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>> CONGRESS: HR 811 Unsafe for Democracy! Halt Holt!<<


H.R. 811 Resource Page

Click here for the Halt 811 Action Page [1]
UPDATE: July 27 "Floor Manager" revision of H.R. 811
Click here to download PDF [2]
Click here to read critical annotation [3] by Nancy Tobi
UPDATE:Text of Amended Holt Bill [4] ("Lofgren substitute")
Released May 8th by House Committee on Administration
UPDATE: Clause-by-Clause Analysis [5] by Nancy Tobi
of the Amended Holt Bill of May 8 (the "Lofgren Substitute")
UPDATE: HR 811: Let the Debate Begin, in the Open, in Public [6]
by Nancy Tobi
UPDATE: A Five-Point Proposal for Publicly Accountable Elections [7]
by Nancy Tobi
Related Links:
Statement on Election Reform by NASS (National Assoc. of Secretaries of State) [8]
NASS Resolution on Election Assistance Commission (EAC) [9]
UPDATE: EAC Takes Aim at Paper Ballots [10]
by Nancy Tobi
Click here for (Pre-Amendment) Text of H.R. 811 [11] (as published on 02/05/07)
Thirteen Significant Problems in H.R. 811, the New Holt Bill [12]

by Nancy Tobi

HR 811: Ten Blunders in A Deceptive Boondoggle [13]

By Bruce O'Dell

Son of Holt, No Better [14]

Critical Annotation of H.R. 811 by Bev Harris.

State (NCSL) and County (NACo) Election Administrators' Joint Statement of Opposition to H.R. 811 [15]
Request by Voters to Amend the Holt Bill [16]

The "Request by Voters" is a nationally distributed appeal to Congress for needed election reforms proposed by the election integrity movement. Election Defense Alliance joins many other organizations in endorsing these proposals for effective legislative reform, to correct the damage wrought by HAVA and to amend or replace well-intentioned but seriously misguided proposals currently present in the "Holt Bill" (H.R. 550).


We are asking for your support of our Request by Voters, and for permission to add your name to our letter to Congress. Please respond with your affirmation of support TODAY by visiting this link to add your name and organization (if applicable) to the petition:

http://www.wethepatriots.org/HAVA/requestbyvoters.php [17]

Election Reform/HR 811 Hearings, House Committee on Administration [18]

 HR 811 The Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007
...

HR 6414

Companion measure to HR 811 containing audit provisions extracted from HR 811


http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/HR6414_Analysis_Dopp [19]

Analyses of EAC:

Danger of centralized, federal executive control over elections

http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/abolish_eac [20]

http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/eac_gopher_bash [21]
Futility of "certification" of voting machines

EAC Certification as a Ponzi Scheme: Summary [22]
EAC Voting Equipment Certification as a Ponzi Scheme [23]

2 attachments

Analysis of Certification Timelines [24]

The proposed Holt Bill (HR 811) attempts to require a text converter in every precinct

Letters and Testimony by Election Officials Opposing HR 811

The Election Center [25]

Boone County, Missouri writes Congress in opposition to Holt Bill [26]

President of Access for the Handicapped, writes Congress in opposition to the Holt Bill [27]

Maryland Election Officials write Congress in opposition to Holt Bill [28]

Chris Nelson, South Dakota Secretary of State writes to Congress in opposition to Holt bill [29]

New Jersey emails Congress in opposition to the Holt Bill [30]

Texas County Clerk faxes Congress in opposition to Holt Bill [31]

Ohio faxes Congress in opposition to the Holt Bill [32]

NH faxes Congress in opposition to the Holt Bill [33]

California faxes Congress in opposition to the Holt Bill [34]

NH faxes Congress in opposition to the Holt Bill (#2) [35]

California faxes Congress in opposition to the Holt Bill (#2) [36]

Thanks to Kathy Dopp of NEDA/USCountVotes for Providing these Links to Selected Articles

"Fool Me Once: Checking Vote Count Integrity"
http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/TierElectionAuditEval.pdf [37]

DeForest Soaries says that "EAC and Federal efforts for election reform 'A Charade,' 'Travesty'!
 http://www.ejfi.org/Voting/Voting-6.htm#soaries [38]

"Why not Re-Authorize the EAC"
http://electionarchive.net/docs_other/EAC-DoNotReauthorize.pdf [39]

"The US Election Assistance Commission Has Not Done its Job"
http://www.votersunite.org/info/TestimonyTheisen03-13-07.pdf [40]

Voting System Software Disclosure.pdf
David Wagner - testimony before the House Admin committee
http://electionarchive.net/docs_other/HearingTestimony/wagner.pdf [41]

"Critical changes are needed to HR811"
http://electionarchive.org/ucvInfo/US/ChangesNeeded2HR811.pdf [42]

"What's Wrong with Holt II (HR 811)" by Bev Harris of Black Box Voting

http://www.opednews.com/maxwrite/page.php?a=30554 [43]

"New Version of Holt Bill: A Giant Step Backwards"
by Nancy Tobi of Democracy for New Hampshire
http://www.opednews.com/maxwrite/page.php?a=30486 [44]

"Essential Revisions to HR811"
By John Gideon, Voters Unite, February 27, 2007
http://www.pdamerica.org/articles/news/2007-02-27-08-16-39-news.php [45]

HR811 Review by Marian Beddill
http://noleakybuckets.org/holt811/holt811detail.shtml/ [46]

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Clause-by-Clause Analysis of HR 811 as Amended May 8

FOR A COMPLETE CLAUSE-BY-CLAUSE-ANALYSIS, Click Here >> to DOWNLOAD the PDF [48]

Also see Five-Point Legislative Alternative below for essential election reform (stripping out the secrecy, computers, unfunded mandates, and executive power grab contained in the Holt bill).

by Nancy Tobi

The Holt Bill is falsely marketed as a paper trail and audit bill.

It is instead a multibillion dollar unfunded boondoggle that embraces and codifies into federal law secret vote counting, White House control over American voting technology, complex computerized voting technology that places an impenetrable and opaque layer between the voter and his vote, and impossible bureaucratic requirements that will threaten and cripple election officials and cause death by bureaucracy to our state election systems.

Our nation’s election officials oppose this bill because they want to protect our election systems from failure, not because they oppose paper based voting.

Our nation’s election officials are ready to implement paper based voting, even after having been sold an e-voting bill of goods following Congress’s 2002 passage of the “Help America Vote Act” (sic), which encouraged the states to use $3 BILLION American taxpayer dollars to purchase of the paperless e-voting equipment for which election officials are now being publicly derided for buying!

We don’t need this bill to bring paper back into our state election systems! We don’t need another multibillion dollar boondoggle to inject even more complex, more opaque, high tech democracy demolishing gadgetry into our voting systems.

There is another answer. See the 4-point Alternative Legislative Proposal at bottom of this posting.

The two BIG LIES being propagated and very successfully circulated about the bill reported out of committee to the House:

1. It is now fully funded

2. It is a completely new bill ("the Lofgren substitute")

RESPONSE TO THE TWO BIG LIES:

1. The $1 BIL appropriated in the bill is not going to come close to covering the costs for the mandated text converter/readback technology, not for this year, and certainly not in 2-3 years when new federal guidelines obsolete (once again) ALL voting technology currently available. And that is not even going into the two new mandated state functions - both of which need to be staffed and operational (certification and audit functions)

2. The bill reported out of committee is titled the Lofgren substitute, I suppose, because it is what Lofgren released from her subcommittee in charge of the bill. However, it is commonly accepted that this version, with the exception of the Capuona amendment, and other small edits, came directly from Holt's office and his counsel, Michelle Mulder, who has been in charge of writing the bill all along. It is different from previous versions, yes, mostly in bad ways, but it is NOT a completely new bill.

Careful readers of the bill reported out of committee to the full house will find the following:

The Capuano amendment, which gives voters choice to use paper ballots if they wish, is the best thing to come out of the bill, and opens the doorway for new thought. A whole new bill, if you will. In fact, a REAL paper ballot bill that could and should be strengthened with guidance, funding and training for what to do with those real paper ballots: i.e., hand count em. This provision has been added to the 4-point proposal appended at bottom of this posting.

Otherwise, most of the old flaws in the bill still exist and have in fact been made worse.

SUPPORTS SECRET VOTE COUNTING! aka ” WE CAN SHOW YOU THE CODE BUT WE’LL HAVE TO ‘KILL’ YOU”
This version of the bill removed all prohibitions on nondisclosed software that had been present in previous versions and actually proactively requires public officials to sign nondisclosure agreements with evoting vendors! The codification into federal law of nondisclosure contractual requirements is unprecedented and anathema to a free democratic society. While they tout the bill as a "paper trail/audit" bill, it now actually provides waivers for thermal paper DREs until 2010 as long as they use those useless reel to reel printers. As anyone knows by now, this paper trail output is difficult to handle, and for all practical purposes, useless for auditing, so the representation of the bill as a paper trail/audit bill is misleading and is nothing other than a bait and switch.
PLACES CONTROL OF ELECTIONS IN THE HANDS OF FOUR WHITE HOUSE APPOINTEES
Although they have removed the provision to extend the EAC, the bill consistently extends authority to the democracy-demolishing entity and even broadens its authorities and responsibilities, going so far as to authorize the EAC to manage taxpayer money for the fraudulent testing and certification Ponzi Scheme! Since the EAC will continue to receive appropriations as long as bills like HR 811 give it broadened and continuous powers and authority, removing the provision in this manner is nothing but a disingenuous shell game.
REMOVES PUBLIC OVERSIGHT, REDUCES ELECTION SECURITY, COMPLICATES ELECTION ADMINISTRATION, OBSCURES VOTING SYSTEM PROCESSES, AND BREAKS THE BANK
HR811 mandates entirely new and highly complex technology (“conversion of human-readable printed or marked vote selections into accessible form”) for every polling jurisdiction in the nation. The requirement for new, complex, opaque computerized technology in the form of a text converter for every polling place in the nation is another nail in the coffin for democratic elections with citizen oversight. Ballot text or selection conversion for multiple language and multiple ballot designs requires the most complex high tech gadgetry yet proposed for our voting systems. This level of complexity injected between American citizens and their votes is unacceptable.

Additionally, it is a

 vastly underfunded mandate. Proponents like to say that the increased funding to $1 billion makes HR 811 a fully-funded bill, but estimates for the text converter alone reach up to a minimum of $4 billion for the technology and programming costs it will incur.

Furthermore,

the device does not even exist in any form tested or certified, and it is still questionable whether any existing technology can meet matrix ballot design needs or pictorial language needs, such as Chinese. This mandated technology is so complex and high tech that the e-voting industry itself does not believe it can deliver the product in any workable, practical, or financially feasible form by the deadline date of 2010.
And once the next iteration of the federal voting system guidelines kicks in, any investment in this technology will be rendered obsolete in 2-3 years by the new software independence requirements in the next version of the guidelines, triggering a whole new round of unfunded investment in Holt-mandated computerized voting technology. This means an exorbitant expense today with an additional “investment”in this Ponzi scheme as soon as the next version of the federal standards is released in 2-3 years.
RIDES ROUGHSHOD OVER STATE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
The bill actually asks states to disregard their own laws in order to comply with its mandates, stating, in effect, "Do what we – the Feds –say, and don't worry about your own state laws that may not actually support our mandates. Just do what we say, then pass the laws just as we are requiring them to be. Don't act as though state legislation is a deliberative process, just pass the laws as we tell you to."

HR 811 is presuming an outcome for state legislation thereby denying any deliberative process that might result in an outcome different from that the bill presumes. This is utter disrespect for the rule of law, state sovereignty, the deliberative legislative process, and is outrageous.

IMPOSES IMPOSSIBLE TIME LINES AND IS OVERLY PRESCRIPTIVE The bill gives states 90 days to come up with plans to completely overhaul their voting systems, and further imposes burdensome reporting requirements to the White House-controlled EAC. The bill contains too much detail for how to implement its requirements, superseding any state requirements, traditions, or other variables. The bill promises todestabilize our state election systems as election officials scramble to meet impossible mandates, leaving no time to take care of the things like security, accuracy, and citizen oversight that are required for democratic elections!

4-Point Alternative Legislative Proposal for Real Paper Trail with Checks and Balances
Plus Incentives for Real Paper Ballots and Hand Counts

1.  In support of the principle of checks and balances and citizen oversight:
Require that Paper Ballots be Offered and Provided Voters at the Polls—
The appropriate election official at each polling place in an election for Federal office shall offer each individual who is eligible to cast a vote in the election at the polling place the opportunity to cast the vote using a pre-printed paper ballot which the individual may mark by hand and which is not produced by a direct recording electronic voting machine. If the individual accepts the offer to cast the vote using such a ballot, the official shall provide the individual with the ballot and the supplies necessary to mark the ballot, and shall ensure (to the greatest extent practicable) that the waiting period for the individual to cast a vote is not greater than the waiting period for an individual who does not agree to cast the vote using such a paper ballot under this paragraph.

Jurisdictions will ensure that a sufficient supply of paper ballots be available, that notice of the option is provided, that the ballots are treated with equal dignity provided to other ballots, including canvassing/counting those ballots on election day, and that consequences are provided for violations. In the event of violations related to the provision, canvassing, and handling of paper ballots, any citizen eligible to vote in the jurisdiction will have standing to go to court to require compliance and authority for the court to grant immediate relief. Funding for training and documentation for election officials and election workers in the proper hand counting methods and election administration using paper ballots will be appropriated to support this provision. Prior to election certification, appropriate protocols must be implemented to ensure the integrity of election results as authenticated by transparent vote counting methods.

(Compliance to be determined by each state in a state plan process that supports the standards for democratic elections, those being citizen oversight and security, and which process includes diverse stakeholders group including citizen representation, published plans, and consequences for noncompliance. State Plans will be published in the Federal Register.)

Effective Date State Plan: February, 2008

Effective Date Implementation: General Election November 2008

2.  In support of the principle of fiscal responsibility and stabilization of state governmental administration, checks and balances and citizen oversight:

BUYOUT funding for states wishing to replace DRE systems with paper-based voting systems.
(BUYOUT funding can be applied to paper ballot, optical scan voting systems, paper ballot, hand count systems, or a combination thereof. In the case of buyout funding as applied to hand count systems, training costs may be included.)

(Compliance to be determined by each state in a state plan process that supports the standards for democratic elections, those being citizen oversight and security, and which process includes diverse stakeholders group including citizen representation, published plans, and consequences for noncompliance. State Plans will be published in the Federal Register.)
Effective Date: February, 2008

3. In support of the principle of checks and balances:
Dissolution of EAC and reallocation of its functional responsibilities to appropriate representational groups (as described below)

Effective Date: January 2008

4.  In support of the principle of fiscal responsibility and stabilization of state governmental administration:
Prohibition on any additional unfunded mandates being added into the bill

Effective Date:  Upon passage

Reallocation of EAC Responsibilities:

  • Generate technical guidance on the administration of federal elections.
    – HAND OVER TO NIST & STANDARDS BOARD WITH CITIZEN REPRESENTATION
  • Produce voluntary voting systems guidelines.
    – HAND OVER TO NIST & STANDARDS BOARD WITH CITIZEN REPRESENTATION
  • Research and report on matters that affect the administration of federal elections.
      – HAND OVER TO STANDARDS BOARD & CITIZENS GROUP
  • Otherwise provide information and guidance with respect to laws, procedures, and technologies affecting the administration of Federal elections.
    – HAND OVER TO STANDARDS BOARD & CITIZENS GROUP
  • Administer payments to States to meet HAVA requirements.
    – HAND OVER TO GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
  • Provide grants for election technology development and for pilot programs to test election technology. 
    – ELIMINATE THIS FUNCTION.
  • Manage funds targeted to certain programs designed to encourage youth participation in elections.
    – HAND OVER TO DEPT. OF EDUCATION
  • Develop a national program for the testing,certification, and decertification of voting systems. 
    – HAND OVER TO NIST & STANDARDS BOARD WITH CITIZEN REPRESENTATION
  • Maintain the national mail voter registration form that was developed in accordance with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), report to Congress every two years on the impact of the NVRA on the administration of federal elections, and provide information to States on their responsibilities under that law. 
    – HAND BACK TO FEC
  • Audit persons who received federal funds authorized by HAVA from the General Services Administration or the Election Assistance Commission.
    – HAND OVER TO GAO
  • Submit an annual report to Congress describing EAC activities for the previous fiscal year.
    – HAND OVER AS APPROPRIATE TO ENTITIES PICKING UP FUNCTIONS AS DESCRIBED ABOVE


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811_May_17_2007.pdf [49]110.97 KB

H.R. 811 Bill, Summary View

On This Page:


1. HR 811 Summary
2. Sponsors and Related Bills
3. HR 811 Section Overview


To return to the full text view of HR 811, Click here [11]

Congressional Research Service Summary


Source: Thomas.gov, http://thomas.loc.gov/ [50]

H.R.811

Title: To amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to require
a voter-verified permanent paper ballot under title III of such Act,
and for other purposes.

Sponsor: Rep Holt, Rush D. [51] [NJ-12]
(introduced 2/5/2007)
     Cosponsors [52] (200)

Related Bills:
S.559 [53]

Latest Major Action: 3/29/2007
House committee/subcommittee actions. Status: Committee Hearings Held.

SUMMARY AS OF:


2/5/2007--Introduced.

Voter Confidence and Increased
Accessibility Act of 2007 - Amends the Help America Vote Act of 2002
(HAVA) with respect to:

(1) ballot verification and mandatory paper
record audit capacity; and
(2) accessibility and ballot verification of
results for individuals with disabilities.

Requires the Director
of the National Institute of Standards and Technology to study, test,
and develop best practices to enhance the accessibility of ballot
verification mechanisms for individuals with disabilities, voters whose
primary language is not English, and voters with difficulties in
literacy.

Requires laboratories to meet standards prohibiting
conflicts of interest as a condition of accreditation for the testing
of voting system hardware and software.

Outlines additional voting system requirements and prohibitions.

Extends the authorization of the Election Assistance Commission (EAC).

Provides for complaints to the Attorney General by persons aggrieved by violations of HAVA.

Makes available additional funding to enable states to meet the costs of the requirements imposed by this Act.

Directs
the chief auditor of each state to appoint an Election Audit Board to
administer, without advance notice to the precincts selected, random
hand counts of the voter-verified paper ballots required to be produced
and preserved for each such election held in the state.

Repeals the exemption of the EAC from certain government contracting requirements.

http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:h.r.00811: [54]

H.R.811

Title: To amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to require
a voter-verified permanent paper ballot under title III of such Act,
and for other purposes.

Sponsor: Rep Holt, Rush D. [51] [NJ-12]
(introduced 2/5/2007)
     Cosponsors [52] (200)

Related Bills:
S.559 [53]

Latest Major Action: 3/29/2007
House committee/subcommittee actions. Status: Committee Hearings Held.

All Information [55]
(except text)		 Text of Legislation
[56]		 CRS Summary [57] Major Congressional Actions
All Congressional Actions
[58]
All Congressional Actions with Amendments
With links to Congressional Record pages, votes,reports
Titles [59]
Cosponsors [52] (200) 		Committees [60]
Related Bills [61] Amendments Related Committee Documents
CBO Cost Estimates Subjects [62]  
Section Overview

Links:

GPO's PDF Display [63] References to this bill in the Congressional Record [64] Link to the Bill Summary & Status file [54]. Printer Friendly Display [65] XML Display [66]
[Help] [67]


H.R. 811


Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007 (Introduced in House)


NOTE: The links below do not function from this website.

To retrieve the following Sections of the Holt bill click here [68]

http://capwiz.com/pdamerica/webreturn/?url=http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c110:H.R.811 [69]:

Beginning [70]
February 5, 2007 [71]
    SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

[68]
    SEC. 2. PROMOTING ACCURACY, INTEGRITY, AND SECURITY THROUGH VOTER-VERIFIED PERMANENT PAPER BALLOT.

[72]
    `SEC. 247. STUDY AND REPORT ON ACCESSIBLE BALLOT VERIFICATION MECHANISMS.

[73]
    SEC. 3. ENHANCEMENT OF ENFORCEMENT OF HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002.

[74]
    SEC. 4. EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION OF ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION.

[75]
    SEC. 5. REQUIREMENT FOR MANDATORY MANUAL AUDITS BY HAND COUNT.

[76]
    `SEC. 321. ESTABLISHMENT OF ELECTION AUDIT BOARDS.

[77]
    `SEC. 322. NUMBER OF BALLOTS COUNTED UNDER AUDIT.

[78]
    `SEC. 323. PROCESS FOR ADMINISTERING AUDITS.

[79]
    `SEC. 324. SELECTION OF PRECINCTS.

[80]
    `SEC. 325. PUBLICATION OF RESULTS.

[81]
    `SEC. 326. PAYMENTS TO STATES.

[82]
    `SEC. 327. EXCEPTION FOR ELECTIONS SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC RECOUNT UNDER STATE LAW.

[83]
    `SEC. 328. EFFECTIVE DATE.

[84]
`Subtitle C--Mandatory Manual Audits by Election Audit Boards [85]
    SEC. 6. REPEAL OF EXEMPTION OF ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION FROM CERTAIN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS.

[86]
    SEC. 7. EFFECTIVE DATE.

[87]

HR 811 (The Holt Bill): Let the Debate Begin

By Nancy Tobi

There is a raging and often destructive debate among voting activists. The source of the discord is "The Holt Bill," a piece of federal election reform legislation named for its primary author, Democratic Congressman Rush Holt from the great state of New Jersey. The destructive nature of the exchanges among activists has led some of us who oppose the bill to propose, in the best of our American democratic traditions, a public debate on the merits of the bill.

We who oppose believe anything that stands to so dramatically transform, and possibly violate, the nature of American democracy deserves robust public debate, based on facts and principle.

Congress has already held its so-called public hearings on the bill, but those hearings were stacked with many pro-811 witnesses, and the few opponents of the legislation were not debating what we oppositional citizens believe are the real issues that need a good, public airing:

* The bill violates state sovereignty and cements control over the nation's voting systems in the hands of four white house appointees.
* The bill codifies into federal law the use of secret vote counting technologies in the United States of America.
* The bill mandates impossible, ineffective and controversial audit and reporting requirements and timetables.
* The bill confuses technology with democracy, embracing the tenets of the one over the other.
* The bill furthers the misguided and undemocratic direction initiated with the Help America Vote Act that replaces observable voting with verifiable voting

Unfortunately, in what appears to be a desperate desire to keep the rhetoric flying and the facts suppressed from any public discourse, supporters of the bill have refused every offer for real public debate.

Some of the more vocal supporters of the bill state that if we opponents are questioning the confusing language of the bill, it must be that we are not as "intelligent" as they are. Sort of like the way a sales person for an exclusive item will look down his nose and tell you, "if you have to ask what it costs, you obviously can't afford it."

If we have to ask what this bill means to our democracy, we are obviously in the wrong shop.

I, for one, would like to see robust debate on the merits of this complex bill. For one thing, the principles of democracy are at stake.

The American people deserve to hear honest debate on if and how this proposed election reform supports the fundamental principles of American democracy without which our elections are nothing but a sham.

As well, the language of the 62 page bill is so dangerously ambiguous in so many critical areas, that we ought to expose the ambiguities to the light before HR811 becomes the law of the land and our elections are thrown to the courts to decide what means what.

And finally, public debate is called for because of the complex, often conflicting, and seemingly impossible and impractical requirements of the bill. These requirements are outrageously expensive, the costs of which will be borne in large part by American property taxpayers as the nation's towns, cities, and counties struggle to meet the bill's unfunded high tech mandates.

And a careful analysis of the bill's timelines, equations, and reporting requirements indicates they just don't seem to add up to anything that will actually work in the real world. This fundamental flaw in the bill puts every state in the nation at risk if it forces them to try to run legal elections when the law itself is unsupportable.

This is not the birthright of democracy the framers of the U.S. Constitution bequeathed us.

The Holt Bill, in its former incarnation as HR 550, languished in committee under the former Republican majority, and was never released to the full House for a vote. With the Democratic takeover, the bill resurfaced in its current incarnation, HR 811. Within days of the November 2006 victory, Dem leaders were predicting the swift passage of election reform. They were going to "own" the issue that had been stymied under the Republican rule.

Unfortunately, the new leadership was stuck holding the same moldy bag of election reform that had been decaying in the former Republican majority's pantry. And time was not kind to the Holt Bill. As it languished, its unpleasant odor wafted through the ranks of citizen activists, many of whom, one by one, began to experience an unmistakable squeamishness about the bill.

When HR 550 was whisked out of the pantry, washed down, spiced up, and placed on the table of the House Administration Committee in its new form as HR 811, many former supporters found they could no longer stomach the bill, even in its shiny new form. One might even say, especially in its shiny new form.

The ranks of ordinary citizens, who laboriously studied the bill and its implications, the nation's election officials, counties, legislators, and even the e-voting industry itself, uniformly rose in loud and raucous opposition to its passage.

HR 811 quickly became a disputed and controversial bill, left only with its primary supporters being well funded lobbying groups like Common Cause, MoveOn, TrueMajority, Verified Voting and VoteTrustUSA.

Nonetheless, rumors abounded that the bill was going to be "fast tracked" through the Committee, on to the House floor, where it would be swiftly passed by a leadership-sponsored "unity" Democratic vote and dropped into the laps of the American people.

But apparently the bill's controversial nature has slowed down the fast track. Now the bill sits on the table, waiting for someone to take a bite. But while it is tempting and delectable to some activists and their seemingly well funded lobbyists, others of us are as repelled by the odor emanating from the bill as ever before.

The arguments proposed by HR 811 proponents are as effective in addressing the problems of the bill as spitting on a house on fire:

* "This is the best bill we can get passed by Congress."
* "If we don't pass this bill now we won't have any election reform in place for 2008."
* "Even if the bill supports secret vote counting, at least we'll force the states to conduct election audits."
* "At least our elections will be, if not observable by the citizenry, verifiable by 'qualified' persons and 'experts'."
* "If you oppose the bill you are not as intelligent as we are."

The problem is that the defects of the bill are not small and can not be dismissed, as has been attempted with each new version of the bill, through copyediting, wordsmithing, and vagaries of text. In fact, the bill's flaws touch - at the deepest levels - our very notions, ideals, traditions, and fundamental constitutional rights with respect to American democracy.

In a recent email exchange inviting Holt proponents to a public debate, activist and attorney Paul Lehto was accused by a central Holt Bill proponent of "blowing hot air and quoting 18th century statesmen." Does this mean that this particular HR 811 proponent, whose organization has recently hired a high powered lobbyist just to get the bill passed, agrees with what George W. Bush is rumored to have stated, that our Constitution is "just a piece of paper"?

God bless Paul Lehto for quoting "18th century statesmen." They are the revolutionary spirits and first American patriots, who rose in opposition to a centralized power that used its authority to make bad and dangerous decisions for the people of this country. It is to them that we owe our freedoms and our dignities.

It is not enough for us to breeze past their messages and to sit content in our air conditioned homes, driving our Mercedes, eating our abundance of food.

Our country, the United States of America, was founded on ideals and principles, the principles of freedom and democracy, bolstered by robust public dissent, dialog, and debate. It is the strength of these principles that have enabled us to become the greatest superpower on earth. It is the words of those "18th century statesmen" that we must shine like a beacon to light for us the way forward, to remind us that our country is a country of the rule of law, and the basis and foundation for that rule of law is the U.S. Constitution.

This revolutionary document and declaration of democratic principles, written in the midst of much public debate and honest dissent and discourse, has stood the test of time. Our Constitution must be in the forefront of everything we do when tinkering with anything as crucial as the foundation of our democracy: our elections.

Lehto provides this quote from 18th century statesman, American patriot and founder James Madison:

. . . [T]he Declaration of Independence is the ring-bolt to the chain of your nation's destiny. . . . The principles contained in that instrument are saving principles. Stand by those principles, be true to them on all occasions, in all places, against all foes, and at whatever cost." --James Madison

Lehto also reminds us that the principles embodied in the Declaration of Independence are clear: we the people are the masters, our elected officials are the servants. Our democracy guarantees us the right to "kick the bums out" when our servants are misbehaving. And this means that we can not allow our elected representatives to enact laws facilitating the rigging of our elections, debasing the tenets of our democracy, and enshrining secret vote counting, which is the foundation of fascism and not democracy.

Lehto, like Madison, reminds us that this right is worth defending, at whatever the cost.

We who oppose HR 811 believe that a public debate on the merits of this legislation is not too high a cost to pay in defense of our country.

National Association of Secretaries of State Resolution Regarding Election Assistance Commission

SOURCE: http://www.nass.org/releases/EAC%20Position%20Cover%20Ltr.pdf [88]

NASS Position on Funding and Authorization of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission

Dear Members of Congress:

The secretaries of state voted at the 2005 National Association of Secretaries of State winter conference to dissolve the U.S. Election Assistance Commission after the 2006 federal general election. The following position statement was passed by a majority of the secretaries in attendance:

Recognizing the U.S. Election Assistance Commission's (EAC) task as a limited one, Congress, in the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), wisely authorized the EAC for only three years. Any duties assigned to the EAC can be completed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology or by the state and local election officials who make up the HAVA Standards Board and its Executive Committee.

The National Association of Secretaries of State encourages Congress not to reauthorize or fund the EAC after the conclusion of the 2006 federal general election, and not to give rulemaking authority to the EAC.

The secretaries believe that allowing the EAC to evolve into a regulatory body is contrary to the spirit of HAVA, and that by 2006 the EAC will have served its purpose. Congress should preserve the states' ability to serve as independent laboratories of change through successful experiments and innovation in election reform.

Sincerely,

The National Association of Secretaries of State

State and County Election Administrators Oppose H.R. 811

Statement published at ">http://www.ncsl.org/standcomm/sclaw/NCSLNACOltr31907.htm [89]
Click to download as PDF [90]

March 19, 2007

Dear Member of Congress:

The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) and the National Association of
Counties (NACo) urge you to oppose H.R. 811, S. 559 or other legislation that would
require dramatic changes in state and local election laws, technology and procedures.

State law controls the processes and administration of elections for federal, state and local
office and the procedures and technology vary greatly across the nation. States have been
extremely aggressive in addressing concerns about the security of our voting systems that
arose as a result of the mandates that Congress imposed as part of the Help America Vote
Act. In addition, counties are going to great lengths to ensure administrative practices
that protect the security of the voting systems and ensure the transparency of audit
processes. This legislation would exacerbate, rather than assist states and counties
in addressing, these challenges which could lead to disastrous unintended
consequences in the 2008 presidential election.

H.R. 811 and S. 559 are a one-size-fits all approach which would rush new voting
technology to market that has not even been developed without testing or certification
and without adequate time for pollworker training and voter education. Twenty-seven
states have already passed paper trail laws and thirteen more are considering this
approach in their current legislative sessions. In total, forty states have either passed or
are considering the question of whether a paper audit trail is right for their state. States
that have passed laws have done so in unique and varied ways to best meet the needs of
their constituents. The pending federal legislation seeks to undermine the hard work of
our nation’s state legislatures and is deeply flawed.

Even if the requirements of this legislation were realistic within the specified deadline,
state and local governments are understandably skeptical of promises of federal funding
for a new, multi-billion-dollar federal mandate for additional election technology and
practices. Congress has repeatedly failed to live up to its fiscal commitments under the
Help America Vote Act. It neither provided timely resources to the Election Assistance
Commission and the National Institute of Standards and Technology to adopt voting
systems standards as promised nor fully funded grants to the states for purchase of
accessible voting equipment.

The Help America Vote Act achieved implementation of new voting equipment and
procedures within a four-year timeframe without disastrous unintended consequences
only because Congress carefully crafted its provisions through extended consultation and
significant input from organizations representing state and local elected officials and
election administrators.

To pursue a more reasoned approach on this issue, please have your staff contact or
Alysoun McLaughlin with the National Association of Counties at 202-942-4254/
[email protected] [91] or Susan Frederick with the National Conference of State
Legislatures at 202-624-3566/[email protected].

Sincerely,

William T. Pound, Executive Director
National Conference of State Legislatures

Larry Naake, Executive Director
National Association of Counties

AttachmentSize
NCSL_NACo_Opposition.pdf [92]547.05 KB

Text of H.R. 811 (as of Feb. 5, 2007, GPO)


  [93]

Note:

The HR 811 text is being marked up with final amendments in the House Committtee on Administration and may emerge substantially altered from the text presented below, which is only the most recent form released to the general public. We understand this bill is on a fast-track and may be released at any time, to go straight to a House vote without affording any further opportunity for public review or comment. If you find this situation as offensive to democracy as we do, feel free to convey those sentiments to the House Committee on Administration [94] and to the Speaker of the House [95]. --EDA

Source: The Library of Congress, THOMAS website
http://thomas.loc.gov [96]

The full text of HR 811 is displayed on this page.

For a summary view of the bill by sections, Click here [97]

HR 811 IH

110th CONGRESS

1st Session

H. R. 811

To amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to require a<br/> voter-verified permanent paper ballot under title III of such Act, and<br/> for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

February 5, 2007

Mr. HOLT (for himself, Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia, Mr. WEXLER, Mr.
EMANUEL, Mr. PETRI, Mr. WOLF, Mr. LEWIS of Georgia, Mr. LANGEVIN, Mr.
COOPER, Mrs. JONES of Ohio, Mr. CLAY, Mr. SHAYS, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr.
ENGLISH of Pennsylvania, Mr. HASTINGS of Florida, Mr. RAMSTAD, Mr. MEEK
of Florida, Mr. ISSA, Mr. CUMMINGS, Mrs. BIGGERT, Ms. LEE, Mr. CASTLE,
Ms. KILPATRICK of Michigan, Mr. KUHL of New York, Ms. CORRINE BROWN of
Florida, Mr. MACK, Mr. SCOTT of Virginia, Mr. ABERCROMBIE, Mr.
ACKERMAN, Mr. ALLEN, Mr. BECERRA, Ms. BERKLEY, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. BERRY,
Mr. BISHOP of Georgia, Mr. BLUMENAUER, Mr. BOREN, Mr. BOSWELL, Mr.
BOUCHER, Mr. BOYD of Florida, Mr. BRADY of Pennsylvania, Mr. BRALEY of
Iowa, Mr. BUTTERFIELD, Mrs. CAPPS, Mr. CARNAHAN, Mr. CHANDLER, Mr.
COHEN, Mr. COSTA, Mr. COSTELLO, Mr. COURTNEY, Mr. CROWLEY, Mr. DAVIS of
Illinois, Mr. LINCOLN DAVIS of Tennessee, Mrs. DAVIS of California, Mr.
DEFAZIO, Ms. DEGETTE, Mr. DELAHUNT, Ms. DELAURO, Mr. DICKS, Mr.
DINGELL, Mr. DOGGETT, Mr. DOYLE, Mr. EDWARDS, Mr. ELLISON, Mr. ENGEL,
Ms. ESHOO, Mr. ETHERIDGE, Mr. FATTAH, Mr. FILNER, Mr. FORTUN.AE6O, Mr.
FRANK of Massachusetts, Mrs. GILLIBRAND, Mr. GONZALEZ, Mr. GORDON of
Tennessee, Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas, Mr. GRIJALVA, Mr. GUTIERREZ, Mr.
HALL of New York, Ms. HARMAN, Ms. HERSETH, Mr. HIGGINS, Mr. HINCHEY,
Ms. HIRONO, Mr. HODES, Mr. HOLDEN, Mr. HONDA, Ms. HOOLEY, Mr. INSLEE,
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas, Mr. JEFFERSON, Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of
Texas, Mr. JOHNSON of Georgia, Mr. KAGEN, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. KILDEE, Mr.
KIND, Mr. KLEIN of Florida, Mr. KUCINICH, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. LARSEN of
Washington, Mr. LOEBSACK, Mrs. LOWEY, Mrs. MCCARTHY of New York, Ms.
MCCOLLUM of Minnesota, Mr. MCINTYRE, Mr. MCNULTY, Mrs. MALONEY of New
York, Mr. MARSHALL, Mr. MATHESON, Ms. MATSUI, Mr. MELANCON, Mr.
MICHAUD, Mr. MILLER of North Carolina, Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California,
Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. MOLLOHAN, Mr. MOORE of Kansas, Mr. MORAN of Virginia,
Mr. PATRICK J. MURPHY of Pennsylvania, Mr. NADLER, Mrs. NAPOLITANO, Ms.
NORTON, Mr. OBERSTAR, Mr. OBEY, Mr. OLVER, Mr. ORTIZ, Mr. PALLONE, Mr.
PASTOR, Mr. PAYNE, Mr. PETERSON of Minnesota, Mr. PRICE of North
Carolina, Mr. REYES, Mr. ROTHMAN, Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD, Mr. RUPPERSBERGER,
Mr. SALAZAR, Ms. LINDA T. SANCHEZ of California, Ms. LORETTA SANCHEZ of
California, Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, Mr. SCHIFF, Ms. SCHWARTZ, Mr. SCOTT of
Georgia, Mr. SERRANO, Mr. SHERMAN, Mr. SHULER, Ms. SLAUGHTER, Mr. SMITH
of Washington, Ms. SOLIS, Mr. SPRATT, Mr. STARK, Mr. STUPAK, Ms.
SUTTON, Mr. TANNER, Mrs. TAUSCHER, Mr. TAYLOR, Mr. TIERNEY, Mr. TOWNS,
Mr. UDALL of Colorado, Mr. VAN HOLLEN, Mr. WALZ of Minnesota, Ms.
WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Ms. WATERS, Ms. WATSON, Mr. WAXMAN, Mr. WEINER, Ms.
WOOLSEY, Mr. WU, Mr. WYNN, and Mr. ALTMIRE) introduced the following
bill; which was referred to the Committee on House Administration

A BILL

To amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to require a
voter-verified permanent paper ballot under title III of such Act, and
for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the `Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007'.

SEC. 2. PROMOTING ACCURACY, INTEGRITY, AND SECURITY THROUGH VOTER-VERIFIED PERMANENT PAPER BALLOT.

    (a) Ballot Verification and Audit Capacity-
      (1) IN GENERAL- Section 301(a)(2) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15481(a)(2)) is amended to read as follows:
      `(2) BALLOT VERIFICATION AND AUDIT CAPACITY-
        `(A) IN GENERAL-
          `(i) The voting system shall require the use of
          or produce an individual voter-verified paper ballot of the voter's
          vote that shall be created by or made available for inspection and
          verification by the voter before the voter's vote is cast and counted.
          For purposes of this clause, examples of such a ballot include a paper
          ballot marked by the voter for the purpose of being counted by hand or
          read by an optical scanner or other similar device, a paper ballot
          prepared by the voter to be mailed to an election official (whether
          from a domestic or overseas location), a paper ballot created through
          the use of a ballot marking device or system, or a paper ballot
          produced by a touch screen or other electronic voting machine, so long
          as in each case the voter is permitted to verify the ballot in a paper
          form in accordance with this subparagraph.
          `(ii) The voting system shall provide the voter
          with an opportunity to correct any error made by the system in the
          voter-verified paper ballot before the permanent voter-verified paper
          ballot is preserved in accordance with subparagraph (B)(i).
          `(iii) The voting system shall not preserve the
          voter-verifiable paper ballots in any manner that makes it possible, at
          any time after the ballot has been cast, to associate a voter with the
          record of the voter's vote.
        `(B) MANUAL AUDIT CAPACITY-
          `(i) The permanent voter-verified paper ballot produced in accordance with subparagraph (A) shall be preserved--
            `(I) in the case of votes cast at the
            polling place on the date of the election, within the polling place in
            the manner or method in which all other paper ballots are preserved
            within such polling place;
            `(II) in the case of votes cast at the
            polling place prior to the date of the election or cast by mail, in a
            manner which is consistent with the manner employed by the jurisdiction
            for preserving such ballots in general; or
            `(III) in the absence of either such manner
            or method, in a manner which is consistent with the manner employed by
            the jurisdiction for preserving paper ballots in general.
          `(ii) Each paper ballot produced pursuant to
          subparagraph (A) shall be suitable for a manual audit equivalent to
          that of a paper ballot voting system.
          `(iii) In the event of any inconsistencies or
          irregularities between any electronic vote tallies and the vote tallies
          determined by counting by hand the individual permanent paper ballots
          produced pursuant to subparagraph (A), and subject to subparagraph (D),
          the individual permanent paper ballots shall be the true and correct
          record of the votes cast and shall be used as the official ballots for
          purposes of any recount or audit conducted with respect to any election
          for Federal office in which the voting system is used.
        `(C) SPECIAL RULE FOR VOTES CAST BY ABSENT MILITARY
        AND OVERSEAS VOTERS- In the case of votes cast by absent uniformed
        services voters and overseas voters under the Uniformed and Overseas
        Citizens Absentee Voting Act, the ballots cast by such voters shall
        serve as the permanent paper ballot under subparagraph (A) in
        accordance with protocols established by the Commission, in
        consultation with the Secretary of Defense after notice and opportunity
        for public comment, which preserve the privacy of the voter and are
        consistent with the requirements of such Act and this Act, except that
        to the extent that such protocols permit the use of electronic mail in
        the delivery or submission of such ballots, paragraph (11) shall not
        apply with respect to the delivery or submission of the ballots.
        `(D) SPECIAL RULE FOR TREATMENT OF DISPUTES WHEN
        PAPER BALLOTS HAVE BEEN SHOWN TO BE COMPROMISED- In the event of any
        inconsistency between any electronic vote tallies and the vote tallies
        determined by counting by hand the individual permanent paper ballots
        produced pursuant to subparagraph (A), any person seeking to show that
        the electronic vote tally should be given preference in determining the
        official count for the election shall be required to demonstrate, by
        clear and convincing evidence, that the paper ballots have been
        compromised (by damage or mischief or otherwise) and that a sufficient
        number of the ballots have been so compromised that the result of the
        election would be changed. For purposes of the previous sentence, the
        paper ballots associated with each voting machine shall be considered
        on a voting-machine-by-voting-machine basis, and only the sets of paper
        ballots deemed compromised, if any, shall be considered in the
        calculation of whether or not the election would be changed due to the
        compromised paper ballots.'.
      (2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT CLARIFYING APPLICABILITY OF
      ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE ACCESSIBILITY- Section 301(a)(4) of such Act (42
      U.S.C. 15481(a)(4)) is amended by inserting `(including the paper
      ballots required to be produced under paragraph (2) and the notice
      required under paragraph (8))' after `voting system'.
      (3) OTHER CONFORMING AMENDMENTS- Section 301(a)(1) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15481(a)(1)) is amended--
        (A) in subparagraph (A)(i), by striking `counted' and inserting `counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3)';
        (B) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking `counted' and inserting `counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3)';
        (C) in subparagraph (A)(iii), as amended by
        paragraph (2), by striking `counted' each place it appears and
        inserting `counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3)'; and
        (D) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking `counted' and inserting `counted, in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3)'.
    (b) Accessibility and Ballot Verification for Individuals With Disabilities-
      (1) IN GENERAL- Section 301(a)(3)(B) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15481(a)(3)(B)) is amended to read as follows:
        `(B)(i) satisfy the requirement of subparagraph (A)
        through the use of at least one voting system equipped for individuals
        with disabilities at each polling place; and
        `(ii) meet the requirements of subparagraph (A) and paragraph (2)(A) by using a system that--
          `(I) allows the voter to privately and
          independently verify the content of the permanent paper ballot through
          the conversion of the printed content into accessible media, and
          `(II) ensures that the entire process of ballot verification and vote casting is equipped for individuals with disabilities.'.
      (2) SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT OF STUDY, TESTING, AND DEVELOPMENT OF ACCESSIBLE BALLOT VERIFICATION MECHANISMS-
        (A) STUDY AND REPORTING- Subtitle C of title II of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15381 et seq.) is amended--
          (i) by redesignating section 247 as section 248; and
          (ii) by inserting after section 246 the following new section:

`SEC. 247. STUDY AND REPORT ON ACCESSIBLE BALLOT VERIFICATION MECHANISMS.

    `(a) Study and Report- The Director of the National
    Institute of Standards and Technology shall study, test, and develop
    best practices to enhance the accessibility of ballot verification
    mechanisms for individuals with disabilities, for voters whose primary
    language is not English, and for voters with difficulties in literacy,
    including best practices for the mechanisms themselves and the
    processes through which the mechanisms are used. In carrying out this
    section, the Director shall specifically investigate existing and
    potential methods or devices that will assist such individuals and
    voters in creating voter-verified paper ballots and in reading or
    transmitting the information printed or marked on such ballots back to
    such individuals and voters.
    `(b) Deadline- The Director shall complete the requirements of subsection (a) not later than January 1, 2010.
    `(c) Authorization of Appropriations- There are authorized
    to be appropriated to carry out subsection (a) $1,000,000, to remain
    available until expended.'.
        (B) CLERICAL AMENDMENT- The table of contents of such Act is amended--
          (i) by redesignating the item relating to section 247 as relating to section 248; and
          (ii) by inserting after the item relating to section 246 the following new item:
      `Sec. 247. Study and report on accessible voter verification mechanisms.'.
      (3) CLARIFICATION OF ACCESSIBILITY STANDARDS UNDER
      VOLUNTARY VOTING SYSTEM GUIDANCE- In adopting any voluntary guidance
      under subtitle B of title III of the Help America Vote Act with respect
      to the accessibility of the ballot verification requirements for
      individuals with disabilities, the Election Assistance Commission shall
      include and apply the same accessibility standards applicable under the
      voluntary guidance adopted for accessible voting systems under such
      subtitle.
    (c) Additional Voting System Requirements-
      (1) REQUIREMENTS DESCRIBED- Section 301(a) of such Act
      (42 U.S.C. 15481(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new
      paragraphs:
      `(7) INSTRUCTION OF ELECTION OFFICIALS- Each State
      shall ensure that all election officials are instructed on the right of
      any individual who requires assistance to vote by reason of blindness,
      other disability, or inability to read or write to be given assistance
      by a person chosen by that individual under section 208 of the Voting
      Rights Act of 1965.
      `(8) INSTRUCTION REMINDING VOTERS OF IMPORTANCE OF VERIFYING PAPER BALLOT-
        `(A) IN GENERAL- The appropriate election official
        at each polling place shall cause to be placed in a prominent location
        in the polling place a notice containing the following statement, in
        boldface type, large font, and using only upper-case letters: `THE
        PAPER BALLOT REPRESENTING YOUR VOTE SHALL SERVE AS THE VOTE OF RECORD
        IN ALL RECOUNTS AND AUDITS. DO NOT LEAVE THE VOTING BOOTH UNTIL YOU
        HAVE CONFIRMED THAT IT ACCURATELY RECORDS YOUR VOTE'.
        `(B) SYSTEMS FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES- All
        voting systems equipped for individuals with disabilities shall
        transmit by accessible media the statement referred to in subparagraph
        (A), as well as an explanation of the verification process described in
        paragraph (3)(B)(ii).
      `(9) PROHIBITION OF USE OF UNDISCLOSED SOFTWARE IN
      VOTING SYSTEMS- No voting system used in an election for Federal office
      shall at any time contain or use any software not certified by the
      State for use in the election or any software undisclosed to the State
      in the certification process. The appropriate election official shall
      disclose, in electronic form, the source code, object code, and
      executable representation of the voting system software and firmware to
      the Commission, including ballot programming files, and the Commission
      shall make that source code, object code, executable representation,
      and ballot programming files available for inspection promptly upon
      request to any person.
      `(10) PROHIBITION OF USE OF WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS
      DEVICES IN VOTING SYSTEMS- No voting system shall contain, use, or be
      accessible by any wireless, power-line, remote, wide area, or concealed
      communication device at all.
      `(11) PROHIBITING CONNECTION OF SYSTEM OR TRANSMISSION
      OF SYSTEM INFORMATION OVER THE INTERNET- No component of any voting
      device upon which votes are cast shall be connected to the Internet at
      any time.
      `(12) SECURITY STANDARDS FOR VOTING SYSTEMS USED IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS-
        `(A) IN GENERAL- No voting system may be used in an
        election for Federal office unless the manufacturer of such system and
        the election officials using such system meet the applicable
        requirements described in subparagraph (B).
        `(B) REQUIREMENTS DESCRIBED- The requirements described in this subparagraph are as follows:
          `(i) The manufacturer and the election
          officials shall document the secure chain of custody for the handling
          of all software, hardware, vote storage media, and ballots used in
          connection with voting systems, and shall make the information
          available upon request to the Commission.
          `(ii) The manufacturer of the software used in
          the operation of the system shall provide the appropriate election
          official with updated information regarding the identification of each
          individual who participated in the writing of the software, including
          specific information regarding whether the individual has ever been
          convicted of a crime involving election, accounting, or computer
          security fraud.
          `(iii) The manufacturer shall provide the
          appropriate election official with the information necessary for the
          official to provide information to the Commission under paragraph (9).
          `(iv) After the appropriate election official
          has certified the source code, object code, and executable
          representation of the voting system software for use in an election,
          the manufacturer may not--
            `(I) alter such codes and representation; or
            `(II) insert or use in the voting system any software not certified by the State for use in the election.
          `(v) The appropriate election official shall
          ensure that all voting machines and related supplies to be used in the
          election shall remain secured within storage facilities arranged for by
          the election official, and shall not be removed from such facilities
          until such time as they are to be delivered to the relevant polling
          place and secured at the polling place until used in the election.
          `(vi) The manufacturer shall meet standards
          established by the Commission to prevent the existence or appearance of
          any conflict of interest with respect to candidates for public office
          and political parties, including standards to ensure that the
          manufacturer's officers and directors do not hold positions of
          authority in any political party or in any partisan political campaign,
          and shall certify to the Commission not later than January 31 of each
          even-numbered year that it meets the standards established under this
          clause.
          `(vii) At the request of the Commission, the
          appropriate election official shall submit information to the
          Commission regarding the State's compliance with this subparagraph.
      `(13) DURABILITY AND READABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR BALLOTS-
        `(A) DURABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR PAPER BALLOTS- All
        voter-verified paper ballots required to be used under this Act
        (including the emergency paper ballots used under paragraph (14)) shall
        be marked, printed, or recorded on durable paper of archival quality
        capable of withstanding multiple counts and recounts without
        compromising the fundamental integrity of the ballots, and capable of
        retaining the information marked, printed, or recorded on them for the
        full duration of the retention and preservation period called for by
        title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 (42 U.S.C. 1974 et seq.) or
        under applicable State law, whichever is longer.
        `(B) READABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR MACHINE-MARKED OR
        PRINTED PAPER BALLOTS- All voter-verified paper ballots marked or
        printed through the use of a marking or printing device shall be
        clearly readable by the naked eye and by a scanner or other device
        equipped for voters with disabilities.
      `(14) PROHIBITING TURNING INDIVIDUALS AWAY FROM POLLING
      PLACES BECAUSE OF PROBLEMS WITH OR SHORTAGES OF EQUIPMENT, BALLOTS, OR
      SUPPLIES-
        `(A) ENSURING ADEQUATE EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES- Each
        State shall ensure that the voting systems it uses to conduct elections
        for Federal office are designed in a manner that ensures that no voter
        will be unable to cast a ballot at a polling place due to a shortage or
        failure of voting equipment, ballots, or necessary supplies.
        `(B) USE OF EMERGENCY PAPER BALLOTS IN CASE OF
        SYSTEM OR EQUIPMENT FAILURE- In the event of the failure of voting
        equipment or other circumstance at a polling place that causes a delay,
        any individual who is waiting at the polling place to cast a ballot in
        an election for Federal office and who would be delayed due to such
        failure or other circumstance shall be advised immediately of the
        individual's right to use an emergency paper ballot, and upon request
        shall be provided with an emergency paper ballot for the election and
        the supplies necessary to mark the ballot. Any emergency paper ballot
        which is cast by an individual under this subparagraph shall be counted
        and otherwise treated as a regular ballot and not as a provisional
        ballot, unless the individual casting the ballot would have otherwise
        been required to cast a provisional ballot if the voting equipment at
        the polling place had not failed.'.
      (2) REQUIRING LABORATORIES TO MEET STANDARDS
      PROHIBITING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AS CONDITION OF ACCREDITATION FOR
      TESTING OF VOTING SYSTEM HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE-
        (A) IN GENERAL- Section 231(b) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15371(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
      `(3) PROHIBITING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST; ENSURING AVAILABILITY OF RESULTS-
        `(A) IN GENERAL- A laboratory may not be accredited by the Commission for purposes of this section unless--
          `(i) the laboratory certifies that the only
          compensation it receives for the testing carried out in connection with
          the certification, decertification, and recertification of the
          manufacturer's voting system hardware and software is the payment made
          from the Testing Escrow Account under paragraph (4);
          `(ii) the laboratory meets the standards
          applicable to the manufacturers of voting systems under section
          301(a)(11)(B)(vi), together with such standards as the Commission shall
          establish (after notice and opportunity for public comment) to prevent
          the existence or appearance of any conflict of interest in the testing
          carried out by the laboratory under this section, including standards
          to ensure that the laboratory does not have a financial interest in the
          manufacture, sale, and distribution of voting system hardware and
          software, and is sufficiently independent from other persons with such
          an interest;
          `(iii) the laboratory certifies that it will
          permit an expert designated by the Commission to observe any testing
          the laboratory carries out under this section; and
          `(iv) the laboratory, upon completion of any
          testing carried out under this section, discloses the test protocols,
          results, and all communication between the laboratory and the
          manufacturer to the Commission.
        `(B) AVAILABILITY OF RESULTS- Upon receipt of
        information under subparagraph (A), the Commission shall make the
        information available promptly to election officials and the public.
      `(4) PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING TESTING; PAYMENT OF USER FEES FOR COMPENSATION OF ACCREDITED LABORATORIES-
        `(A) ESTABLISHMENT OF ESCROW ACCOUNT- The
        Commission shall establish an escrow account (to be known as the
        `Testing Escrow Account') for making payments to accredited
        laboratories for the costs of the testing carried out in connection
        with the certification, decertification, and recertification of voting
        system hardware and software.
        `(B) SCHEDULE OF FEES- In consultation with the
        accredited laboratories, the Commission shall establish and regularly
        update a schedule of fees for the testing carried out in connection
        with the certification, decertification, and recertification of voting
        system hardware and software, based on the reasonable costs expected to
        be incurred by the accredited laboratories in carrying out the testing
        for various types of hardware and software.
        `(C) REQUESTS AND PAYMENTS BY MANUFACTURERS- A
        manufacturer of voting system hardware and software may not have the
        hardware or software tested by an accredited laboratory under this
        section unless--
          `(i) the manufacturer submits a detailed request for the testing to the Commission; and
          `(ii) the manufacturer pays to the Commission,
          for deposit into the Testing Escrow Account established under
          subparagraph (A), the applicable fee under the schedule established and
          in effect under subparagraph (B).
        `(D) SELECTION OF LABORATORY- Upon receiving a
        request for testing and the payment from a manufacturer required under
        subparagraph (C), the Commission shall select at random, from all
        laboratories which are accredited under this section to carry out the
        specific testing requested by the manufacturer, an accredited
        laboratory to carry out the testing.
        `(E) PAYMENTS TO LABORATORIES- Upon receiving a
        certification from a laboratory selected to carry out testing pursuant
        to subparagraph (D) that the testing is completed, along with a copy of
        the results of the test as required under paragraph (3)(A)(iii), the
        Commission shall make a payment to the laboratory from the Testing
        Escrow Account established under subparagraph (A) in an amount equal to
        the applicable fee paid by the manufacturer under subparagraph (C)(ii).
      `(5) DISSEMINATION OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON ACCREDITED LABORATORIES-
        `(A) INFORMATION ON TESTING- Upon completion of the
        testing of a voting system under this section, the Commission shall
        promptly disseminate to the public the identification of the laboratory
        which carried out the testing.
        `(B) LABORATORIES WITH ACCREDITATION REVOKED OR
        SUSPENDED- If the Commission revokes, terminates, or suspends the
        accreditation of a laboratory under this section, the Commission shall
        promptly notify Congress, the chief State election official of each
        State, and the public.'.
        (B) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS- Section 231 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15371) is further amended--
          (i) in subsection (a)(1), by striking `testing,
          certification,' and all that follows and inserting the following:
          `testing of voting system hardware and software by accredited
          laboratories in connection with the certification, decertification, and
          recertification of the hardware and software for purposes of this Act.';
          (ii) in subsection (a)(2), by striking
          `testing, certification,' and all that follows and inserting the
          following: `testing of its voting system hardware and software by the
          laboratories accredited by the Commission under this section in
          connection with certifying, decertifying, and recertifying the hardware
          and software.';
          (iii) in subsection (b)(1), by striking
          `testing, certification, decertification, and recertification' and
          inserting `testing'; and
          (iv) in subsection (d), by striking `testing,
          certification, decertification, and recertification' each place it
          appears and inserting `testing'.
        (C) DEADLINE FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF STANDARDS AND
        ESCROW ACCOUNT- The Election Assistance Commission shall establish the
        standards described in section 231(b)(3) of the Help America Vote Act
        of 2002 and the Testing Escrow Account described in section 231(b)(4)
        of such Act (as added by subparagraph (A)) not later than January 1,
        2008.
      (3) SPECIAL CERTIFICATION OF BALLOT DURABILITY AND
      READABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR STATES NOT CURRENTLY USING PAPER BALLOTS-
      If any of the voting systems used in a State for the regularly
      scheduled 2006 general elections for Federal office did not operate by
      having voters cast votes on paper ballots (such as through the use of
      an optical scan voting system), the State shall certify to the Election
      Assistance Commission not later than 90 days after the date of the
      enactment of this Act that the State will be in compliance with the
      requirements of section 301(a)(13) of the Help America Vote of 2002, as
      added by paragraph (1), in accordance with the deadline established
      under this Act, and shall include in the certification the methods by
      which the State will meet the requirements.
    (d) Availability of Additional Funding to Enable States to Meet Costs of Revised Requirements-
      (1) EXTENSION OF REQUIREMENTS PAYMENTS FOR MEETING
      REVISED REQUIREMENTS- Section 257(a) of the Help America Vote Act of
      2002 (42 U.S.C. 15407(a) is amended by adding at the end the following
      new paragraph:
      `(4) For fiscal year 2007, $300,000,000, except that
      any funds provided under the authorization made by this paragraph shall
      be used by a State only to meet the requirements of title III which are
      first imposed on the State pursuant to the amendments made by section 2
      of the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007, or to
      otherwise modify or replace its voting systems in response to such
      amendments.'.
      (2) USE OF REVISED FORMULA FOR ALLOCATION OF FUNDS-
      Section 252(b) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15402(b)) is amended to read as
      follows:
    `(b) State Allocation Percentage Defined-
      `(1) IN GENERAL- Except as provided in paragraph (2),
      the `State allocation percentage' for a State is the amount (expressed
      as a percentage) equal to the quotient of--
        `(A) the voting age population of the State (as reported in the most recent decennial census); and
        `(B) the total voting age population of all States (as reported in the most recent decennial census).
      `(2) SPECIAL RULE FOR PAYMENTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007-
        `(A) IN GENERAL- In the case of the requirements
        payment made to a State for fiscal year 2007, the `State allocation
        percentage' for a State is the amount (expressed as a percentage) equal
        to the quotient of--
          `(i) the number of remedial precincts in the State; and
          `(ii) the total number of remedial precincts in all States.
        `(B) REMEDIAL PRECINCT DEFINED- In this paragraph,
        a `remedial precinct' means any precinct (or equivalent location)
        within the State for which the voting system used to administer the
        regularly scheduled general election for Federal office held in
        November 2006--
          `(i) did not use paper as the medium for vote
          casting, or if the system used paper, did not use durable paper of
          archival quality; or
          `(ii) did not provide that the entire process of ballot verification was equipped for individuals with disabilities.'.
      (3) INCREASE IN STATE MINIMUM SHARE OF PAYMENT- Section 252(c) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15402(c)) is amended--
        (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting after `one-half
        of 1 percent' the following: `(or, in the case of the payment made for
        fiscal year 2007, 1 percent)'; and
        (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting after `one-tenth
        of 1 percent' the following: `(or, in the case of the payment made for
        fiscal year 2007, one-half of 1 percent)'.
      (4) REVISED CONDITIONS FOR RECEIPT OF FUNDS- Section 253 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15403) is amended--
        (A) in subsection (a), by striking `A State is
        eligible' and inserting `Except as provided in subsection (f), a State
        is eligible'; and
        (B) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
    `(f) Special Rule for Fiscal Year 2007- Notwithstanding any
    other provision of this part, a State is eligible to receive a
    requirements payment for fiscal year 2007 if--
      `(1) not later than 30 days after the date of the
      enactment of the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of
      2007, the State certifies to the Commission the number of remedial
      precincts in the State (as defined in section 252(b)(2)(B)); and
      `(2) not later than 90 days after the date of the
      enactment of such Act, the chief executive officer of the State, or
      designee, in consultation and coordination with the chief State
      election official, has filed a statement with the Commission describing
      the State's need for the payment and how the State will use the payment
      to meet the requirements of title III (in accordance with the
      limitations applicable to the use of the payment under section
      257(a)(4)).'.
      (5) PERMITTING USE OF FUNDS FOR REIMBURSEMENT FOR COSTS
      PREVIOUSLY INCURRED- Section 251(c)(1) of such Act (42 U.S.C.
      15401(c)(1)) is amended by striking the period at the end and inserting
      the following: `, or as a reimbursement for any costs incurred in
      meeting the requirements of title III which are imposed pursuant to the
      amendments made by section 2 of the Voter Confidence and Increased
      Accessibility Act of 2007 or in otherwise modifying or replacing voting
      systems in response to such amendments.'.
      (6) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION REGARDING STATES RECEIVING
      OTHER FUNDS FOR REPLACING PUNCH CARD, LEVER, OR OTHER VOTING MACHINES-
      Nothing in the amendments made by this subsection or in any other
      provision of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 may be construed to
      prohibit a State which received or was authorized to receive a payment
      under title I or II of such Act for replacing punch card, lever, or
      other voting machines from receiving or using any funds which are made
      available under the amendments made by this subsection.
      (7) EFFECTIVE DATE- The amendments made by this
      subsection shall apply with respect to fiscal years beginning with
      fiscal year 2007.

SEC. 3. ENHANCEMENT OF ENFORCEMENT OF HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002.

    Section 401 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15511) is amended--
      (1) by striking `The Attorney General' and inserting `(a) In General- The Attorney General'; and
      (2) by adding at the end the following new subsections:
    `(b) Filing of Complaints by Aggrieved Persons-
      `(1) IN GENERAL- A person who is aggrieved by a
      violation of section 301, 302, or 303 which has occurred, is occurring,
      or is about to occur may file a written, signed, notarized complaint
      with the Attorney General describing the violation and requesting the
      Attorney General to take appropriate action under this section.
      `(2) RESPONSE BY ATTORNEY GENERAL- The Attorney General
      shall respond to each complaint filed under paragraph (1), in
      accordance with procedures established by the Attorney General that
      require responses and determinations to be made within the same (or
      shorter) deadlines which apply to a State under the State-based
      administrative complaint procedures described in section 402(a)(2).
    `(c) Clarification of Availability of Private Right of
    Action- Nothing in this section may be construed to prohibit any person
    from bringing an action under section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of
    the United States (42 U.S.C. 1983) (including any individual who seeks
    to enforce the individual's right to a voter-verified paper ballot, the
    right to have the voter-verified paper ballot counted in an election,
    or any other right under subtitle A of title III) to enforce the
    uniform and nondiscriminatory election technology and administration
    requirements under sections 301, 302, and 303.
    `(d) No Effect on State Procedures- Nothing in this section
    may be construed to affect the availability of the State-based
    administrative complaint procedures required under section 402 to any
    person filing a complaint under this subsection.'.

SEC. 4. EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION OF ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION.

    (a) In General- Section 210 of the Help America Vote Act of
    2002 (42 U.S.C. 15330) is amended by striking `each of the fiscal years
    2003 through 2005' and inserting `each fiscal year beginning with
    fiscal year 2003'.
    (b) Effective Date- The amendment made by subsection (a)
    shall take effect as if included in the enactment of the Help America
    Vote Act of 2002.

SEC. 5. REQUIREMENT FOR MANDATORY MANUAL AUDITS BY HAND COUNT.

    (a) Mandatory Manual Audits by Election Audit Boards- Title
    III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15481 et seq.) is
    amended by adding at the end the following new subtitle:

`Subtitle C--Mandatory Manual Audits by Election Audit Boards

`SEC. 321. ESTABLISHMENT OF ELECTION AUDIT BOARDS.

    `(a) Establishment- Not later than 60 days before the date
    of each election for Federal office held in the State, the chief
    auditor of each State shall appoint an Election Audit Board to
    administer, without advance notice to the precincts selected, random
    hand counts of the voter-verified paper ballots required to be produced
    and preserved pursuant to section 301(a)(2) for each such election held
    in the State (and, at the option of the State or jurisdiction involved,
    of elections for State and local office held at the same time as such
    election).
    `(b) Composition-
      `(1) IN GENERAL- Each political party in the State with
      a candidate in any of the regularly scheduled elections for Federal
      office held in the State whose candidates in the most recent regularly
      scheduled general elections in the State received at least 5% of the
      aggregate number of all votes cast in such elections, together with any
      independent candidate who received at least 5% of the aggregate number
      of all votes cast in the most recent regularly scheduled general
      elections in the State, shall select a qualified individual for
      appointment to the Election Audit Board of the State.
      `(2) UNAFFILIATED MEMBERS- In addition to the
      individuals serving on the Board pursuant to paragraph (1), the chief
      auditor of the State shall appoint qualified individuals who are not
      nominated by any political party or candidate and who are not employees
      or agents of any political party or candidate to serve on the Board.
      The number of individuals appointed pursuant to this paragraph shall be
      sufficient to ensure that the total number of individuals serving on
      the Board is an odd number not less than 7.
      `(3) QUALIFICATIONS- An individual is qualified to be
      appointed to the Board if the individual has professional experience in
      carrying out audits on an impartial basis, and does not have any
      conflict of interest with the manufacturer or vendor of any voting
      system which was used in any of the elections that will be audited by
      the Board.
      `(4) DIVERSITY IN APPOINTMENTS- In making appointments
      to the Board, the chief auditor of the State shall (to the greatest
      extent practicable) ensure that the members of the Board reflect the
      demographic composition of the voting age population of the State.
    `(c) Special Rule For Runoff and Special Elections-
      `(1) RUNOFF ELECTIONS- If a runoff election for Federal
      office is held in the State, the Election Audit Board which was
      appointed for the initial election which resulted in the runoff
      election shall serve as the Election Audit Board with respect to the
      runoff election.
      `(2) SPECIAL ELECTIONS- If a special election for
      Federal office is held in the State (other than a special election held
      on the same date as the date of a regularly scheduled election for
      Federal office), the Election Audit Board which was appointed for the
      most recent regularly scheduled election for Federal office in the
      State shall serve as the Election Audit Board with respect to the
      special election.
    `(d) Chief Auditor Defined- In this subsection, the `chief
    auditor' of a State is an official of the State government, who, as
    designated by the Attorney General of the State and certified by the
    Attorney General of the State to the Commission, is responsible for
    conducting annual audits of the operations of the government of the
    State under the laws or constitution of the State, except that in no
    case may an individual serve as the chief auditor of a State under this
    subsection if the individual is the chief State election official.

`SEC. 322. NUMBER OF BALLOTS COUNTED UNDER AUDIT.

    `(a) In General- Except as provided in subsection (b), the
    number of voter-verified paper ballots which will be subject to a hand
    count administered by the Election Audit Board of a State under this
    subtitle with respect to an election shall be determined as follows:
      `(1) In the event that the unofficial count as
      described in section 323(a)(1) reveals that the margin of victory
      between the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes in the
      election is less than 1 percent of the total votes cast in that
      election, the hand counts of the voter-verified paper ballots shall
      occur in 10 percent of all precincts (or equivalent locations) in the
      Congressional district involved (in the case of an election for the
      House of Representatives) or the State (in the case of any other
      election for Federal office).
      `(2) In the event that the unofficial count as
      described in section 323(a)(1) reveals that the margin of victory
      between the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes in the
      election is greater than or equal to 1 percent but less than 2 percent
      of the total votes cast in that election, the hand counts of the
      voter-verified paper ballots shall occur in 5 percent of all precincts
      (or equivalent locations) in the Congressional district involved (in
      the case of an election for the House of Representatives) or the State
      (in the case of any other election for Federal office).
      `(3) In the event that the unofficial count as
      described in section 323(a)(1) reveals that the margin of victory
      between the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes in the
      election is equal to or greater than 2 percent of the total votes cast
      in that election, the hand counts of the voter-verified paper ballots
      shall occur in 3 percent of all precincts (or equivalent locations) in
      the Congressional district involved (in the case of an election for the
      House of Representatives) or the State (in the case of any other
      election for Federal office).
    `(b) Use of Alternative Mechanism- Notwithstanding
    subsection (a), a State may adopt and apply an alternative mechanism to
    determine the number of voter-verified paper ballots which will be
    subject to the hand counts required under this subtitle with respect to
    an election, so long as the National Institute of Standards and
    Technology determines that the alternative mechanism will be at least
    as effective in ensuring the accuracy of the election results and as
    transparent as the procedure under subsection (a).

`SEC. 323. PROCESS FOR ADMINISTERING AUDITS.

    `(a) In General- The Election Audit Board of a State shall
    administer an audit under this section of the results of an election in
    accordance with the following procedures:
      `(1) Within 24 hours after the State announces the
      final unofficial vote count in each precinct in the State, the Board
      shall determine and then announce the precincts in the State in which
      it will administer the audits.
      `(2) With respect to votes cast at the precinct or
      equivalent location on or before the date of the election (other than
      provisional ballots described in paragraph (3)), the Board shall
      administer the hand count of the votes on the paper voter-verified
      ballots required to be produced and preserved under section
      301(a)(2)(A) and the comparison of the count of the votes on those
      ballots with the final unofficial count of such votes as announced by
      the State.
      `(3) With respect to votes cast other than at the
      precinct on the date of the election (other than votes cast before the
      date of the election described in paragraph (2)) or votes cast by
      provisional ballot on the date of the election which are certified and
      counted by the State on or after the date of the election, including
      votes cast by absent uniformed services voters and overseas voters
      under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, the
      Board shall administer the hand count of the applicable voter-verified
      ballots required to be produced and preserved under section
      301(a)(2)(A) and section 301(a)(2)(B) and compare the count it
      administers with the count of such votes as announced by the State.
    `(b) Special Rule in Case of Delay in Reporting Absentee
    Vote Count- In the case of a State in which, under State law, the final
    count of absentee and provisional votes is not announced until after
    the expiration of the 7-day period which begins on the date of the
    election, the Election Audit Board shall initiate the process described
    in subsection (a) for administering the audit not later than 24 hours
    after the State announces the final unofficial vote count for the votes
    cast at the precinct or equivalent location on or before the date of
    the election, and shall initiate the administration of the audit of the
    absentee and provisional votes pursuant to subsection (a)(3) not later
    than 24 hours after the State announces the final unofficial count of
    such votes.
    `(c) Additional Audits if Cause Shown-
      `(1) IN GENERAL- If the Election Audit Board finds that
      any of the hand counts administered under this section do not match the
      final unofficial tally of the results of an election, the Board shall
      administer hand counts under this section of such additional precincts
      (or equivalent jurisdictions) as the Board considers appropriate to
      resolve any concerns resulting from the audit and ensure the accuracy
      of the results.
      `(2) ESTABLISHMENT AND PUBLICATION OF PROCEDURES
      GOVERNING ADDITIONAL AUDITS- Not later than January 1, 2008, each State
      shall establish and publish procedures for carrying out the additional
      audits under this subsection, including the means by which the State
      shall resolve any concerns resulting from the audit with finality and
      ensure the accuracy of the results.
    `(d) Public Observation of Audits- Each audit conducted
    under this section shall be conducted in a manner that allows public
    observation of the entire process.

`SEC. 324. SELECTION OF PRECINCTS.

    `(a) In General- Except as provided in subsection (c), the
    selection of the precincts in the State in which the Election Audit
    Board of the State shall administer the hand counts under this subtitle
    shall be made by the Board on an entirely random basis using a uniform
    distribution in which all precincts in a State have an equal chance of
    being selected, in accordance with such procedures as the Commission
    determines appropriate, except that--
      `(1) at least one precinct shall be selected at random in each county; and
      `(2) the Commission shall publish the procedures in the Federal Register prior to the selection of the precincts.
    `(b) Public Selection- The random selection of precincts
    under subsection (a) shall be conducted in public, at a time and place
    announced in advance.
    `(c) Mandatory Selection of Precincts Established
    Specifically For Absentee Ballots- If a State establishes a separate
    precinct for purposes of counting the absentee ballots cast in an
    election and treats all absentee ballots as having been cast in that
    precinct, and if the state does not make absentee ballots sortable by
    precinct, the State shall include that precinct among the precincts in
    the State in which the Election Audit Board shall administer the hand
    counts under this subtitle.

`SEC. 325. PUBLICATION OF RESULTS.

    `(a) Submission to Commission- As soon as practicable after
    the completion of an audit under this subtitle, the Election Audit
    Board of a State shall submit to the Commission the results of the
    audit, and shall include in the submission a comparison of the results
    of the election in the precinct as determined by the Board under the
    audit and the final unofficial vote count in the precinct as announced
    by the State, as well as a list of any discrepancies discovered between
    the initial, subsequent, and final hand counts administered by the
    Board and such final unofficial vote count and any explanation for such
    discrepancies, broken down by the categories of votes described in
    paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 323(a).
    `(b) Publication by Commission- Immediately after receiving
    the submission of the results of an audit from the Election Audit Board
    of a State under subsection (a), the Commission shall publicly announce
    and publish the information contained in the submission.
    `(c) Delay in Certification of Results by State-
      `(1) PROHIBITING CERTIFICATION UNTIL COMPLETION OF
      AUDITS- No State may certify the results of any election which is
      subject to an audit under this subtitle prior to the completion of the
      audit and the announcement and submission of the results of the audit
      to the Commission for publication of the information required under
      this section.
      `(2) DEADLINE FOR COMPLETION OF AUDITS OF PRESIDENTIAL
      ELECTIONS- In the case of an election for electors for President and
      Vice President which is subject to an audit under this subtitle, the
      State shall complete the audits and announce and submit the results to
      the Commission for publication of the information required under this
      section in time for the State to certify the results of the election
      and provide for the final determination of any controversy or contest
      concerning the appointment of such electors prior to the deadline
      described in section 6 of title 3, United States Code.

`SEC. 326. PAYMENTS TO STATES.

    `(a) Payments For Costs of Conducting Audits- In accordance
    with the requirements and procedures of this section, the Commission
    shall make a payment to a State to cover the costs incurred by the
    State in carrying out this subtitle with respect to the elections that
    are the subject of the audits conducted under this subtitle.
    `(b) Certification of Compliance and Anticipated Costs-
      `(1) CERTIFICATION REQUIRED- In order to receive a
      payment under this section, a State shall submit to the Commission, in
      such form as the Commission may require, a statement containing--
        `(A) a certification that the State will conduct
        the audits required under this subtitle in accordance with all of the
        requirements of this subtitle;
        `(B) a notice of the reasonable costs anticipated
        to be incurred by the State in carrying out this subtitle with respect
        to the elections involved; and
        `(C) such other information and assurances as the Commission may require.
      `(2) AMOUNT OF PAYMENT- The amount of a payment made to
      a State under this section shall be equal to the reasonable costs
      anticipated to be incurred by the State in carrying out this subtitle
      with respect to the elections involved, as set forth in the statement
      submitted under paragraph (1) a notice submitted by the State to the
      Commission (in such form and containing such information as the
      Commission may require).
      `(3) TIMING OF NOTICE- The State may not submit a
      notice under paragraph (1) until candidates have been selected to
      appear on the ballot for all of the elections for Federal office which
      will be the subject of the audits involved.
    `(c) Timing of Payments- The Commission shall make the
    payment required under this section to a State not later than 30 days
    after receiving the notice submitted by the State under subsection (b).
    `(d) Authorization of Appropriations- There are authorized
    to be appropriated to the Commission for fiscal year 2008 and each
    succeeding fiscal year such sums as may be necessary for payments under
    this section.

`SEC. 327. EXCEPTION FOR ELECTIONS SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC RECOUNT UNDER STATE LAW.

    `This subtitle does not apply to any election for which a
    recount is required automatically under State law because of the margin
    of victory between the two candidates receiving the largest number of
    votes in the election. Nothing in the previous sentence may be
    construed to waive the application of any other provision of this Act
    to any election (including the ballot verification and audit capacity
    requirements of section 301(a)(2)).

`SEC. 328. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    `This subtitle shall apply with respect to elections for
    Federal office beginning with the regularly scheduled general elections
    held in November 2008.'.
    (b) Availability of Enforcement Under Help America Vote Act
    of 2002- Section 401 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 15511), as amended by
    section 3, is amended--
      (1) in subsection (a), by striking the period at the
      end and inserting the following: `, or the requirements of subtitle C
      of title III.';
      (2) in subsection (b)(1), by striking `section 303' and inserting `section 303, or subtitle C of title III,'; and
      (3) in subsection (c)--
        (A) by striking `subtitle A' and inserting `subtitles A or C', and
        (B) by striking the period at the end and inserting the following: `, or the requirements of subtitle C of title III.'.
    (c) Clerical Amendment- The table of contents of such Act
    is amended by adding at the end of the item relating to title III the
    following:

`Subtitle C--Mandatory Manual Audits by Election Audit Boards

      `Sec. 321. Establishment of Election Audit Boards.
      `Sec. 322. Number of ballots counted under audit.
      `Sec. 323. Process for administering audits.
      `Sec. 324. Selection of precincts.
      `Sec. 325. Publication of results.
      `Sec. 326. Payments to States.
      `Sec. 327. Exception for elections subject to automatic recount within 24 hours under State law.
      `Sec. 328. Effective date.'.

SEC. 6. REPEAL OF EXEMPTION OF ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION FROM CERTAIN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS.

    (a) In General- Section 205 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15325) is amended by striking subsection (e).
    (b) Effective Date- The amendment made by subsection (a)
    shall apply with respect to contracts entered into by the Election
    Assistance Commission on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 7. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    Except as otherwise provided, this Act and the amendments
    made by this Act shall apply with respect to elections for Federal
    office occurring during 2008 and each succeeding year.

END

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Links:
[1] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/Halt811
[2] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/HR811_FloorManagersAmendment_072707a.pdf
[3] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/hr_811_revision_072707
[4] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/HR811_LofgrenSubstitute_050807.pdf
[5] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/811_clause_analysis_051507
[6] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/call_for_open_public_debate_on_hr_811
[7] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/five_point_proposal
[8] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/NASS_reform_legislation
[9] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/NASS_resolution_EAC
[10] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/eac_takes_aim_at_paper_ballots
[11] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/HR811_bill_text
[12] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/13_problems_Holt811_Tobi
[13] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/hr_811_ten_blunders
[14] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/son_of_holt_no_better
[15] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/state_county_811_opposition
[16] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/request_by_voters_to_amend_the_holt_bill
[17] http://www.wethepatriots.org/HAVA/requestbyvoters.php
[18] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/811_hearings_HCA_march2007
[19] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/HR6414_Analysis_Dopp
[20] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/abolish_eac
[21] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/eac_gopher_bash
[22] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/eac_certification_ponzi_summary
[23] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/eac_ponzi
[24] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/analysis_of_certification_timelines
[25] http://www.electioncenter.org/hr811testimony.html
[26] http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/node/view/3740
[27] http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/node/view/3739
[28] http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/node/view/3738
[29] http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/node/view/3737
[30] http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/node/view/3733
[31] http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/node/view/3730
[32] http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/node/view/3729
[33] http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/node/view/3728
[34] http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/node/view/3727
[35] http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/node/view/3721
[36] http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/node/view/3720
[37] http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/TierElectionAuditEval.pdf
[38] http://www.ejfi.org/Voting/Voting-6.htm#soaries
[39] http://electionarchive.net/docs_other/EAC-DoNotReauthorize.pdf
[40] http://www.votersunite.org/info/TestimonyTheisen03-13-07.pdf
[41] http://electionarchive.net/docs_other/HearingTestimony/wagner.pdf
[42] http://electionarchive.org/ucvInfo/US/ChangesNeeded2HR811.pdf
[43] http://www.opednews.com/maxwrite/page.php?a=30554
[44] http://www.opednews.com/maxwrite/page.php?a=30486
[45] http://www.pdamerica.org/articles/news/2007-02-27-08-16-39-news.php
[46] http://noleakybuckets.org/holt811/holt811detail.shtml/
[47] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/HR811_LofgrenSubstitute_050807.pdf
[48] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/811_May_17_2007.pdf
[49] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/811_May_17_2007.pdf
[50] http://thomas.loc.gov/
[51] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/?&Db=d110&querybd=@FIELD%28FLD003+@4%28%28@1%28Rep+Holt++Rush+D.%29%29+01580%29%29
[52] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HR00811:@@@P
[53] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:SN00559:
[54] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:h.r.00811:
[55] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HR00811:@@@L&summ2=m&
[56] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c110:H.R.811:
[57] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HR00811:@@@D&summ2=m&
[58] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HR00811:@@@X
[59] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HR00811:@@@T
[60] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HR00811:@@@C
[61] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HR00811:@@@K
[62] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HR00811:@@@J
[63] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/t2GPO/http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:h811ih.txt.pdf
[64] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?r110:@OR+%28+@1%28H.R.+811%29++@1%28H.+R.+811%29++%29
[65] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?c110:./temp/%7Ec110yYHLv3
[66] http://thomas.loc.gov/home/gpoxmlc110/h811_ih.xml
[67] http://thomas.loc.gov/home/xml_help.html
[68] http://capwiz.com/pdamerica/webreturn/?url=http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c110:H.R.811:
[69] http://capwiz.com/pdamerica/webreturn/?url=http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c110:H.R.811
[70] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110wvtmdk:e0:
[71] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110wvtmdk:e344:
[72] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110wvtmdk:e3710:
[73] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110wvtmdk:e11720:
[74] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110wvtmdk:e35685:
[75] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110wvtmdk:e37714:
[76] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110wvtmdk:e38186:
[77] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110wvtmdk:e38553:
[78] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110wvtmdk:e42352:
[79] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110wvtmdk:e44997:
[80] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110wvtmdk:e48565:
[81] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110wvtmdk:e49980:
[82] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110wvtmdk:e52084:
[83] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110wvtmdk:e54356:
[84] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110wvtmdk:e54902:
[85] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110wvtmdk:e56023:
[86] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110wvtmdk:e56638:
[87] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110wvtmdk:e57109:
[88] http://www.nass.org/releases/EAC%20Position%20Cover%20Ltr.pdf
[89] http://www.ncsl.org/standcomm/sclaw/NCSLNACOltr31907.htm<br
[90] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/NCSL_NACo_Opposition.pdf
[91] mailto:[email protected]
[92] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/NCSL_NACo_Opposition.pdf
[93] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?c110:./temp/%7Ec110yYHLv3#skip_menu
[94] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/HCA_Contact_info
[95] http://electiondefensealliance.org/mailto
[96] http://thomas.loc.gov
[97] http://electiondefensealliance.org/h_r_811_bill_summary_view
[98] http://thomas.loc.gov/home/contact/contact-tom.html
[99] http://www.loc.gov/access
[100] http://www.loc.gov/homepage/legal.html
[101] http://www.usa.gov/