/or rigorous audits of machine counts before the ballots leave the poll site.
" Make copies of ballots available to public at no charge. This way folks can conduct unofficial recounts themselves at no charge. Adds a critical layer of transparency.
" Need to better understand County's security and chain-of-custody procedures for absentee ballots, memory cards, the central scanner, post office, mail houses, printers, reporting results to the Secretary of State, storing ballots and poll site scanners at the elections office, security seals, etc.
" Election-integrity problems in the state election code.

And more.

5. Learn More About Election Integrity Issues

See www.Countedascast.com [319].

Was the 2004 Election Stolen? By Robert F. Kennedy Jr., Rolling Stone, 5-1-06, http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/060106R.shtml [320]

Will the Next Election Be Hacked? By Robert F. Kennedy Jr., Rolling Stone, 10-5-06, http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/092106R.shtml [321]

Please forward this email to anyone you think would be interested. To be added to the email list to receive these updates, email eplinda@aol.com [315]. To be removed from the list, reply to eplinda@aol.com [315] with "unsubscribe" in the subject line.

Sincerely,
Linda Bagneschi Dorrance
Member, Marin County Election Advisory Committee and Election Integrity and Voter Confidence Subcommittee

The Bowen CA Senate Hearings on Elections and Voting, 2005-06

Transcripts of each of the California Senate Election Committee hearings convened by Sen. Bowen  during 2005 and 2006 are online at this web address: http://www.sen.ca.gov/ftp/SEN/COMMITTEE/STANDING/EL/_home/HearingTranscripts/ [322]
Each of the hearings is listed below with links to the transcripts so you can download them directly from this page.

If you weren't able to attend these hearings in person, now you can read what you missed. If you were there but couldn't believe your ears the first time, check out in print what the registrars, vendors, and Sec. of State officials actually said! Leading luminaries in computer security, the nation's most informed secretary of state candidate, and of course you, the passionate voting rights activists of California are all here in searchable HTML. There probably isn't a better collection of public discussions on the current status of American elections. Collect them all! (all links at above URL)

Voting Rights Task Force, Alameda County

VTRF History

The Voting Rights Task Force (VRTF) was formed shortly after the presidential election of 2004. It's first success was to kickstart the effort to convince Senator Boxer to stand up with the citizens of Ohio to insist that Congress review of the 2004 election results. That was followed by the first national election integrity teach-in, held in Oakland in February of 2005.

In May 2005, the Alameda County supervisors were about to purchase 3000 Diebold touchscreen machines. A persistent, respectful lobbying effort convinced the supervisors to dump Diebold, buy only one (Sequoia) touchscreen machine per polling place, and to have every vote cast on those machines hand-checked in the November, 06 election. We also succeeded for a while in convincing the supervisors to run a security vulnerability test of the machines, though in the end they broke their promise to do so.

The VRTF supported State Senator Debra Bowen in her efforts to pass good election reform laws.

The VRTF has been present at numerous hearings in Sacramento, speaking out for fair and accurate elections.

The VRTF worked very hard to get Debra Bowen elected Secretary of State.

VRTF members help lead the monitoring effort in the 10 congressional district in the 2006 election. This covered 4 counties, and involved many hundreds of people.

The VRTF has worked hard to educate the public about election integrity issues. This included speeches, workshops, and publication of the following websites :
www.ElectionDefenseAlliance.org [200]
www.Election-Reform.org [202]
www.ElectBowen.org [201]
www.CountedAsCast.com [203]

VRTF home page: http://www.wellstoneclub.org/com_votingrtf.htm [330]

See Also: http://www.countedascast.com/alameda/vrtf.php [33]

Jim Soper
VRTF Co-Chair
510 258 4857
www.CountedAsCast.com [203]

VRTF In Action

Spearheaded the effort to convince Senator Boxer to stand up with the citizens of Ohio to insist that Congress review the 2004 election results before accepting the state slates of electors (1/05)

Organized first national election integrity teach-in that drew leading speakers from all over the country. Resulted in a film "Vote Rigging 101" (2/05)

Strongly supported Senator Debra Bowens bills so that they could be come law. Most significantly, the bill that required that paper audit trails actually be used to check the vote. (9/05)

Made a critical contribution to the election of Debra Bowen as Secretary of State (4/06 - 11/06). This was the 2nd most important election in the US in 2006 (After the Virigina senatorial election that gave the democrats a majority in the Senate).

This campaign included:
- intense lobbying at the democratic convention to get her an 80+% endorsement of the party
- tireless phone banking and leafleting at BART stations, movie theaters, and even Raider games
- a non-stop effort to get the message out to clubs, newspapers, and radio stations
- houseparties to raise money for the campaign

In May of 05, Alameda county was on the verge of buying 3,000 Diebold touchscreen DREs. For the next year and a half the VRTF lead the fight for fair and accurate elections.

This effort included educating the Board of Supervisors in public hearings, and private meetings, initiating petitions, and emails and phone calls to the supervisors to insist on fair and accurate elections, holding press conferences and talks to local civic groups to educate the public, and writing numerous letters to the editor.

The result was, that in November 2006, voters in Alameda county:

- voted primarily on paper ballots
- the county save millions of dollars by purchasing only 1 touchscreen DRE per polling place (about 800 total)
- Diebold machines were thrown out of the county
- 100% fo all votes cast on touchscreen DREs were double-checked
- the county held a security assessment of the voting systems and procedures that, while far from sufficient, was more thorough than any county had conducted

Note: The certification conditions required by Secretary of State Bowen in July of 07 parallel the "Alameda model" - 1 touchscreen machine per polling place, vote primarily on paper, 100% audit of all votes on touchscreen DREs

Has spoken up in favor of fair and accurate elections at public hearings in Sacramento, for years - including organizing press conferences and rallies. At at least one hearing the VRTF was the only organization in Sacramento to speak up for democracy.

Has held meetings with the staffs of Senators Boxer and Feinstein, and Congresswomen Pelosi and Lofgren, to encourage legislation that would support fair and accurate elections nationwide (2006)

Educated the public at clubs, and websites through the Solano Stoll about the issues. (The VRTF also won 2nd prize for best "float" for the 200? Solano Stoll !)

Member authored websites include the ElectionDefenseAlliance.org, Election-Reform.org, and CountedAsCast.com
Dan Ashby : www.ElectionDefenseAlliance.org [200]
Jerry Berkman : www.ElectBowen.org [201], www.Election-Reform.org [202]
Jim Soper : www.CountedAsCast.com [203]

VRTF efforts are continuing with the Stand Firm with Debra Bowen project, and proposals for new legislation to make elections in California more secure and accurate.

Workshops by Michelle and Jim on election integrity issues:

Voting Machines 101 was given on 9/20/06, by Jim Soper
Election Monitoring was given on 10-11-06, by Michelle Gabriel

Previous Presentations:

The Voting Rights Task Force
with the support of KPFA Free Speech Radio, 94.1 FM
PRESENTS

ELECTIONS in CRISIS!
Who's Cheating, and What We Can Do About It

An All-Day Expose´ of Vote Rigging and Suppression in Election 2004
featuring the nation's foremost fraud investigators, the best election documentaries you've never seen, action proposals by participating organizations, and follow-through networking

TUESDAY, September 13, Noon to 10 p.m.
Grand Lake Theater, 3200 Grand Avenue, Oakland

Featured Speakers

BOB FITRAKIS and STEVEN ROSENFELD, Ohio Free Press,
Did George W. Bush Steal America's 2004 Election? -- Essential Documents

BEV HARRIS, investigative reporter and founder of Black Box Voting.org,
The Mechanics of Vote-Rigging: How They Do It

Introductions by Larry Bensky, Pacifica National Affairs Correspondent, Radio KPFA

Schedule

Act 1: Afternoon Fraud Fest of Documentary Shorts and Features, 12:00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m.
Suggested Donation: $6.00

Act 2: Evening Program: Elections In Crisis! 7:00 p.m. - 9:00 p.m.
Suggested Donation: $10.00

Act 3: Networking to Reclaim Democracy 9:00 p.m. - 10:00 p.m.
Priceless

Colorado Counties Moving to Paper in Wake of E-voting Decertifications

Original article appears at: http://www.montrosepress.com/articles/2007/12/28/news/doc47748ec0b6ce180... [331]

County will conduct '08 election on paper ballots
By Katharhynn Heidelberg
Daily Press Senior Writer

Montrose, CO -- County residents can consider this year's election a warm-up for 2008's.

"We'll be using paper ballots," Montrose County Commissioner Bill Patterson said Thursday. "We'll be using it the same way we did it in 2007."

Several components of Montrose County's Hart InterCivic voting machines were de-certified by Colorado Secretary of State Mike Coffman last week. Coffman had required all four of the state's electronic voting equipment vendors to undergo re-certification in the wake of a 2006 court order stemming from a lawsuit over electronic voting machines.

Coffman de-certified some systems manufactured by three of the state's four vendors, including Hart. His report said some of Hart's equipment was conditionally approved for certification, if specified changes were made.

Hart spokesman Peter Lichtenheld previously said the company disagrees with the decision and may appeal. The company also questioned the process Coffman used.

The remedies called for were too expensive, Montrose County Clerk and Recorder Fran Tipton Long said Thursday, and that prompted her decision to use a paper ballot. (Long will retain a disabled access unit at each polling place; these are required by law.) She also plans to obtain a new, larger optical scanner that can count ballots quickly.

The scanner must be approved by the SOS and is expected to cost the county more than its current scanner, the price tag of which was $10,000.
If the new scanner is not certified, the county will resort to hand-counting, which will delay election results.

"But it's better than alternately having to buy DREs (direct recording electronic machines) that have been conditionally approved," Long said of scanner costs.

She was faced with a similar decision in 2007, when the state lagged behind in getting machines re-certified per the 2006 court order. The state said vendors had been sluggish in responding to requests for information.

Rather than spend money on machines that could be de-certified, Long decided to hold a paper-ballot election for 2007 -- and now, for 2008.

To bring equipment up to state re-certification requirements this time around, she would not only have to pay for upgrades, but also hire and train at least 10 more people. "One million dollars is a conservative figure," Long said of the possible overall costs.

"That's why I'm not willing to use an electronic machine at this time. I have full confidence in the electronic machines, but we are not going to expend additional taxpayer dollars," she said.

"It's not that their equipment is bad, it's that the state is looking at higher standards. But in doing so, they've really put a fiscal burden on the counties."

Long also said future elections were an issue, no matter how much money was spent on the current system. "We want something that's going to last for a while."

Coffman said in a Wednesday news release that he supported using paper ballots for the 2008 election, but he couldn't support allowing the all-mail election advocated by the Colorado County Clerks Association.

He said federal law still requires a handicapped-accessible voting machine to be available everywhere that voters are allowed to drop off ballots.

"No matter how the Legislature ultimately decides to conduct the election, we will still need some electronic voting machines," he said.

"Today, voters in general elections have the ability to either vote by absentee ballot or in person at a polling place. I think these choices ought to be preserved."

Long said an all-mail election would give counties breathing room.

"We need a time-out period, only for 2008, so that we're not rushed on picking equipment. We want something for 2008 and the future. We want to do this right and slowly," she said.

"I need to do what is right for our citizens. It's nothing we created ourselves; it's a reaction to what's been handed down by the secretary of state. I'm trying to take a proactive stance and not be sitting on the fence come Election Day."

Colorado Lawsuit Filed to Bar E-Voting in November Election

Go to original article in Rocky Mountain News [332]

Colorado SoS Coffman Advocates Paper Ballots in ’08

Original article published by Craig Daily Press at: http://www.craigdailypress.com/news/2007/dec/27/craig_briefs_dec_27/ [336]

Colorado SoS Coffman Advocates Paper Ballots in ’08

Craig, CO — Mike Coffman, Colorado Secretary of State, will make a recommendation to the state Legislature that a polling place election using paper ballots be utilized for the 2008 presidential election, he announced Wednesday.

“I have more confidence in having votes cast on paper ballots at the polls rather than relying exclusively on electronic voting machines or in voting by mail,” Coffman said, in a press relase. “If Douglas County had paper ballots available for voters at their vote centers in the 2006 mid-term election they would not have the distinction of having the last vote cast in the country sometime after 1:00 a.m. on the following day.”

Coffman recently decertified many electronic voting machines and optical scan devices used in Colorado. He questioned the security and accuracy of the voting equipment and wants the problems resolved in time for the 2008 election.

The Secretary of State does not support a majority of county clerks across the state who want the legislature to approve an all-mail ballot for next year’s presidential election.

“Today, voters in general elections have the ability to either vote by absentee ballot or in person at a polling place,” Coffman said in the release.
“I think these choices ought to be preserved.”

Though he disagrees with the growing sentiment among county clerks for an all-mail ballot, Coffman acknowledges the clerks are overwhelmed with managing an election process that is “continually changing and becoming more and more challenging.”

“County clerks are the hardest working elected officials in Colorado, and I fully understand that switching to an all-mail ballot system will lighten their load considerably, and that’s something for the Legislature to consider,” he said. “Whichever way the Legislature chooses to go, I will work with them as well as the county clerks to make it the best election possible.”

Colorado Voter Registration Information

Attached is the Colorado Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT:  Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

Colorado's 7th District (US House)

PBS News Hour profile of Colorado's 7th Congressional District and another close election in midterm 2006: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/vote2006/profile/co_7.html [338]

Conneticut Voter Registration Information

Attached is the Conneticut Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT:  Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

Delaware Voter Registration Information

Delaware Voter Registration Database Report:
State Regulations and Procedures Implementing HAVA Voter Registration Requirements

Attached is the Delaware Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT: Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

Florida's 15th District

This is a map of Florida's 15th District in Brevard County.

Florida Attorney General Investigating ES&S-Premier Merger

Voting-Machine Firm Merger Investigated

Florida's attorney general is investigating a voting-machine company merger that has voting-rights groups worried that the move will concentrate too much power over democracy in one private company.

Similar Stories:

DCCC's Florida Race Analysis

http://www.dccc.org/races/states/fl/ [345]

Florida Voter Registration Information

Florida Voter Registration Database Report:
State Regulations and Procedures Implementing HAVA Voter Registration Requirements

Attached is the Florida Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT: Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

Sarasota Initiative Offers Voters Choice of Paper or Vapor

Sarasota County (Florida) Voters Will Choose Voting Technology

From the Lakeland (Florida) Ledger, Saturday, September 16, 2006

See original article in Lakeland Ledger [235]

OR: http://tinyurl.com/l4jbg [235]

SARASOTA
Voters in this Southwest Florida county [Sarasota] will be able to decide in November whether to continue using computerized voting booths or go back to paper ballots, a circuit judge ruled.

County attorneys argued a proposed ballot initiative asking voters to choose between the county's current electronic voting and the old paper system was unconstitutional. But Circuit Judge Robert B. Bennett Jr. ruled Wednesday that the initiative was legal.

Sarasota is among several Florida counties that bought paperless touch-screen voting machines after the controversy surrounding paper ballots in the 2000 election.

A group called Sarasota Alliance for Fair Elections ( http://www.safevote.org [53] ) is challenging the reliability of the machines, saying electronic voting leaves no paper trail and is vulnerable to tampering.

VoterGA Seeks Summary Judgment June 9 in State E-Voting Lawsuit

May 27, 2008
Garland Favorito of VoterGA writes:

Mark your calendars now. At long last we will get our first day in court. On Monday June 9 Todd Harding, with assistance from our lead counsel, Walker Chandler, will make an oral argument in support of his motion for Summary Judgment to remove the unverifiable voting machines throughout Georgia.

The Defendants will argue their motion to dismiss all counts of the lawsuit. All motions are posted on the voterga.org web site under the legal suit tab [ http://voterga.org/more/index.cfm?Fuseaction=more_15725 [347] ].
The arguments will take place at 9:00 am in Fulton Co. Superior Court. Judge Johnson is the presiding judge.

The motion for Summary Judgment seeks to ban the Diebold AccuVote TS-R6 from Georgia on the grounds that sole reliance on an electronic ballot cannot provide protection equal to that of an absentee paper ballot used in Georgia.

The motion also seeks to ban the Diebold GEMS servers that are currently used to count both the electronic and optical scan votes in Georgia on the grounds that the state has already admitted that they cannot detect fraudulent manipulation of the vote and thereby they abridge the right to vote.

The motion further seeks to ban the Diebold AccuVote TSX machines piloted in Georgia on the grounds that their sequentially rolled election results jeopardize secrecy of the ballot as required by the Georgia Constitution, a point already admitted in a report from the office of the current Secretary of State.

Should any or all of these counts be upheld most of the arguments can be used in other states so they will have a nationwide impact.

If you are a Georgian, WE NEED YOU THERE. I am asking everyone who can make it to please come out and show that you support the lawsuit to restore the integrity of Georgia voting. Please wear your VoterGa pins or other related badges of support. This is our chance to make an impression on the judge that we care. I would expect the oral arguments to run less than one hour.

Click here for more detail [349]

You can click here to make a donation [350] or mail your contribution to:

Voter GA
P.O. Box 808
Decatur, Ga. 30031

Please remember that all contributions are fully tax deductible and that your entire contribution goes to exclusively to offset legal fees because we are an all volunteer organization.

We expect to receive a ruling in July.

Garland

404 664-4044

A Georgia State Audit Trail Chronology

A Georgia State Audit Trail Chronology

On or about March 1, 2001 the Senate State and Local Government Operations Committee (SLOGO) passed SB 213; and on or about March 13, 2001 the House Government Affairs Committee passed the bill.

On or about March 21, 2001, the General Assembly passed the bill that was amended by the House, and it was signed by the governor as Act 166 of the Georgia Legislature on or about April 18, 2001.

On or about March 7, 2002 the Ethics Committee passed SB 414; on or about April 1, 2002 the House Governmental Affairs Committee passed the bill; and on or about April 12, 2002 the General Assembly passed the bill as amended by the House.

Dubious Prosecution of Georgia Election Tech Dismissed

Georgia Election Case Dismissed After Questionable Prosecution

Georgia Supreme Court Rejects Challenge to DRE Machines

Source: AJC
http://www.ajc.com/news/georgia-politics-elections/court-upholds-touchscreen-voting-148666.html
Court Upholds Touchscreen Voting

By BILL RANKIN
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution    10:51 a.m. Monday, September 28, 2009

The Georgia Supreme Court on Monday upheld the use of touch-screen voting, rejecting claims the machines violate the right to vote.
In a unanimous ruling, the court turned back a challenge by a group of citizens who filed suit three years ago in Fulton County Superior Court. A judge had previously dismissed the suit, ruling in favor of state officials.

The group claimed their fundamental right to vote is harmed because the recording, counting and retention of their votes, unlike paper ballots, are not being properly protected, which can prevent fraudulent manipulation of the results.

But the state high court, in a ruling written by Justice George Carley, found the use of touchscreen voting systems does not severely restrict the right to vote. 

Download the Court Ruling [355]
 
 
photocredit: eyspahn
Georgia's Supreme Court upheld a lower court ruling
affirming state's right to use electronic voting machines

VoterGA Response to Today's Ruling

VoterGa Supporters,

The Georgia Supreme Court ruled today that our current form of un-auditable voting does not infringe upon the fundamental right to vote and to have our vote counted. This ruling essentially gives the state a license to pretend to conduct elections.

Not one of the 100+ million votes that have been cast on the machines since 2002 can be audited for accuracy and correctness of vote recording. Georgia  law in 2001 and 2002 required that any new machines have an independent audit trail of each vote cast.

The state’s own witnesses have acknowledged that the specific type of electronic voting machines we purchased and use do not have such an independent audit trail. The machines can only internally recreate selections that may or may not have been shown to voter. Without an independent audit trail, it is impossible to determine whether the actual ballots cast on Election Day were recorded correctly. Auditable electronic voting machines were available for purchase in 2002 as they are today.

When one or two officials can commit the state of Georgia to a $ 54 million purchase of voting equipment that was illegal at the moment of purchase, there must be some mechanism of accountability. Otherwise, public officials can operate above the law.

In this particular case, the previous boss of former Secretary of State Cox, who signed the purchase agreement, was the lobbyist for Diebold, the voting machine vendor. When the people have no recourse even for a standard trial of evidence , they become slaves to their government rather than the masters of it.

The Georgia Supreme Court also upheld the remarkable lower court decision that no trial is warranted on any count of the 13-count legal suit. The Georgia Supreme Court declined to overturn that lower court decision in spite of 17 disputes of facts cited in lower court conclusions and 41 disputes of facts cited against claims made by the state to Georgia Supreme Court.

Several of these disputes involved claims that were directly contradicted by the evidence in the record and clearly cited. Summary judgment dismissals, such as the one that the Georgia Supreme Court has just upheld, are rare in this type of case because standard procedures for any court in America require the court to hear the evidence in order to determine the facts before reaching a conclusion.

Now that the state has proven not to  be unable to rule against itself on any count, some Constitutional parts of the case could be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. While offering a more substantive decision than the lower court, the Georgia Supreme Court did not cite U.S. Supreme Court rulings related to ballot counting and recounting to corroborate its decision. All such U.S. Supreme Court rulings confirm that ballot counting and recounting requires strict scrutiny.

On the contrary, the Georgia Supreme Court decided that the state need only have a rational basis for implementing the voting systems. Even so, there is no rational basis for implementing a voting system that violates the law.

--Garland Favorito
www.voterga.org

P.S. I will send a follow-up e-mail on possible  next steps once we have had time to analyze the decision.

Download the Court Ruling [355]

.

Georgia Supreme Court To Hear VoterGA Suit, July 13

Editor's Note:

The VoterGA lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of Georgia's all-DRE voting system, is one of the most important election integrity legal cases in the nation.  After years working its way through the Georgia courts, this case is coming before the Georgia Supreme Court for an oral argument hearing this coming Monday, July 13th.

The VoterGA coalition is seeking donations to cover at least some of the considerable legal expenses they've incurred.
Please consider sending VoterGA a donation [356] .

Also please forward this article to others, using the "Send to Friend" and "Share This" links at the foot of this article (see more at Read More).

Thank you --  Election Defense Alliance

==========================

A Message from Garland Favorito and VoterGA

Click here for more detailed map [349]

Motions & Case Information: www.voterga.org [357]

Additional articles on the evolution of this lawsuit:  http://electiondefensealliance.org/georgia [358]

Georgia Voter Registration Information

Attached is the Georgia Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT:  Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

HB 790 Precinct Audit Superior to Standard Random Audits

Advantages of HB 790 Precinct Audit Over Standard Random Audits

*Note: HB 790 from the prior legislative session has been updated and divided into two related bills, HB 858 and HB 859, addressing DRE and optical scan voting systems.
See below for full text of each.

The following discussion of HB 790 provides context for the successor bills 858 and 859.

The proposed Georgia state audit bill, HB790, is unique in that it provides audit protection beyond normal voter-verified paper trail provisions in current federal and state electronic voting law. In addition to standard features such as requiring a voter-verified permanent paper record, and designating that paper record as the “official” ballot for audit, recount, count verification and election challenges, the bill also includes a unique, precinct-level approach to auditing. This precinct audit provision offers a more public, localized, comprehensive, and extensive audit practice than what has been available in any other electronic voting legislation to date.

The precinct audit provision stipulates that each precinct will conduct a public manual count on a contested race selected randomly at the precinct on election night.

Any discrepancies are to be posted on the door at the precinct, included with the precinct election results, and posted publicly on county web sites and reported to the state. These instant audit checks would allow 3000+ Georgia precincts to randomly verify every election race count multiple times while avoiding the burden on poll workers to hand count all races at each precinct -- (a concern of legislators). Here is a comparative overview of the HB 790 precinct audit methodology vs. standard random audits that some states currently employ:

Standard Random Audits:

A standard random audit for an electronic voting machine implementation might typically hand count 5% of the precinct ballots. There are several major problems with this approach.

• Only about 5% of the actual races may be audited leaving the other 95% unprotected and open to errors or fraud.

• The decision as to what precincts are audited can be predetermined by one person.

• One audit controller and one election programmer can collude to control the outcome of an election.

• The auditing typically takes place at state or country tabulation centers without public participation.

• The audit results are typically produced after original results have been reported and, in several cases, they have never replaced original erroneous results.

HB790 Precinct Audits:

The HB790 precinct audits eliminate problems associated with standard random audits in several ways.

• Georgia, having just over 3,000 precincts and an average of 300 total contested races in an election, would audit every race on an average of twice in every county.

• The decisions as to what races to hand count are made publicly at the precinct and cannot be controlled by one individual.

• The hand count is performed in full public view at the precinct on election night and cannot be altered.

• Discrepancies are publicly posted at the precinct and on the county web site for future verification.

Conclusion:

The HB7980 random audit provision is a bold, historic move to return a key part of the election process back to the citizens. (Georgians had already ceased counting ballots at the precincts years before the introduction of electronic voting). HB 790 provides auditing that is far superior to what is implemented in other states. If HB 790's provisions are implemented in any Georgia bill, that would serve as a foundation to make Georgia the national model for electronic voting legislation.

---

Updated Versions of the Precinct Audit Proposals fr the 2008-2009 Legislative Session

Opti Scan:
http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2007_08/sum/hb858.htm [360]

A BILL to be entitled an Act to amend Chapter 2 of Title 21 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to elections and primaries generally, so as to provide for the duplicating of certain damaged optical scan ballots; to provide for certain recounts; to provide for additional grounds for challenging an election; to provide for a random hand count of optical scan ballots at the precinct; to provide procedures for such count; to provide for related matters; to provide an effective date; to repeal conflicting laws; and for other purposes.

By: Representatives Geisinger of the 48th, Lindsey of the 54th, Setzler of the 35th, Coan of the 101st, Powell of the 29th, and others

A BILL TO BE ENTITLED
AN ACT

To amend Chapter 2 of Title 21 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to elections and primaries generally, so as to provide for the duplicating of certain damaged optical scan ballots; to provide for certain recounts; to provide for additional grounds for challenging an election; to provide for a random hand count of optical scan ballots at the precinct; to provide procedures for such count; to provide for related matters; to provide an effective date; to repeal conflicting laws; and for other purposes.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF GEORGIA:

SECTION 1.
Chapter 2 of Title 21 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to elections and primaries generally, is amended by revising Code Section 21-2-483, relating to counting of optical scan ballots, as follows:
"21-2-483.

(a) In primaries and elections in which optical scanners are used, the ballots shall be counted at the precinct or tabulating center under the direction of the superintendent. All persons who perform any duties at the tabulating center shall be deputized by the superintendent, and only persons so deputized shall touch any ballot, container, paper, or machine utilized in the conduct of the count or be permitted to be inside the area designated for officers deputized to conduct the count.

(b) All proceedings at the tabulating center and precincts shall be open to the view of the public, but no person except one employed and designated for the purpose by the superintendent or the superintendent´s authorized deputy shall touch any ballot or ballot container.

(c) At the tabulating center, the seal on each container of ballots shall be inspected, and it shall be certified that the seal has not been broken before the container is opened. The ballots and other contents of the container shall then be removed, and the ballots shall be prepared for processing by the tabulating machines. The ballots of each polling place shall be plainly identified and cannot be commingled with the ballots of other polling places.

(d) Upon completion of tabulation of the votes, the superintendent shall cause to be completed and signed a ballot recap form, in sufficient counterparts, showing:

(1) The number of valid ballots, including any that are damaged;
(2) The number of spoiled and invalid ballots; and
(3) The number of unused ballots.

The superintendent shall cause to be placed one copy of the recap form and the defective, spoiled, and invalid ballots, each enclosed in an envelope, in the ballot supply container.

(e) For any election for which there is a qualified write-in candidate, the feature on precinct count and central count tabulators allowing separation of write-in votes shall be utilized. If any vote cast on the write-in ballot in combination with the vote cast for the same office on the ballot exceeds the allowed number for the office, the vote cast for that office only shall not be counted. In the discretion of the superintendent, either a duplicate ballot shall be made on which any invalid vote shall be omitted or the write-in ballot and the ballot shall be counted in such manner as may be prescribed by State Election Board rules, omitting the invalid vote.

(f) If it appears that a ballot is so torn, bent, or otherwise defective that it cannot be processed by the tabulating machine, the superintendent or the poll manager, as appropriate, in his or her discretion, may order the proper election official at the tabulating center or precinct to prepare a true duplicate copy for processing with the ballots of the same polling place, which shall be verified in the presence of a witness. The damaged ballot shall be given a unique serial number which shall be written on the ballot. All duplicate ballots shall be clearly labeled by the word 'duplicate,' shall bear the designation of the polling place, and shall be given the same serial number as the defective ballot. The defective ballot shall be retained.
(g)(1) The precinct tabulator shall be programmed to return to the voter at the time that the voter inserts the ballot any ballot on which an overvote is indicated, along with any ballot that cannot be processed by the tabulator for reevaluation or correction or spoiling of the ballot, and a new ballot shall be issued if the voter desires to vote another ballot in order to correct mistakes, overvotes, or other problems.

(2)(A) The central tabulator shall be programmed to reject any ballot, including absentee ballots, on which an overvote is detected and any ballot so rejected shall be manually reviewed by the vote review panel described in this Code section to determine the voter´s intent as described in subsection (c) of Code Section 21-2-438.

(B) In a partisan election, the vote review panel shall be composed of the election superintendent or designee thereof and one person appointed by the county executive committee of each political party and body having candidates whose names appear on the ballot for such election, provided that, if there is no organized county executive committee for a political party or body, the person shall be appointed by the state executive committee of the political party or body. In a nonpartisan election, the panel shall be composed of the election superintendent or designee thereof and two electors of the county, in the case of a county election, or the municipality, in the case of a municipal election, appointed by the chief judge of the superior court of the county in which the election is held or, in the case of a municipality which is located in more than one county, of the county in which the city hall of the municipality is located. The panel shall manually review all ballots rejected by the tabulator under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph and shall determine by majority vote whether the elector´s intent can be determined as described in subsection (c) of Code Section 21-2-438 and, if so, said vote shall be counted as the elector intended. In the event of a tie vote by the vote review panel, the vote of the election superintendent or designee thereof shall control.

(h) The official returns of the votes cast on ballots at each polling place shall be printed by the tabulating machine. The returns thus prepared shall be certified and promptly posted. The ballots, spoiled, defective, and invalid ballots, and returns shall be filed and retained as provided by law.

(i)(1)(A) In primaries and elections in which precinct based optical scan tabulating equipment is used, a random sample of the optical scan ballots shall be counted at each precinct under the direction of the poll manager.

(B) After processing all optical scan ballots and printing the results tapes from the tabulating machines, the poll manager shall randomly select one contested race from the ballot for a hand count. Such selection shall be made by listing all of the contested races on the ballot individually on uniform sized slips of paper, uniformly folding such slips of paper such that the name of the race cannot be seen, placing the slips of paper into a container and mixing the slips thoroughly, and then drawing from the container one slip of paper. Upon drawing the slip of paper, the manager shall then announce the race that will be hand counted. The slips of paper shall be available for examination by any member of the public who desires to do so.

(C) After randomly selecting the race for a hand count, the manager or a poll officer under the direction of the manager shall unlock the ballot boxes containing the optical scan ballots. The poll manager shall then proceed to count the votes cast in the randomly selected race as shown on the ballots. Such count shall be performed in the same manner as for paper ballots as provided in Code Section 21-2-437 for the randomly selected race. Upon the conclusion of the count, the manager or a poll officer under the direction of the manager shall record the results of the hand count on the return sheet and shall compare the results for the race to the results shown on the tapes from the tabulating machine for such race. In the event of a discrepancy in the count between the totals for such race, the manager or a poll officer under the direction of the manager shall post the results of the hand count and one set of return tapes from the tabulating machine, noting any discrepancies found, at the polling place for the information of the public.

(D) After performing the hand count of the race or races, the manager shall cause the optical scan ballots to be securely sealed in the ballot box and shall seal the return sheets, tally sheets, one set of return tapes, and other completed forms in an envelope for transfer to the election superintendent.

(2)(A) In primaries and elections in which central count optical scan tabulating equipment is used, a random sample of the optical scan ballots shall be counted at the tabulating center at each precinct under the direction of the superintendent.

(B) After processing all optical scan ballots and printing the results reports from the tabulating machines, the superintendent shall randomly select one contested race from the ballot for a hand count. Such selection shall be made by listing all of the contested races on the ballot individually on uniform sized slips of paper, uniformly folding such slips of paper such that the name of the race cannot be seen, placing the slips of paper into a container and mixing the slips thoroughly, and then drawing from the container one slip of paper. Upon drawing the slip of paper, the superintendent shall then announce the race that will be hand counted. The superintendent shall then randomly select a number of precincts constituting at least 10 percent of the precincts in the county for the hand count. Such selection shall be made by listing all of the precincts individually on uniform sized slips of paper, uniformly folding such slips of paper such that the name of the precinct cannot be seen, placing the slips of paper into a container and mixing the slips thoroughly, and then drawing from the container one slip of paper at a time until the appropriate number of precincts has been selected. Upon drawing the slip of paper, the superintendent shall then announce the race that will be hand counted The slips of paper shall be available for examination by any member of the public who desires to do so.

(C) After randomly selecting the race for a hand count, the superintendent shall cause the selected race on each ballot cast in the selected precincts to be hand counted as provided in this paragraph. Such count shall be performed in the same manner as for paper ballots as provided in Code Section 21-2-437 for the randomly selected race. Upon the conclusion of the count, the superintendent shall record the results of the hand count on the return sheet and shall compare the results for the race to the results shown on the reports from the tabulating machine for such race. In the event of a discrepancy in the count between the totals for such race, the superintendent shall post the results of the hand count and one set of return tapes from the tabulating machine, noting any discrepancies found, at the tabulating center or the office of the superintendent for the information of the public.

(j) In the event of a discrepancy between the hand count totals from the precincts and the totals from the tabulating machines, the superintendent shall use the hand count totals as the official results. The superintendent shall immediately make the public aware of any such discrepancy by posting notice of such discrepancy at his or her office for the information of the public and on the official website of the county or municipality on which the county or municipality posts election returns if the county or municipality has such a website. The superintendent shall note on the official returns for the primary, election, or runoff, as appropriate, the vote totals that are based, in whole or in part, on hand counts as a result of a discrepancy between the hand count and the machine totals."

SECTION 2.

Said chapter is further amended by adding new subsections (e) and (f) to Code Section 21-2-495, relating to procedure for recount or recanvass of votes, to read as follows:

"(e) Any other provision of this Code section to the contrary notwithstanding, a candidate may petition the Secretary of State, in the case of a candidate in a race which is voted upon by electors in more than one county, or the election superintendent, in the case of races voted upon by electors in one county or a portion of one county, for a hand recount of the optical scan ballots in a county when it appears that there is a discrepancy in a precinct in such county between the hand count of a randomly selected race pursuant to subsection (i) of Code Section 21-2-483 and the results for the same race as shown on reports from the tabulating machines. Upon receiving a proper petition, the Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate, shall order a hand count to be conducted of all of the optical scan ballots for such race in such county. Such hand count shall be held at any time prior to the certification of the consolidated returns by the Secretary of State. The hand count shall be conducted by the appropriate superintendent or superintendents in the manner and pursuant to the procedures otherwise provided in this Code section for counting paper ballots. The petition pursuant to this Code section shall be in writing and signed by the person or persons requesting the hand count. The petition shall set forth the discrepancies and any evidence in support of the petitioner´s request for a hand count and shall be verified. The result of such hand count shall then become the official result of such primary, election, or runoff. The cost of such recounts shall not be charged to any candidate, political party or body, or elector.

(f) Any other provision of this Code section to the contrary notwithstanding, a candidate or ten or more electors who cast ballots in the race in which the candidate ran may petition the Secretary of State, in the case of a candidate in a race that is voted upon by electors in more than one county, or the election superintendent, in the case of a candidate in a race that is voted upon by the electors of one county or a portion of one county, for a hand recount of the optical scan ballots in all precincts when it appears that there are similar discrepancies in more than one precinct between the hand count of a randomly selected race pursuant to subsection (i) of Code Section 21-2-483 and the results for the same race as shown on the reports from the tabulating machines. Upon receiving a proper petition, the Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate, shall order a hand count to be conducted of all of the optical scan ballots for such race in all precincts. Such hand count shall be held at any time prior to the certification of the consolidated returns by the Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate. The hand count shall be conducted by the appropriate superintendent or superintendents in the manner and pursuant to the procedures otherwise provided in this Code section for counting paper ballots. The petition pursuant to this Code section shall be in writing and signed by the person or persons requesting the hand count. The petition shall set forth the discrepancies and any evidence in support of the petitioner´s request for a hand count and shall be verified. The result of such hand count shall then become the official result of such primary, election, or runoff."

SECTION 3.
Said chapter is further amended by revising Code Section 21-2-522, relating to grounds for contesting an election, as follows:
"21-2-522.
A result of a primary or election may be contested on one or more of the following grounds:
(1) Misconduct, fraud, or irregularity by any primary or election official or officials sufficient to change or place in doubt the result;
(2) When the defendant is ineligible for the nomination or office in dispute;
(3) When illegal votes have been received or legal votes rejected at the polls sufficient to change or place in doubt the result;
(4) For any error in counting the votes or declaring the result of the primary or election, if such error would change the result;
(5) When there is an unexplained discrepancy between the results of a hand count of a race pursuant to subsection (i) of Code Section 21-2-483 and the results of such race as shown by the tabulating machine tapes or reports in a precinct in which the person filing the contest was a candidate and such discrepancy places the results of such race in doubt; or
(5)(6) For any other cause which shows that another was the person legally nominated, elected, or eligible to compete in a run-off primary or election."

SECTION 4.
This Act shall become effective on January 1, 2008.

SECTION 5.
All laws and parts of laws in conflict with this Act are repealed.

07 LC 28 3248

House Bill 859

By: Representatives Geisinger of the 48th, Lindsey of the 54th, Coan of the 101st, Powell of the 29th, Meadows of the 5th, and others

To amend Chapter 2 of Title 21 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to primaries and elections generally, so as to provide a definition; to require all electronic recording voting systems to produce an elector verified, permanent paper record of the votes recorded on such systems for each elector; to provide that electors shall have an opportunity to verify such record after voting; to provide for reexamination and recertification of direct recording electronic voting systems under certain circumstances; to authorize the use of certain printers and printer interfaces; to authorize the use of alternative means of voting under certain circumstances; to provide for certain recounts; to provide for additional grounds for challenging an election; to provide that such paper records be the official record of the votes in an election for use in recounts and election challenge proceedings; to provide for a random hand count of the permanent paper records at the precinct; to provide procedures for such count; to provide for related matters; to provide an effective date; to repeal conflicting laws; and for other purposes.

A BILL TO BE ENTITLED

AN ACT to amend Chapter 2 of Title 21 of the O.C.G.A

BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF GEORGIA:

SECTION 1.
Chapter 2 of Title 21 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to primaries and elections generally, is amended by adding a new paragraph (21.1) to Code Section 21-2-2, relating to definitions, to read as follows:
"(21.1) 'Permanent paper record' means the paper copy record of an elector´s vote that is printed by a direct recording electronic unit and is deposited or caused to be deposited by the elector in a ballot box or similar container. Such permanent paper records shall be the official records of the votes cast in a primary, election, or runoff in the case of a discrepancy between the votes shown on such paper records and the votes shown on the DRE units and for the purposes of recounts and election contests under this chapter."

SECTION 2.
Said chapter is further amended by adding new paragraphs (6.1) and (6.2) to Code Section 21-2-379.1, relating to requirements for use of electronic recording voting systems, to read as follows:
"(6.1) It shall produce an elector verified, permanent paper record with a manual audit capacity for such system which shall be available as an official record for any recount conducted under Code Section 21-2-495 or for any election challenge under Article 13 of this chapter involving any primary or election in which such system is used;
(6.2) It shall provide the elector with an opportunity to review and verify the permanent paper record before casting his or her vote on the system and to change his or her ballot or correct any error in such record or vote;".

SECTION 3.
Said chapter is further amended by revising subsection (f) of Code Section 21-2-379.2, relating to review of manufacturer´s electronic recording voting system by Secretary of State, as follows:
"(f) When a direct electronic recording recording electronic voting system has been so approved, no each improvement or change that does not impair its accuracy, efficiency, or capacity to a direct recording electronic voting system, whether related to hardware or software, shall render necessary a reexamination or reapproval of such system, or of its kind."

SECTION 4.
Said chapter is further amended by revising subsection (b) of Code Section 21-2-379.10, relating to procedure for electors using DRE units, as follows:
"(b) After the summary screen is displayed and the elector desires to make no further changes to his or her votes, the elector shall be notified that he or she is about to cast the ballot. The Prior to the elector casting his or her vote on the unit, the unit shall produce for the elector´s review a permanent paper record of the elector´s votes to be cast. The elector shall then review such permanent paper record and, if such record is correct, the elector shall then press the appropriate button on the unit or location on the screen to actually cast his or her ballot and cause such votes to be recorded, and to allow the permanent paper record to be deposited in a ballot box or other secure container. If the elector discovers an error or errors in the votes shown on the permanent paper record, the elector shall advise the poll officers who shall take such steps as necessary to allow the elector to correct such error or errors in the elector´s votes on the DRE unit and to produce a corrected permanent paper record. The incorrect permanent paper record shall be voided and treated in the same manner as a spoiled ballot. After pressing the appropriate button on the unit or location on the screen to cast the ballot, the elector´s vote ballot shall be final and shall not be subsequently altered. The permanent paper records shall be secured in locked ballot boxes or similar secure containers at all times in a manner similar to paper ballots under this chapter and such ballot boxes or containers shall not be opened nor shall such permanent paper records be counted until the close of the polls. In the event that the DRE unit cannot produce a correct permanent paper record of the elector´s votes, such unit shall be shut down and sealed and the superintendent and the Secretary of State shall be immediately notified of such problem."

SECTION 5.
Said chapter is further amended by revising Code Section 21-2-379.11, relating to procedure for tabulation of votes, as follows:
"21-2-379.11.
(a)(1) In primaries and elections in which direct recording electronic (DRE) voting equipment is used, the ballots a random sample of the permanent paper records created by the direct recording electronic units shall be counted at the each precinct or tabulating center under the direction of the superintendent poll manager.
(2) All persons who perform any duties at the a precinct or tabulating center shall be deputized by the superintendent and only persons so deputized shall touch any ballot, container, paper, or machine utilized in the conduct of the count or be permitted to be in the immediate area designated for officers deputized to conduct the count.
(b) All proceedings at the tabulating center and precincts shall be open to the view of the public, but no person except one employed and designated for the purpose by the superintendent or the superintendent´s authorized deputy shall touch any ballot, any DRE unit, or the tabulating equipment.
(c) After the polls have closed and all voting in the precinct has ceased, the poll manager shall shut down the DRE units and extract the election results from each unit as follows:
(1) The manager shall obtain the at least three results tape tapes from each DRE unit and verify that the number of ballots cast as recorded on the tape tapes matches the public count number as displayed on the DRE unit; and
(2) If a system is established by the Secretary of State, the poll manager shall first transmit the election results extracted from each DRE unit in each precinct via modem to the central tabulating center of the county; and
(3) The manager shall then extract the memory card from each DRE unit.
(d) Upon completion of shutting down each DRE unit and extracting the election results, the manager shall cause to be completed and signed a ballot recap form, in sufficient counterparts, showing:
(1) The number of valid ballots;
(2) The number of spoiled and invalid ballots;
(3) The number of provisional ballots; and
(4) The number of unused provisional ballots and any other unused ballots.
The manager shall cause to be placed in the ballot supply container one copy of the recap form and any unused, defective, spoiled, and invalid ballots, each enclosed in an envelope.
(e) The manager shall collect and retain the zero tape and one of the results tape tapes for each DRE unit and place such tapes with the memory card for each unit and enclose all such items for all of the DRE units used in the precinct in one envelope which shall be sealed and initialed by the manager so that it cannot be opened without breaking the seal.
(f)(1) After collecting the tapes from the DRE units, the manager shall randomly select one contested race from the ballot for a hand count. Such selection shall be made by listing all of the contested races on the ballot individually on uniform sized slips of paper, uniformly folding such slips of paper such that the name of the race cannot be seen, placing the slips of paper into a container and mixing the slips thoroughly, and then drawing from the container one slip of paper. Upon drawing the slip of paper, the manager shall then announce the race that will be hand counted. The slips of paper shall be available for examination by any member of the public who desires to do so.
(2) After randomly selecting the race for a hand count, the manager or a poll officer under the direction of the manager shall unlock the ballot boxes containing the permanent paper records and shall count the number of records in such ballot boxes which number shall then be entered onto a recap sheet and compared to the number of persons shown as having voted on the electors list, the numbered list of voters, and the voters´ certificates. Any discrepancy shall be duly noted.
(3) After completing the count of the number of permanent paper records contained in the ballot boxes, the manager shall then proceed to count the votes cast in the randomly selected race as shown on the records. Such count shall be performed in the same manner as for paper ballots as provided in Code Section 21-2-437 for the randomly selected race. Upon the conclusion of the count, the manager or a poll officer under the direction of the manager shall record the results of the hand count on the return sheet and shall compare the results for the race to the results shown on the tapes from the DRE units for such race. In the event of a discrepancy in the count between the totals for such race, the manager or a poll officer under the direction of the manager shall post the results of the hand count and one set of return tapes from the DRE units, noting any discrepancies found, at the polling place for the information of the public.
(4) After performing the hand count of the race or races, the manager shall cause the permanent paper records to be securely sealed in the ballot box and shall seal the return sheets, tally sheets, one set of return tapes, and other completed forms in an envelope for transfer to the election superintendent.
(g) The manager and one poll worker shall then deliver the envelope ballot boxes and envelopes to the tabulating center for the county or municipality or to such other place designated by the superintendent and shall receive a receipt therefor. The copies of the recap forms, unused ballots, records, and other materials shall be returned to the designated location and retained as provided by law.
(g)(h) Upon receipt of the sealed envelope containing the zero tapes, results tapes, and memory cards, the election superintendent shall verify the signatures on the envelope. Once verified, the superintendent shall break the seal of the envelope and remove its contents. The superintendent shall then download the results stored on the memory card from each DRE unit into the election management system located at the central tabulation point of the county in order to obtain election results for certification.
(i) In the event of a discrepancy between the hand count totals from the precincts and the totals from the DRE memory cards, the superintendent shall use the hand count totals as the official results. The superintendent shall immediately make the public aware of any such discrepancy by posting notice of such discrepancy at his or her office for the information of the public and on the official website of the county or municipality on which the county or municipality posts election returns if the county or municipality has such a website. The superintendent shall note on the official returns for the primary, election, or runoff, as appropriate, the vote totals that are based, in whole or in part, on hand counts as a result of a discrepancy between the hand count and the machine totals."

SECTION 6.
Said chapter is further amended by adding new Code Sections 21-2-379.12 and 21-2-379.13 to read as follows:
"21-2-379.12.
Until the federal Elections Assistance Commission established pursuant to the federal Help America Vote Act of 2002 adopts standards for printers attached or connected to direct recording electronic voting equipment and used for the purpose of providing elector verified, permanent paper records with a manual audit capacity for the votes cast by each individual voter on such equipment and until printers designed or authorized for use with the direct recording electronic voting equipment in use in this state have been certified under such standards, no provision of this chapter nor any rule or regulation of the Secretary of State or the State Election Board shall prohibit the use of direct recording electronic voting equipment that utilizes such printers for such purpose on the basis that such printers or printer interfaces have not received certification or that such direct recording electronic voting equipment has not been certified for use with such printers or printer interfaces in primaries and elections from an independent testing authority that tests and certifies voting equipment or other certifying body or entity.

21-2-379.13.
If 20 percent or more of the direct recording electronic units at a precinct become inoperative for whatever reason during a primary, election, or runoff, the superintendent shall provide alternative means of voting at such precinct. Provisional ballots may be used for such purpose, but shall be deemed to be regular ballots for which the provisional ballot procedures shall not be applicable unless the elector casting the ballot qualifies as a provisional voter under Code Section 21-2-418, in which case the ballot shall continue to be handled as a provisional ballot."

SECTION 7.
Said chapter is further amended by adding new subsections (e) and (f) to Code Section 21-2-495, relating to procedure for recount or recanvass of votes, to read as follows:
"(e) Any other provision of this Code section to the contrary notwithstanding, a candidate may petition the Secretary of State, in the case of a candidate in a race which is voted upon by electors in more than one county, or the election superintendent, in the case of races voted upon by electors in one county or a portion of one county, for a hand recount of the permanent paper records in a county when it appears that there is a discrepancy in a precinct in such county between the hand count of a randomly selected race pursuant to subsection (f) of Code Section 21-2-379.11 and the results for the same race as shown on the DRE units. Upon receiving a proper petition, the Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate, shall order a hand count to be conducted of all of the permanent paper records for such race in such county. Such hand count shall be held at any time prior to the certification of the consolidated returns by the Secretary of State. The hand count shall be conducted by the appropriate superintendent or superintendents in the manner and pursuant to the procedures otherwise provided in this Code section for counting paper ballots. The petition pursuant to this Code section shall be in writing and signed by the person or persons requesting the hand count. The petition shall set forth the discrepancies and any evidence in support of the petitioner´s request for a hand count and shall be verified. The result of such hand count shall then become the official result of such primary, election, or runoff. The cost of such recounts shall not be charged to any candidate, political party or body, or elector.
(f) Any other provision of this Code section to the contrary notwithstanding, a candidate or ten or more electors who cast ballots in the race in which the candidate ran may petition the Secretary of State, in the case of a candidate in a race that is voted upon by electors in more than one county, or the election superintendent, in the case of a candidate in a race that is voted upon by the electors of one county or a portion of one county, for a hand recount of the permanent paper records in all precincts when it appears that there are similar discrepancies in more than one precinct between the hand count of a randomly selected race pursuant to subsection (f) of Code Section 21-2-379.11 and the results for the same race as shown on the DRE units. Upon receiving a proper petition, the Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate, shall order a hand count to be conducted of all of the permanent paper records for such race in all precincts. Such hand count shall be held at any time prior to the certification of the consolidated returns by the Secretary of State or the election superintendent, as appropriate. The hand count shall be conducted by the appropriate superintendent or superintendents in the manner and pursuant to the procedures otherwise provided in this Code section for counting paper ballots. The petition pursuant to this Code section shall be in writing and signed by the person or persons requesting the hand count. The petition shall set forth the discrepancies and any evidence in support of the petitioner´s request for a hand count and shall be verified. The result of such hand count shall then become the official result of such primary, election, or runoff."

SECTION 8.
Said chapter is further amended by revising Code Section 21-2-522, relating to grounds for contesting an election, as follows:
"21-2-522.
A result of a primary or election may be contested on one or more of the following grounds:
(1) Misconduct, fraud, or irregularity by any primary or election official or officials sufficient to change or place in doubt the result;
(2) When the defendant is ineligible for the nomination or office in dispute;
(3) When illegal votes have been received or legal votes rejected at the polls sufficient to change or place in doubt the result;
(4) For any error in counting the votes or declaring the result of the primary or election, if such error would change the result;
(5) When there is an unexplained discrepancy between the results of a hand count of a race pursuant to subsection (f) of Code Section 21-2-379.11 and the results of such race as shown by the DRE units in a precinct in which the person filing the contest was a candidate and such discrepancy places the results of such race in doubt; or
(5)(6) For any other cause which shows that another was the person legally nominated, elected, or eligible to compete in a run-off primary or election."

SECTION 9.
This Act shall become effective on January 1, 2008.

SECTION 10.
All laws and parts of laws in conflict with this Act are repealed.

History of Georgia's Electronic Elections and VoterGA

How It Happened:

In 2002, Georgia implemented electronic voting that cannot be verified, audited, or recounted. In 2004, just 2 years after a $54 million electronic voting “revolution”, Free Congress Foundation ranked Georgia dead last nationally in voting systems and procedures. The reasons are simple:

* No Georgia voter can verify that their ballots were cast correctly;
* No poll worker can verify that any voting machine counted votes correctly and;
* Recounts are now impossible since we can only reprint previous unverifiable results;

When the machines were evaluated, several computer professionals and concerned citizens who are now in our organization explained both verbally and in writing to state election officials including Professor Britain Williams who headed the evaluation that:

* Voting machines can be accidentally or intentionally programmed in a variety of ways to count differently on election night then than during a certification;
* The machines selected for evaluation had no external audit trails to verify their accuracy;
* At least two other machine vendors offered external web based or printed ballot audit trails;

In spite of our concerns, the Secretary of State (S.O.S.) installed these systems against our will. Once implemented, the new procedures:

* Removed all direct physical evidence of voter intent from Georgia elections;
* Reduced the percentage of auditable ballots cast in Georgia from about 82% to 0% and;
* Allowed fraud and errors to become virtually undetectable statewide.

The Diebold AccuVote TS series machines they purchased have been the subject of scathing reviews by universities and state reports nationwide. For example, Johns Hopkins found that the software had “gross design and programming errors” and the Nevada Electronic Sys. Div. Chief reported to the S.O.S. that they were “a legitimate threat to the integrity of the election process”. California, Ohio, Nevada and Maryland have officially concluded that machines and procedures similar to those used in Georgia are inadequate to conduct elections in their states.

What Has Been Done So Far:

We have tried executive and legislative branch options to preserve the integrity of Georgia elections since these machines were under evaluation and after they were selected. The brief history of the actions and responses from both Democrat and Republican leaders is astounding:

* In 2002, S.O.S. Cathy Cox ignored the 21st Century Voting Commission recommendation that: “the chosen system should have the capability to produce an independent paper audit trail of every ballot cast”;

* Cox and Elections Director Rogers still adamantly oppose voter verified paper ballot audit trails (VVPBAT) and election night verification at the legislature while they publicly claim to support them;

* The State Elections Board bought eletronic poll books with the $17,000,000 that could have been used to purchase the secure printers the S.O.S. claimed were needed for external audit trails;

* In 2006, legislative leaders chose SB500 a 3 precinct self repealing audit trail pilot over our SB591 and HB790, bi-partisan bills with external audit trails and vote count protection procedures that gained the support of 10 civic organizations and independent parties;

* Gov. Perdue recently deferred inquiries to the S.O.S. in response to our direct appeal to eliminate unverifiable voting by executive order.

Without citizen action, the future of Georgia elections looks extremely looks dim:

* For the 3 precinct SB500 pilot, Rogers insisted on purchasing newer Diebold equipment that still cannot produce an easily auditable ballot because they roll voting results into a sealed canister instead of cutting them into ballots like grocery store or gas pump slips.

* House and Senate Conference Committee members refused to dictate appropriate technology for the pilot and ignored our contention that newer Diebold machines are just as inappropriate for use now as the unverifiable voting machines were in 2002.

If the government officials we entrust will not protect one of our most precious rights, we are left with no choice but to file suit so that Georgia citizens can have the assurance that their vote was counted correctly and accurately.

What We Must Do Now:

The good news is that key portions of the Georgia Constitution and Georgia Election Code protect our rights. There are also several state and federal precedents on our side as well as equal protection provisions. But we must file suit to protect our freedom. Our suit will seek three basic objectives that most any Georgia voter would expect in an election. These are to:

* Require that any technology used in Georgia must either be able to read or produce ballots as required by the Georgia Constitution;

* Provide for public, precinct level counting of votes to ensure that the machines tallied the votes correctly as required by Georgia Election Code.

* Stipulate in the event of similar discrepancies across precincts in a given race, that the state manually recount that race at no cost to the candidates or parties involved

If these principles cannot be achieved, then we must cease using electronic voting machines altogether. We urge you to join us in the fight to save Georgia by restoring the integrity of Georgia elections. Georgia needs your immediate help so that we can take appropriate legal action to restore voting that can be verified, audited and recounted.

Freedom is not free.
Please click the Donation button to contribute or mail your contribution to:
Voter GA P.O. Box 808 Decatur, Ga. 30031

Justice in Georgia? A History of the Voter GA Lawsuit

Voter GA Case History

Summary Judgement Hearing 9/8/08 in VoterGA Lawsuit

[Notice from Garland Favorito of VoterGA, announcing court date in the often-postponed summary judgement hearing in the statewide lawsuit challenging the legality of Georgia's all-DRE voting system. -- Ed.]

VoterGA Supporters,

At long last our court date has been rescheduled for Mon. Sept. 8 at 2:30pm.
Todd Harding, with assistance from our lead counsel, Walker Chandler, will make an oral argument in support of his motion for Summary Judgment to remove the unverifiable voting machines throughout Georgia. The Defendants will argue their motion to dismiss all counts of the lawsuit. All motions are posted on the voterga.org web site under the legal suit tab. The arguments will take place in courtroom 8B of the Fulton Co. Superior Court at 185 Central Ave. approximately two blocks south of the Underground Atlanta and the Five Points Marta station.

The motion for Summary Judgment seeks to ban the Diebold AccuVote TS-R6 from Georgia on the grounds that sole reliance on an electronic ballot cannot provide protection equal to that of an absentee paper ballot used in Georgia.

The motion also seeks to ban the Diebold GEMS servers that are currently used to count both the electronic and optical scan votes in Georgia on the grounds that the state has already admitted that they cannot detect fraudulent manipulation of the vote and thereby the abridge the right to vote.

The motion further seeks to ban the Diebold AccuVote TSX machines piloted in Georgia on the grounds that their sequentially rolled election results jeopardize secrecy of the ballot as required by the Georgia Constitution, a point already admitted in a report from the office of the current Secretary of State.

Should any or all of these counts be upheld most of the arguments can be used in other states so they will have a nationwide impact.

The Defendants will argue to have all counts dismissed so if you are a Georgian, WE NEED YOU THERE. I am asking everyone who can make it to please come out and show that you support the lawsuit to restore the integrity of Georgia voting. Please wear your VoterGa pins or other related badges of support. This is our chance to make an impression on the judge that we care. I would expect the oral arguments to run about one hour.

Even if you are not from Georgia, this case can help you rid your state of unverifiable electronic voting. Please help us win these oral arguments by making a contribution to offset the court costs and legal fees for the arguments. You can click here [369] to make a donation or mail your contribution to: Voter GA P.O. Box 808 Decatur, Ga. 30031. Please remember that all contributions are fully tax deductible and that your entire contribution goes exclusively to offset legal fees because we are an all-volunteer organization.

Garland Favorito

404 664-4044

Three Candidates Added to VoterGA Lawsuit as Plaintiffs

Press Release: Tuesday, Nov. 21, 2006

Media Contact:
Garland Favorito
(404) 664-4044

2006 Election Candidates Join E-Voting Rights Suit

ATLANTA, GA – VoterGA, a diverse non-partisan coalition that organized an E-Voting rights lawsuit filed in Georgia during July of this year, announced today its intent to enjoin three 2006 election candidates as plaintiffs to the suit. Included are a Democrat, Republican and an independent write-in candidate who are questioning the 2006 primaries, run-off and general election, respectively.

Mary Wilhite, a Republican who took first in a House District 22 primary but was edged in a run-off by 35 votes, stated she was offered a recount that could not truly be performed. “Our Cherokee County Elections Director agreed to a recount because the victory margin was only 1% but state procedures simply re-accumulate previous totals. No ballots were ever recounted because no ballots actually exist. The process was completed in about a half hour with no change in results.”

Woody Holmes, independent write-in candidate for Georgia House District 65, stated that on the day his election was certified, Fulton County reported he had only two votes. After he questioned the results, the next day the county changed the total to 217 but Holmes believes he got that many votes in a single precinct. He explained: "Our campaign went door-to-door and collected signatures of support from over 800 voters, we distributed 250 yard signs, mailed 4000 campaign pieces to homes in the district, operated a phone bank to get out the vote as well as using automated phone calling to reach out to voters. My message was grounded on issues important to the voters in the district, noting the differences between me and my opponent who was the only named candidate on the ballot."

Former Democratic State Senator, Donzella James, who ran for the 13th U.S. Congressional District, questioned the results of her primary. “There is no way for candidates to truly determine if they won or lost. We must insist on machines and procedures to ensure that every vote is recorded accurately just as it was cast. Even if there is little that can be done about our races this year, all Georgia voters and future candidates will benefit from restoring accountability to our elections.”

The landmark lawsuit challenges the legality and constitutionality of Georgia’s current voting method including the audit trail pilot. It charges that recounts are not currently possible, ballots and people were unconstitutionally removed from elections, electronic voters are not afforded the equal protection given absentee voters and that machine accuracy cannot be determined on Election Day with or without the pilot. The lawsuit can be viewed at the web site, http://www.voterga.org [61].

VoterGA Lawsuit: Favorito v. Cox, Perdue, and Georgia State Election Board

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA

CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.

GARLAND FAVORITO, MARK SAWYER,
RICARDO DAVIS, AL HERMAN, FRIEDA SMITH, KATHRYN WEITZEL, ADAM SHAPIRO, and CATHIE CALABRO,
Plaintiffs,

VS

CATHY COX, SECRETARY OF STATE OF GEORGIA
SONNY PERDUE, GOVERNOR OF GEORGIA
GEORGIA STATE ELECTION BOARD,
Defendants.

COMPLAINT
Come now the Plaintiffs, above-named, and show this Honorable Court the following:

INTRODUCTION

1.Plaintiffs are electors of the State of Georgia opposed to Georgia’s use of Diebold Touch-Screen voting machines, hereinafter “DVMS”, as currently used and configured. Said DVMS are being used throughout the State of Georgia in its elections and referenda in derogation of Plaintiffs’ legal and constitutional rights to have verifiable, auditable, and recount-capable election results available to them, to election officials, and to the public so as to properly safeguard the integrity, credibility, and reliability of the electoral process.

JURISDICTION and VENUE

2.This case arises under the Constitution and the laws of the State of Georgia. This Court has jurisdiction based upon O.C.G.A. §9-4-1 et sequitur to grant both declaratory and injunctive relief.
Venue, under O.C.G.A.§ 9-10-30, is appropriate in Fulton County as at least one of the Defendants against whom substantial relief is prayed has his principal residence there.

PLAINTIFFS

3.Plaintiff Garland Favorito is an elector of the State of Georgia and a resident of Fulton County. He is an independent computer consultant and serves as Elections Director of the Constitution Party, a registered political body under the laws of the State of Georgia.

4.Plaintiff Mark Sawyer is an elector of the State of Georgia and a resident of DeKalb County. He is a curriculum coordinator and board member of Defenders of Democracy, hereinafter “DOD”, an unincorporated organization that represents approximately 2000 concerned citizens who want to restore the integrity of elections in Georgia.

5.Plaintiff Ricardo Davis is an elector of the State of Georgia and a resident of Cherokee County. He is a business systems computer analyst and current Chairman for the Constitution Party of Georgia, a registered political body under the laws of the State of Georgia.

6.Plaintiff Al Herman is an elector of the State of Georgia and a resident of DeKalb County. He owns and operates a video production business, is a former write-in candidate for the U.S. House Of Representative Seat for the 7th Congressional District of Georgia. He is Treasurer of the Georgia Green Party, a political body under the laws of Georgia.

7.Plaintiff Frieda Smith is an elector of the State of Georgia and a resident of Cobb County.

8.Plaintiff Kathryn Weitzel is an elector of the State of Georgia and a resident of Cobb County. She is a waitress and homemaker and co-founder of the Libertarian Action Network.

9.Plaintiff Adam Shapiro is an elector of the State of Georgia and a resident of the City of Atlanta in Fulton County. He is a visually impaired voter and co-chair of the Georgia Green Party, a political body under the laws of Georgia.

10. Plaintiff Cathie Calabro is an elector of the State of Georgia and a resident of the City of Atlanta in Fulton County. She has been a life long Democratic Party campaign worker and is a writer, editor and scholar.

DEFENDANTS

11.Defendant Cathy Cox is the Secretary of State of Georgia, in which capacity she is responsible for the orderly and accurate administration of the electoral processes of the State of Georgia. She is an Election Officer under the provisions of 42 U.S.1973e and is responsible under the Official Code of Georgia Annotated to uphold the laws of Georgia in regards to its electoral processes. She is sued in her capacity as Secretary of State as well as in her capacity as Chairperson of the State Election Board.

12.Defendant Sonny Perdue is the Governor of Georgia, and as such is responsible for the proper enforcement of the laws of Georgia and is likewise chargeable with the duty to protect and defend the laws and Constitutions of the State of Georgia.

13.Defendant Georgia State Election Board is an official state board created under the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 21-2-30. Among its other duties, it is responsible to supervise and coordinate the work of the office of the Secretary of State, and to formulate, adopt and promulgate such rules and regulations consistent with law as will be conducive to the fair, legal, and orderly conduct of primaries and elections.

GENERAL OVERVIEW

14.With the consent and knowledge of Defendant State Election Board and the General Assembly of Georgia, Defendant Cox, in her official capacity as Secretary of State, promoted and implemented electronic voting by the use of Diebold Touch Screen Voting Machines [DVMS] throughout Georgia beginning in 2002. Virtually all election day voting in Georgia as well as most early voting is now done by DVMS. Absentee ballots and some early voting are done via paper ballots.

15.During the voting machine evaluation and selection process, public comments were solicited. From the response to these solicitations, Defendants and/or their subordinates received numerous easily verifiable warnings that the problems and shortcomings hereinafter set forth concerning the proposed usage of DVMS were reasonably to be anticipated with the adoption of the DVMS system.

16.Notwithstanding such warnings, and ignoring other verifiable voting systems on the market, the Defendants:

A. Adopted the use of DVMS;
B. Entered into a contract to acquire and distribute same, and to replace the voting systems of Georgia with such DVMS at the cost to the taxpayers of Georgia of more than 54 Million dollars;
C. Did not implement procedures necessary to preserve the audit controls, verifiability, and recount capabilities comparable to those of optical scan and punch card systems that were in place in Georgia at the time of the DVMS purchase.

17.The Defendants could have evaluated and selected electronic voting machines which produce votes that can be verified, audited, and recounted or the Defendants could have continued to use optical scan punch card equipment that produces votes that can be verified, audited, and recounted.

COUNT ONE

The Definition of “Ballot” Set By O.C.G.A. § 21-2-280 is Unconstitutional

18.Each and every allegation set forth each of the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint is incorporated by reference herein.

19.Article II, Section 1, Paragraph 1 of the Georgia Constitution provides as follows:

Method of Voting

Elections by the people will be conducted by secret ballot and shall be conducted in accordance with procedures required by law.

20. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-280 states as follows:
All primaries and elections in this state shall be conducted by ballot, except when voting machines are used as provided by law.

21. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-280 attempts to exclude elections conducted by the use of voting machines from the Constitutional requirement that the election be conducted by secret ballot. This exclusion conflicts with Article II, Section 1, Paragraph 1 of the Georgia Constitution. State law cannot legally provide for exceptions to the Georgia Constitution, which requires that elections must be conducted by secret ballot.

22. O.C.G.A.§ 21-2-280 further states: “A ballot may be electronic or printed paper”.

23. The aforesaid code section’s attempt to redefine the term “ballot” to include an electronic record if only electronic is being relied upon is also unconstitutional in that an electronic record breaks the custody and control that voters have typically enjoyed over their own ballots and that the framers of the Constitution would obviously expect. Such redefinition of the term ballot deprives the voters of their heretofore generally accepted rights and privileges as follows:

A. The voter cannot touch or even see his own alleged electronic record that has been defined as a “ballot”;
B. The voter cannot verify that his ballot selections were recorded correctly because he cannot see the selections as allegedly recorded or tabulated in the vote counting process;
C. The voter cannot confirm that a ballot was ever actually cast because he has no access to the electronic record that the Georgia Code claims is a ballot;
D. The DVMS procedures only produce and tally alleged voting machine totals and do not provide for any manual count of any ballots;
E. Election results cannot be audited because no tangible external physical evidence of individual voter intent is ever produced;
F. Elections cannot be recounted because only reprints of previous unverifiable results are possible with the current machines and implementation.

24. The Constitution was framed in an era of paper ballots. Current, widely referenced definitions of ballot that are historically applicable and would have been generally accepted at the time the Constitution was framed are:

A. A ball, ticket, paper, or the like by which one votes and which gives no indication of who the voter is.
B. A sheet of paper or a card used to cast or register a vote, especially a secret one .
C. A document listing the alternatives that is used in voting.
Each of the foregoing definitions indicate that a ballot provides direct, physical evidence of voter intent that the voter can see, cast, and count as necessary. The characteristics of an electronic record are inconsistent with these generally accepted definitions.

25. The characteristics of a standard ballot referenced in the Georgia Constitution are so unlike those of an electronic computer record that it creates a further conflict between the current unconstitutional definition of a ballot in the Georgia Election Code and the obvious intent that the framers of the constitution implied by the term “ballot”.

26. Plaintiffs are entitled to have the Court declare that the attempted redefinition of the term ballot in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-280 violates the terms of the Georgia Constitution.

COUNT TWO

Use of DVMS Deprives The People from Conducting Elections by Unconstitutionally Delegating Critical Election Functions to Machine Processes that Cannot be Verified or Audited by the People

27.Each and every allegation set forth in each of the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint is incorporated by reference herein.

28.Prior to the 2002 Georgia DVMS implementation, approximately 83% of Georgia election day voters used optical scan and punch card equipment to cast ballots that could be verified and/or audited by the people or their representatives. The 2002 DVMS implementation broke the traditional chain of custody between the election day voter and his ballot, thus reducing the percentage of non-absentee ballots that could be verified, and/or audited by the people from approximately 83% to 0%.

29. Under the current DVMS implementation:

A. The DVMS chooses ballot selections for the voter and places them in an internal electronic record that the voter is never allowed see and is not able to see;
B. The DVMS does not permit voters to directly cast their ballots but instead claims to cast the ballot for the voter without providing any protection for the voter to physically confirm that the ballot was ever cast,
C. The DVMS produces totals of the votes for each candidate or referendum issue without allowing involvement by people in counting any votes or auditing the counts.

30. At the time the framers of the Georgia Constitution included the phrase elections by the people, there was a standard bond between the people and their ballots because the traditional chain of custody was in place throughout most of Georgia. The framers of the Georgia Constitution expected that:

A. The People would directly choose their own candidate selections and verify the selections on their ballots;
B. The People would directly and physically cast their ballots to ensure that the votes on the ballots cannot be manipulated; and
C. The People could be involved in counting the ballots to determine election results.

31. The current implementation of the DVMS method of voting in Georgia is in violation of Article II, Section 1, Paragraph 1 of the Georgia Constitution in that people have been removed from the three key elements of the electoral process, to wit, choosing the candidates, casting the ballots, and counting the results. The DVMS implementation is incapable of providing the voter or election officials with tangible, recorded evidence of individualized voter intent and thus deprives the people from conducting credible elections by unconstitutionally delegating critical election functions to machine processes that cannot be verified or audited by the people or their representatives.

32. O.C.G.A.21-2-379.11 (b) states in pertinent part:
“All proceedings at the tabulation center shall be open to the view of the public but no person except one employed and designated for the purpose by the superintendent of the superintendent’s authorized deputy shall touch any ballot, any DRE (see footnote 1) unit or the tabulating center.”

33. The transfer of the rights and duties of counting election results from the people or their representatives to others, to wit, private company programmers using secret proprietarial source codes and aftermarket “patches”, has resulted in the erection of a shroud of secrecy around the vote counting process. Plaintiffs contend that on several occasions, since the implementation of DVMS, observers have been refused the right to view counting at the county tabulation centers. Refusal to allow such observers to view counting processes at the tabulation centers is a violation of the aforesaid law.

34. O.C.G.A. 21-2-584 provides in pertinent part:

“If any manager refuses or willfully fails to administer the oath to the poll officer in the manner required by this chapter, or if any poll officer shall knowingly act without being first duly sworn, or if any person shall sign the written form of oath without being duly sworn, or if any manager or any other person authorized to administer oaths shall certify that any such person was sworn when he or she was not, he or she shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”

35. The transfer of the rights and duties of counting election results from the people or their representatives to others (i.e. programmers) has resulted in access to election results by unelected and unsworn individuals or companies. The source code for the DVMS is a proprietary code created, manipulated, and controlled by Diebold employees or others of the Diebold Company’s choosing with no common elector review, comprehension, or verification, either before, during, or after the election process. Diebold representatives have repeatedly been utilized on election nights since 2002 to assist various counties within the State of Georgia to produce election results.

36. O.C.G.A. 21-2-99 provides in pertinent part:

(a) The election superintendent shall provide adequate training to all poll officers and poll workers regarding the use of voting equipment, voting procedures, all aspects of state and federal law applicable to conducting elections, and the poll officers? or poll workers? duties in connection therewith prior to each general primary and general election and each special primary and special election; provided, however, such training shall not be required for a special election held between the date of the general primary and the general election. Upon successful completion of such instruction, the superintendent shall give to each poll officer and poll worker a certificate to the effect that such person has been found qualified to conduct such primary or election with the particular type of voting equipment in use in that jurisdiction. Additionally, the superintendent shall notify the Secretary of State on forms to be provided by the Secretary of State of the date when such instruction was held and the number of persons attending and completing such instruction. For the purpose of giving such instructions, the superintendent shall call such meeting or meetings of poll officers and poll workers as shall be necessary. Each poll officer shall, upon notice, attend such meeting or meetings called for his or her instruction.

(b) No poll officer or poll worker shall serve at any primary or election unless he or she shall have received instructions, as described in subsection (a) of this Code section; shall have been found qualified to perform his or her duties in connection with the type of voting equipment to be used in that jurisdiction; and shall have received a certificate to that effect from the superintendent; provided, however, that this shall not prevent the appointment of a poll officer or poll worker to fill a vacancy arising on the day of a primary or election or on the preceding day.

37. Diebold representatives do not take the required oath to serve during elections nor do they receive the required certificate even though their activities included electronically connecting to county servers for real-time monitoring of election results, repeatedly transmitting inaccurate county results, and handling voting machines that contained memory cards with completed absentee ballots.

38. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-94 provides in pertinent part:

“The following shall be the form of the oath to be taken by each manager: 'I, _______________, do swear (or affirm) that I will as manager duly attend the ensuing election (or primary) during the continuance thereof, that I will not admit any person to vote, except such as I shall firmly believe to be registered and entitled to vote at such election (or primary), according to the laws of this state, that I will not vexatiously delay or refuse to permit any person to vote whom I shall believe to be entitled to vote as aforesaid, that I will use my best endeavors to prevent any fraud, deceit, or abuse in carrying on the same, that I will make a true and perfect return of the said election (or primary), and that I will at all times truly, impartially, and faithfully perform my duties therein to the best of my judgment and ability.'”

39. The transfer of the rights and duties of counting election results from the people to others has also resulted in an unlawful delegation of administration responsibilities to Diebold representatives who are not sworn to uphold the election laws of Georgia. Participating in the conduct of an election without being properly sworn to the oath of office is a violation of O.C.G.A. § 21-2-584.

COUNT THREE

The Current DVMS Implementation Does Not Comply With O.C.G.A.§ 21-2-379.1

40. Each and every allegation set forth in each of the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint is incorporated by reference herein.

41. In support of the proposed change to electronic voting, the General Assembly passed O.C.G.A.§ 21-2-379.1, Requirements for Use of Electronic Voting Systems, which states:

No direct electronic recording voting system shall be adopted or used unless it shall at the time satisfy the following requirements:

within which paragraph (8) reads as follows:
It [any electronic voting machine] shall when properly operated record correctly and accurately every vote cast.

42. Electronic voting using DVMS was implemented by Defendant Cox without a procedure to ensure that the machines can “record correctly and accurately every vote cast” on the days of elections when said machines are actually used as required by law. Defendant Cox implemented no procedure to test or audit the alleged results and tallies after elections.

43. The current procedures that call for machine certifications in lieu of election night audits are unlawful because O.C.G.A.§ 21-2-379.1 requires that the machines record correctly and accurately every vote cast at the time of use.

44. Academic, institutional, and official state-commissioned reports from throughout the country have exposed serious design and security defects that have led to the rejection, decertification, halt of deployment, or legislative action to replace the DVMS systems in the states of Nevada , California , Ohio and Maryland . Each of these states concluded in official capacities that machines and procedures similar to those used in Georgia are dangerous to the integrity of the elective process.

45. United States Supreme Court decisions have consistently recognized the right of citizens to have their votes counted and to have those rights protected. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 it stated: "It has been repeatedly recognized that all qualified voters have a constitutionally protected right to vote . . . and to have their votes counted". In United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, the Court wrote: [it is] "as equally unquestionable that the right to have one's vote counted is as open to protection . . . as the right to put a ballot in a box".

46. Diebold representatives, Defendant Cox, and others representing the office of Defendant Cox have acknowledged that uncertified electronic “patches” were made to the DVMS after said DVMS were certified for the 2002 elections and prior to those elections. Diebold representatives and Defendant Cox. contended that those patches were limited to the operating system of the DVMS.

47. O.C.G.A. 21-2-379-2 (f). states in pertinent part:
“When a direct electronic recording voting system has been so approved, no improvement or change that does not impair its accuracy, efficiency or capacity shall render necessary a reexamination or reapproval of such system or of its kind”

48. Operating system patches can affect efficiency, accuracy or capacity of the DVMS and thus render a reexamination necessary as required by law. Defendant Cox and vendor, Diebold, conducted no such reexamination after the uncertified patches were installed on the DVMS and therefore, violated O.C.G.A. 21-2-379-2 (f). Such violations are capable of repeated future occurrences.

49. As a result of this violation of law, the DVMS were never properly certified for the 2002 elections. No records exist in the Office of the Secretary of State regarding a certification letter certifying the software version used on election days for the 2002 Elections.

50. For the aforesaid reasons, Plaintiffs are entitled to have the Court declare that the Defendants are unable reliably to comply with the verification requirements of O.C.G.A._21.2.379.1 (8) or with their obligations to certify election results under the provisions of O.C.G.A. 21-2-499 (b) and/or U.S.§ 42 U.S.1973e, or to protect the rights of the people to honest and open elections guaranteed them by the Georgia Constitution. The Plaintiffs are entitled to have Defendants enjoined from using the DVMS in its present configurations.

COUNT FOUR

The DVMS, As Configured, Deny Candidates and their Supporters
Their Rights to Fair Recountings of Votes in Close Elections

51. Each and every allegation set forth in each of the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint is incorporated by reference herein.

52. The Georgia Election Code provides conditions by which a candidate “shall have the right to a recount of the votes cast”. For example, O.C.G.A. 21-2-495 (c) provides in pertinent part:
“…any such candidate or candidates receiving a sufficient number of votes so that the difference between his or her vote and that of a candidate declared nominated, elected or eligible for a runoff is not more than 1 percent of the total votes cast, within a period of two business days following the certification of the election results, shall have the right to a recount of the votes cast if such request is made in writing by the losing candidate.”

53. The existing DVMS implementation is capable only of recounting the original alleged electronic records that were initially reported by the DVMS machines and do not provide direct physical evidence of individualized voter intent of votes directly and physically cast by voters. The electronic records relied upon during the recounting process are mere allegations or summations of the DVMS machines. The original vote-casting reported by the machine was never actually visible to the voter so the voter had no way to verify whether or not his selections were accurately recorded by the DVMS in the first place.

54. Direct, physical evidence of voter intent is essential to the integrity of the election process, and it is necessary for poll officials to be able to maintain custody over the records of voter intent and that such records be kept safely in a ballot box or other safekeeping device prior to tallying, and for the people to maintain custody over the process of counting and recounting votes as well as the occasional auditing of machine performance to provide evidence of integrity and reliability as well as to detect and prevent election fraud.

55. Plaintiffs are entitled to have the court enjoin the use of the current DVMS implementation and to mandate that other systems of vote capture and preservation be instituted or reinstituted so that recounts provided for by O.C.G.A. 21-2-495 (c) but actually occur.

COUNT FIVE

Use of DMVS Denies Equal Protection for Electronic Voters vs. Absentee/Pre-election Voters

56. The allegations set forth in all of the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated by reference herein.

57. Article 1 Section 1 Paragraph 2 of the Georgia Constitution provides that:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.

58. Absentee and many pre-election Ballots have the obvious characteristics of a ballot that the framers of the Georgia Constitution intended. Such ballots provide that:

A. The voter can see the selections that are on the ballot;
B. The voter can cast the ballot at designate receiving locations if the voter chooses;
C. The people of Georgia, including officials sworn to uphold the laws of the state, can physically count the ballots;
D. The ballots represent direct physical evidence of voter intent and are retained for recount purposes which they are fully capable of fulfilling

59. While voters who cast absentee or written pre-election ballots are afforded these protections, while voters who cast votes on regular election days in Georgia must cast their votes on the DVMS and thereby are not afforded any of these privileges under the current laws of the state and cannot reliably hope that they enjoy equality of treatment either in elections or recounts with those whose votes have been preserved by physical means.

60. Plaintiffs are entitled to have the Court declare that use of DVMS in its current form violates the Georgia Constitution’s equal protection guarantees of those voters using DVMS vis-à-vis the selections made by those who vote by written ballots and to mandate that the Defendants implement a system or systems which will adequately safeguard the rights of the users of voting machines and assure that as to elections and recounts that they shall stand on an equal footing with those who have voted by using standard ballots.

COUNT SIX

Georgia’s Audit Trail Pilot Project to Comply with Voting Accuracy and Correctness Law Cannot Safeguard the Rights of the People or Provide Assurances Against Future DVMS Failures

61. Each and every allegation set forth in each of the foregoing Paragraphs is incorporated by reference herein.

62. Because the General Assembly was worried about the same issues raised in this Complaint, it passed O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.12 which provides as in pertinent part as follows:

The Secretary of State shall implement a pilot program providing for the use of direct recording electronic (DRE) voting equipment equipped and configured with an elector verified, permanent paper record of the votes cast by each elector on each DRE unit in one precinct each in the Counties of Cobb, Bibb, and Camden in the 2006 November general election and any runoff from such election.”

63. For the purpose of the three-precinct pilot project, the Elections Division of the office of the Secretary of State has chosen to purchase and implement a newer version of the Diebold AccuVote series machines that are currently used throughout Georgia. That model that is frequently referred to as the AccuVote TSX, that the Elections Division intends to implement in the pilot precincts for the 2006 elections do not produce individually separated ballots but instead roll all alleged election results captured by the voting machine into a sealed canister.

64. During the 2006 House Government Affairs Committee hearings for SB500 and HB790, SB500 author Sen. Bill Stevens and Elections Director Kathy Rogers expressed concern that it could take at least 33 hours and possibly up to 66 hours for a precinct to hand count even a single race on election night with the selected technology. Consequently, the law enacted as a result of the passage of SB500, O.C.G.A.21-2-379.12 (c), provides in pertinent part that:

“…the Secretary of State shall cause a complete manual audit to be performed on each DRE unit used in the pilot project for voting within 30 days following the 2006 November general election and within 30 days of any runoff of such election.”

65. O.C.G.A. 21-2-499 (b) provides in pertinent part that:

“Not later than 5:00 P.M. on the fourteenth day following the date on which such election was conducted, the Secretary of State shall certify the votes cast for all candidates described in Subparagraph (A) of paragraph (4) of Code Section 21-2-497 and upon all question voted for by the electors of more than one county and shall no later than that same timed lay the returns for presidential electors before the Governor.” And that: “The Governor shall certify the slates of presidential electors no later than 5:00 P.M. on the fifteenth day following the date on which such election was conducted.”

66. The testimony referenced in the foregoing Paragraphs regarding the selected technology renders it impossible for the Elections Division to determine that the voting machines did “record correctly and accurately every vote cast” when the technology was used on Election day or the evening thereof. Furthermore, the newly implemented law allows the manual audit for accuracy to be completed after election results are certified as described in the foregoing Paragraph.

67. Even if the altered DVMS used in the pilot project can show they accurately recorded votes, the project cannot be relied upon by the State of Georgia to bolster any contention that the DVMS machines were reliable in the past, are reliable in the current election cycle, or henceforth will be so reliable as to assure Plaintiffs, the Court, and the people of Georgia that the concerns set forth in this entire Complaint are without merit or legal justification.

68.Plaintiffs are entitled to have the Court declare that the so-called pilot project mandated by O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.12 can in no way be relied upon to validate or legalize the use of the DVMS as currently implemented and that the pilot project’s and any future election’s use of the DVMS roll-up system is itself is violative of the prompt certification and reporting of vote results required by O.C.G.A. 21-2-499 (b) and similar prompt-reporting statutes.

COUNT SEVEN

The Audit Trail Pilot Project, Unconstitutionally Underminesthe Affected Voters’ Rights To a Secret Ballot

69. Each and every allegation set forth in each of the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint is incorporated by reference herein.

70. The Georgia Constitution’s explicit guarantee of a secret ballot necessarily includes the requirement that a recapitulation of voter activity cannot indicate for whom a given voter voted.

71. The new Diebold Accuvote TS machines with printed roll-up vote/ballot tabulation cannot fulfill said Constitutional requirement of a secret ballot because the machines list voter results in the sequence that the voters came into the polling place, thus giving indication of who the voter might be and how he voted.

72. Determining the identity of the voter could be even easier once recently-purchased electronic poll books that can record date and time of voter appearance are implemented in Georgia. No assurances can be obtained that such information is not captured because the vendor, Diebold, has already contended in election-related cases that the data structures of their products are of a proprietary nature and cannot be revealed to the general public.

73. Plaintiffs are entitled to have the Court declare the so-called pilot project unconstitutional and to enjoin the state or its political subdivisions from using DREs that make printed sequential records of individual voting choices.

COUNT EIGHT

Mandamus

74. The allegations set forth in the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated by reference herein.

75. Plaintiffs are entitled to relief by mandamus as provided for by O.C.G.A. § 9-6-24 which reads:
Where the question is one of public right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, no legal or special interest need be shown, but it shall be sufficient that a plaintiff is interested in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced.

76. The Court has full and complete power to fashion mandate relief by virtue of O.C.G.A.§ 9-6-20, which reads:

Enforcement of official duty; inadequacy of legal remedy

All official duties should be faithfully performed; and whenever, from any cause, a defect of legal justice would ensue from a failure to perform or from improper performance, the writ of mandamus may issue to compel a due performance, if there is no other specific legal remedy for the legal rights.

WHEREFORE Plaintiffs pray:

a) That summons and process issue;
b) That the Court inquire into the issues of this case;

DECLARATORY RELIEF SOUGHT

c) That the Court use its legal authority to declare the following:

1. That the current implementation of Diebold AccuVote TS (R6) voting machines cannot meet the requirements of O.C.G.A.§ 21-2-379.1 (8) since the machines provide no practical means for verification to ensure that they did“ record correctly and accurately every vote cast” when they are used on Election Day

2. That the current system of use of Diebold Equipment (DVMS) does not adequately provide direct physical evidence of voter intent;

3. That the current system of use of Diebold System (DVMS) does not adequately insure the right of candidates and the voting public to a recount where such is allowed by law;

4. That the current system of use of Diebold (DVMS) does not provide a means to audit the veracity or otherwise physically recount votes cast so as to assure the integrity of the electoral process;

5. That O.C.G.A.-21.2.280 is unconstitutional and is in violation of Article II, Section 1, Paragraph 1 of the Georgia Constitution in its attempt to redefine the Constitutional meaning of a ballot to an internal electronic record that the voter cannot see or touch, that neither the voter nor a voter registrar can verify was cast, and that provides no direct physical evidence of voter intent which can be relied upon at a recount;

6. That the current use of the Diebold AccuVote TS (R6) voting machines is unconstitutional in that such use violates Article II, Section 1, Paragraph 1 of the Georgia Constitution in that it is unable to produce a ballot that the voter can see or touch, that the voter can verify was cast, or that provides direct physical evidence of voter intent as to elections or recounts;

7. That voters who cast electronic records during an election on the currently employed Diebold AccuVote TS (R6) voting machines are denied equal protection under the Georgia Constitution relative to those votes cast by absentee ballots and/or early written ballots that can easily be verified, audited, and recounted;

8. That the planned implementation of the Diebold AccuVote TSX voting machines for the 3 precinct pilot cannot meet the requirements of O.C.G.A.§ 21-2-379.1 (8) since the machines provide no practical means for verification to ensure that they did “record correctly and accurately every vote cast” at the time they are used on Election Day;

9. That the pilot project can in no way be determinative of past, present or future DVMS accuracy;

10. That the planned implementation of the Diebold AccuVote TSX voting machines for the precinct pilot cannot meet the ballot secrecy requirements of the Georgia Constitution since the machines produce voter results in a paper roll that represents the exact sequence in which the voters cast their ballots;

11. That any f computer codes and devices used in DRE’s should be available for inspection upon reasonable request and not be held as proprietary information or infringe upon other relevant rights of the public to inspect and know the public business.

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SOUGHT

d) That should the Court find and declare that the DVMS voting machines and their system of employment is violative of state statutory or constitutional protections that it:

1. Enjoin the State of Georgia from using any electronic voting systems that do not produce simultaneous, individualized, physical printouts or non-sequential memoranda of direct voter intent;

2. Enjoin the State of Georgia from using any electronic voting systems unless and until procedures are implemented for the precincts to verify that the machines used actually counted votes correctly on election night prior to the posting of election results;

3. Enjoin the Defendants from destroying any materials (including documents, software, data,) relating to the primaries and elections of 2002, 2004, and 2006 until the disposition of this case is complete.

4. Enjoin the State of Georgia from purchasing any additional electronic voting equipment that does not comply with Georgia statutory and Constitutional requirements.

5. Enjoin the State of Georgia from using any electronic voting systems that have secret source codes and/or electronic “patches” that are not available for reasonable public scrutiny before, during, and after elections.

MANDATE RELIEF SOUGHT

e) That should the Court, find and declare the DVMS voting machines and their system of employment is violative of state statutory or constitutional protections that it:

1. Require that the Office of Secretary of State implement procedures to ensure that any voting machines used in Georgia “record correctly and accurately every vote cast” at the time they are used on election days as required by O.C.G.A.§ 21-2-379.1 (8), and:

a. Mandate that for a ballot to be designated as an official ballot in Georgia, that ballot must be must be viewable to the voter, physically verifiable by the voter as being cast, and retained as direct physical evidence of voter intent for audit and recount purposes;

b. Require public, manual vote counting of official ballots in at least one contested race or referendum selected publicly and randomly at each precinct and conducted by the precinct on election night immediately after the polls close and before precinct results are posted;

c. Require posting of any discrepancies found between machine counts and manual counts at the precinct prior to the publication of results and include those discrepancies as part of the official election results and posting of those discrepancies on any county web sites that contain election results;

d. Require procedures where a candidate or ten electors can petition for an automatic recount at no charge to the candidate or other parties involved if discrepancies span precinct boundaries.

e. Mandate that the State of Georgia make available to the public upon reasonable request any and all source code used to operate voting machines, county tabulation servers, and the state tabulation center.

2. Direct that any and all relief granted in these prayers be fashioned to ensure that the need of all visually impaired voters, as well as voters with other disabilities, to continue to vote independently with any special equipment that may be necessary to achieve the relief sought.

3. Require Defendants to turn over any and all relevant materials to the Court or its authority so the Court can determine whether any person or persons did willfully neglect his, her, or their duties during the 2002 implementation and subsequently of DVMS voting in Georgia.

e) Award reasonable attorneys fees to Plaintiffs for the prosecution of this action;
f) That the Court order that a jury trial be had as to any contested facts;
g) That the Court grant such other and further relief as it may deem appropriate.

Respectfully submitted,

Law Office of Walker Chandler

___________________________
Walker Chandler, Attorney for Plaintiffs
Georgia Bar. No. 120675

15 Jackson Street
P.O. Box 7
Zebulon, Georgia 30295
(770) 567-3882
(770) 567-0225 Fax

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA

CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.

GARLAND FAVORITO, MARK SAWYER,
RICARDO DAVIS, AL HERMAN, FREIDA SMITH, KATHRYN WEITZEL, ADAM SHAPIRO, and CATHIE CALABRO,

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CATHY COX, SECRETARY OF STATE OF GEORGIA
SONNY PERDUE, GOVERNOR OF GEORGIA
GEORGIA STATE ELECTION BOARD,
Defendants.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF SERVICE

I, Dennis R. Dunn, Deputy Attorney General of the State of Georgia hereby acknowledge service of a copy of the Complaint and Summons by and on behalf of each of the following named Defendants, to wit:
Cathy Cox, Secretary of State of the State of Georgia
Sonny Perdue, Governor of the State of Georgia
State Election Board, State of Georgia

I also hereby acknowledge that I have received the copy of the Complaint that is to be served on the Office of the Attorney General as required by O.C.G.A. § 9-4-7
This _______ day of July, 2006.

_____________________________
Dennis R. Dunn
Deputy Attorney General
Sworn to and subscribed before me
This _____ of July, 2006.

___________________________
Notary Public

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA

CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.

GARLAND FAVORITO, MARK SAWYER,
RICARDO DAVIS, AL HERMAN, FREIDA SMITH, KATHRYN WEITZEL, ADAM SHAPIRO and CATHIE CALABRO,

Plaintiffs,
VS
CATHY COX, SECRETARY OF STATE OF GEORGIA
SONNY PERDUE, GOVERNOR OF GEORGIA
GEORGIA STATE ELECTION BOARD,

Defendants.

VERIFICATION

Upon oath duly deposed, I hereby state upon oath that the facts and allegations contained in the foregoing Complaint are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
This _____ day of July, 2006.

___________________________________ ___________________________________

Sworn to and subscribed before me Sworn to and subscribed before me
the day and year above written. the day and year above written.

______________________________________. ______________________________________.
Notary Public Notary Public
My Commission expires:___________. My Commission expires:___________.

___________________________________ ___________________________________

Sworn to and subscribed before me Sworn to and subscribed before me
the day and year above written. the day and year above written.

______________________________________. ______________________________________.
Notary Public Notary Public
My Commission expires:___________. My Commission expires:___________.

___________________________________ ___________________________________

Sworn to and subscribed before me Sworn to and subscribed before me
the day and year above written. the day and year above written.

______________________________________. ______________________________________.
Notary Public Notary Public
My Commission expires:___________. My Commission expires:___________.

___________________________________ ___________________________________

Sworn to and subscribed before me Sworn to and subscribed before me
the day and year above written. the day and year above written.

______________________________________. ______________________________________.
Notary Public Notary Public
My Commission expires:___________. My Commission expires:___________.

VoterGA and the Lawsuit to Reclaim Georgia's Elections

Source: VoterGA homepage, http://www.voterga.org [61]

About VoterGA and the Statewide Lawsuit

Machine Accuracy – Georgia law requires that electronic voting machines “…record correctly and accurately every vote cast…” at the time they are used. No procedure was ever implemented to ensure that the machines record the votes accurately on election night when they are used.

Recount Ability – State law provides conditions when candidates are entitled to a recount of votes. Georgia E-Voting made recounts impossible because it removed all direct physical evidence of voter intent from our elections. Voter verified ballots were replaced by voter inaccessible electronic records. Only reprints of previous unverifiable results are now possible.

Ballot Requirement – The Georgia Constitution requires all elections to be conducted by ballot. When E-Voting was implemented in 2002, Georgia law was modified to state that elections “shall be conducted by ballot except when voting machines are used…” State law cannot override a Constitutional requirement. Elections must be conducted by ballot, not by electronic record.

People Participation - The Georgia Constitution defines our “method of voting” as “elections by the people”. Currently, the people cannot see the selections on their own ballots, cannot confirm that their ballots were cast and cannot participate in counting the votes to determine election results. All critical functions of “elections by the people” were unconstitutionally removed from the people.

Equal Protection – The Constitution also states: “No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.” Georgia absentee voters cast votes on standard ballots that can be verified, audited and recounted. Georgia Election Day voters do not have those same privileges and are denied equal protection of the laws stated above.

The lawsuit also claims the audit trail pilot project is unconstitutional and illegal as follows:

Ballot Secrecy – The Constitution requires that elections “must be conducted by secret ballot” so that no one can identify candidates that the voter chose. The newer Diebold pilot project machines roll election results sequentially into a sealed canister. This technique can allow a poll worker or observer who accesses the results to determine precisely what candidates each voter selected.

Machine Accuracy – The newer Diebold pilot machines also cannot meet time of use accuracy requirements because they do not produce individually separated ballots that can be quickly counted and audited once the polls close. The new pilot project law even allows for machine results to be audited AFTER the election results are certified.

The basic relief that the lawsuit will seek could have been implemented in 2002 including:

* Statewide external audit trails for all electronic voting machines;
* A public audit of at least one randomly selected race at the precinct on election night;
* An automatic race recount if similar audit count discrepancies are found across precincts.

Instead, citizens like those in VoterGA who have already spent thousands of hours and dollars on this issue now must file suit to restore voting that can be verified, audited and recounted. As you can see, all seven counts of the suit are very strong. We need to win only one of the first five counts to win the case against current E-voting and just one of the last two counts to win against the pilot project. Georgia needs your immediate help so that we can take appropriate legal action to restore voting that can be verified, audited and recounted. Freedom is not free. Please click the Donation button to contribute or mail your contribution to:

VoterGA P.O. Box 808 Decatur, Ga. 30031

We are a volunteer organization so all money that you give will directly offset the legal expenses of preparing, filing and arguing this suit to preserve the principles of democracy in Georgia. See the Contribute page [372] for information about special gifts for donors. Thank you.

Also See These Related Articles:

http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/GA_electronic_elections_history_v... [373]

http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/georgia_state_audit_trail_chronology [374]

http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/GA_HB_790_Precinct_Audit [375]

Major Changes Proposed for Hawaii Election Code

Hawaii Proposes Major Revision of Election Rules

Hawaii Voter Registration

Hawaii Voter Registration Database Report:
State Regulations and Procedures Implementing HAVA Voter Registration Requirements

Attached is the Hawaii Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Click to download the Hawaii Voter Registration report [382]

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT: Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

Idaho Voter Registration Information

Idaho Voter Registration Database Report:
State Regulations and Procedures Implementing HAVA Voter Registration Requirements

Attached is the Idaho Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT: Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

Illinois Voter Registration Information

Illinois Voter Registration Database Report:
State Regulations and Procedures Implementing HAVA Voter Registration Requirements

Attached is the Illinois Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT: Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

Indiana Voter Registration Information

Indiana Voter Registration Database Report:
State Regulations and Procedures Implementing HAVA Voter Registration Requirements

Attached is the Indiana Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT: Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

Iowa Voter Registration Information

Iowa Voter Registration Database Report:
State Regulations and Procedures Implementing HAVA Voter Registration Requirements

Attached is the Iowa Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT: Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

Kansas Voter Registration Information

Kansas Voter Registration Database Report:
State Regulations and Procedures Implementing HAVA Voter Registration Requirements

Attached is the Kansas Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT: Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

Kentucky Voter Registration Information

Kentucky Voter Registration Database Report:
State Regulations and Procedures Implementing HAVA Voter Registration Requirements

Attached is the Kentucky Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT: Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

Louisiana Voter Registration Information

Louisiana Voter Registration Database Report:
State Regulations and Procedures Implementing HAVA Voter Registration Requirements

Attached is the Louisiana Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT: Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

Maine Miscounts and Strangeness

After about 50 follow-up questions, the secretary of state's office finally conceded that someone

could go in to their office and ask to see their results sheets, beginning 3 days after the election. . .

When I asked if ANYONE came in to ask to look at results for this election,

both persons I spoke with said "No."

The Maine Numbers

Maine Voter Registration Information

Maine Voter Registration Database Report:
State Regulations and Procedures Implementing HAVA Voter Registration Requirements

Attached is the Maine Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT: Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

Maryland Voter Registration Information

Maryland Voter Registration Database Report:
State Regulations and Procedures Implementing HAVA Voter Registration Requirements

Attached is the Maryland Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT: Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

Massachusetts Resources

Massachusetts Legislature
Find your Massachusetts senator or representitive by city or town. Links to all member's webpages.
http://www.mass.gov/legis/citytown.htm [394]

Massachusetts Constitution
The text of the Massachusetts Constitution.
http://www.mass.gov/legis/const.htm [395]

Massachusetts Administrative Laws
Massachusetts Administrative code, Chapters 1-182 of the state code. Scroll down to title VIII for electoral laws
http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/mgl/gl-pt1-toc.htm [396]

General Laws of Massachusetts
The text of the general laws of Massachusetts; searchable, and sortable by effective dates
http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/mgl/index.htm [397]

Senate Bills
Site contains the text of all proposed senate legislation.
http://www.mass.gov/legis/billsrch.htm [398]

House Bills
A Searchable database of proposed house legislation
http://www.mass.gov/legis/hbillsrch.htm [399]

Massachusetts state homepage-many links to law and government information sources
Includes links to all Massachusetts State administrative agencies, courts, and the legislature. http://www.mass.gov [400]

Massachusetts General Court
The official site of the legislative branch of Massachusetts enables users to?find bill information from the state house of representatives and state senate from 2005 to the current legislative session.
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/ [260]

Massachusetts Courts and case law finders
Massachusetts judicial opinions from 1804-to the present. Click on the slip opinions linkfrom the Mass Reports site.
http://massreports.com/ [401]

On FindLaw, navigate to US Law: cases and codes and select Massachusetts.
http://www.findlaw.com/ [253]

Massachusetts Secretary of State
Find forms and applications for business via the corporate portal as well as election information via that election http://www.sec.state.ma.us/ [402]

Massachusetts Courts Self-Help Center
Site contains forms, rules, links to courts, and the self-help center for all Massachusetts courts. Fill out forms on line for various types of cases. Get detailed information on how to proceed with your case. Find links that will help you complete your case without an attorney.
http://www.mass.gov/courts/resources.html [403]

Massachusetts state agencies-link to the state agency index
http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=mg2subtopic&L=4&L0=Home&L1=State+Government&... [404]

Massachusetts Attorney General
The homepage of the Massachusetts attorney general, includes resources and important phone numbers.
http://www.ago.state.ma.us/ [405]

Massachusetts Voter Registration Information

Massachusetts Voter Registration Database Report:
State Regulations and Procedures Implementing HAVA Voter Registration Requirements

Attached is the Massachusetts Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT: Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

Abusive Voter Purge Program Exposed in Michigan

Michigan Election Reform Alliance Reports Investigation of State Voter Purge

Court Orders Halt to Illegal Michigan Purging

Source: The Advancement Project [410]

UNITED STATES STUDENT ASSOCIATION FOUNDATION v. LAND

Download the Court Order [411]

Judge Rules Michigan Voter Purge Program Violates Federal Law

October 14, 2008

In a major victory for voting rights, a judge yesterday ruled that Michigan's voter removal program violates federal law and ordered the state to stop illegally purging voters from the rolls. The decision comes in a lawsuit filed last month by Advancement Project, the American Civil Liberties Union, the ACLU of Michigan, and the law firm of Pepper Hamilton LLP.

"We are gratified that the judge ordered the state of Michigan to halt its unlawful purge program," said Bradley Heard, senior attorney with Advancement Project. "This decision protects thousands of Michigan residents' voting rights from being infringed upon during this important and historic presidential election, and beyond. It is now up to the state of Michigan to afford these voters the protections that federal law requires."

Judge Stephen J. Murphy of the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Michigan ruled that one of Michigan's voter removal programs violates the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA). In question was a Michigan state law requiring local clerks to nullify the registrations of newly-registered voters whenever their original voter identification cards are returned by the post office as undeliverable. Detroit elections officials report that nearly 30,000 voters per year in that city alone are removed from the rolls as a result of this state election law. The NVRA permits voters to remain on the voter rolls for at least two federal elections after voter registration cards are returned.

Judge Murphy ordered that state to "immediately discontinue their practice of cancelling or rejecting a voter's registration based upon the return of the voter's original voter identification card as undeliverable."

The plaintiffs in the case are the United States Student Association (USSA) and the ACLU of Michigan. The parties have asked the federal court to schedule a hearing as soon as possible and to enter an immediate temporary injunction barring further purges under these programs.

Attorneys in this case are Heard of Advancement Project; Bell-Platts and Neil Bradley of the ACLU Voting Rights Project; Moss and Michael Steinberg of the ACLU of Michigan; and Matthew J. Lund, Mary K. Deon and Deborah Kovsky of Pepper Hamilton LLP.

From the Order:

'WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that the defendants Michigan Secretary of State and the Michigan Director of Elections:

(1) Immediately discontinue their practice of cancelling or rejecting a voter's registration based upon the return of the voter's original voter identification card as undeliverable;

(2) Remove the "rejected" marking in the QVF from the registrations of all voters whose original voter IDs have been returned as undeliverable since January 1, 2006 until the present, unless rejection was warranted for some other lawful reason;

(3) Make no other designation, including but not limited to "cancelled," in these voters' registration records in the QVF or elsewhere, that will prevent their ballots from being counted if they appear at the polls and give whatever further proof of Michigan residence is required or permitted under applicable state and federal law; unless such a designation is warranted by written notice from the voter or for some reason other than change of residence;

(4) Preserve and not destroy until after December 31, 2009, any and all records relating to maintenance of Michigan's voter registration files that have, since January 1, 2006, resulted in the cancellation of the registration of voters who have applied for out of state driver’s licenses, or the cancellation or rejection of voters’ registrations based upon the return of original voter identification cards ; and

(5) Give no order, direction, or encouragement that any other government official or any other person engage in activity hereby prohibited to them.

It is further ORDERED that the defendants Michigan Secretary of State, the Michigan Director of Elections, and the Ypsilanti City Clerk file an answer to the complaint in this action no later than fourteen days from the date of this Order.

SO ORDERED.

s/Stephen J. Murphy, III
STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III
United States District Judge

News 
Advancement Project And ACLU Sue Michigan Secretary Of State Over Unlawful Voter Purging [413] (9/18/2008)

Legal Documents 
United States Student Association Foundation v. Land - Order [414] (10/13/2008)

United States Student Association Foundation v. Land - Complaint [415] (9/17/2008)

United States Student Association Foundation v. Land - Ex Parte Motion [416] 9/17/2008)

United States Student Association Foundation v. Land - Motion for Preliminary Injunction [417] (9/17/2008)

United States Student Association Foundation v. Land - Request For Expedited Consideration [418] (9/17/2008)

Michigan

Michigan Voter Registration Database Report:
State Regulations and Procedures Implementing HAVA Voter Registration Requirements

Attached is the Michigan Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT: Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

FAQ on the Minnesota Recount

http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2008/11/06/recount_faq/ [420]

FAQ on the Senate Recount

by Tom Scheck, Minnesota Public Radio, Tim Nelson, Minnesota Public Radio, Brian Bakst, Associated Press
November 6, 2008

Answers to some of your questions about the recount process in Minnesota's U.S. Senate race.

ELECTION DAY HAS COME AND GONE. WHY ARE THE VOTE TOTALS STILL CHANGING?

County election officials are double-checking their vote counts. If they discover an error, they report it to the Secretary of State's office.

After votes are cast in a particular precinct, an election official has to manually enter the total into the system and then compare it with the official receipt that comes out of the optical scan machines.

That process leaves room for human error -- for example, numbers are sometimes transposed, so instead of 84, a total would be reported as 48.

WHEN DOES THE COUNTING FINALLY END?

Each county in Minnesota has a canvassing board, which certifies the election results in that county. The deadline for the counties to certify the numbers was Monday, Nov. 10.

The counties are required to submit their election reports to the Secretary of State by Friday, Nov. 14.

WHEN DOES THE STATE GET INVOLVED?

The State Canvassing Board meets on Tuesday, Nov. 18 to certify the results of the election. At that point the board will order a recount in the Senate race, which is required by state law because of the slim margin. All other races, where the outcome is certain, will be certified.

WHO SITS ON THE STATE CANVASSING BOARD?

The Canvassing Board has five members -- the Secretary of State, two Minnesota Supreme Court justices, and two other judges named by the Secretary of State. None of the judges who serve on the board can be up for election on the ballot they are reviewing.

Secretary of State Mark Ritchie on Wednesday named Supreme Court Chief Justice Eric Magnuson and Justice G. Barry Anderson to the board, along with Ramsey County Chief Judge Kathleen Gearin and Judge Edward Cleary.

HOW WILL THE RECOUNT WORK?

Every single vote cast for the U.S. Senate candidates will be recounted by hand.

The official recount will be conducted in approximately 110 locations throughout the state, generally in every county courthouse and in the city halls of major cities. In some locations more than one recount "station" will be used depending on the size of the jurisdiction.

All the ballots are currently being stored in secure rooms at county courthouses and elections offices around the state.

The people doing the recounting will be county election officials and election judges. Teams of recounters will examine each ballot and record the vote.

As many as four, perhaps even more, people will be present as each ballot is recounted -- the election judge doing the recounting, representatives from each candidate's campaign, and any other interested parties. The recounts and canvassing board meetings are all open to the public.

WHAT WILL THE RECOUNT OFFICIALS LOOK FOR?

The recounters will determine the intent of the voter when they encounter problem ballots.

Most voters fill in the circle next to the candidate they choose. But sometimes an individual will put a check mark or an X next to a name. Others will circle a name. Ballots marked in that way cannot be scanned by the voting machines, so they wouldn't have been counted the first time around.

If a voter's intentions aren't clear by looking at a ballot, or if there is any objection to the decision being made by the election official by either one or both of the candidates' representatives, the ballots in dispute become "challenged" ballots that will go to the State Canvassing Board for review.

HOW LONG WILL THIS PROCESS TAKE?

Local election officials have until Dec. 5 to complete their portion of the recount, and to forward their results and any challenged ballots to the Secretary of State.

The Secretary of State will put together a final summary of the results and present it to the State Canvassing Board. The board will meet in St. Paul on Dec. 16 and rule on each disputed ballot. At the end of this process, the Canvassing Board will certify the results of the election and declare a winner.

The board hopes to complete its work by Dec. 19.

HOW MUCH WILL THIS COST?

Ritchie says the cost of a recount is about 3 cents per ballot. Since there are nearly 3 million ballots to count, the total will be about $90,000. It will be paid by taxpayers.

COULD THIS END UP BEING TAKEN TO COURT?

It's quite likely that the outcome could be decided in a courtroom instead of an election office.

Either candidate -- or any eligible voter -- can head to court to challenge the way the election was conducted or the votes were tallied. The challenge must be filed within a week of the post-recount canvass.

The two sides will likely wait until the State Canvassing Board certifies the results after the recount, before one of them files a civil action in Ramsey County District Court.

HOW WOULD THE CASE PROCEED?

If a case is filed, state law requires that it go to trial in just 20 days. In that time, a judge would appoint dozens, or even hundreds, of three-person teams of ballot inspectors, all over the state, to sort through the votes.

Each campaign would name one person to each team, and both parties would have to agree on a third neutral person for each team. The teams will put aside the obvious votes and flag disputed ballots for review by the court.

By law, the judge in the case would make a decision on each disputed ballot. But since nearly all judges are political appointees, the two sides might ask for a panel of three judges to decide the case.

If one side or the other does not like the outcome, they could ask the state Court of Appeals to act.

WHY WOULD A CANDIDATE CHOOSE THIS PROCESS INSTEAD OF GOING WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S RECOUNT?

Under the Secretary of State's recount, the candidates have very little control over the process.

Under the court's jurisdiction, the candidates, their attorneys and the political parties would become involved. Each party would choose representatives to review each ballot and will argue for or against its inclusion, depending on their viewpoint.

Under this scenario, the recount conducted by the Secretary of State is essentially rendered meaningless.

If the candidates go this route, the recount becomes much more expensive, but the parties involved would pay the cost -- not Minnesota's taxpayers.

Since the stakes in this race are very high and have national implications, there will probably be money, lawyers and political operatives from all over the country heading this way to become involved.

MN Recount Updates 12/12/08: Big Breaks for Franken

Source:
http://tpmelectioncentral.talkingpointsmemo.com/2008/12/franken_gets_big... [421]

Franken Gets Big Win At Canvass Board

By Eric Kleefeld - December 12, 2008, 11:48AM

Al Franken's chances of winning the Minnesota recount may have just gone up astronomically.

The state canvassing board just voted unanimously that absentee ballots that were initially rejected because of clerical errors -- and the current estimate from the hearing is that there could be nearly 1,600 of them, based on some extrapolation -- should be counted, probably the single biggest issue that the Franken campaign has been hammering ever since this recount began, and which really seemed up in the air going into this hearing.

The board can't directly order the county officials to do the counting, only making a formal request to go back and count the votes and then submit amended totals. But many counties have already begun or finished the process of sorting the rejected absentees at the board's request, and board members did castigate any election officials who wouldn't do so, with some of them even leaving open the option of seeking a court order if necessary.

Because of all that, it seems very likely that the vast majority of these ballots will be counted before this is over -- and it could possibly seal the deal for Franken. Pre-election polling showed him winning the overall pool of absentee ballots by a solid margin, so it seems pretty reasonable to assume that the newly-counted votes will break for Al. If that proves to be correct -- and if Norm Coleman is unable to stop it through further litigation -- Franken will probably pull ahead of Coleman and win the election.

Late Update: Just to clarify, this was a separate question from the missing Minneapolis ballots, which they ruled on earlier and we posted on below. The board took on two crucial issues this morning, and on both of them ruled in favor of the Franken camp's position.

6-minute video by the Franken campaign on improperly rejected absentee ballots

===================================================

====================================================
Source:
http://tpmelectioncentral.talkingpointsmemo.com/2008/12/in_boost_to_fran... [422]

In Boost To Franken, Minnesota Restores Missing Ballots To The Count

By Eric Kleefeld - December 12, 2008, 11:13AM

Some good news for Al Franken: The state canvasing board just voted unanimously to compensate for the loss of those 133 missing ballots in Minneapolis by going back to the recorded Election Night vote totals for this precinct, sparing Al the loss of a net 46 votes.

This means Franken has survived a major threat, as his campaign's calculations of how the race would go ultimately depended on the ballots being found or compensated for.

The Coleman campaign had been arguing against this move, on the grounds that the state can't count ballots that no longer seem to exist -- they were believed to be in a ballot marked "1 of 5," but can no longer be found -- while the Franken camp said that to do otherwise would be to disenfranchise the 133 people who had the poor luck of having their ballots end up in a lost envelope.

The board, made up of a mixture of Republicans, Democrats and independents, has sided with Franken on this one.

More to come.

Late Update: To be clear, we're watching the hearing over here on a streaming video feed.

Late Late Update: State Atty. Gen. Lori Swanson (D) just gave her advisory opinion on another very big issue, whether absentee ballots that appear to have been improperly rejected should be put back in the count. Swanson told the board that they have the authority to request (but not order) that counties meet again to count those ballots. If the board sides with Swanson, this could be a huge boost to Franken, as he had a good-sized lead among the overall absentee ballots, and introducing new votes into the count would probably net him some more in the total.

Minnesota Voter Registration Information

Minnesota Voter Registration Database Report:
State Regulations and Procedures Implementing HAVA Voter Registration Requirements

Attached is the Minnesota Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT: Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

Mississippi Voter Registration Information

Mississippi Voter Registration Database Report:
State Regulations and Procedures Implementing HAVA Voter Registration Requirements

Attached is the Mississippi Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT: Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

Reverse Mississippi's Deliberate Ballot Design Manipulation

Action of the Day 091708

Tell the Mississippi governor: The purposefully confusing ballot is illegal!
http://www.care2.com/go/z/e/0Xto/wRCg/E0DA [425]

The Republican Secretary of State decided to bury the Senate race below all local contests on the ballot.
The race, between interim Senator Roger Wicker -- a Republican temporarily appointed to replace Trent Lott -- and former Democratic Governor Ronnie Musgrove, is expected to be close, making it one of the most important in the state.

Not only does burying this Senate race below all the local ones confuse voters, it's a direct violation of state election law, which clearly states that federal races must be on the top of the ballot!

Tell Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour -- who approved the ballot -- to reverse his decision in order to maintain the integrity of America's electoral process!
http://www.care2.com/go/z/e/0Xto/wRCg/E0DA [425]

Missouri Voter Registration Information

Missouri Voter Registration Database Report:
State Regulations and Procedures Implementing HAVA Voter Registration Requirements

Attached is the Missouri Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT: Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

Nebraska Voter Registration Database Information

Nebraska Voter Registration Database Report:
State Regulations and Procedures Implementing HAVA Voter Registration Requirements

Attached is the Nebraska Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT: Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

Nevada Voter Registration Information

Nevada Voter Registration Database Report:
State Regulations and Procedures Implementing HAVA Voter Registration Requirements

Attached is the Nevada Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT: Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

Montana Elections Code

http://data.opi.state.mt.us/bills/mca_toc/13.htm [429]

Search [430] · MCA Contents [431]

Table of Contents

Title 13. ELECTIONS

Back Up One Level in Table of Contents [431]

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
[432] CHAPTER 2. REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS
[433] CHAPTER 3. PRECINCTS AND POLLING PLACES
[434] CHAPTER 4. ELECTION JUDGES [435]
CHAPTER 5 THROUGH 9 RESERVED.
CHAPTER 10. PRIMARY ELECTIONS AND NOMINATIONS
[436] CHAPTER 11. ELECTION PROCLAMATION (Repealed) [437]
CHAPTER 12. ELECTION SUPPLIES AND BALLOTS [438]
CHAPTER 13. ELECTION PROCEDURE [439]
CHAPTER 14. NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS [440]
CHAPTER 15. CANVASSING, RETURNS, AND CERTIFICATES [441]
CHAPTER 16. RECOUNTS AND TIE VOTES [442]
CHAPTER 17. VOTING SYSTEMS [443]
CHAPTER 18. ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS (Repealed) [444]
CHAPTER 19. MAIL BALLOT ELECTIONS [445] CHAPTER 20 RESERVED.
CHAPTER 21. MONTANA ABSENT UNIFORMED SERVICES AND OVERSEAS ELECTOR VOTING ACT
[446] CHAPTER 22. YOUTH VOTING ACT [447]
CHAPTER 23 AND 24 RESERVED.
CHAPTER 25. ELECTIONS FOR FEDERAL OFFICE
[448] CHAPTER 26. CONVENTION TO RATIFY AMENDMENTS TO UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
[449] CHAPTER 27. BALLOT ISSUES [450]
CHAPTER 28 THROUGH 34 RESERVED.
CHAPTER 35. ELECTION AND CAMPAIGN PRACTICES AND CRIMINAL PROVISIONS
[451] CHAPTER 36. CONTESTS
[452] CHAPTER 37. CONTROL OF CAMPAIGN PRACTICES
[453] CHAPTER 38. POLITICAL PARTIES [454]

New Hampshire Voter Registration Information

New Hampshire Voter Registration Database Report:
State Regulations and Procedures Implementing HAVA Voter Registration Requirements

Attached is the New Hampshire Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List: Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains information about state voter registration that was current as of the date of publication.

As of January 1, 2006, federal law requires that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT: Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

O'Dell Testimony to NH Legislature on UBS Auditing 11.05.07

My name is Bruce O’Dell, and I am a self-employed information technology consultant based in Minneapolis, Minnesota. I have twenty five years professional experience specializing in the design of very large scale computer systems with extraordinary requirements for security and integrity. For example, while an employee of American Express, I led a project to design a central computer security service to authorize access to financial systems across that company and exchange data and transact on our customers’ behalf, with other financial institutions throughout North America. In 2005 I was the architect in charge of deploying a comprehensive new company-wide security environment at one of the 20 largest public companies in America. I would like to thank the Sub-Committee for the opportunity to share my perspective on electronic voting as someone accountable for the security and integrity of computer systems which safely handle billions - or even trillions - of dollars of other people’s money.

Since the heady days of the 1960s, a new, multi-billion-dollar electronic voting industry with world-wide growth aspirations has emerged. Whether the original drive to automate our voting was driven by genuine desire to improve elections or a simple faith that the latest and greatest technology must necessarily be the best, that industry is now so entrenched it has now become almost impossible to question the original decision to automate voting through application of computer technology.

Problems with computerized voting equipment are well-documented in the computer security community, and began to surface as soon as it was first deployed more than 40 years ago. As early as 1984, as reported in the well-respected “Risks to the Public of the Use of Computer Systems” forum a “series of articles by David Burnham in The New York Times documented vulnerabilities to tampering in equipment sold by Computer Election Systems, then the dominant electronic vendor; elections with their machines were challenged in Indiana, West Virginia, and Maryland, with rigging suspected in the 1984 election in the first two states; Federal Election Commission standards were described as inadequate; Texas also investigated numerous discrepancies involving Business Records Corporation - formerly known as Computer Election Systems; the NSA was asked to investigate if CES systems were open to fraud; California and Florida also investigated; [voting systems examiner] Michael Shamos was quoted as saying CES systems equipment "is a security nightmare open to tampering in a multitude of ways."

Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, in the fall of 1988, noted: "America’s fundamental democratic institution is ripe for abuse... It is ridiculous for our country to run such a haphazard, easily violated election system. If we are to retain confidence in our election results, we must institute adequate security procedures in computerized vote tallying, and return election control to the citizenry."

In a pattern often to be repeated over the years, little attention was paid to those reports nor to the urgent warnings from independent security experts; while Business Records Corporation prospered and grew rapidly, eventually merging into the company known as Election Systems & Services, currently the leading vendor of computerized election equipment and services.

Yet despite these warnings - which in hindsight seem remarkably prescient - several generations of increasingly complex and expensive computerized voting technology were subsequently developed, marketed and deployed. At the same time, for nearly twenty years, the catalog of reported problems, outages and security vulnerabilities also continued to grow - and recently, accelerated rapidly thanks in part to the “Help America Vote Act” of 2002 (HAVA). Passed in the aftermath of the disputed presidential election in 2000, HAVA was intended to improve the process of voting in America. But as a direct result of its enactment, a new wave of secret and proprietary computerized voting technology has completed the process of computerization of American elections.

With thousands of reported problems nationwide affecting newly-deployed electronic voting equipment in the subsequent elections of 2002, 2004 and 2006, it is clear that HAVA has had precisely the opposite effect to its stated intention. As an information technology professional I am dismayed that all this has been allowed to happen with the blessing and active participation of so many of my colleagues, many of whom make their living promoting e-voting technologies. Billions of dollars have been spent on new voting equipment in the absence of what I would consider adequate disclosure of the true costs and risks to policy makers and the general public. This is a disservice to those who must rely on IT professionals to assess the technologies they do not understand.

As we will see, not only are there fundamental limitations to our ability to prove the accuracy and trustworthiness of any complex real-world computing system, voting itself deserves the strongest degree of protection. Many of my colleagues, as well as their clients and the general public, seem to utterly misunderstand the essential point: computerized voting systems should be classified as national defense systems demanding a much higher standard of protection than more conventional applications.

Undetected widespread covert manipulation of computerized voting systems is the functional equivalent of invasion and occupation by a foreign power. In either case the people lose control of their own destinies, perhaps permanently. Undetected covert manipulation of voting systems could even be worse than mere invasion, since the “electoral coup” would appear to occur with the illusion of the manufactured consent of the governed, and there would be no “tanks in the street” to galvanize resistance.

Voting systems used in American federal elections grant regulatory powers over the world’s largest economy, disbursement authority for the federal procurement budget, control of the composition of the Supreme Court and federal judiciary, and command of the world’s only superpower military. The financial rewards alone for covert influence over the outcome of state elections are potentially very lucrative as well.

Yet despite the fact that our computerized voting systems collectively represent the most irresistible target for insider manipulation in the history of the world, they are not even currently given the same level of protection as systems I’m familiar with in banking and financial services, much less than to computerized gaming equipment in Las Vegas. This is a national scandal, and a disgraceful lapse on the part of my profession.

You may hear from those who believe, to the contrary, that there are powerful information technology industry quality assurance and inspection techniques - such as certification of hardware and software by independent testing laboratories, county-sponsored Logic and Accuracy Testing, or even source code inspection - that can ensure the integrity and accuracy of New Hampshire’s computerized vote tabulation software

Yet, ensuring the integrity of systems is the hardest of all challenges in computing. Once again I believe my profession has failed to adequately inform our clients and the general public.

One of the primary reasons why trustworthy technology is so hard to achieve is that the mind-boggling complexity of real-world systems provides an enormous number of potential points of vulnerability. Voting hardware is deployed at more than 180,000 precincts and in more than three thousand counties in the US -not to forge those of the 309 voting locations in New Hampshire that tabulate votes by machine. The mere physical logistics of moving all that equipment out to the field and getting election results back to the central tabulators for the official canvass is challenging.

Not only are there potentially hundreds of New Hampshire voting devices, there are thousands of individual hardware and software components within each device. This includes proprietary software developed by voting equipment vendors, mass market consumer products like Microsoft Windows, and a host of highly complex, very specialized software - most with no visible behaviors - supplied by a long list of other vendors, many of them offshore.

In addition to all the devices and their individual components, we must also consider the collective actions of the thousands of people who participate, directly or indirectly, in designing, programming, testing, distributing, manufacturing, installing, maintaining, configuring, operating, transporting, monitoring, repairing and storing the vast number of hardware and software components that collectively add up to our system of electronic voting.

You may well hear advocates for rigorous testing and controls to be applied throughout the end-to-end voting process, but the truth is, no amount of testing alone can conjure trust in the overall system.

It is well known in the information technology profession that computers are ultimately "black boxes" - you cannot actually see what bits are really present and executing; and all methods to attempt to do so require other software that itself has the same problem, in an infinite regress. There is no workaround.

The only way to truly know what is running in a computer at any given moment is to observe its behavior: give all possible inputs, measure its corresponding outputs, and then check to see if the inputs and outputs you observe match the specification.

It is reasonable to ask if computer software is always tested before use, why bother to double-check after the fact? Unfortunately, you really have no guarantee that a given computer program's behavior as measured, say, at 10:00 AM will have any relationship to the same program's execution at noon. Computers have clocks and can tell time, and can easily be programmed to behave differently at different times, on different dates – or under an endless variety of different circumstances.

When it comes to systems processing high-value transactions of interest to potential criminal embezzlers - like money or votes - the inherent limitations of point-in-time behavioral testing make it unacceptably risky. Instead, some kind of computer behavioral monitoring system is required to record a vulnerable system's inputs and corresponding outputs while it is processing critical transactions. This would provide all the information needed to enable a human auditor or another automated auditing system to spot processing errors or manipulation of the transactions. But as I will point out, the inherent nature of voting severely limits our ability to monitor the behavior of voting systems.

Independent inspection and certification of source code has no real benefit. If a malicious insider at Diebold or ES&S truly wanted to corrupt vote tabulation logic, they would hardly put it in the official release handed over for review. There’s simply no reason to trust that any software delivered for inspection bears any relationship whatsoever to the logic that actually runs on voting devices in an election.

Since real-world computer systems involve complex inventories of hundreds or even thousands of application program modules, firmware, device drivers and operating system components, static inspection alone will never be able to reliably determine what those components will actually do at any given point in time. There’s simply no reason to believe that a given executable binary file corresponds to the given source code, and no way to truly know what the executable is doing - except by running it. Static inspection is not a security measure.

If source code inspection could allow us to reliably predict how a particular instance of a program will actually work in the field, Microsoft Windows would be a rock-solid, bulletproof product - after all, tens of thousands of programmers spend their professional careers scrutinizing its source code every day. It’s simply absurd for serious IT professionals to state that it would be anything more than a sham to “inspect” whatever source code a vendor supplies. Worse yet, it misleads the public, making it seem as if IT professionals have the power to “know” the source code is benign, and to “know” precisely what it will and won’t do, and to “know” where and how it is actually running in a particular device in the field - when of course, we do not.

Nor can we test security into software. It is a truism in my profession that the purpose of testing is to find “bugs” - not to indicate that a piece of software contains no flaws. It’s a subtle point, but what it really means is that if I’ve found 100 errors, there is simply no magic oracle that will then tell me “well, that’s all, we’re done, no more bugs”.

If it was possible to test quality - much less security - into any piece of software Microsoft Windows would also be the bug-free, highly secure platform we all know it to be, since Microsoft has the world’s most sophisticated automated testing tools, thousands of paid testers, and hundreds of thousands of people worldwide who volunteer to help. Yet even so several critical Microsoft security defects have been reported every month for the last several years. But not to pick on Microsoft; Secunia, a Danish company, maintains an online listing of security issues in popular software; in every case these flaws were discovered after completion of formal testing. The list itself is currently over 700 pages long.

As socially-responsible professionals we must openly acknowledge the inherent limitations of our ability to ensure voting is as trustworthy as a critical national security system should be. We cannot and should not ask the public to simply trust the outcome of any testing and certification process, no matter how many “experts” say so.

I know that some may at this point draw an analogy between computerized banking and computerized voting. For example, Michael Shamos, a noted advocate of computerized voting, and a long-time consultant to states on the certification of their electronic voting systems has stated:

“Why should voting systems be held to a standard of perfection when nothing else in society is? Nonetheless, electronic voting watchdogs insist that election equipment must be perfect or it is totally unusable. The analogy between voting systems and the bank is particularly apt because (1) the chance of a system being tampered with successfully is low; (2) even successful tampering does not necessarily result in the wrong candidate being elected; and (3) only a small portion of the vote is cast on one machine.”

Unfortunately, computerized voting and computerized banking actually have almost nothing in common.

One reason why electronic financial transactions are as secure as they are (by which I only mean that embezzlement is the exception and not the rule) is that while financial transactions are private, they are hardly anonymous; you need to prove your identity to all the other counterparties involved. Each counterparty gets and keeps their own independent records of the transaction, all counterparties are strongly motivated to spot discrepancies and compare their records with others, while procedures relating to resolution of financial disputes are legally mature.

Why are voting systems so different? In contrast with banking, voting is both a private and an anonymous transaction. Applying counterparty-based financial auditing mechanisms to voting transactions as they occur would compromise the confidentiality of the vote and voter.

To meet the standards of banking, not only would multiple independent copies of audit records fully describing the voter’s identity and ballot choices need to be generated and shared with multiple parties, 100% of those transaction records would be routinely audited and the results double-checked by external auditors as well as the voters themselves.

Although some computer scientists feel they can maintain both voter privacy and vote count integrity by some magical all-electronic secret internal audit, ultimately there is no reliable means to do so. At the moment of creating the electronic audit record, the computer could be programmed to electronically assert you input “Smith for Governor" even though you actually input "Jones for Governor". Every such all-electronic auditing scheme, no matter how elaborate, would from that point on then simply record a lie with every appearance of the truth.

The only way voters can protect themselves from such a consistently-told electronic lie is with some kind of corresponding tangible, visible record that can be used as a proof you really voted for Jones. Unlike in banking, we cannot give a voter a receipt or a monthly statement; the best we can do is receive from the voter an anonymous receipt that says the equivalent of "Someone Voted for Jones", and then entrust it to the electoral authorities to count (by hand or machine) and to retain for future auditing or recounting.

In voting, on the other hand, only a relative few states routinely audit their paper ballot records (if they have any) and then in only a few percent of the precincts are any ballots checked at all. Yet if a bank audited only a few percent of its accounts - or none at all unless one of their depositors paid for it themselves - its customers would flee, regulators would shut it down, and under current Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, its Board of Directors would face possible jail time.

To its credit the state of New Hampshire has avoided purchase and deployment of the most risky and problematic class of voting equipment: Direct-Recording Electronic voting equipment (with or without a so-called “voter verified paper audit trail”). Unfortunately it has chosen to continue to rely on Diebold optical scan voting equipment known to be vulnerable to manipulation. Yet by legally enshrining a voter-marked paper ballot, whether tallied by people or by machines, as the definitive record of voter intent, New Hampshire is far better prepared than many other states to ensure the integrity of its democratic processes.

The risks of errors and covert manipulation are inherent to the use of computer software. Human nature being what it is, those risks are ever-present in all systems that process high-value transactions - especially those involving money or voting. So to achieve trustworthiness, independent auditing of an electronic vote count via of an independent should always be performed.

Both the accuracy and integrity of any paper ballot record must also be assured.

To ensure integrity, no one must be able to alter, delete, or substitute paper ballot records after they are verified by the voter and until they are tallied. Immediately after the election, traditional paper-based audit and control concerns take precedence. In general, the more time passes since creation and the further it travels from point of origin, the more risk there is of manipulation or destruction of paper records.

Unfortunately, there is no such thing as perfect security; the best we can do is to mitigate the risks as best we can. In recognition of this inherent problem, the Canadian system of counting paper ballots in-precinct on election night - in concert with their absentee/early voting procedure - is highly secure. The paper flow is always under observation, and ballots are immediately counted in front of multiple adversarial counterparties - namely the political party representatives.

Admittedly, even rigorous paper-handling processes are not perfectly secure - but on the other hand, in the last 600 years of general use of paper records, we have figured out some pretty good procedures. Yet I doubt that many jurisdictions in America handle paper election records with the level of custodial care that we find, say, in handling real estate collateral in the mortgage-backed securities market, much less in Canadian elections.

There are additional practical problems with checking the trustworthiness of an electronic vote tally after the fact. Since paper ballot records are typically not recounted unless margins are very close, brazen theft would be rewarded in practice. No candidate losing by a large margin wants to challenge an election and force a recount. Political culture being what it is in America, such candidates quickly get labeled as "sore losers" who "waste the public's money and the government's time" on pointless recounts, and who use "conspiracy theories" to compensate for their inability to admit they lost.

Although New Hampshire’s experience with recounts appears to show that electronic and paper tallies seldom differ by a significant number of votes, relatively few “top ticket” races have been recounted - presumably the rewards of altering the outcome of major state or federal offices are more likely to outweigh the risk of discovery.

When statewide recounts of paper ballot records for high-stakes races occur, recent experiences in Ohio and Washington state clearly reveal the potential for flaws in both approach and execution in conventional recount and spot audit protocols.

I personally believe that New Hampshire is better served by enhancing its hand-counted paper ballot protocols, to retain full citizen control and oversight of the electoral process. On the other hand, as long as optical scan tabulation is performed (especially on equipment known to be vulnerable to covert manipulation), counting some of the ballots by hand and comparing to the electronic tally can identify accidental or deliberate mistabulation of the vote. The details of the independent hand count protocol determine the probability of detection.

There are two general approaches for hand count validation of electronic vote tabulation: precinct random spot audits and universal ballot sampling. Several states currently rely on precinct random spot audits; for example, California counts 1% of its precincts by hand, and Minnesota performs a random post-election hand-count audit of 2 precincts per county (amounting to somewhat more than 4% of the total number of precincts). Due to differences between the human and the electronic and mechanical interpretation of voter intent, small discrepancies are not necessarily a sign of systematic mistabulation - although there are credible exploits in close elections where outcome-altering results can be determined by just a few votes per precinct. Typically there is a formal or informal standard for expanding the hand-count validation if significant discrepancies are detected; in Minnesota the standard for expanding the audit is a 0.5% discrepancy between the hand and machine tally.

There are several potential drawbacks with conventional precinct spot-audit protocols. (1) There are classic concerns about chain of custody which are proportional to the time which passes between casting the ballot and performing the hand count validation. Ideally, the spot audit would occur in precinct on election night. (2) The recent conviction and sentencing of election officials in Ohio who “gamed” the selection of precincts for the Ohio partial recount to ensure that no discrepancies would be detected illustrates the difficulty of ensuring true random selection is followed. (3) If hand count validation occurs in only a few percent of precincts and mistabulation is clustered, the laws of statistics tell us that there can still remain a significant chance that the mistabulation is not detected. (4) Clustered mistabulation may be detected, but the magnitude of the discrepancy may be too small to expand the audit further. Political pressures may be placed on a candidate such that even if a suspicious pattern of discrepancies is detected - but it appears to be insufficient to change the outcome - it would not be practical to continue to contest the result and expand the audit. (Candidates do not wish to be labeled a “sore loser” - those who do may find their career in peril.)

The Election Defense Alliance has created and published the results of computer simulations of a variety of precinct spot-audit protocols - such as the ones proposed in Washington DC in 2006 as HR 550, and this year, as HR 811. Our findings indicate that especially in the case of the US House of Representatives (involving on average about 440 precincts, nationwide), there is an unacceptably high rate of failure to detect outcome altering mistabulation in many credible scenarios as modeled.

The alternative hand-count election verification protocol involves a somewhat counter-intuitive approach: hand-counting a few percent of the vote in 100% of the precincts, rather than hand-counting 100% of the vote in a few percent of the precincts.

This protocol - which Election Defense Alliance calls UBS, or “Universal Ballot Sampling” - randomly selects a sample of individual ballots from every precinct voting location, and hand-counts just those ballots. The rationale for doing so is that this is an analogy to a “public opinion poll”, in that it randomly samples ballots for hand-counting in much the same way that an opinion poll randomly samples a population. If enough ballots are sampled and hand-counted, the accuracy of that sample can be estimated to a high degree of precision - just as the margin of error of a random public opinion poll can be estimated to a high of precision. It turns out that randomly sampling approximately 15,000 - 20,000 votes in any contest should produce a sample that reflects the outcome of the election as a whole within plus or minus 1%, with 99% certainty.
Since most US House races generate 150,000 - 200,000 votes, simply randomly sampling every tenth ballot in a precinct should ensure that when the precinct hand count sample results are rolled up, the votes for US House candidates in the sample match the votes in the electorate as a whole within plus or minus 1% with high confidence.

Election Defense Alliance has created computer simulations of the UBS protocol and empirically verified that, if the precinct ballot sample is random, indeed UBS did detect 100% of simulated mistabulations > 1% of the vote.

This addresses several problems with the alternative, precinct spot-audit approach. If the UBS and the optical scan tally are within 1% with the sample sizes indicated, there should be high confidence that there was no significant machine mistabulation. The false-positive rate should be very low.

On the other hand, if the difference between the UBS result and the optical scan tally is greater than 1%, there is a strong and objective mathematical case for a candidate to challenge the official tally and request an expanded hand (re)count. Since the UBS results are available as soon as the optical scan tally is available, a candidate is also empowered to challenge suspect results before the “official” tally becomes fixed in the minds of the voting public and their political peers.

We have identified a number of ways to ensure that the sample of ballots selected for UBS handcount is random. It is also important to make sure that absentee ballots are pooled with in-precinct ballots, and that both are sampled randomly. Once again the election practices in New Hampshire seem well-suited to a UBS-style protocol, since early voting (which introduces additional chain of custody risk) is not allowed, and absentee ballots are counted in-precinct on election night, and the pool of people familiar with efficient hand-count procedures is large.

Returning to the question posed earlier: the fundamental question - why should machines tally our votes in secret - remains unanswered. Other than for the obvious financial benefit of the vendors, why should voting be a transaction tallied in secret by machines, rather than a civic transaction performed by people in public view?

In fact, there is a fascinating study from 2001 (interestingly enough, published shortly before HAVA was enacted) which concluded that not only were hand-counted paper ballots the most accurate of all vote counting methods, measuring by residual vote rate, but that every single technological “innovation” of the last century - lever machines, punch cards, optical scan, DRE - actually measurably decreased the accuracy of the voting process. Their conclusion:

These results are a stark warning of how difficult it is to implement new voting technologies. People worked hard to develop these new technologies. Election officials carefully evaluated the systems, with increasing attentiveness over the last decade. The result: our best efforts applying computer technology have decreased the accuracy of elections, to the point where the true outcomes of many races are unknowable.

There is an entire industry which is predicated on the belief that computers are better than people when it comes to counting votes, yet the precise nature of the problem that electronic voting was intended to solve remains unclear. The balance of evidence indicates that while voting by computer may well be wide open to insider manipulation, and in practice has been plagued by glitches and inaccuracies, at least it’s more expensive than the alternatives. Even when legal paper ballots are tabulated on optical scanners, the effort required to put in place a statistically-valid hand-check of the machine tallies does tend to undermine the rationale for automation in the first place.

In the final analysis, I believe computer automation of voting will be regarded by future historians as one of the greatest blunders in the history of technology. Our choice now is to determine at what price - both in money and public good will - that realization will finally strike home. In the meantime, states like New Hampshire can take action to engage its citizens in safeguarding its democratic processes, though effective hand-count validation of optical scan vote counts.

Court Orders Re-Evaluation of New Jersey E-voting Machines

N.J.'s 11K Electronic Voting Machines Ordered  Re-evaluated to Determine Accuracy, Reliability

All voting machines and vote tally transmitting systems must be disconnected from the Internet; all people who work with them, and third-party vendors who examine or transport the machines, must undergo criminal background checks; and the state must put in place a protocol for inspecting voting machines, to ensure they have not been tampered with, ruled Superior Court Judge Linda Feinberg in Mercer County.

She did not, however, go one step further and enforce a 2005 state statute requiring that all voting machines in New Jersey produce a voter-verified paper ballot.

"I am disappointed the court did not take the step of mandating a voter-verified paper trail or scrapping the electronic machines altogether," said Assemblyman Reed Gusciora (D-Princeton Borough) one of a group of Mercer County residents who brought the suit against the state.

N.J.'s 11K Electronic Voting Machines Ordered  Re-evaluated to Determine Accuracy, Reliability

All voting machines and vote tally transmitting systems must be disconnected from the Internet; all people who work with them, and third-party vendors who examine or transport the machines, must undergo criminal background checks; and the state must put in place a protocol for inspecting voting machines, to ensure they have not been tampered with, ruled Superior Court Judge Linda Feinberg in Mercer County.

She did not, however, go one step further and enforce a 2005 state statute requiring that all voting machines in New Jersey produce a voter-verified paper ballot.

"I am disappointed the court did not take the step of mandating a voter-verified paper trail or scrapping the electronic machines altogether," said Assemblyman Reed Gusciora (D-Princeton Borough) one of a group of Mercer County residents who brought the suit against the state.

Feinberg’s ruling calls for the voting machines to be reevaluated within the next 120 days by a panel with "a requisite knowledge of computers and computer security." She also said the state should no longer leave voting machines unattended in public places.

The lawsuit was started by Rutgers Clinical Professor Penny Venetis, co-director of the Constitutional
Litigation Clinic. Plaintiffs are the Princeton-based Coalition for Peace Action; voter Stephanie Harris; Gusciora; and New Jersey Peace Action.

• Voting-machine problems crop up in Essex, Somerset and Gloucester counties [458]

• Dec. 22, 2008: N.J. voting machine deadline looms with no resolution expected [459]

• Nov. 4, 2008: Voters find long lines, voting machine glitches around the nation [460]

• Voting-machine malfunctions crop up at some polling places [461]

• June 20, 2008: Judge rules public can see voting machine test results [462]

• March 11, 2008: Voting machine errors spur independent analysis [463]

New Jersey Voter Registration Information

New Jersey Voting and Elections News

Sequoia Machines Hacked, Suit Filed to Decertify in NJ

Virus in the Voting Machines: Tainted Results in NY-23

Virus in the Voting Machines: Tainted Results in NY-23

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'Whether the erroneous results are computer error, or tampering,
significant doubt now exists with regard to the accuracy of the vote counts from November 3rd . . . A manual paper-ballot recount of the vote could resolve computer vote accuracy questions.'
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Hoffman Considers Legal Challenge

Paper Ballots Have Not Been Counted

READER COMMENTS

First the Impossible, Now the Improbable, in NY-23

Source: Gouverneurtimes.com [474]

2nd in a series
Click NY23 tag [475] to see all related stories.

First the Impossible, Now the Improbable, in NY-23

Northern NY News
by Richard Hayes Phillips, Ph.D.  
Friday, 27 November 2009 12:14

Editor's Note: Based on additional information provided by the St. Lawrence County Board of Elections, Dr. Phillips revised this article to improve clarity and accuracy.

CANTON, NY – As reported last week, impossible numbers were found in the St. Lawrence County election results for the special election in New York’s 23rd Congressional District.  Ninety-three (93) “phantom votes,” more votes counted than the number of ballots cast, were reported in six election districts, and negative numbers reported for the “blank ballots,” or “undervotes.”

These were not the certified results.  The author deeply regrets having said that they were.  The numbers, which the Board of Elections attributes to data entry errors, have since been corrected.  However, scrutiny of the certified election results reveals numerous districts (precincts) where the results, although not always mathematically impossible, are not credible.

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'The court-ordered 'pilot' election in New York’s 23rd Congressional District was an utter failure . .

. . . the time-tested lever machines were much more reliable.'

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On Friday, November 6, three days after the election, one of the involved campaigns obtained from the Board of Elections a spreadsheet of the preliminary (unofficial) election results, precinct by precinct.  Absentee ballots had not yet been counted.  This serves as an important “snapshot” with which to compare the final (certified) results.

As previously reported, voting machine failures at eight polling places in St. Lawrence County caused the Board of Elections to hand count those ballots.  Realistically, there was no other choice but to do so.  According to the Board, the locked voting machines were transported to a warehouse in Canton where the ballots were counted by hand.  The problem with this procedure is that it is illegal under § 9-100 of New York State Election Law, which requires that the votes be counted at the polling place:
§ 9-100  At the close of the polls the inspectors of election shall, in the order set forth herein, lock the machine against voting, account for the paper ballots, canvass the machine, cast and canvass all the ballots, canvass and ascertain the total vote and they shall not adjourn until the canvass be fully completed.

Onondaga County optical scanner

An audit of the poll books and absentee voter lists for three of these eight polling places reveals that the preliminary hand count could not have been correct. In Louisville, there were 885 actual voters at the polls, but only 691 votes were counted for Congress on Election Night.  In Waddington, there were 754 actual voters at the polls, but only 347 votes were counted for Congress on Election Night.  In Rossie, there were 138 actual voters at the polls, but only 94 votes were counted for Congress on Election Night.  53 votes were counted later.  Bill Owens got 50 of them.

Ballots Should Be Counted in Public

One possible reason for the short counts on Election Night is that the Sequoia/Dominion ImageCast machines have two slots and two bins for ballots.  There is a slot which sucks a ballot into the optical scanner, much like a dollar bill is sucked into a vending machine, and after the ballot is scanned it drops into a locked box.  There is another slot in the front of the machine which can be opened when the scanner breaks down and emergency paper ballots need to be segregated and counted by hand; these ballots drop into a separate locked box.  It is possible that the Board of Elections initially counted the ballots from one box but not the other.  But this is precisely why § 9-102.3(b) of New York State Election Law requires that the ballots be counted in public at the polling place, and why § 9-108.1 requires that the number of ballots be cross-checked with the poll books to be sure that all the ballots have been counted.

§ 9-102.3(b)  Paper ballots and emergency ballots cast during voting machine breakdowns which have been voted shall then be canvassed and tallied, the vote thereon for each candidate and ballot proposal, announced and added to the vote as recorded on the return of canvass.

§ 9-108.1  The board of inspectors, at the beginning of the canvass, shall count the ballots found in each ballot box without unfolding them, except so far as to ascertain that each ballot is single, and shall compare the number of ballots found in each box with the number shown by the registration poll records, and the ballot returns to have been deposited therein.

Another problem with these voting machines is that it is mechanically possible to open both ballot slots, and both locked boxes, even while the optical scanner is operating.  This opens the possibility that ballots could be deposited into the wrong ballot box, inadvertently or deliberately, and never be counted.  An eyewitness who voted at the only polling place in Russell told me that she was not allowed to place her own ballot in the machine; a poll worker examined her ballot and placed it into the machine for her.  This caused her to be concerned about both the privacy of her vote and the security of the vote count.

Blank Ballots Beyond Belief

As previously reported, the number of “blank” ballots, or “undervotes,” is calculated by subtracting the number of votes counted for a given office from the total number of ballots cast.  In the Congressional race, the highest percentage of “blank” ballots anywhere in St. Lawrence County was in Russell’s 2nd district.  According to the poll book there were 590 actual voters at the polls, and there were 11 absentee ballots, for a total of 601, in Russell’s 1st and 2nd districts combined.  According to the certified results there were 338 ballots cast, of which 23 (6.8%) were blank, in the 1st district, and 262 ballots cast, of which 27 (10.3%) were blank, in the 2nd district.  It is highly unlikely that 10.3% of the voters made no choice among three candidates in one of the most hotly contested races in the nation.

The second-highest percentage of “blank” ballots for Congress was in Hammond.  According to the poll book there were 569 actual voters at the polls, and there were 67 absentee ballots plus one special federal ballot, for a total of 637.  According to the certified results there were 637 ballots cast, of which 51 (8.0%) were blank – again, a highly unlikely percentage for a hotly contested race. 

In Hammond, the preliminary (unofficial) results had shown 305 votes for Owens, 206 for Hoffman, and 37 for Scozzafava.  The final (certified) results show 298 votes for Owens, 228 votes for Hoffman, and 60 votes for Scozzafava.  The difference, which should represent the 67 absentee ballots, is minus 7 for Owens, 22 for Hoffman, 23 for Scozzafava, and, by subtraction, 29 blanks.  Whether the drop in Owens’ vote total is an error or a correction is unknown.  But there is simply no way that 29 (or even 22) of 67 voters who took the time and effort to cast an absentee ballot made no choice for Congress.

Post-Election Vote Loss

Hammond is not the only polling place where one candidate or another managed to lose votes subsequent to Election Day.

    * In DeKalb’s 1st district, where there were 355 actual voters at the polls, the preliminary (unofficial) results had shown 201 votes for Owens, 128 for Hoffman, and 26 for Scozzafava.  The final (certified) results show 189 votes for Owens, 132 votes for Hoffman, and 34 votes for Scozzafava.  The difference, which should represent 15 absentee ballots, is minus 12 for Owens, 4 for Hoffman, and 8 for Scozzafava – a net increase of no votes at all.

    * In Lisbon’s 1st district, the preliminary (unofficial) results had shown 146 votes for Owens, 149 for Hoffman, and 13 for Scozzafava.  The final (certified) results show 121 votes for Owens, 159 for Hoffman, and 19 for Scozzafava.  The difference, which should represent 19 absentee ballots, is minus 25 for Owens, 10 for Hoffman, and 6 for Scozzafava – a net decrease of nine votes.

    * In Massena’s 9th district, the preliminary (unofficial) results had shown 108 votes for Owens, 87 for Hoffman, and 2 for Scozzafava.  The final (certified) results show 119 votes for Owens, 69 for Hoffman, and 4 for Scozzafava.  The difference, which should represent 14 absentee ballots and one special federal ballot, is 11 for Owens, minus 18 for Hoffman, and 2 for Scozzafava – a net decrease of five votes.

Post-Election Vote Gain

There are also places where more, not fewer, votes were added to the totals than can be explained by the reported number of absentee ballots.  In most cases the discrepancy was only one or two votes, which could easily be due to corrections made during recanvassing of the vote totals as required by law.  But some examples are not so easily explained.

    •    In Ogdensburg’s 1st district, where there were 305 actual voters at the polls, the preliminary (unofficial) results had shown 141 votes for Owens, 103 for Hoffman, and 10 for Scozzafava. The final (certified) results show 167 votes for Owens, 119 for Hoffman, and 16 for Scozzafava.  The difference, which should represent 9 absentee ballots, is 26 for Owens, 16 for Hoffman, and 6 for Scozzafava – a net increase of 48 votes.  Even now, there are reportedly 13 blank ballots out of 315, or 4.1% of the total.  But more importantly, the electronic vote count on Election Night was short by 39 votes, or 12.8% of the actual total of 305.  Either these were initially counted as blanks, or not counted at all, or some combination of the two.

    •    In Lisbon’s 2nd district, the preliminary (unofficial) results had shown 114 votes for Owens, 110 for Hoffman, and 9 for Scozzafava.  The final (certified) results show 116 votes for Owens, 133 for Hoffman, and 12 for Scozzafava.  The difference, which should represent 6 absentee ballots, is 2 for Owens, 23 for Hoffman, and 3 for Scozzafava – a net increase of 28 votes.  Thus the electronic vote count on Election Night was short by 22 votes, or 8.3% of the actual total.  (The poll books do not reveal the precise number of voters at the polls, because Lisbon was a multiple-precinct polling place, as were Massena’s 9th and 10th districts).

More examples, with somewhat less egregious numbers, could be cited for all of the categories presented in this article.  But it suffices to show that there were suspiciously high percentages of “blank” ballots reported in Russell’s 2nd district and in Hammond; extraordinary declines in the vote totals subsequent to Election Day in DeKalb’s 1st district, Lisbon’s 1st district, and Massena’s 9th district; and lost votes on Election Night in Ogdensburg’s 1st district and Lisbon’s 2nd district.  Each of these corruptions of the vote count can be attributed to electronic vote tabulation. 

Together with the breakdown or freezing of the Sequoia/Dominion ImageCast voting machines at eight polling places, there is more than enough evidence in St. Lawrence County to show that the court-ordered “pilot” election in New York’s 23rd Congressional District was an utter failure, and that the time-tested lever machines were much more reliable.

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Gouverneurtimes Online Poll: Hand Count Paper Ballots?

 

 

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Richard Hayes Phillips, Ph.D., is one of the leading election fraud investigators in the United States.  His book on the 2004 Ohio election, Witness to a Crime: A Citizens’ Audit of an American Election [476], based on examination of some 30,000 photographs of actual ballots, poll books, and other election records, is available at http://www.witnesstoacrime.com [477]

Last Updated on Friday, 27 November 2009 15:12