Election Defense Alliance
Published on Election Defense Alliance (http://electiondefensealliance.org)

Home > content > Take Action

Take Action

Send This Page to a Friend [1]

At the foot of this page, you will find the Take Action menu tree. Each link opens up to list additional practical, effective ways you can take action in your own community or from your desktop to restore integrity, transparency, and public accountability to U.S. electoral democracy. (Check the "Citizen Activism Tools" too.) 

Other Easy Ways to Get Started

1.  Open an EDA web account

Click to register: http://www.ElectionDefenseAlliance.org/Join [2] 

2. Donate

EDA is a sponsored project of  Columbus Institute for Contemporary Journalism, a 501(c)(3) organization, so your donations are tax-deductible.

We welcome your one-time donations as well as recurring monthly contributions.  Please select a contribution level that is right for you.

3. Contact us


Send us your ideas for actions:  info@ElectionDefenseAllance.org [3].

Then click here 
What You Can Do [4]  for many more options to choose from.
  

4. Join a local group

To find a state or regional election integrity group near you, see this directory:
http://electiondefensealliance.org/regional_election_integrity_organizations [5]

If you know of additional groups not listed here, please send us their contact information.

 

What Can You Do to Promote Election Integrity?

Action of the Day

It will take consistent effort and a clear message to put the electoral crisis and its implications in front of the American people. 

Please help by taking the simple daily actions you will find posted here at the Action of the Day page.

Actions of the Week are posted in the side column to your right, and daily actions in the listing you see below here.

The most current  opportunities are at the top of the list.

We're asking you to help us monitor the country. 
If you're aware of breaks in the system that need to be corrected, let EDA know.

Send your recommendations for action alerts to Info[at]ElectionDefenseAlliance[dot]org [6] with "Action of the Day" in the subject line.

SCOTUS: Corporate Purchase of Elections = 'Free Speech'

Source: http://freespeechforpeople.org/resources [7]

Freespeech for People.org

"On January 21, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that corporations are entitled to spend unlimited funds in our elections. The First Amendment was never intended to protect corporations.

This cannot stand. Join our campaign to protest this decision [8]. Protect our democracy! Free speech is for people — not corporations."

freespeechforpeople.org is a campaign sponsored by Voter Action (voteraction.org), Public Citizen (citizen.org), the Center for Corporate Policy (corporatepolicy.org)  and American Independent Business Alliance (amiba.net) to restore the First Amendment's free speech guarantees for the people, and to preserve and promote democracy and self-government.  We are joined by a growing wave of people around the country.

http://freespeechforpeople.org/about [9]

Responses to the  Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission  Supreme Court Ruling
 

Read the Freespeech for People.org  press release [10] responding to the Supreme Court decision issued January 21, 2010.

Read the Freespeech for People constitutional  draft amendment [11].

Read the Supreme Court ruling [12].

Listen to press call [13] on Supreme Court decision.

Read background articles [14]  . . . Resources continue @ Read More
 

 

Jeff Clements, Citizens United v. FEC: Time for a Free Speech for People Amendment? [15], American Constitution Society Blog 

Steve Cobble, People = Corporations, Not [16]., Huffington Post.

Is legalizing corporate electioneering "pro-business"? [17]

Jeff Clements, Beyond Citizens United v. FEC: Re-Examining Corporate Rights [18] American Constitution Society.

Jeff Clements, Making Democracy Work: Free Speech for People (PDF) [19]

Jamin Raskin, Corporations Are Not People [20] National Public Radio.

Jim Sleeper, Corporate Free Speech? Since When? [21] Boston Globe.

The Rights of Corporations [22] (editorial), New York Times.

Jess Bravin, Campaign Finance Ruling Looms [23], Wall Street Journal.

Monica Youn, Corporations Have No Business in Elections [24] Los Angeles Times.

Videos:

Jeff Clements [25]

John Bonifaz [26]

Transcript of arguments in Citizens United v. FEC, Sept. 9, 2009: PDF [27].

 Contact freespeechforpeople.org here [28]




Corporations Are Not the People: A PEN Action to Reverse 'Citizens United' Court Ruling

The following action has been prepared by PEN (People's E-mail Network) in response to the U.S. Supreme Court rulling in 'Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission' asserting that corporate money in politics is the equivalant of the right of free speech by individual citizens. 

Using the PEN action page, you can simultaneously send a letter to:

(1)  Your U.S. Representative in Congress
(2)  Both your U.S. Senators, and
(3)  The editorial letters page of your regional newspaper


Action Page: Corporations Are NOT The People
http://www.peaceteam.net/action/pnum1029.php [29]

Congress must act swiftly to block and override this Court ruling by enacting legislation to reject the "Corporate Personhood" doctrine and reassert that governments regulate corporations, not the other way around.

Rep. Alan Grayson (D FL 8) has already assembled proposed legislation in the House [30] to counter the Court's ruling.  Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) is doing the same in the Senate.
______________________________________________


Because of the gravity of the crime against the Constitution committed by a gang of 5 right wing judicial outlaws on our Supreme Court yesterday, we are launching two critical action pages at once

Action Page: Corporations Are NOT The People
http://www.peaceteam.net/action/pnum1029.php [29]

Action Page: Impeach The Supreme Court 5
http://www.peaceteam.net/action/pnum1030.php [31]

Having so grossly abused its jurisdiction by presuming to decide a question expressly waived by the petitioner in the Court below (p 12), this rogue Supreme Court ruled for the FIRST time that NO corporation can be constrained from unlimited influence over our elections.

Even assuming that the Court intended the decision to only apply to American corporations, the Court expressly declined (pp 46-47) to reach the question of whether foreign ownership stakes in American corporations should likewise be given carte blanche to put their thumbs on the scales of our democracy.

How does The Supreme Court 5 propose parsing which of these extra-national legal artificialities should be allowed to corrupt our democratic election process? Apparently in their minds, all of them.

Action Page: Corporations Are NOT The People
http://www.peaceteam.net/action/pnum1029.php [29]

So what is it that we can and MUST do? The first and most prominent proposal we heard yesterday, and which we of course support, was to amend the Constitution to clarify that corporations have no such rights as people (which is to say U.S. citizens).

We are on ominous and clear notice that there is no further outrage these 5 gangsters in black robes are not gleefully and arrogantly capable of. Indeed, in his dissenting opinion (that the majority did not go far ENOUGH), Clarence Thomas characterized the decision as only a "first step" (Thomas opinion p. 1).

It is worth nothing that the authorship of the majority opinion is claimed by Anthony M. Kennedy, heretofore generally considered the least wing-nutty of the 5. The immediate and unavoidably necessary recourse must be impeachment for all five.

Action Page: Impeach The Supreme Court 5

http://www.peaceteam.net/action/pnum1030.php [31]
_______________________________

Facebook participants can also submit the action pages at

Corporations Are Not The People:
http://apps.facebook.com/fb_voices/action.php?qnum=pnum1029 [32]

Impeach The Supreme Court 5:
http://apps.facebook.com/fb_voices/action.php?qnum=pnum1030 [33]

And on Twitter, just send the following Twitter reply for the Corporations Are Not The People action

@cxs #p1029

And this Twitter reply for the Impeach The Supreme Court 5 action

@cxs #p1030

_______________________________

New Four-Color Bumperstickers


We are making available for no charge (not even shipping) your choice of one of two absolutely gorgeous
full 4 color process bumper stickers.

Take a "Corporations Are NOT The People" bumper sticker, OR a "Impeach The Supreme Court 5" bumper
sticker for free.

You can request your bumper sticker from the return page after you submit either of the action pages above. Or you can do directly to this page and get them there.

Bumper Stickers for no charge:
http://www.peaceteam.net/bumper_stickers.php [34]

If you would like to get alerts like these, you can do so at http://www.millionfaxmarch.com/in.htm [35]



Move to Amend 'Citizens United' and Abolish Corporate Personhood

Source:   http://www.movetoamend.org/learn-more [36]

Republished here as a public service with full attribution to the originating source, MovetoAmend.org

Learn More

The Supreme Court decision in Citizens United is here:
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-205.pdf [37]

Read the opinions, and you will see why Justice Stevens, in his dissent, was compelled to state the obvious:

. . . . corporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires. Corporations help structure and facilitate the activities of human beings, to be sure, and their “personhood” often serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are not themselves members of “We the People” by whom and for whom our Constitution was established.

Like to learn more? Here are some good places to begin . . .

~ History of the Corporation [38] ~
~ The Need for Constitutional Reform [39] ~
~ Building a Democracy Movement [40] ~

History of the Corporation

Sourcewatch: Corporate Rights
This special SourceWatch page has links to the real story about the Supreme Court's revolutionary and unconstitutional decision to asserting that federal laws cannot limit corporate "speech."
See: http://sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Portal:Corporate_Rights [41]

Abolish Corporate Personhood
This speech, given by Molly Morgan of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, follows the history of corporate power from the American Revolution to the present, detailing the ways in which the powerful elite have used the Constitution, the Courts and the corporation to quash the rights of We the People.
See: http://www.wilpf.org/docs/ccp/corp/ACP/Personhood_Talk.pdf [42]

The Democracy Crisis
In this PowerPoint presentation, Riki Ott--a marine biologist and toxicologist from Alaska who fought Exxon for twenty years after the Valdez oil spill--shows that the spill was not just an ecological crisis, but a manifestation of a democracy crisis.
See: http://ultimatecivics.org/spresent.html [43]

Corporatization: An Internal Clash of Civilizations
The authors write that, "Within the framework of U.S. constitutional law, in which personhood conveys fundamental protections against state action, the dubious doctrine of corporate personhood has allowed corporations to gain constitutional insulation from democratic control of corporate investment in key activities, including electioneering, lobbying, advertising, resource extraction, and manufacturing."
See: http://www.democracysquare.org/files_public/TNIyearb05us.pdf [44]

The "Right" to Harm the Environment
Jan Edwards and Alis Valencia use this article to make the connection between corporate personhood and the destruction of the environment, going through the Bill of Rights and citing specific instances in which corporations used these rights to devastate the planet and local
communities.
See: http://www.californiademocracy.org/corporations/resource/environ.pdf [45]

Taking Care of Business
Richard Grossman explains the history of corporate rule, contrasting it with the power of state legislators to control corporations and offering specific stories of states exercising their power to reign in corporate power. Explains the relationship between the Supreme Court and corporate constitutional rights, and explains how to use the state charter power to abolish those rights.
See: http://www.nancho.net/bigbody/chrtink1.html [46]

The Essence of the Corporation
Ben Manski follows the legal history of the corporation from the ancient world to the early days of the Republic in order to understand its essence.
See: http://www.libertytreefdr.org/publications/manski_essence_of_the_corpora... [47]

The Need for Constitutional Reform

Significant Cases in the Evolution of Corporate "Rights"
Reclaim Democracy has developed an excellent compendium of 20th century federal court decisions that have expanded federal protections for corporations against the public good.
See: http://reclaimdemocracy.org/personhood/#significant [48]

Timeline
This timeline by Jan Edwards lays out the cases that gave corporations the
rights of persons and compares it to the struggles for rights for actual
persons.
See: http://www.californiademocracy.org/corporations/resource/timeline.pdf [49]

Voting Rights Amendment
Rep. Jesse Jackson, Jr., is the lead sponsor of the Right to Vote Amendment, knows that, "In a democracy there is nothing more fundamental than having the right to vote."
See: http://jackson.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=72... [50]
and: http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=205 [51]

Voter Bill of Rights
The Voter Bill of Rights is a document embraced by hundreds of voting rights organizations. It was originally a product of the 2001 Democracy Summer program, following the election debacle of 2000. It was amended for the 2004 No Stolen Elections! campaign, and amended again for the No More Stolen Elections! campaign in 2008.
See: http://www.nomorestolenelections.org/resources/voter_bill_of_rights [52]

Why So Many Good State Laws Are "Unconstitutional"
Corporate anthropologist Jane Anne Morris writes that, "Using the commerce clause, the "free trade" mantra of the time, they decided that states could not ban the manufacture, import, and sale of a substance that obviously many states wanted to ban. In other words [the] . . . . Supreme Court acted as a legislature."
See: http://www.poclad.org/bwa/Spring08.htm#pinkoleo [53]

Municipal Government and Local Democracy
As provided by CELDF, J. Allen Smith informed us in 1907 that, "The powerful corporate interests engaged in the exploitation of municipal franchises are securely entrenched behind a series of constitutional and legal checks on the majority which makes it extremely difficult for public opinion to exercise any effective control over them."
See: http://www.celdf.org/HomeRule/JAllenSmithMunicipalGovernment/tabid/227/D... [54]

Why Regulation Alone Won't Work
Regulatory agencies are often controlled by the industries they were formed to regulate. There is even a term for the phenomenon-- "regulatory capture." And a captured regulatory agency that serves the interests of the corporations that are supposed to regulate--with the power of the government behind them-- is very often worse than no regulation whatsoever. Corporate anthropologist Jane Anne Morris describes the history, and suggests what to do about it.
See: http://www.poclad.org/bwa/fall98.htm [55]

Building a Democracy Movement

Extending Democracy
In this video, Ben Manski, Diane Farsetta and Kevin Alexander Gray join the Progressive Magazine in addressing the challenge of extending democracy in the United States:
See: http://www.democracysquare.org/publications/video_extending_democracy [56]

How and Why the People of Humboldt County Defended Local Democracy
Katilin Sopoci-Belknap, co-campaign manager the Measure T initiative banning
corporate money in local elections, speaks at a community forum about the
history of corporate power. She describes how corporations seized our First
Amendment right to free speech, equated speech with money and hijacked the
ability of communities to govern and defend themselves against abuse.
http://votelocalcontrol.org/sopoci-belknap.htm [57]

'Citizens United' Decision Further Weakens U.S. Democracy

Source:  OpEdNews
http://www.opednews.com/articles/The-Supreme-Court-decision-by-Ralph-Nader-100122-424.html


January 22, 2010

The Supreme Court Decision Further Weakens Our Democracy

By Ralph Nader

Yesterday's 5-4 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission shreds the fabric of our already weakened democracy by allowing corporations to more completely dominate our corrupted electoral process. It is outrageous that corporations already attempt to influence or bribe our political candidates through their political action committees (PACs), which solicit employees and shareholders for donations.

With this decision, corporations can now directly pour vast amounts of corporate money, through independent expenditures, into the electoral swamp already flooded with corporate campaign PAC contribution dollars. Without approval from their shareholders, corporations can reward or intimidate people running for office at the local, state, and national levels.

Much of this 183 page opinion requires readers to enter into a fantasy world and accept the twisted logic of Justice Kennedy, who delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Alito, and Thomas. Imagine the majority saying the "Government may not suppress political speech based on the speaker's corporate identity."

Perhaps Justice Kennedy didn't hear that the financial sector invested more than $5 billion in political influence purchasing in Washington over the past decade, with as many as 3,000 lobbyists winning deregulation and other policy decisions that led directly to the current financial collapse, according to a 231-page report titled: "Sold Out: How Wall Street and Washington Betrayed America" (See: WallStreetWatch.org [58]).

The Center for Responsive Politics reported that last year the U.S. Chamber of Commerce spent $144 million to influence Congress and state legislatures.

The Center also reported big lobbying expenditures by the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) which spent $26 million in 2009. Drug companies like Pfizer, Amgen and Eli Lilly also poured tens of millions of dollars into federal lobbying in 2009. The health insurance industry trade group America's Health Insurance Plans (AHIP) also spent several million lobbying Congress. No wonder Single Payer Health insurance - supported by the majority of people, doctors, and nurses - isn't moving in Congress.

Energy companies like ExxonMobil and Chevron are also big spenders. No wonder we have a national energy policy that is pro-fossil fuel and that does little to advance renewable energy (See: OpenSecrets.Org).

No wonder we have the best Congress money can buy.

I suppose Justice Kennedy thinks corporations that overwhelm members of Congress with campaign contributions need to have still more influence in the electoral arena. Spending millions to lobby Congress and making substantial PAC contributions just isn't enough for a majority of the Supreme Court. The dictate by the five activist Justices was too much for even Republican Senator John McCain, who commented that he was troubled by their "extreme naivete."

There is a glimmer of hope and a touch of reality in yesterday's Supreme Court decision. Unfortunately it is the powerful 90 page dissent in this case by Justice Stevens joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Justice Stevens recognizes the power corporations wield in our political economy. Justice Stevens finds it "absurd to think that the First Amendment prohibits legislatures from taking into account the corporate identity of a sponsor of electoral advocacy." He flatly declares that, "The Court's ruling threatens to undermine the integrity of elected institutions across the Nation."

He notes that the, Framers of our Constitution "had little trouble distinguishing corporations from human beings, and when they constitutionalized the right to free speech in the First Amendment, it was the free speech of individual Americans that they had in mind." Right he is, for the words "corporation" or "company" do not exist in our Constitution.

Justice Stevens concludes his dissent as follows:

"At bottom, the Court's opinion is thus a rejection of the common sense of the American people, who have recognized a need to prevent corporations from undermining self government since the founding, and who have fought against the distinctive corrupting potential of corporate electioneering since the days of Theodore Roosevelt. It is a strange time to repudiate that common sense. While American democracy is imperfect, few outside the majority of this Court would have thought its flaws included a dearth of corporate money in politics."

Indeed, this corporatist, anti-voter majority decision is so extreme that it should galvanize a grassroots effort to enact a simple Constitutional amendment to once and for all end corporate personhood and curtail the corrosive impact of big money on politics. It is time to prevent corporate campaign contributions from commercializing our elections and drowning out the voices and values of citizens and voters. It is way overdue to overthrow "King Corporation" and restore the sovereignty of "We the People"! Remember that corporations, chartered by the state, are our servants, not our masters.

Legislation sponsored by Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL) and Representative John Larson (D-CT) would encourage unlimited small-dollar donations from individuals and provide candidates with public funding in exchange for refusing corporate contributions or private contributions of more than $100.

It is also time for shareholder resolutions, company by company, directing the corporate boards of directors to pledge not to use company money to directly favor or oppose candidates for public office.

If you want to join the efforts to rollback the corporate concessions the Supreme Court made yesterday, visit Citizen.Org and freespeechforpeople.org [59].

Election Day Action Plan

What You Can Do to Defend the Vote on Election Day -- and Beyond

1. Vote (on a real paper ballot, in person, in the precinct, whenever possible)

2. Be a Pollworker for Democracy [60]

3. Video the Vote [61]

4. Conduct a Citizens' Election Verification Exit Poll [62] (EVEP)

5. File Poll Incident Reports [63] with Voter Story, Watch the Vote, CNN, EDA, NPR, Twitter, and MORE [63]

6. Protect the Count [64]: Record Precinct Vote Counts and Watch the Ballots

7. Monitor the Central Count [65] at your County Elections Department

8. Be Prepared to Protest Suspect Election Outcomes [66]


1. VOTE

(on paper, of course!)


Voting in person in your local precinct is always the best policy.
If you have the option of requesting a paper ballot in lieu of voting DRE, always vote paper, not vapor.
If you have an absentee (mail-in) ballot that you haven't already mailed, walk it in to your local polling site on election day, or take it in person to the county election department any time prior to election day.
If you are voting on an optical scan system, the most reliable way to have your vote correctly read is to mark your vote with a firm Number 2 lead pencil!


2. Be a Pollworker for Democracy

Throughout the US boards of elections are desperate for poll workers. The average age has been creeping up over the past decades, and in many instances there are critical shortages. We have significant testimony from poll workers who saved literally hundreds of votes in 2004. The power of even a single poll worker inside a polling station who is committed to democracy can be immense.
Read more [67]

Sign up: http://act.credoaction.com/pollworkers/index.html [60]


3. Video the Vote

We also urge citizens to join the Video the Vote [68] teams that will be going to thousands of polling stations. The bare but vital footage that was shot at besieged inner city precincts in central Ohio 2004 has stood as a vital beacon to show the tip of how thousands of voters were deliberately disenfranchised. This time, we need saturation coverage to protect against and document every possible violation of our rights as citizens.
Learn more and sign up: http://www.videothevote.org/ [68]


4. Conduct Independent Election Verification Exit Polls (EVEP) [69]


Election Defense Alliance, Election Integrity and The Warren Poll are organizing an Election Verification Exit Polling (EVEP) project as a safeguard for the November 2008 presidential election -- and we're calling on you to help. Exit polling provides an independent check on "official results" reported by suspect computerized voting systems. Unlike the national exit poll conducted by a private consortium of newsmedia corporations, who withhold their raw polling data and heavily "adjust" their results to match the reported election results (!), this Citizens' Exit Poll will fully disclose the data so there can be no doubt about the truth of the numbers and what they reveal about the purported truth of the official election results -- and, for that matter, the purported truth of the corporate newsmedia exit poll.


5. File Poll Incident Reports [70]

with Voter Story, CNN, EDA, 1-800 Our Votes, Watch the Vote, Twitter, NPR, and more


6. Protect the Count

Record the Precinct Vote Totals and Watch the Ballots
Watch the pollworkers print out the machine end-of-day vote reports from the voting machines. Then, with a video camera, record the "poll tapes" as soon as the pollworkers post them on the outside of the polling site. Slowly pan the length of the tally tape, recording all the vote totals on it. As soon as you can, upload this information to the Protect the Count Project: (upload links at YouTube and Black Box Voting forthcoming; check back soon.)
There are 3 additional parts to Protect the Count/ Tactics vary according to the nature of the electronic voting systems where you live.
Read and download the 4-page instructions here: Protect the Count [71]


7. Observe the Central Count


Monitor County Election Headquarters
You are a member of the voting public and have the right to observe election procedures so long as you don't obstruct the election workers.
Don't let anybody tell you any different.

Things to bring: Clipboards, notepads, pens, digital cameras, video cameras, tape recorders, cell phones, and binoculars (to see the tabulator monitor screens).

For further instructions on Central Count Monitoring, LOOK HERE [65]


Additional Guides to Election Day Monitoring

Download the 5-page overview, "Gathering Election Evidence" [72]

BlackBoxVoting.org's Election Monitoring Watchlist: What To Watch For [73]

Also: Download the comprehensive 2006 Citizens' Toolkit by Black Box Voting Citizen's Tool Kit [74]

Ohio Election Justice Campaign: Quarantine That Machine! [75]
(Treat election violations as a crime scene)


8. Protest Suspect Election Returns: Code Orange Rapid Response Demonstrations

On election night, the EDA Data Analysis Working Group [76] will be rapidly checking election results against the citizen-organized Election Verification Exit Polls [62] (EVEP) and other baseline data such as pre-election tracking polls and voter registration figures, to determine if and where the "official" (computerized) vote counts are suspiciously at odds with observed reality. Please sign up now to be notified where and when to assemble for Code Orange [77] vigils on election night.

The purpose of these peaceful but resolute public demonstrations will be to convey these messages to the nation:

1. Insist that the news media not report as fact what they cannot verify (see Open Letter to the Media [78])

2. No concessions until all the votes have been counted (see Standing for Voters Pledge [79])

3. Candidates must challenge suspect outcomes

4. Reject suspect election results and demand handcounts of the voter-marked paper ballots


For an overview of the Election Day Rapid Response plan and how you can join in, see
EDRR 2008: A Six-Part Plan to Defend the Vote [80]





AttachmentSize
Be_Pollworkers_FP.rtf [67]6.2 KB

Election Day Watchlist


BBV_What_to_Watch_ForSource: Original content by Bev Harris posted at Blackboxvoting.org [81]. Cross-posted here with full attribution to BlackBoxVoting.org.

For an overview of citizen election monitoring -- what to look for, what questions to ask -- see this five-page digest:
BBV Guide to Gathering Election Evidence [72]

For the "Top 5 Things You Can Do To Protect Election 2008" download Black Box Voting's
2008 Citizens' Tool Kit [82].

You can also request a free printed copy of the 2008 Toolkit in a 4.5" x 7" booklet format easy to carry in your pocket.
Go to the home page of Black Box Voting [83] to request a copy.

For a comprehensive (118-page) year-round guide to election integrity activism, download Black Box Voting's 2006 edition of the Citizens' Toolkit, called "Take Back Your Elections"
Download the "2006 Citizens' Tool Kit" [74]


WHAT TO LOOK FOR:

Journalistic malpractice
Watch for the media to announce who "wins" instead of stating "We predict (name of candidate) will win." News channels are supposed to report the news, not create the news. Results as reported by the news never match the actual results, by the way.

What to do: Object and reject premature "calls." Get the facts, however long it takes, and report them, wherever you can.

Also watch for:

"The gray pie slice" -- In the 2008 New Hampshire primary, CNN used a gray pie slice without a name to represent Ron Paul. Other candidates, even when pie slices were smaller, were colored and had candidate names affixed.

What to do: Record coverage start to finish to gather evidence of any journalistic malpractice.

Also watch for: Eroding vote totals. You may see candidate totals go DOWN during the count.

What to do: Record coverage start to finish.

Also watch for:
Unusual fluctuations or insufficient variations with minor candidates.
In one Minnesota district in 2004, for example, ALL MINOR CANDIDATES received the same percentages of votes, until screen shots were posted
and questioned by Internet watchdogs. Then the vote totals were spread more normally. In Florida in 2000, at one point the Socialist Worker
Party candidate had more votes dumped into his totals in a single county than he received statewide. One strategy for electronic vote
manipulation involves use of minor candidate vote bins to store votes temporarily.

What to do: Record television coverage start to finish to retain and examine later, and take screen shots of incoming AP totals from sites like http://www.politico.com [84].

WATCH FOR AND DOCUMENT VOTING RIGHTS PROBLEMS IN THREE AREAS:
- Access to voting (voter rolls)
- Fairness (deceptive practices)
- Counting the votes

ACCESS TO VOTING
Watch for: - Registrations hijacked to a different party - Omissions and improper additions to the voter rolls The new "electronic pollbooks" help to block citizen oversight and also introduce sophisticated attack vectors.

What to do:
Gather evidence: Documents, records, video, audio and photographs.
Persevere - keep gathering proof, even after the election is over.
Example: When voter registration is hijacked to a different party, there should be a paper trail. Find out your state's regulations for the paperwork
needed to change a voter's party preference. Use public records requests to request the backup documents. If they can't produce them,
expose the fraud by propagating the evidence, to blogs, legislators, citizens groups. Get your evidence to at least five different entities.
Find out if your local jurisdiction is now using electronic voter sign-in instead of observable paper pollbooks.

DECEPTIVE PRACTICES
Watch for:
Omission of candidate names on the ballot or screen; misdirection about where/when/how to vote; misleading ballot design; confusing or
misleading instructions; intimidation tactics

What to do:
Gather evidence and propagate it.

If it happens in the polling place:
Call an elections worker over and show them; then ask that they write the incident down to document it, and watch to see that they do so.
Then submit a formal public records request for a copy of the incident report and any other incident reports throughout the jurisdiction.

If it happens outside the polling place:
Video, photograph, get documents, and if you obtain evidence, propagate it to at least five entities, including Internet sites, mainstream
news, legislators, elections officials and citizens groups.

VOTE COUNTING
Watch for: Whether you can see the chain of custody; whether you can see the votes themselves being counted.

CHAIN OF CUSTODY:
The greatest risk for manipulation of the count is from inside access.
The best way to prevent vote-counting fraud by insiders is to require a fully public chain of custody. If chain of custody is not public, even
spot checks, audits and recounts will fail to ensure integrity in the election. Your ability to review chain of custody varies depending on your jurisdiction. Most locations nowadays have removed chain of custody from public view - which means citizens must go to
extraordinary lengths to learn the simplest information, if they can get it at all.

Look for:
Weak links in the chain, or "narrow spots in the pipe" where just a few people, or just one person, has access to the votes before (or shortly
after) the vote count is announced. JUST ONE BROKEN LINK means the vote count cannot be trusted.

What to do:
Get evidence of broken links, narrow spots in the pipeline, or inside-only access/oversight. Evidence means documents and videotape. Persevere
- it may take time to evaluate even one link in the chain. When you get evidence that the chain has been broken or left public view, propagate the evidence to at least five entities, like blogs, voting rights groups, open government groups, the media, and public officials. Prepare
a report with a local group of citizens, submit it to those with authority in your jurisdiction, request remediation of individual
issues before the next election.

ACCURACY OF THE VOTE COUNT Except in hand count locations, you will be unable to see your votes being counted. The counting is now controlled by government insiders and voting machine programmers. Your right to citizen sovereignty over your own government is at stake, and you have been placed in the position of trying to get circumstantial evidence to authenticate the count. This places an extraordinary and unsustainable burden on the citizenry. You can surrender the voting process to government insiders now, or you can put up a fight.

Look for:
On DRE (touch-screen, dial-a-vote) systems - observe screens carefully, watch for vote-hopping to selections you did not choose. The vote may hop to another choice immediately or after a delay, or even after you have page to a new screen.

What to do:
Stop the process immediately, call an elections worker over, see if you can replicate it, request that they write the incident down, stay and
watch while they do so, make a formal request for the public record of their incident reports and all other incident reports in your jurisdiction. Double and triple check before casting votes, and document all anomalies. (If you witness vote-hopping on a dial-a-vote system like the Hart eSlate, document it using every means necessary and contact Black Box Voting, BradBlog, and VotersUnite.)

After polls close, videotape poll closing activities and videotape the results tape and any other reconciliation forms filled out by poll
workers. If they won't let you videotape, then videotape them telling you that you cannot watch, or that you can't capture evidence of the
poll closing and counting procedures.

On optical scan systems (fill in bubble, draw arrow):
Observe whether the vote count increments when you deposit your ballot. After polls close, videotape poll closing activities and videotape the results tape from the optical scan machine and also videotape any other reconciliation forms filled out by poll workers. These should include number of ballots provided, cast, unused and spoiled, along with number of voters checked in to vote.

If you live in New York:
Most New Yorkers are voting on lever machines, which -- unlike the scanners and DREs -- are extremely difficult to tamper with in a wholesale, nontransparent way. However, many New Yorkers do not realize that customized Sequoia scanners are used to count tens of thousands of
absentee votes. Start asking questions about those votes (chain of custody, counting). Ascertain your rights to observe and examine your
computerized absentee counting system.

Also: New York public records laws include the VENDORS in freedom of information requirements.
Consider submitting public records requests directly to Sequoia Voting Systems. Ask for things like correspondence, incident reports,
invoices, contracts. These vendor-directed records requests are especially important because it looks like New York's Nov. 2008 elections will be run on Sequoia computerized systems, or something similar.

IF YOU LIVE IN GEORGIA, KENTUCKY, CONNECTICUT:
You, too, can request public records DIRECTLY FROM THE VENDOR. Let's get to work on opening them up.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ABOUT ACCURACY OF THE VOTE COUNT
Compare number of voters checked in to vote with number of votes. Note any arithmetic that doesn't add up. You may also want to visit the main elections division for your jurisdiction to observe and record procedures and activities. If you cannot view and record the computer screen, you are being blocked from viewing even circumstantial evidence of the count. Check your state election law as to whether counting votes in secret has ever been authorized. Persevere. Take as much time as it takes to gather real evidence, including evidence of efforts to obstruct your right to oversee chain of custody and counting.

Evidence means: Documents, video, audio and photos.

SURRENDER NOW OR DIG IN FOR THE LONG HAUL
The Government is currently displacing citizen sovereignty over election processes. Assert your right to sovereignty via documentation and
oversight to authenticate election procedures and results, and when your rights are obstructed, gather evidence of this and propagate it. All
evidence you acquire during the primary election cycle should be applied towards regaining citizen sovereignty over elections in the
Nov. 2008 election.

It's easy to become overwhelmed. Yet, if many different citizens simply welcome the awakening of their own civic
duty, trust to their own common sense and innate creativity, and take just one step, the next will become clear.
Trust me on this. Good luck and God bless, Bev Harris Founder - Black Box Voting

Guide to Gathering Election Evidence: A 5-page digest. Download BBV's "Gathering Evidence" [72]

Citizens' Toolkit 2008: A five-point guide to essential monitoring actions on election day Download BBV 2008 Citizens' Toolkit [85]

Citizens' Toolkit 2006: A general guide to year-round election monitoring and investigation Download BBV 2006 Citizens' Toolkit [86]


Help Build a National Election Integrity E-mail Network

The Election Integrity "Superlist" E-mail Network Plan in Brief:
With your help, Election Defense Alliance proposes building a national election integrity E-mail network composed of many separate e-mail lists, each one a branch in the larger tree.

Each branch will be managed by a participating individual or organization who agrees to transmit occasional election integrity messages to the addresses on the e-mail lists they manage.

Note: We are not asking for lists of individual e-mail addresses. We are asking you to help us make contacts with e-mail list managers, so that election integrity messages can be transmitted to the mailing lists they manage.

RATIONALE
Information and Speech Are Still Free on the Internet (Use or Lose)
Let's make full use of internet e-mail, the only mass communications medium we have that is not subject to corporate censoring of news about fraudulent elections. The EI movement should put to full use the power of proliferating e-mail contacts to branch out beyond the core membership of our respective electoral integrity organizations. This is what it will take to build the level of mass awareness necessary to break through corporate media control and reclaim our elections and government from the corporations and "unduly electeds" who have usurped our democracy.

METHOD
Building the Election Integrity Superlist involves identifying managers of e-mail lists, persuading them to participate in a national election integrity e-mail network, and asking 10 questions about the characteristics of each list they manage.

Participation in the network is always voluntary. Each list manager will have discretionary control over which messages to send or not send.

Please note, we are not asking for lists of individual e-mail addressess (always a closely guarded resource!).

Rather, we are compiling a list of e-mail lists, and obtaining agreements from list managers to relay occasional messages of broad relevance to the election integrity cause. All group and individual list managers participating in the network may propose messages to be sent over the network. Transmission of each message is always at the voluntary option of each participating group or list manager.

How to Participate

    • Think of likely sources of e-mail lists
    • Identify the persons who manage those lists
    • Explain project and request list managers' participation
    • Gather 10 points of information about each list
    • Send in the list information to EDA [87]

That's it in a nutshell. A project discussion and methodological details are presented in greater detail at: http://electiondefensealliance.org/email_network_plan [88] where you will also find download links for a cover letter you can adapt for your own, and list questionnaire forms to use when interviewing list managers.

Help File Evidence for CA Investigation of Prop. 8


On Election Night, 2008, one or more members of the EDA Election Data Analysis Working Group downloaded the CNN screenshot of unadjusted exit poll results for CA Proposition 8 that is now the catalyst for a rapidly growing statewide call for an official investigation.

Election Defense Alliance is calling on any California voter who witnessed or otherwise has evidence indicative of miscount in the Proposition 8 contest to please file a formal complaint with the CA SoS office so it can be entered as evidence in an official investigation we have been told may be initiated as early as this Wednesday.

See sample complaint letter lower in this post, and click this link to download the CA election fraud complaint form [89].

EDA is asking for collective public review of the complaint and evidence, and any additional comment or correction you would recommend be added to the complaint and evidentiary letter (see below) sent to the CA SoS office, citing the EDA exit poll evidence.

EDA Director Dan Ashby is in communication with Sharon and Richard Tamm who filed the original complaint and letter of supporting evidence, (reproduced below) to which the CA SoS office has affirmatively responded.

EDA is prominently mentioned in that original complaint as the source for the most compelling single piece of evidence calling the official Prop. 8 vote count into question.

The CA SoS office has responded with a request for as much supporting evidence as possible to be submitted by Monday November 24 using the CA election fraud complaint form [89].
You can scan the completed form and any supporting documents and e-mail them to: Elections@sos.ca.gov [90]

However, evidence will continue to be accepted beyond Monday, so please do file additional reports when you can, but as soon as you can.

Please Forward this page by clicking the E-mail This Page link below or by using the Share Page webtools, upper right column.

Click the Read More link to read the rest of this post and how you can help bring an investigation into the Prop. 8 vote count.


Election Verification Exit Polls May Also Turn Up Evidence


Additionally, EDA conducted citizen exit polls in 19 precincts in Los Angeles County and precincts in Alameda and San Francisco counties. This evidence may also be brought to bear in questioning the veracity of the official machine count on Proposition 8.

If you have been involved in analyzing any of the CA voting results, and specifically anything to do with Proposition 8, please contact the CA Secretary of State's Election Fraud Investigation Unit:

SECRETARY OF STATE'S OFFICE
ELECTION FRAUD INVESTIGATION UNIT
1500-11th STREET, 5th Floor
Sacramento, CA 95814

English: 1-800-345-VOTE (8683)
Spanish: 1-800-232-VOTA (8682)

On the telephone menu, press option 2 to record a report of election fraud.

Please also send a copy of your complaint or other information to Info[at]ElectionDefenseAlliance[dot]org [91] with "Prop. 8" in the Subject line.


Collect Evidence of Machine Error for HAVA Sec. III Complaints

Additionally, you will see that the second page of the CA election fraud complaint form refers specifically to any indication that HAVA Sec. III has been violated.

Sec. III concerns standards of acceptable error rates in voting machines (which as we know, in practice are widely ignored).

This is an opportunity to cite evidence (such as EDA Council member Judy Alter has documented in L.A.) of machine read error rates in excess of the HAVA standards, as additional grounds for investigating the Proposition 8 vote count.

With enough public pressure, we may be able to bring about official recounts at the precinct, county, or even statewide level. If you have any knowledge of violations of HAVA voting machine accuracy standards, please include that in your letter of complaint too.

A list of the voting machines in every CA county [92] is attached for download.


Excerpts of Announcement Calling for Investigation of Prop. 8 Vote Count

Election Defense Alliance [93] and other election fraud watchdogs found a greater than 8% discrepancy between exit polls and reported results for Proposition 8. This is a key indicator of possible vote fraud and should be investigated by the Secretary of State. In order to do this she needs to receive Election Complaint Forms from California registered voters.

[Click to download CA election fraud complaint form [89].]

Final elections returns must be submitted to the Secretary of State's office by December 9th and will be certified on December 13th so we don't have much time.
They will combine all similar complaints into one investigation and the more citizen complaints they have the better.

I am going to drive my complaint (and any others that are ready) to Sacramento on Monday morning 11/24 so they can assign an investigator by the Wednesday before Thanksgiving.

--Sharon Ryals Tamm [filer of initiating complaint]

Otherwise mail it to the address listed on the second page of the form which is also listed below.

Or you can scan the completed form and any supporting documents and email it to: Elections@sos.ca.gov [90]
or you can call a complaint into the numbers listed.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S OFFICE
ELECTION FRAUD INVESTIGATION UNIT
1500-11th STREET, 5th Floor
Sacramento, CA 95814

English: 1-800-345-VOTE (8683)
Spanish: 1-800-232-VOTA (8682)

When naming the "Person(s) and Organizations Against Whom Complaint is Brought" cast as wide a net as possible and include anyone and everyone you can think of who might be involved in, liable, responsible or accountable for possibly fraudulant elections results on Proposition 8. I have included how I filled out my complaint form below.

There is more evidence coming out from www.electiondefensealliance.org [93] that should be included but this was the best I could do for now.

The line for victims on the form could include names of California citizens whose right to marry was eliminated by Prop 8. Obtain their permission first.


Text from Initiating Election Complaint Form Submitted by Sharon Ryals Tamm

PAGE 1: ELECTION COMPLAINT FORM brought by Sharon Ryals Tamm

PERSON(S) OR ORGANIZATION(S) AGAINST WHOM COMPLAINT IS BROUGHT:
National Exit Polls (NEP aka Edison/Mitofsky); CNN; all companies whose election systems are used in the State of California including but not limited to ES&S, Sequoia, Hart Intercivic, and Premier Election Solutions (aka Diebold), all elections officials and elections personnel of the State of California, including all County Registrars' Offices and the Secretary of State's Office and their respective staff including temporary workers.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Date(s) and time(s) alleged events occurred: 11/04/2008—11/05/2008 including but not limited to the hours of 6am 11/04/08 to 1am 11/05/08 PST
Location(s) of alleged event(s): The State of California, all polling places, precincts, county and state elections and elections equipment locations, including those where votes were counted or machine tallied, especially in Los Angeles county.
Names and phone numbers of witnesses or other victims: Richard Tamm, 510-524-4608. Emily Levy 831-429-8946. Dan Ashby 510-233-2144.

DESCRIBE YOUR COMPLAINT (if necessary attach additional sheets):
Attached is initial evidence of a greater than 8% discrepancy between exit polls and tabulated results for Proposition 8. Recent elections history has shown this type of discrepancy is a key indicator of possible election fraud requiring further investigation. Please employ all means necessary to acquire and examine all data, equipment and persons that could possibly account for such a discrepancy; in particular, all raw poll data procured by National Exit Polls (NEP-aka Edison/Mitofsky) including which precincts they polled, the testimony of polling personnel, and exactly how NEP revised poll data later to match results reported on CNN. In addition to any California Elections statutes and regulations that may apply please review under the HAVA Title III Section attached and any other section relevant to the issues brought in this complaint. I request that regional hearings be held throughout the state on these concerns.


Text of Supporting Evidentiary Letter Provided to CA SoS Office by Richard Tamm

To the Honorable Debra Bowen et al:

I am writing to you to request that the Office of the Secretary of State of California launch an election fraud investigation into the vote count of Proposition 8 based on the following evidence.

I received the following as part of an email from Mark Crispin Miller who passed it on from Velvet Revolution:

'"Around the world, exit polls are used to determine the need for investigation of elections. In the U.S., the National Exit Poll (NEP, also known as Edison/Mitofsky) now adjusts results to match vote counts before issuing its final polling numbers. Election Defense Alliance downloaded NEP numbers from the internet on election night, however [around 8 PM, as told to me by Dan Ashby of EDA], before poll results were changed to match the official vote count.

This is the exit poll from early in the evening of election night.
There were 2,168 respondents, and they break down as follows (a "yes" vote is a vote against same-sex marriage):

[I rearranged the percentages reporting to the following format.]

Prop 8: Yes: No:
Males: 48% 52%
Females: 48% 52%

View actual screen capture

This is the exit poll from later in the evening. There were 2,240 respondents -- 72 more respondents than in the earlier poll -- and they break down in a very different way:

Prop 8: Yes: No:
Males: 53% 47%
Females: 52% 48%

View actual screen capture

This discrepancy should be ringing alarm bells. Something doesn't add up."

If you view the screen captures, you see they are from CNN, which I would consider to be a fairly reputable organization. The shift in percentages does NOT add up. Here's why:

Using the above percentages and respondent numbers, and assuming that Male and Female respondents are approximately 50% each, the shift can be seen this way:

Prop 8, Males and Females: Yes: No: respondents:
About 8 PM: 48% 52% of 2,168

Later in the evening: 52.5% 47.5% of 2,240
Percentage change: + 4,5% - 4.5%

Based on the number of respondents, percentages convert (without exit poll adjustments) to:
Prop 8, Males and Females: Yes: No: respondents:
About 8 PM: 1,041 + 1,127 = 2,168
Later in the evening: 1,176 + 1,064 = 2,240
Respondents change: + 135 - 63

For the percentage changes in the later exit poll reports to make sense, with the addition of 72 more respondents, we would have to see a change of + 135 for a Yes on Prop 8, and - 63 for a No on Prop 8.

My question is: How does the addition of 72 respondents to the later exit poll cause an increase of 135 votes for Prop 8 and a decrease of 63 votes against Prop 8?

Exit polls are done with people who just voted, telling how they had just voted. And exit polls have, traditionally, been extremely accurate, so much so that a number of European countries that still do hand-counted paper ballots use their exit polls to declare the winner before the hand-count is complete.

I request that the Secretary of State of California launch an election fraud investigation to get to the bottom of this. As time is of the essence, while final vote counts are still being tallied, you can immediately at least demand all relevant material from the National Exit Poll (NEP, also known as Edison/Mitofsky), and start a larger hand-counted paper-ballot audit of some selected precincts/counties.

Please consider this information and request with the utmost seriousness and urgency. And, if I can be of any further assistance, do not hesitate to contact me.

Thank you very much,

Richard Tamm



AttachmentSize
CA_fraudcomplaint_form.pdf [89]50.66 KB
CA_Co_votesystems070308.pdf [92]38.98 KB

Oppose NY Scanner Certification, Albany Hearing, 12.15.09

Crucial State Board of Elections Vote Tuesday!

Board Scheduled to Decide on Certification of Optical Scanners to Count NY's Votes in Secret!

Can you come to Albany?


Let's fill the room and show the State Board of Elections that the public cares about our elections and insists on constitutional, transparent election systems.
Tuesday, December 15, 2009
Noon
State Board of Election Offices
40 Steuben Street, 4th Floor
Albany, New York

Sign up to speak!

You may only have one minute, so prepare a brief statement.
If you'd like help with talking points, contact joanne[at]etcnys[dot]org [94]
Joanne has also offered to coordinate rides from Dutchess County.

Take photos!

Send them to us at info[at]etcnys[dot]org [95]

Bring signs!

Here are some ideas for quick signs:

Don't Certify!
No to Secret Vote Counting!
Kellner Knows: Votes Switched in Erie Co.
NY Elections Ain't Broke! Don't 'Fix' Them!
Scanners Count Votes in Secret! Vote No!
ERMA is Unconstitutional!
Vote Your Conscience! Vote No!

If you can't make it to Albany...

Call or email the SBoE and tell them:
Do not certify optical scanners. Preserve NY's transparent, reliable vote-counting system.

Phone: (518) 474-6220

Email:
info[at]elections[dot]state[dot]ny[dot]us [96]

The Election Transparency Coalition thanks you for your support!
Please donate to support the litigation.
http://ihcenter.org/groups/re-mediaetc [97]

Sign Up for Code Orange Rapid Response Demonstrations

SIGN UP HERE [98]

No More Rolling Over

In 2004, Ukrainians took to the streets to protest a stolen election. They demonstrated by the millions, for days on end, until they overwhelmed the attempted electoral coup. They demanded a revote, and they got their legitimate government back.

In 2004, we Americans had our votes stolen and our government hijacked, but we were immobilized with shock.

This time we will be ready.

No More Stolen Elections

Election Defense Alliance and other election integrity allies are monitoring the lead-up to the election for danger indicators. We will know where to look, and what to look for.

We will be analyzing election returns in real time, and when we find vote theft and suppression,

we will call on you to rally for the republic in mass protests strategically focused for maximum effect.

We are neither predicting or announcing where the protests will be called.

Our response will be swift and decisive with the element of surprise and the determination to sustain protest as long as necessary.

How long?

Until we get an honest accounting of the votes.

We need to know who will stand with us in defense of our votes and where we can reach you when the call goes out.

United We Count

Can we count on you?

Yes! When the call comes, I will be there!

SIGN UP HERE [98]





03.16.09 Pledge Today to Keep Peter B. Collins on the Radio!

UPDATE 3.20.09

Although many people responded to last week's appeals to help sustain the Peter B. Collins radio show, there wasn't a sufficient level of projected income to meet the $5,000 monthly cost of the show.

So, Friday March 20 was the final over-the-air broadcast for Collins' independently syndicated program.  Collins announced plans to return in June with a podcast [Internet only] show, initially one or two days per week. 

On his final broadcast, Peter thanked all his loyal listeners and supporters. He offered to return any donations made with the expectation that the daily broadcast would continue, and invited everyone who would like to receive news about future plans for the Collins show to send an e-mail subscription request to: Peter at this address [99]  [ peter[at]peterbcollins[dot]com ]

==========================

Action of the Day Post    3.16.09  

Veteran San Francisco talk show host Peter B. Collins is one of our stalwart election integrity voices in broadcast media.

His show features Brad Friedman as a regular guest covering election issues every Friday for a full hour.

( Here's the most recent Friday show: http://www.peterbcollins.com/3-13-09/ [100] )

But times are tough in independent progressive radio, and just last week Collins announced that he is unable to continue meeting the monthly $5,000 expense of keeping his show on the air.

Loyal listeners are responding to keep Peter on the airwaves. Election integrity advocates Dale Axelrod, Dave Berman, and Mark Crispin Miller are circulating appeals on Peter's behalf.

If 500 people who tune into Peter's shows via Internet radio would pledge $10 a month, the show could go on.

Donation Page:  http://www.peterbcollins.com/you-can-help/ [101]

Collins is willing to reconsider, but that decision depends on how much public support is shown by end of today, March 16.

Those who regularly listen to Collins already know he is one of the best informed, most fearlessly progressive talk show hosts in the nation, and one of the few radio beacons for the election integrity message.

For those who don't know what they're missing, the Peter B. Collins radio shows are available as a podcast subscription at:

http://green960.com/cc-common/podcast/single_podcast.html?podcast=peterbcollins.xml [102]

During live broadcasts  you can tune in via this KXRA Internet link: http://www.krxa540.com/component/content/article/5-listen-on-the-internet [103]

Past shows are also archived on the web at: http://www.peterbcollins.com/ [104]

In a recent post on his site Collins wrote:

"Since we started on KRXA in 2005, I've been covering the costs of producing the show and delivering it to our affiliate stations by satellite. With phone bills and the other expenses, it adds up to more than $5,000 a month. We get a little advertising revenue and some generous listeners contribute, but most of it is absorbed by my small business, Collins Media Services. Until last summer, I was able to cover the costs from my work as a radio producer and consultant. Like everyone else, the Bush recession has hit me hard."

(Full account at: http://www.peterbcollins.com/i-made-a-tough-decision/ [105] ).

As Dale Axelrod wrote in his public letter of support,

"Word has it that he (Collins] is open to the idea of an angel from heaven dropping in to help meet his $5000 monthly nut. If something like that were to happen, one of the nation's most intelligent, informative, insightful, entertaining, and important progressive voices would likely be able to stay on the public airwaves, where he belongs."

Can we get 500 mini-angels to pledge $10./month for the next 6 months, so we don't lose this important progressive voice?

E-mail Peter B. Collins at this address [106]

Let him know if you're willing to subscribe for at least 6 months, and how much you can pay.

Or, go directly to this contribution page to pitch in: http://www.peterbcollins.com/you-can-help/ [101]

Thanks (I'm in for $10./month)

Dale Axelrod

www.Verifygra.com [107]

For an Election that Really STANDS UP!

* * * Thanks to Dale Axelrod and Dave Berman for their letters that inspired this EDA Action of the Day.

We depend on activists around the country to keep us posted about needed actions.

Please e-mail your recommendations in to Info[at]ElectionDefenseAlliance[dot org with "Action of the Day" in the subject line.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

EDA Widgets

Widgets are little patches of code that set up interactive connections from one website or blog to another. Widgets are a great way to introduce audiences on other sites to the election integrity cause, and to direct visitors to information and contribution pages at EDA and related sites. See below for a growing selection of EDA widgets that we hope you will use to help seed election integrity messages across the Internet.

How to Use Widgets:

Copy and paste the code blocks into a web or blog page where you want the widget to appear. Widgets can be installed on single pages, or as side column "blocks" displayed across multiple pages of a website. Widget code can also be inserted in the body of an HTML-enabled e-mail message, and sent out to your address book or other e-mail lists. Clicking the "Share" tab on these widgets enables e-mailing the widget code to share with others, who can then display the widgets on their websites and blogs.


EDA Newsfeed RSS Subscription Chiclet

[108]Subscribe in a reader [108]
 



EDA Newsfeed Headline Animator

EDA Newsfeed [109]

↑ Grab this Headline Animator [110]


The EDA Frontpage News Widget

Displays live hyperlinks to the current frontpage news articles at EDA. Click the Options tag to display and select from a variety of code formats adapted for particular blogging and social networking platforms. There's also a version for running on a personal computer desktop.

 

Get this widget! [111]
 




Fundraising widget, EDA General Fund:
 

[112]



 

Fundraising widget, Arizona Transparency Project (AZTP)
 

[113]



 

 

Flip Out for Election Integrity

Action of the Day 9.19.09

Flip Out for Election Integrity

Turn 100 Lincolns into 10 Flip Ultra Videocams

to Help EDA   Defend the Vote [114]

Flip Ultra

Start Date: September 19
End Date: October 3

Note: We made our initial goal of $500 thanks in largest part
to a long-time EDA supporter whose donation will enable us
to deploy 10 of these videocams to election monitoring teams.
If this idea appeals to you, you can help us buy more cams
with an earmarked donation on the EDA Donate page [115].

Here's a fun way to triple the reach of your Defend the Vote donation [114], by leveraging the Flip Video Spotlight offer.


Facebook Cause: http://k5cyz.tk [116]

Tweeters go here:  http://twitter.com/Dan_EDA [117]

For every $50 donated to this Defend-the-Vote fundraising drive, EDA will be able to deploy a discrete, high-quality handheld videocam to volunteer election monitors in the field, building on the "Video the Vote" movement that has proved so effective in awakening Americans to the crisis in our electoral system.

How this works:

As a participating partner in the Flip Video Spotlight program, EDA has the privilege of purchasing Flip Video Ultra 4GB 120-minute camcorders at a price of $50 -- a $100 savings over retail.

Your donation goes three times as far.

By reaching this $500 goal in 2 weeks, EDA can distribute 10 Flip Ultra videocams to EDA election monitoring partners such as
Save R Vote [118] (Riverside Co. CA) and Arizona Transparency Project [113] (Pima and Maricopa counties).

We can reach this goal in any of these ways:

50 gifts of $10 (the Causes minimum donation)
33 gifts of $15
25 gifts of $20
20 gifts of $25
10 gifts of $50
5 gifts of $100

Here's the Free Option:


Everyone can give a boost to this drive by forwarding and recommending this Flip for Election Integrity fundraising drive to your friends via e-mail and social network sharing.
Let's Flip Out for the next 2 weeks and see how we do.


To learn more about the Spotlight program, visit http://www.flipvideospotlight.com [119]




Meeting to Preserve NY Lever Voting, Manhattan, July 9

Thu, 07/09/2009 7:30pm - 9:30pm
DEFENDERS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO VOTE GO HEAD-TO-HEAD
WITH STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS COMMISSIONER


July 9, 2009   7:30 PM
10th Street and 2nd Ave in Manhattan

The Threat to Voting in New York and What to Do About It:
Why lever machines are safe to vote on (and affordable) and optical scanners are neither


Douglas Kellner, Commissioner of NYS Board of Elections
Mark Crispin Miller, renowned author of "Fooled Again, The Real Case for Electoral Reform"
Andi Novick, attorney, driving force behind efforts to preserve New York's constitutionally-compliant lever voting system

Main Sanctuary at St. Marks Church in the Bowery
10th Street and 2nd Ave in Manhattan
sponsored by the Village Independent Democrats -- all invited, free
(212 741- 2994)

New York State is the only left in the U.S. that stills has a transparent and verifiable method of voting. All other states have moved to electronic vote-counting systems that make it impossible for election officials, official observers, candidates, or the public to determine whether the announced vote totals accurately represent the votes cast.

These secret vote-counting systems violate the principles of a constitutional democracy as represented in two centuries of statutory law and judicial precedence interpreting New York’s Constitution, and as recently held by Germany’s Constitutional Court. Yet electronic voting systems are slated to be fully operational in New York by 2010.

At this free public event, Andi Novick will outline the reasons New York's Election Reform and Modernization Act (ERMA) is unconstitutional, Mark Crispin Miller will discuss the dangers of electronic vote counting systems, and Douglas Kellner will explain the state's insistence on an expensive change in election technology beyond what is required by the federal government.

Please Donate and Sign our Petition:

Notwithstanding almost 20 county resolutions and 2,000 New Yorkers resisting ERMA's mandate to replace our trustworthy, reliable, affordable lever machines with expensive, undetectably hackable software-based machines, NYS is moving ahead.

The only way to stop the State from making elections less safe and costing taxpayers millions of dollars year after year, is to have ERMA declared unconstitutional.

Stop the State from depriving us of our constitutional right to vote.

Please make a tax-deductible donation to the Election Transparency Coalition so we can continue our work: http://ihcenter.org/groups/re-mediaetc [97]

And sign the petition in support of retaining our transparent lever voting system:
http://electiondefensealliance.org/save_ny_levers [120]

(20 counties is a lot more than 2,000 citizens- please circulate this widely).

For more information:
http://markcrispinmiller.com/2009/07/mcm-and-andi-novick-speak-on-voting... [121] http://nylevers.wordpress.com/ [122]
http://markcrispinmiller.com/ [123]
http://www.wheresthepaper.org/ny.html#WhyKeepLevers [124]
http://lever-voting-machines.blogspot.com/ [125]

Registration Deadlines Closing Fast -- Let Everyone Know

Last chance to vote in the presidential election!

In 1 to 3 days from today (Oct. 4th through 6th) voter registration CLOSES in 26 of the States and territories.

Double-check your registration status (Poke your Vote to the right >>>>
or better, use the All State Registration Directory link also to the right. >>>>

Your Vote is Your Voice.

Spread the Word.

Be Heard.

If you can, hand-deliver to your county elections department.
Otherwise, there may still be time to mail -- but check the mail-in regulations for your state.

Registrations Received By Mail: [ARIZONA -- For Example Only! Check your own state's rules.]

In the case of registration by mail, a voter registration is valid if it complies with
either of the following:

1. The registration is dated 29 days or more before an election and is received by the
County Recorder by first class mail within 5 days after the last day to register to
vote in that election.

2. The form is postmarked 29 days or more before an election and is received by the
County Recorder by 7 p.m. on the day of that election.

Check here for thorough registration details in your state [126]

Tell the President-Elect: We Want Paper Ballots


Send This Page to a Friend [1]

Barack Obama's Transition Team is calling for public input on what direction the US should go in.

1. Go to http://change.gov/page/s/yourvision [127] and let the President-Elect know what the people want and need from our government. 2. Please forward this email to everyone you know. [Click the "E-mail This Page" link at the foot of this article]. If they hear from millions of us, it will make a difference!

EDA Communications group member Dale Axelrod (originator of the Paper Ballot Platform Plank) presents this recommendation:

Support Legislation for PAPER BALLOTS

Since we've recently had elections with very slim margins, no undocumented totals should be relied upon in presidential or congressional voting. All across the country, instances of paperless, electronic touch-screen (DRE’s) voting machines’ losing, misdirecting, or miscounting large numbers of votes has been well-documented. In the interest of ensuring auditable and trustworthy election results: PLEASE support immediate passage of ELECTION REFORM legislation requiring that paper ballots replace paperless, touch-screen voting systems in time for the November 2010 congressional elections. Trust in elections is central to trust in government. Only with a tangible, paper ballot can voters have confidence that there is something to count. Complete Details with Live Links at: http://www.paperballot.info/ [128] Download, print, and distribute this flyer [129]

The PLAN


Complete Details with Live Links at: http://www.paperballot.info/ [128]

AttachmentSize
PB Verified Elections 2010.pdf [129]132.18 KB

WARNING: Straight-Party Ballot Option a Danger to Your Vote

Voters Beware in These 15 "Straight-Party" States:

Alabama Indiana Iowa Kentucky Michigan New Mexico North Carolina [130] Oklahoma Pennsylvania Rhode Island

South Carolina Texas Utah West Virginia Wisconsin

OVERVIEW

Voters are warned that use of the "straight-party" ballot option to be offered on voting machines in 15 states this November may result in the loss of votes cast for president and US senate. In 2004 reports of aberrant electronic voting machine behavior resulting in the cancellation of votes for president and senate were associated with the "straight party" mode of casting a ballot for an entire party-based slate of candidates.

Careful study of 2004 election incident reports (EIRS) revealed that the effects of straight-party machine voting in New Mexico in 2004, reported in this original investigative study by EDA Coordinator Judy Alter, were subsequently identified as having occurred in the same fashion on voting machines in other states that also offered the straight-party ballot option.

The straight party ballot option is a known and continuing danger in this upcoming presidential election. Given the proven risks, EDA urges voters to avoid using the "straight-party" option when casting your ballot. Cast your selections for each office individually.

===================

DOWNLOAD This Article:

This brief version [131] (printed below)

Full-length original report [132]

===================

Effects of the Straight Party Voting Option and Sequoia Voting Machines
Observed During the 2004 General Election in Santa Fe County, New Mexico

By Judith B. Alter, Ed.D.
Director, Protect California Ballots
EDA Council Member at Large

This study of a single county in New Mexico describes the effect of the "straight-party" voting option in relation to the high "under-vote" that occurred in the 2004 presidential election in Santa Fe County. The "straight party" voting option allows a voter to mark or cast a single vote that registers for all candidates in the voter's political party. This study revealed in Santa Fe County, several of the patterns found by other researchers who have studied the election in the entire state of New Mexico. Unusual voting patterns emerged when researchers compared the presidential results to the totals of the statewide "down-ticket" candidates in the three voting opportunities: Absentee, Early Voting, and Election Day. Different Sequoia voting systems were used for each of these three classes of voting.

After the November 2004 presidential election, the Green and Libertarian parties requested a recount in New Mexico because the state had the highest under-vote rate for president in the nation. Election officials record an under-vote when the voter does not make a choice for a particular race, in this case for president. Recount volunteers working with BlackboxVoting.org filed numerous public records requests for election documents. The material acquired from these public records requests provides the basis for the analysis provided here. The "straight-party" option appears to have contributed, in a major way, to the historic "under-vote" for president in New Mexico, 2004.

New Mexico Set National Record for Presidential Undervotes

The high under-vote rate (no vote for any candidate for an office) in Santa Fe County and the rest of New Mexico may have occurred primarily when voters chose the "straight-party" voting option on election day. Another vote reducing and possible vote-shifting scheme seems to have been present in the Sequoia scanners that counted hand-marked paper ballots cast during absentee and early voting in the straight party choices for minor third parties. Finally, a large discrepancy exists between the number of signatures on voter rosters, the total votes cast, and the presidential votes cast, especially on Election Day.

New Mexico voters had three different opportunities to vote; each was tabulated by proprietary Sequoia software. A voter could choose to vote: (1) absentee (ABS), using a paper ballot tabulated by Sequoia Optech 4C-400 scanners; (2) in early (EV) at five specified locations using a paper ballot tabulated by Sequoia Optech Insight scanners; or (3) on Election Day (ED), using Sequoia Advantage push button machines (DRE-direct recording electronic devices) that tabulated the votes and recorded the results on internal memory tapes. In Santa Fe County on election day 86 precincts or polling sites contained a total of 214 Sequoia push button DRE machines.

In Santa Fe County, 62% of the voters registered as Democrats, 18% Republican, and 20% as "other" or "decline to state." Of these voters, Absentee voters comprised 29% of the total Santa Fe County votes, 35% chose to participate in Early Voting, and 36% participated in Election Day voting. Of these voting choices, 0.26% of Absentee (ABS) ballots contained under-votes, 0.22% of Early Voting ballots recorded under-votes, and a full 4.2% of Election Day ballots were recorded as under-votes for president. This means that of the 36% of voters who voted on Election Day in Santa Fe County, 4.2% of them did not record a vote for president.

In contrast to results reported on the New Mexico Secretary of State's website, actual election night material provided the numbers of voters who chose the "straight-party" option. The "straight-party" option allows a voter of a specific party to check a single box indicating the intention to vote for all the candidates in that party for all the races. The voter would check one box and believe that all those running for any office of their party would receive their vote. The "down-ticket" races refer to all of those contests below the president, such as congressional or senate races, where a partisan vote was possible.

"Straight-Party" Voting

The evidence about how the "straight-party" option worked on election day came from the compiled lists of voter complaint calls received by the many election protection services sponsored by groups such as the NAACP, PFAW, MoveOn, etc. These complaints were compiled by the Election Incidents Reporting Service (EIRS) (http://voteprotect.org [133]). The reports shed light on the problems that occurred when voters chose the "straight-party" option in New Mexico and 16 other states with the straight party option.

EIRS records indicate that the "straight-party" option appears to have resulted in reports of missing presidential vote selections for every political party except the Republican Party. When a Republican voter selected the straight party option, a Bush vote appeared to register automatically; that is, the machine showed "Bush" (with rare exceptions). Many "straight-party" voters of parties other than the Republican Party may not have noticed the absence of a presidential vote on their review screens. Other voters who reported seeing no presidential vote on their review screens may not have realized how their choice of the "straight-party" option contributed to the absence of a presidential vote. The "straight-party" option appeared to have created a large under-vote by means of the no-vote-for-president (except Bush) phenomenon.

The second way the straight party option contributed to the under-vote occurred when voters selected candidates outside their straight party selection. Many voters may not have known that, on electronic voting machines, after selecting the straight party option, if they then voted for a candidate from another party, that non-straight party vote cancelled the voter's straight party choices throughout the rest of the ballot. For example, perhaps a Democrat voted for the Green Party candiate for county surveyor instead of the Democratic candidate for that office. That one vote outside the Democratic straight party slate would automatically cancel all of the voter's previously selected votes for Democratic candidates throughout the ballot.

Machines Spontaneously Presented Wrong Candidate Selection

Voters who chose the straight party option also reported another problem. Instead of no presidential choice appearing on the voting machine screen, voters reported that the wrong candidate, often Bush, appeared. Only two EIRS reports in New Mexico (Sandoval County) came from Republicans saying that their straight party selection initially displayed a vote for a Democratic or Green Party candidate. These voters reported being able to successfully correct the choice.

The difficulty in removing the wrong presidential choice, however, created another means of generating an under-vote. To override the automatic Bush vote or the voter’s wrong choice on the Sequoia push-button electronic voting machines, voters had to push the button for Bush (or the wrong candidate) again (a toggle mechanism) to erase the vote. Voters reported that they had to push the Bush button from two to ten times to remove that incorrect choice before they could vote for their preferred candidate.

Furthermore, after removing the vote for the wrong candidate and voting again for their intended choice, some voters reported that when they got to the review screen at the end of the ballot, they found no vote for president had registered. Voters reported the need to scroll back up the ballot one or two more times to vote again for their presidential choice. Even when the review screen actually showed their correct vote, citizens voiced concern that their vote might not actually register. They worried about the voters who were unable to find and correct this problem of a non-vote or a wrong vote for president.

The programmed mechanisms in the straight party option probably contributed to the high under-vote rate on Election Day. These programmed mechanisms for the straight party option include a vote shifting formula in the scanners used to count ballots for absentee and early voting (see below); and with the DREs on Election Day: no-vote-for-president for all but the Republican party; a difficult to change incorrect presidential vote; an inadvertent canceling of straight party votes when voting outside that party, or undetected or uncorrected Bush default. The under-vote total alone, 1117, amounts to 19% of Kerry’s loss by 5988 in New Mexico. In New Mexico, the Election Day statewide presidential under-vote was 17,095.

Down-Ticket Discrepancies in Early Voting and Absentee

One might assume that the "straight-party" discrepancies only occurred on the Election Day electronic DRE voting machines. Not so! Evidence shows votes for President for persons voting "straight-party" in third parties, such as the Green Party, both in the Absentee and the Early Voting choices were not recorded. For example, the straight party choice for the Green party showed 2 votes, but no votes registered for David Cobb. There were, however, minimal under-votes recorded; this implies another candidate received the "shifted" vote. Sequoia scanners with proprietary software counted both the Absentee and the Early Voting paper ballots. Since the three Democratic members of the State Election Board prevented the official hand recount, citizens have no way to know how much vote shifting occurred.

Roster Signatures, Total Votes Cast, Votes for President: Hidden Provisional Ballots

The website of the NM Secretary of State lists the total number of roster signatures for each voting occasion by precinct. A comparison of the total number of signatures with the total votes counted shows, for all voting occasions in Santa Fe, 1523 more roster signatures than total ballots cast. That is a large number of voters who signed the roster books, but for some reason, did not have their ballot counted. That number, 1523, is 27% higher than the tallied under-vote of 1117. The website also shows 205 phantom votes, (more votes cast than roster signatures) in the three voting occasions: 95 in absentee voting and 110 in early voting. Researchers Warren Stewart and Ellen Theisen explained that election officials subtracted phantom votes from the under-vote in their certified vote tallies instead of listing the phantom votes in a separate category on the certified totals.

The total number of more-signatures-than-votes-cast may be the uncounted provisional ballots: 2% of the total ballots cast in Santa Fe County. Rather than post the counted and uncounted provisional ballots as a separate category, Warren Stewart reports, the Secretary of State adds the total provisional ballots counted to the election night totals. Combine the 1523 uncounted ballots to the under-vote of 1117 and get 2640. This 2640 is 4% of the total Santa Fe County vote and it may represent the extent of voter disenfranchisement in this County. If the uncounted provisional ballots were primarily from newly registered Democrats whose voter registration forms remained unprocessed or destroyed, then much of the 2640 votes (under-vote + uncounted provisional ballots) amounts to 44% of Kerry’s 5,988 vote loss.

Summary

When voters use the "straight-party" option during an election, they run the risk of losing their vote. The effects observed in New Mexico have also been seen in many other states that offer the "straight-party" option. Whether intentional or unintentional, the use of proprietary software prevents citizens from observing the actual vote counting; thus, citizens do not know if their votes are counted as cast. Scanners that count paper ballots use proprietary software and are just as susceptible to large inaccuracies as the touch screen machines. Citizens must vote on paper ballots but unless citizens also hand count these ballots no one can verify the accuracy of the total vote count with or without the "straight-party" option. Since fifteen states in November 2008 continue to offer the "straight-party" voting option and almost no option to hand count paper ballots yet exists, after reading this evidence, voters should avoid using the "straight-party" option.

======================

Other Articles About the 2004 New Mexico Presidential Election:

Stewart, Warren. 2005. “Did We Bounce An Election?” www.votersunite.org [134] and http://www.votersunite.org/info/newMexicophantomvotes.asp [135]

Theisen, Ellen and Warren Stewart. 2004. “Summary Report on New Mexico State Elections Data.” www.USCountVotes.org [136]

Liddle, Elizabeth, and Josh Mittledorf. 2005. “Analysis of Undervotes in New Mexico’s 2004 Presidential Ballots.” www.USCountVotes.org [136]

Plotner, Robert Glenn. 2005. “A Guide to irregularities in the 2004 New Mexico General Election.” www.USCountVotes.org [136]

State of New Mexico, Office of New Mexico Secretary of State, Secretary of State, Rebecca Vigil-Giron, http://www/sos.state.nm.us/Election/cntyindx04.html [137]

=========================

Thank-yous: Green and Libertarian Parties, Jeremiah Akin, Warren Stewart, Ellen Theisen, Ken Aaron, Stuart Shakman, Dan Ashby, Myra Boime, Megan Matson, Scripps Howard News Service, Eva Kataja, Mitch Buszek, Wayne M. Burke, Lubosh Novak, and others in Recount New Mexico; Bernie Ellis, Kip Humphrey.



AttachmentSize
Avoid_StraightParty_Brief_Alter.pdf [131]93.32 KB
Straight_Party_Complete_Study_Alter.pdf [132]7 MB

Tell EAC to Release Report: No Evidence for Alleged "Voter Fraud"

According to USA Today, a new report shows there is no evidence that significant numbers of voters are lying about their identity at the polls, voting twice or voting in the name of dead people. Yet across the country, burdensome voter ID bills and other legislation that disenfranchises eligible voters are being justified by this made-up epidemic. We deserve to know which threats are real and which threats are imaginary.

Please petition the Elections Assistance Commission to release its report on voter fraud!
http://www.ReleaseTheReport.com [138]

Right-wing members of Congress and state legislators have been passing onerous laws that make it harder for citizens to vote. Despite erecting barriers to the ballot box and disenfranchising voters, they’ve claimed these laws are necessary to stop rampant voter fraud. 

Thanks to a press leak, it is now public that the US Elections Assistance Commission (EAC) commissioned a report to find out about voter fraud.
According to USA Today [139],the EAC’s report shows that there is no evidence that significant numbers of voters are lying about their identity at the polls, voting twice, or voting in the name of dead people. Let me repeat that: NO
EVIDENCE.

While this has long been suspected by those of us who have fought discriminatory attempts to address “voter fraud” (e.g. voter ID bills that would, in effect, create a poll tax for poor, elderly and minority citizens who don’t have or need government issued ID in their regular lives), the
EAC report makes it official: voter fraud does not present a health risk to our democracy. That is, it would be official if the EAC had released it. … But it won’t release it.

Please petition the EAC to release the report at http://www.ReleaseTheReport.com [140]!

Across the country, states have been introducing legislation requiring voters to show identification before voting, preventing eligible voters from casting ballots. Indeed, the US Congress has tried to pass national Voter ID legislation four times in the last four months – all in the
name of stopping the one electoral cancer from which we don’t appear to be suffering. Worse, the mostly Republican legislators who are pushing such “prescriptions” are more like doctors who are getting kickbacks for prescribing cancer drugs to healthy people, insofar as they are keeping away from the polls voters who tend to cast ballots for the other party.

Sign the petition [141]
to the EAC urging that this report be released and that hearings be held on its findings. We deserve to know which threats are real and which threats are imaginary.

http://www.ReleaseTheReport.com [142]

-- Alert Researched and Distributed by People For the American Way

03/09/09 Support Ellen Brodsky in Broward Co. 'Trespassing" Trial

For Immediate Release March 9, 2009

For More Information Contact:

Tanner Andrews, PA

386-490-1128, Fax: 386 734 2116

E-mail address

Counsel for Ellen H. Brodsky

NOTICE OF TRIAL

IN THE COUNTY COURT OF THE 17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY FLORIDA STATE of FLORIDA,

Plaintiff v. ELLEN BRODSKY, Defendant

Please show Ellen Brodsky your support by being in the Court Room when her trial begins.

She did nothing wrong as evidenced by this video. http://www.youtube..com/watch?v=2CVMoLjOtP4 [143] ______________________________________________________________________________

Case Number: 2008-026997-MM10A

Type: MISDEMEANOR TRESPASS AFTER WARNING

Judge: Honorable Fred J. Berman

Location: BROWARD COUNTY CENTRAL COURTHOUSE

201 S.E.. 6TH STREET

FORT LAUDERDALE, FL 33301

DATE: 03/11/2009

TRIAL: 9:00 A.M.

COURTROOM: 0418

_______________________________________________________________________________________

Can You Help with Legal Expenses?

It would be greatly appreciated if you could please send a check in any amount to help with her legal expenses. Please send to Ellen H. Brodsky, 2004 Granada Drive, Coconut Creek, FL 33066. Put in memo, Legal Expenses. It is not tax deductible. Ellen also has a Pay Pal account. If you wish to use your Credit Cards or your Checking Account with PayPal, please send an email to Ellen Brodsky, ehbrod@yahoo.com [144], and she will send you a Pay Pal Request Money email. Please specify the amount you wish to give in your email to Ellen. You'll be helping to uphold the right of every citizen to monitor every election.

Case Background:

Ellen was arrested on November 13, 2008 under the authority of Brenda Snipes, Supervisor or Elections while trying to observe the counting of our votes. Ellen was physically thrown out of the Canvassing Board Meeting of November 7, 2008, for raising her hand to ask three questions. She was threatened with arrest for trespassing and disorderly conduct should she ever return again to the vvoting machine warehouse.

So how is it possible for a citizen to be charged with trespassing when they are attending a public meeting to witness the counting of the votes?

The disorderly conduct charges were dropped, yet the state attorney representing the supervisor of elections continues to use this as justification for her arrest. The supervisor of elections property is limited to inside the building itself. Was Ellen in the box or uut of the box? This and other questions remain in dispute; and this is why Judge Berman has not dismissed the case.

Ellen pleaded not guilty at her arraignment on January 26, 2009. The Florida Sunshine Laws provide for the public to attend and address the proceedings of any public meeting including Vote Counting. Florida Statute 104.29 has provided the public the legal right to hear and see how our votes are being counted.

Judge Berman is the same judge who presided over the canvassing board during a  2005 logic and accuracy test recorded in this video by Black Box Voting that you can see here: http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/show.cgi?tpc=2197&post=7356

Judge Berman says all Broward County judges at some point get recycled to serve on canvassing boards and that he believes he can try the case fairly.

Ellen's attorneys want to make sure she can get a fair trial in Broward County.

"Being arrested is not recommended and ultimately, the experience makes us sick of our government. That is the effect that they hope for, which is to punish us for trying to be good citizens when we expect transparency and open government." -- Ellen Brodsky

Contact Information for Ellen Brodsky

Ellen H. Brodsky Founder, Broward Election Reform Coalition http://groups.yahoo.com/group/electionreform/ [145] Candidate for Supervisor of Elections, Broward County, November 2008 http://www.ellenbrodsky.com [146] E-mail address [144] 954-263-6032

 

 

 

 

 

Give a Year-End Gift for Election Integrity

Donate by Thursday, Dec. 31 and Take a 2009 Tax Deduction

All contributions to EDA are fully tax-deductible, so take a 2009 deduction now for more Election Integrity in 2010.

___________________

Click to view our

Election Defense Alliance 2009 Year-End Action Report [147]

_______________________

EDA has partnered with Groundspring to bring you a secure and convenient DONATIONS page [115] where you can tailor your election integrity donation exactly to your preferences.

You can make a one-time donation
in any amount you choose, or if you prefer, you can select a monthly donation option to spread your contribution over 12 months.

Plus, we're sending out donation premiums as thanks for your election integrity contributions.

See our Donations page [115] for details on the EDA buttons, stickers, EI books [148] and documentary DVDs [149] you can get as a donation premium with your tax-deductible contribution.

See our EDA Store page [150] for a complete listing of EDA election integrity items.

Stock up on those EI books you've been meaning to read or the films you've missed, and wear a "Prevent Unwanted Presidencies" button [151] as a reminder of what happens when a nation lets machines count the votes.

If you have any questions or problems while placing your order, just e-mail us at Orders [152] or phone our new TOLL FREE number 877-375-3930 and an executive director will be happy to assist you.

May 8: Tell HCA, NO Coverup! Investigate Florida-24th CD!

The following emergency response action comes from The PEN (Peoples' E-Mail Network)

Everyone has heard about the dramatically suspicious results in the Jennings congressional race in FL-13, but did you know that there were massive parallel shenanigans going on in FL-24 as well? And yet we got a tip late today that tomorrow the House Administration committee is secretly, and without public notice, preparing to dismiss their own inquiry into this other still NOT conceded race run by Clint Curtis, the famous voting software rigging whistle blower.

Since the election, dedicated volunteers have spent massive hours painstakingly collecting affidavits from citizens block by block in the district that constitute direct proof that the results in FL-24 are also not only beyond credulity, they are patently fraudulent. There is a still LIVE challenge to this election the Florida state courts, JUST AS in the Jennings case. So why is the House administration even considering refusal to hear this evidence, where it may even constitute evidence of a broader statewide conspiracy, and give additional weight to the Jennings FL-13 challenge as well?

Because of the shortness of time this will be primarily a PHONE action. Please locate the member of the House Administration committee closest to you from the list below and call them first thing in the morning. Distance being equal you may find the Democrat more receptive. Tell them that even if you are not in their particular district, they are the closest House member to represent you on this committee. And ask them to give the evidence in the FL-24 ALSO the fair and just congressional hearing it deserves.

You can call toll free at 800-828-0498, 800-459-1887 or 800-614-2803 and ask for your choice of House member below, in particular the CHIEF OF STAFF listed, or you can use their direct dial phone/fax numbers.

MORE EVIDENTIARY INFORMATION IS BELOW THIS COMMITTEE MEMEBER LISTING SECTION

CA-3
Dan Lungren (R)
ph: (202) 225-5716, fax: (202) 226-1298
Chief of Staff: Victor Arnold-Bik
email: victor.arnold-bik.house.gov

CA-16
Zoe Lofgren (D)
ph: (202) 225-3072, fax: (202) 225-3336
Chief of Staff: Stacey Leavandosky
email: stacey.leavandosky.house.gov

CA-22
Kevin McCarthy (R)
ph: (202) 225-2915, fax: (202) 225-2908
Chief of Staff: James Min
email: james.min.house.gov

CA-53
Susan A. Davis (D)
ph: (202) 225-2040, fax: (202) 225-2948
Chief of Staff: Lisa Sherman
email: lisa.sherman.house.gov

MA-8
Michael Capuano (D)
ph: (202) 225-5111, fax: (202) 225-9322
Chief of Staff: Robert Primus
email: robert.primus.house.gov

MI-3
Vernon Ehlers (R), Ranking Member
ph: (202) 225-3831, fax: (202) 225-5144
Chief of Staff: Bill McBride
email: bill.mcbride.house.gov

PA-1
Robert A. Brady (D), Chair
ph: (202) 225-4731, fax: (202) 225-0088
Chief of Staff: Stan White
email: stan.white.house.gov

TX-20
Charles A. Gonzalez (D)
ph: (202) 225-3236, fax: (202) 225-1915
Chief of Staff: Kevin Kimble
email: kevin.kimble.house.gov

THE HOUSE ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE'S POSSIBLE BOGUS REASONS FOR DISMISSING THE CLINT CURTIS CONTEST (talking points if you get challenged on the phone):

* [Not enough evidence.] What we did not have is mainstream media coverage. What we do have is hard evidence that there is a discrepancy between the official count and the affidavits that were gathered from actual voters.

* [Sworn affidavits not good enough.] In the past, it was exit polls that were considered not good enough because they did not connect the vote with the voter. Our system does exactly that. It is like having a paper ballots to count except even better. It is signed. Affidavits and eye witness testimony are the corner stone of our legal system.

* [Your signature not good enough.] If the committee is not willing to accept what every court in the country requires as evidence, what level of proof are you willing to accept?

* [Source code unknown.] If the committee requires the errors in the code to be found, we must be allowed access to the code and the machines. We are aware of hundreds of experts willing to independently examine and blueprint those proprietary systems should that opportunity become available.

DETAILED BASIS OF THE CONTEST:

The Congressional Contest filed by Clint Curtis is a Contest where the results of the election can be proven. Unlike Christine Jennings, whose loss was caused by 18,000 missing votes that unfortunately can never be found, Clint Curtis for Congress Campaign has found and tabulated data from actual voters that conclusively proves that Mr. Curtis received more votes than the official results recorded.

The reason Mr Curtis did not concede is that although there was an apparent 16% loss, this loss did not reflect the Zogby Poll taken just weeks before the election that showed us within 2% points nor by the polling conducted by the online vote verification tool http://www.VoteNow2006.net [153]. The Zogby Poll also revealed that Curtis was leading among likely voters who describe themselves as Independents by a full 11 points. The opponents lead was just 45% to 43%, with one in ten (10%) undecided.

The so called wide margin of 16 points in Mr. Curtis' race is the exact reason it possible to find where the count was not accurate. If the results were closer like a 51/49 split or 369 votes as in the Jennings race, it would have been nearly impossible to determine whether or not the official results were accurate. Every voter would have to be contacted to find the few votes that may not have been recorded accurately.

On virtually every block walked by volunteers, the results have shown that more votes were cast for Clint Curtis than officially recorded. Walking for Democracy, the volunteers gathered sworn affidavits signed by the voters in District 24 as to how they voted for Governor, Congress and Amendment Three. The Governor's race and Amendment Three were control questions. The results from that data confirm the official results, while the data in this Congressional race is shown to be inaccurate.

For example in Precinct 66 in Seminole County (highlighted below), official results showed that Mr. Curtis received 57% of the Democratic and Independent vote. According to the affidavits gathered however, he received over 80% of that vote. In each of the precincts that have been walked, he has received from 6%- 22% more Democratic and Independent votes than the official results.

This simple method of determining how voters actually cast their ballot, can be independently verified. Congress can mandate a non-partisan group of volunteers or pay personnel to gather affidavits from District 24 voters. The cost is minimal and results easily obtainable. Congress owes it to the American people to determine once and for all whether or not the electronic voting machines counted accurately. This is not about partisan politics. This is about our Democracy.

Please take action NOW, so we can win all victories that are supposed to be ours, and forward this message to everyone else you know.

If you would like to get alerts like these, you can do so at http://www.millionphonemarch.com/in.htm [154]

march50:113989

Powered by The People's Email Network
Copyright 2007, Patent pending, All rights reserved

Pima Supervisors Vote to Disclose Election Databases

Bookmark for daily updates on Pima Election Integrity Trial: http://arizona.typepad.com/blog/pima.html [155]

VICTORY!

Today the Pima County Supervisors voted to release the entire database series from 2006 primary, general, and RTA elections.

See today's report from "Blog for Arizona" (Michael Bryan) crossposted at the EDA Blog [156].
Congratulations to all involved, and particularly to John Brakey for spearheading this precedent-setting effort.

Also See Arizona Press Accounts of Today's Action: Click here [157]

Tucson TV News Video Here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W9iXJahaGmk [158]


Jan. 8 Action: Lobby the Pima County Supervisors

(addresses below)


The County Attorney has filed an apparently unauthorized notice of appeal, presumably purely on the word of County Administrator Chuck Huckelberry, or on the initiative of the County Attorney's office itself.

Only the Board of Supervisors has the authority to decide whether to appeal the court's ruling, and they haven't yet met to make any decision on the matter.

Tuesday morning January 8, 2007 we will present affidavits and letters from renowned computer scientists and election integrity activists stating that releasing these databases cannot harm national security as Chuck Huckelberry and his lawyers claim.

Copies of the supporting declarations may be downloaded from the links at the foot of this article.

Pima County Administration Building
130 W. Congress Street
First Floor Meeting Room

Election Trial item early on agenda
Please arrive by 9:00 a.m.

There are some 800 databases going back to May of 1998. Making them public could prove our votes were NOT counted inaccurately. If there is no probl
em, what is Pima County afraid of? Could these databases and audit logs prove the County committed election fraud?

The Democrats have also taken issue with several of Judge Miller's findings of fact as not supported by the testimony, and some of his conclusions of law as erroneous. See Democrats Motion to Amend for more details.

Bill Risner make a powerful case that Judge Miller would be hard-pressed to ignore that the Judge quite simply got several points wrong in his under-advisement opinion.

Discussion of the lawsuit will be one of the very first items on the agenda, so try to at the Board's Chambers by 9 am.

Contact the Supervisors and let them know this is a critical issue for you. Sources near the case indicate the Board will probably vote to appeal unless Ann Day decides to vote with Ray Carroll. She should be the target of heaviest lobbying. Ray Carroll is already in support of election integrity; call and thank him for his leadership.

Ann Day, District 1
(520) 740-2738

Ramón Valadez, District 2
(520) 740-8126

Sharon Bronson, District 3
(520) 740-8051

Ray Carroll, District 4
(520) 740-8094

Richard Elías, Chairman, District 5
(520) 740-8126

See http://arizona.typepad.com/blog/pima.html [155] for in-depth coverage

AttachmentSize
David_Jefferson_Declaration.pdf [159]48.66 KB
Tom_Ryan_Declaration.pdf [160]24.23 KB
Brennan_Center_Delaration.pdf [161]91 KB
EDA AUDIT AZ letter press info Jan 8 2008.pdf [162]645.96 KB

Press Accounts on Pima Supervisors' Release of Vote Databases

AZ_Star


RTA databases to be released

Info from '06 election may help clear the air over integrity issue
By Erica Meltzer
ARIZONA DAILY STAR

DID YOU KNOW?
It took 20 years and four tries after Maricopa County adopted a
transportation sales tax for Pima County residents to approve a similar
levy.
Maricopa County expects to complete the last stretch of freeway authorized in its original 1986 vote later this
year.
Pima County will release the databases from the 2006 RTA election -- a vote that touched off questions about the integrity of the county's ballot-counting procedure.

The release will allow Democratic Party activists to examine the results for evidence of tampering. The decision goes beyond a judge's order that the county release the final databases from the 2006 primary and general elections.
Faced with a raucous crowd of more than 60 people demanding the county release the RTA database, the Board of Supervisors Tuesday originally voted only not to appeal the judge's order, which amounted to agreeing to release those records.
Republican Supervisor Ray Carroll voted no because he wanted the RTA records released as well.
The issue was scheduled for an executive session to receive legal advice, but the supervisors remained in open session and heard from five speakers before the first vote.

But the crowd didn't disperse after the vote, instead remaining to speak at call to the audience, which is scheduled for the end of the meeting.
Carroll repeatedly asked the other supervisors why they did not want to hear from the more than 30 people who signed speaker cards and continued his questioning after the vote.

Elections-integrity activist John Brakey; started shouting that people had waited far too long already and should not have to wait any longer.
Brakey sat down after board Chairman Richard Elias repeatedly told him he was out of order and threatened to have him removed.
"We cannot turn this into a carnival," Elias said as the crowd became increasingly unruly.
But as Brakey quieted, a chant went up: "We want our voices heard. We want our voices heard."
Elias then agreed to hear the speakers, some of whom said they were "disgusted" with having to "beg" for public records.
The Democratic Party says access to the computer files is necessary for it to perform its election-oversight duties in a high-tech age. Other parties also would have access to the files.

After hearing from more than 20 speakers, Elias made a motion to reconsider the earlier vote, and the supervisors voted unanimously to release the RTA records as well as the 2006 general and primary records. They also voted to release all the files associated with the three elections, instead of just the final databases, as ordered by the judge.
The crowd rose in a standing ovation after the vote.

The Regional Transportation Authority election created a half-cent sales tax to fund a $2 billion, 20-year transportation plan.
After raising concerns about practices within the county elections division and the security of electronic vote-counting machines, the county Democratic Party sued the county for access to the computer files from past elections.

At trial, the party presented witnesses who testified an elections employee took home backup files, and the county lost tapes of the RTA election after they were returned by the secretary of state.

Pima County acknowledged security flaws in new technology and has developed a plan to address many of the problems. The county is accepting public comment on the plan until the end of the week. It is available on the county Web site,
www.pima.gov [163].

Activists have said the plan is a good start but still leaves the system vulnerable to hacking by an insider. County Administrator Chuck Huckelberry said he will present a revised plan and a summary of public concerns in February and suggested the supervisors could decide then if they want to ask for a court order to recount the paper ballots from the RTA to reassure the public the election was fair.

Elias made a motion to have the county ask for such a recount, but it was not voted on because there was no agenda item related to the RTA election. Voting on items not on a posted agenda is a violation of the Open Meetings Act.

Attorney Bill Risner, who represented the Democrats, said such court orders are hard to obtain, and the release of the database is a much more certain way to examine the election results, given the judge's ruling after the trial determined that election databases are public records.
John Moffatt, a technology expert with the county, said it should be a simple matter of copying the databases to a disk, and he would work with representatives from all the recognized parties to get the information out as
soon as possible.

Risner said the party will develop a computer program to analyze the databases, which it will make available to anyone who wants it.

Risner said there still are legal issues that have to be resolved. He wants a ruling that the databases always are public records and must be released promptly enough to let political parties challenge an election within the five-day deadline.

Risner also has asked the court to award his team $279,907 in legal fees.

Contact reporter Erica Meltzer at 807-7790 or emeltzer@azstarnet.com



http://www.tucsoncitizen.com/daily/opinion/73553.php
[164]

Our Opinion: Ray Carroll drives county move toward transparency

Tucson Citizen
letters@tucsoncitizen.com [165]
Tuesday's decision by Pima County politicians to release elections-related data is the first step in restoring voter confidence.

It is a victory for democracy through establishment of an open and transparent elections system and process.

The Board of Supervisors, acceding to an unrelenting Supervisor Ray Carroll, voted not to appeal December's order by a Pima County Superior Court judge that the county release the elections data.

Judge Michael Miller had ordered the county to turn over parts of elections electronic databases, from the 2006 primary and general elections, to the Pima County Democratic Party in response to its lawsuit questioning whether the elections system is secure and tamper-proof.

The county had considered appealing that order, claiming the databases contained sensitive information whose release might make it easier to hack into the elections system.

The supervisors rightly dropped the appeal threats Tuesday. And thanks to Carroll, supervisors went beyond that. The board also voted to release records of the 2006 Regional Transportation Authority election that were not included in the judge's order.
Had the county appealed the ruling, voters would have gotten the clear impression that it was hiding something.

Confidence and transparency are the cornerstones of a free-functioning democracy. The county would have risked losing those cornerstones had it continued fighting to keep its election data secret.

Additionally, if voters believe their ballots will not be counted accurately and confidentially, if they believe something nefarious or underhanded is going on behind the scenes, election turnout will plunge.

The case pulled aside the curtain of county election operations, exposing matters of substantial concern.
At trial last month, expert witnesses for the county conceded that the voting system could have been manipulated to swing elections results.

Simple software manipulation could mean voters would cast their ballots one way, but they could be tabulated according to a hacker's wishes.
County officials said while that could have happened, it never did.

This case demonstrated that voters are unwilling to take the county's word on election security without independent verification.
Ray Carroll championed open government by pushing for prompt and full release of all relevant data while fellow supervisors seemed content to meet the minimal required disclosure.

By dropping appeal threats, releasing more material than the judge ordered and allowing qualified outsiders to look at the inner workings of elections, the county has moved to assure voters it has nothing to hide.


Our Opinion: Ray Carroll drives county move toward transparency [164]
Tucson Citizen, AZ - 2 hours ago
Tuesday's decision by Pima County politicians to release elections-related data is the first step in restoring voter confidence. ...
County does U-turn, will release vote data [166]
Tucson Citizen, AZ - 4 hours ago
The Pima County Board of Supervisors voted Tuesday not to appeal a Superior Court judge's ruling to turn over computerized databases to the Pima County ...

Plan L to Save New York's Levers and Block the E-Machines

Dear New York Friends,

This is the first in a series of quick and simple actions designed to stop computerized voting from coming to NYS and Help Save Our Lever voting machines by letting our Election Commissioners, elected representatives and the press hear from you: New Yorkers who will not be silent while our secure voting system is replaced with "crap".

Please choose one of the sample letters below and e-mail to the NYS Election Commissioners at info@elections.state.ny.us [96] - Make sure the subject line says "Share with all election commissioners"

We know everyone is pressed for time but the impact of your letter will be enhanced if you are also able to cc your letters to:
-- your local election commissioners - http://www.elections.state.ny.us/CountyBoards.html [167]
-- your state representatives - www.congress.org [168] for email addresses
-- your local media - www.congress.org [168] - for media click on # 8 "media guide."

We encourage you to personalize your letters if you desire and please include your e-mail address and your town. Scroll to end of letters for important information.

Here are the letters to choose from:

LETTER 1

Dear Commissioners,

As a citizen of New York and resident of (fill in the blank) County I am appalled to learn that New York still intends to replace our dependable and transparent lever voting machines with electronic voting systems which the consensus of scientific experts has deemed too unreliable and insecure and about which the National Institute of Standards and Technology has stated "experience in testing software and systems has shown that testing to high degrees of security and reliability is from a practical perspective "not possible."

As election commissioners who have sworn an oath to protect the voters of New York, the state legislature will heed your advice. The requirements of HAVA have now been met through the provision of ballot marking devices at every polling place. I implore you now to inform the legislature what common sense, your professional experience and oath of office demand - that secure, transparent and reliable elections depend upon the retention of our lever machines and the rejection of electronic optical scanners and DREs.

Yours Sincerely,
Name
town


LETTER 2:

Dear Commissioners,

We look to you to uphold your oath of office to protect the voters of New York. Our county election commissioners cannot fulfill their oaths to do the same if you blind them with computerized vote counting machines that renders the process they are responsible for, invisible. We have been watching and reading and we know that software-driven voting machines are "insufficient to guarantee a trustworthy election." (Project EVEREST/, Ohio Secretary of State, 2007). Do not certify computerized machines that have been shown to allow one person "...with temporary access to a single voting machine" to steal the entire election. (California's Top-to-Bottom Review, 2007). Indeed you cannot in good faith certify machines when the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the agency which advises the US Election Assistance Commission on the writing of federal voting system standards, has already found that, " ...testing to high degrees of security and reliability is from a practical perspective not possible."

SAVE OUR LEVER VOTING SYSTEM.

Sincerely,
Name
Town


Letter 3

[ FOR THOSE WHO READ THE RECENT BLOG POST AT http://re-mediaetc.blogspot.com/ [169] ]

Dear Commissioners,

We look to you to uphold your oath of office to protect the voters of New York. We have been following the progress of New York's certification testing of the optical scan voting systems, including your weekly reports to Judge Sharpe and your public Commissioners meetings. As your best efforts have shown, you cannot in good faith "certify" any software-driven voting systems. This should come as no surprise however, since the National Institute of Standards and Technology has already found that, "...testing to high degrees of security and reliability is from a practical perspective not possible." (Requiring Software Independence in VVSG 2007, Nov. 2006)

We know from the experience of other states that software-driven voting systems are "insufficient to guarantee a trustworthy election." (Project EVEREST, Ohio Secretary of State, 2007). Please do not certify computerized machines that have been shown to allow one person "...with temporary access to a single voting machine" to steal the entire election. (California Secretary of State's Top-to-Bottom Review, 2007).

We ask you to PLEASE SAVE OUR LEVER VOTING SYSTEM. Return the Title I HAVA money, and continue to provide and perfect accessible ballot markers for voters with special needs to comply with HAVA using Title II funds. But please do not ask the vast majority of New York's voters to trust that the software will get it right on election night, when this is impossible to guarantee.

Sincerely,
Name
Town


If you have not yet SIGNED the PETITION to stop computerized voting and save our levers

please go to http://www.ElectionDefenseAlliance.org/save_ny_levers [170]


This Just In: Tonite on PBS TV Stations: Mark Crispin Miller on Bill Moyers Discussing Election Fraud

Details: http://electiondefensealliance.org/MCM_Moyers_Journal_pbs [171]


Thanks for your commitment to safeguarding our democracy. Please circulate this action alert and the petition among your friends, lists, groups and other New Yorkers willing to resist the take over of our electoral system,

Rady Ananda, Joanne Lukacher, Andi Novick, Howard Stanislevic

Re-Media Election Transparency Coalition
http://re-mediaetc.blogspot.com/ [169]

Election Defense Alliance.org
http://www.ElectionDefenseAlliance.org/save_ny_levers [170]

--------------------------------------
* "[T]he voting industry sells crap. And that's the problem." -- SBoE Commissioner Kellner, 6/19/08

Reclaim the Vote, Day by Day

Nov. 9 - Actions for Day 2 of Reclaiming the Vote (Click here) [172]

Nov 8 - Day 1, Reclaiming the Vote: "Widespread Vote-Switching" [173] -- EDA Data Analysis Project

Reverse Mississippi's Deliberate Ballot Design Manipulation

Update: In a partial victory that fell short of actual correction to this situation, the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that state law requires that contests for national office be placed at the top of the ballot (rather than be buried at the bottom) -- but stopped short of issuing an order that this be done.
To download a PDF of the court ruling in Barbour v. Berger click here. [174]
We recommend especially the dissenting opinion by Justice Diaz joined by Easly and Graves.

Action of the Day 091708

-- [Today's action prepared by the Care2 Petition Site: http://www.care2.com]
EDA editor's note: We are reproducing the text of the Care2 Alert verbatim.
The facts speak for themselves. Republican officials in Mississippi in charge of the state's election procedures have deliberately chosen to alter ballot design in violation of state law and common sense, with the predictable result that voters will be disoriented and many will probably error when voting on the U.S. Senate race.

Denouncing the perpetrators of partisan election manipulations like this one is NOT a partisan act on our part.
Election fraud, manipulation, and dirty tricks are wrong no matter who the perpetrators are -- and it is a multipartisan civic duty to put a stop to it.


Republican officials in Mississippi must be desperate. They're pulling out the stops in election shenanigans in an attempt to confuse voters, hoping to push a close Senate contest to the Republican candidate.

Tell the Mississippi governor: The purposefully confusing ballot is illegal!
http://www.care2.com/go/z/e/0Xto/wRCg/E0DA [175]

The Republican Secretary of State decided to bury the Senate race below all local contests on the ballot.
The race, between interim Senator Roger Wicker -- a Republican temporarily appointed to replace Trent Lott -- and former Democratic Governor Ronnie Musgrove, is expected to be close, making it one of the most important in the state.

Not only does burying this Senate race below all the local ones confuse voters, it's a direct violation of state election law, which clearly states that federal races must be on the top of the ballot!

Tell Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour -- who approved the ballot -- to reverse his decision in order to maintain the integrity of America's electoral process!
http://www.care2.com/go/z/e/0Xto/wRCg/E0DA [175]

AttachmentSize
Barbour_v_Berger_order.pdf [174]807.64 KB

Vote Election Transparency into the Top 10 List at Change.org

Action of the Day January 11th through 15th

 

Second, Final Round of Voting Underway for "Top 10 Ideas for Change"

Download PDF flyer [176]

The election integrity proposal Move the Country Towards Transparent Elections [177] at Change.org, won 1st place in the Technology Policy category, qualifying for a runoff contest to place among the "Top 10 ideas for change." Out of 88 finalist ideas, this proposal is the ONLY ONE addressing voting system integrity. The second and FINAL voting round is now underway. Voting ends at 5 pm (Eastern Time) on Thursday, Jan 15th. The top vote-getting proposals will be presented to the Obama administration with advocacy backing from the Change.org coalition of organizations (see below for more about the Change.org coalition). This election transparency proposal, currently with 1500 votes, is in 36th place out of 88 entries. Running in 1st place with 10,219 votes is a proposal to legalize marijuana, while a proposal to forgive student loans is in 10th place with 5061 votes. So, quite a few votes are needed to lift this election transparency proposal into the Top 10. Vote Here Now [177]. The proposal calls for open source software election systems. Although we at EDA advocate HCPB (hand-counted paper ballots) as the most satisfactory solution for a number of practical and philosophical reasons, we can agree with open source advocates that private corporations have no business running elections, and that open source, nontabulating ballot scanners and printers can help overcome linguistic and physical access barriers to voting while screening for accidental overvotes and undervotes. There are many informed and stimulating comments [177] in the discussion on this proposal which we recommend for your consideration. Additionally, there are many other important proposals on a wide range of policy topics [178], and you may vote for as many as you like. Whatever other issues you may wish to support, however, we urge everyone to cast a vote for election transparency [177]. As we should all realize by now, without honest elections, no other aspirations for positive social change can be achieved. "Change" begins with ensuring that our votes count! Vote Here Now [177].

Here's How to Help:

1. Vote in the final round [177]. Then help us GOTV (get-out-the-vote): 2. Link this page to your web or social networking site. (Use the "Bookmark/Share" tools in the top right column). 3. Forward this page using the "E-mail this page" link at the foot of this article. 3. Send e-mail blasts to your lists now through the 15th. Feel free to attach or link to this PDF flyer [176] Dale Axelrod of the EDA Communications Working Group is mobilizing the GOTV effort behind this proposal. Contact Dale with your ideas and offers of assistance: E-mail [179] Voice Mail (24 hrs): 415-824-1549 Mobile: 707-235-9089

Download PDF flyer [176]


More Details about Change.org and the "Top 10 Ideas for Change"

Source: http://www.change.org/ideas [180]

What is Ideas for Change in America?

Ideas for Change in America is a citizen-driven project that aims to identify and create momentum around the best ideas for how the Obama Administration and 111th Congress can turn the broad call for "change" across the country into specific policies. The project is nonpartisan, and invites all political points of view. It is not connected to the Obama campaign or the Obama Administration.

How does it work?

Anyone can submit an idea and comment and vote on others. The top 10 rated ideas will be presented to the Obama Administration on Inauguration Day, January 20, 2009 as the "Top 10 Ideas for America." We will then launch a national campaign behind each idea and mobilize the collective energy of the millions of members of Change.org, MySpace, and partner organizations to ensure that each winning idea gets the full consideration of the Obama Administration and Members of Congress.

How are the top ideas determined?

The "Top 10 Ideas for America" will be determined through two rounds of voting. In the first round, ideas will compete against other ideas in the same issue category. The first round will end on December 31, 2008, and the top 3 rated ideas from each category will make it into the second round. The second round of voting will begin on Monday, January 5, and each qualifying idea will compete against the qualifying ideas from all other categories. Second round voting will end on Thursday, January 15.

AttachmentSize
PB Verified Elections 2010-2.pdf [176]132.18 KB

Work-from Home Volunteers to Help Document '08 Elections


Action of the Day

Monday 11.17.08

Working from your home computer, here's how you can help with EDA Election '08 exit poll and monitoring projects.

We currently have 3 projects to choose from.

1. Entering exit poll questionnaires into a database entry form.

2. Researching voter turnout in conjunction with the exit poll project.

3. Entering election monitoring reports for Save-R-Vote.

In all cases we will provide you a coordinator contact, easy instructions, and an estimate of how much work/time is involved.
You choose how much time you can put in.

Follow the "Read more" jump link for details and contacts.
Click the "E-mail this page" link to forward this request to others.


EVEP Data Entry


The Election Verification Exit Poll (EVEP) project conducted about 40 citizen exit polls in 12 different states in this presidential election.

Data analysts are working on the numbers, but they could use your help entering the exit poll responses into a master database.

Data entry is as simple as clicking selection boxes with a mouse.

The more people we have taking small portions of this work, the sooner we can complete the database and begin publishing results.

If you can help, please send an E-mail to Info@ElectionDefenseAlliance.org [6] with "EVEP Data Entry" in the Subject line.

Or, leave a phone message with your contact information at: 510 275 5723.


Election Turnout Research


To augment and refine results of the citizen exit polls, this project is to collect information on voter participation rates by party registration, drawing on poll registers and related election day records. Work involves navigating government websites and possibly phone queries with county election admin and IT staff. Should take a few hours.
If you can help, please send an E-mail to Info@ElectionDefenseAlliance.org [6] with "Turnout research" in the Subject line.
Or, leave a phone message with your contact information at: 510 275 5723.

Election Monitoring Data Entry


Data entry consists of reading monitor checklists and entering the remarks in a spreadsheet table.
Getting this information into a database will enable the project to quantify and analyze the problems identified on election day
in this survey of Riverside County precincts by EDA affiliate group, Save-R-Vote, one of the most experienced election monitoring groups in the country.
If you can help, please send an E-mail to Info@ElectionDefenseAlliance.org [6] with "Monitoring checklist" in the Subject line.
Or, leave a phone message with your contact information at: 510 275 5723.
Please forward this request to anyone you know who might be able to help.

Thank you,

Dan Ashby
EDA Co-founder and Director

Election Defense Alliance is a sponsored project of International Humanities Center, a 501(c)(3) organization

Let the People Count

Had Enough of "Faith-Based" Elections Entrusted to a Corporate Machine?

Tell Congress and the Media You Want Paper Ballots Counted By Hand in The Precincts. Then Sign Up to Join the WE COUNT Corps.

Click Here [181] for a quick, one-click way to write your U.S. Senators, your Representative, and your regional newspaper all at once. We provide a sample letter you can adapt to make your own. Copy, paste, alter, and add what you want to say. Click here to Act [181]

Do More --

Volunteer to hand-count ballots in your local precinct:

Click here to Join the WE COUNT Corps [182]

THUR NOV 9 -- Day 2 of Reclaiming the Vote

Action 1

Send in Election Night CNN and CBS Exit Poll Screen Captures to EDA Data Analysis Project

Think the 2006 Midterm Elections were clean? Think again!
Early analysis shows that the mainstream media exit polls have been shifted about 3% to the right.

EDA was able to capture unadulterated exit poll figures for only a few of the states at a few time intervals.

Collecting as many of the original exit poll displays BEFORE they were "adjusted" is our highest election forensics priority.
(But keep on sending county and precinct election data, too!)

IMPORTANT! Do NOT just collect what is on news sites now.
Make sure you are sending in original, nonrevised exit polls you captured on election night.
REPEAT, the exit polls that are displaying now on news sites such as CNN and CBS have been falsified.

Send your exit poll captures from CNN* and CBS (two different exit polls)
to EDA Data Analysis [183]

(The CNN display is the main network news consortium exit poll. CBS commissioned a second, different exit poll).


Action 2

Observe and Collect the Manual Tallies in Your Counties-- Call Today!

(This action alert from Verified Voting, about the Transparency Project, a comprehensive plan to document all phases of the Midterm election.)

Today's focus: Capture the Voter Verified Paper Records and/or Manual Tally random sampling of the vote totals.

Read on, then phone your local election office to find out when and where these counts will be conducted, and go observe,record,and send in the results to the Transparency Project [184].

* (Please forward to the EDA Election Data Analysis Project [185] also).
__________________________

Friends,

We're now on the other side of Election Day -- can you believe it? But the election is not over yet -- the vote-counting continues, and so must our efforts to protect democracy! We need you, RIGHT NOW, to find out if and when manual audits are occurring in your area, and if they are, to go and observe the auditing process.

As many of you know firsthand, people in various parts of the country worked very hard over the last few years to achieve an important safety net for our democracy: voter-verified paper records (VVPR's) and routine manual audits. VVPR's provide for recovery of voter intent - and, thus, for accurate elections - in the case of machine failure. Manual auditing of the VVPR's serves as a diagnostic tool that can be used to pinpoint and uncover hidden problems, ensuring that our elections, no matter how smooth they may seem on the outside, accurately reflect the will of the people.

Please check to see whether audits might be happening in your area. If so, we urge you to IMMEDIATELY take the following steps:

1. Call the elections department in your county, township, or voting jurisdiction TODAY to find out when and where the audit will be conducted. Please be aware that the audits will begin VERY soon in most places, which means that you MUST call NOW.

2. Make sure you know the requirements to observe in your area, if any.

3. Participate in observing a portion or all of the audit process. Don't worry if you can't observe the whole process - any observation that you're able to conduct will be useful.

4. Complete Verified Voting's Audit Observation Questionnaire. There are two separate questionnaires -- one for manual audits of votes cast on a specific percentage of machines or percent/number of votes, the other for manual audits of a specific percentage of precincts -- depending on the state in which you live. Please keep reading for information on your area!

5. Submit your completed questionnaire to Verified Voting, so that we can compare auditing practices in different areas. The information that you submit will be made publicly available, minus any personally identifiable information.

You can submit your completed questionnaire online at http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=6409 [184],

or you can fax it to us at 940-403-2255,

or mail the hard copy to Verified Voting, 1550 Bryant St., Suite 855, San Francisco, CA 94103.

Out of the twenty-eight states that now have a VVPR requirement statewide, thirteen have an audit requirement (see http://verifiedvoting.org/audits [186]). KY and PA also have an audit requirement, even though there's no VVPR law -- and some additional states do them voluntarily.

If you live in CO, CT, NM, NY, WA, or PA:

Fill out the machine questionnaire, which can be downloaded here: http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/downloads/AuditQ-Machine.pdf [187]

If you live in AK, AZ, CA, HI, IL, KY, MN, NC, or WV:

Fill out the precinct questionnaire, which can be downloaded here: http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/downloads/AuditQ-Precinct.pdf [188]

A few additional notes on various states:

AZ - If you live here, due to the way the law is written, you may need to push to make sure the audit actually happens. AZ may need actual participants to carry out the audit, not just observers.

CO - Be a part of history! The audits here will be the first ever under the new statewide requirement.

MN - If you plan to observe in this state, please contact us at observer@verifiedvoting.org [189], so that we can put you in touch with the group that is coordinating an observation effort there.

NM - This state's audit law doesn't take effect until 2007, but it would be a good idea for the Secretary of State to conduct one anyway. Consider orchestrating a letter-writing campaign to the Secretary of State to make it happen. People there have already been writing to the editors of local newspapers.

NV - There is no audit requirement here, but audits have been conducted for the past few years. Call your elections department for more information.

PA - Audits here are of a specific percent/number of votes (as opposed to a specific percentage of randomly selected machines or precincts).

VT - This state doesn't have an audit requirement, but might conduct one. Call your elections department to find out if it's happening.

Your observation of audits can help to:

- Pinpoint specific machine-related or vote-counting problems.
- Ensure that audits are being conducted in the way that they are supposed to be by law in your area, and if not, ensure documentation of errors that occur in the process.
- Determine the best methods for conducting audits in the future (e.g., is it better to randomly select machines? precincts? etc.).

Effective manual audits entail hand-counting a significant number of the paper ballots and comparing those totals to the machine counts in order to make sure the system is counting properly. Manual audits can help us tell whether the machinery of our democracy is working properly. Your participation will make a difference! Make that call now to find out where and when to GOTO - Get Out To Observe!

All the best,

Courtenay

Courtenay Strickland Bhatia
President, Verified Voting
415-487-2255 work
415-235-0126 cell
http://www.verifiedvoting.org/ [190]

Every vote must count as cast.

Vote for Election Transparency by Midnight 12/31

 

Deadline Tonight Dec. 31st at Midnight Pacific Time (3:00 a.m. Eastern, 2:00 a.m. Central) Cast your votes NOW at www.Change.org [191] for Election Integrity and Transparency. Complete Details Below.

Thousands of citizens inspired by the Obama presidency are submitting policy proposals to a contest called "Ideas for Change in America" sponsored at the website www.Change.org [191]. Voting in the first round closes TONIGHT Dec. 31st at midnight (Pacific time). That gives the eastern half of the country enough time to party in the New Year and still vote until 3:00 a.m. The top 3 proposals voted for in each category will advance to a final round of voting, from January 5 through January 15. The top 10 proposals to emerge from the final voting round will be presented to the Obama Administration on Inauguration Day as the "Top 10 Ideas for America." To read more below about "Ideas for Change in America" and the consortium of organizations sponsoring Change.org, see the bottom of this article, and visit this link: http://www.change.org/ideas/faq [192] And while you're at the Change.org website, be sure to visit the EDA page: http://www.change.org/electiondefensealliance [193] The page just went up, and could use some testimonials to fill it in. If you like what we do, please leave a good word for us. Thanks!

3 Election Integrity Proposals are in the Running -- But They Need Your Votes!

You can vote for all 3 EI proposals from this page, using the widgets below. The widgets will take you to the webpage for each proposal. You will see a Vote button on the page, and when you click it, you will be prompted to open an account. It only takes a minute; then you can vote. There are three different EI proposals in three different categories --but only one of them at the moment is in a position to get past this first elimination round. In the Technology Policy category, a proposal called "Move the country towards transparent election systems" is in 1st place with more than 700 votes and seems positioned to advance to the second voting round. This proposal, initiated by an Open Source voting proponent, and boosted with votes by Open Voting Consortium members, is very open and nonprescriptive in its language: Move the country towards transparent election systems The currently utilized intellectual property software based election systems have been proven deficient by government study ( CA Secretary of State Top to Bottom Review etc)- Transparency in government should start with elections- We must implement uniform, open source, paper ballot systems by immediately conducting feasibility studies. The Obama administration should consider candidates with open government understanding when interpreting EAC positions. -- Brent Turner (Election Reform Activists for Obama ), SF, CA Dec 13 http://www.change.org/ideas/view/move_the_country_towards_transparent_el... [177] This idea is currently in 1st Place in Technology Policy and is in position to make it into the second round. But no sense in being complacent. EDA recommends voting for this measure, since it is the ONLY election-integrity-related proposal that has a chance of advancing past this elimination round of voting. (EI advocates of all stripes can debate the message once this proposal makes it to the second round of voting). You can vote for this issue RIGHT NOW by clicking this widget. (Be sure to come back and vote for the 2 HCPB proposals too).

The HCPB Proposals

There are two HCPB (hand-counted paper ballot) proposals in two different categories. Clearly, EDA advocates HCPB solutions to the election crisis. But neither of the HCPB proposals have nearly enough votes to survive the elimination round. We recommend voting for them anyhow. There is no penalty for multiple voting, and every vote counts. Maybe the 1048 members of this EDA news alert list can do something to improve those numbers between now and midnight -- especially the 94 of you who have offered to forward EDA announcements on to your own e-mail lists! You can vote for each of the 3 EI proposals using the widgets embedded on this page. And, you can FORWARD this message right now by clicking the E-mail this article link at the foot of this page. In the Other [194] category, a HCPB proposal called "Return to citizen-run, citizen-counted, citizen monitored elections" is currently in 57th Place in Other and needs 1858 more votes to make it into the second round. Here are the top 3 issues in the Other category: 3,310 votes, Appoint Secretary of Peace in Department of Peace and Non-Violence 1,989 votes, Repeal the Patriot Act 1,921 votes, End Corporate "Personhood" Return to citizen-run, citizen-counted, citizen monitored elections reads in part: Control of elections must be taken back from corporations, whose procedures right now and for the last several election cycles equate to secret vote counting (with secret software and non-transparent procedures -AND brought back into the hands of citizens through hand-counted paper ballot elections - WITH enhanced security procedures such as video cameras on the ballot box - WITH citizens monitoring all day - WITH ballot boxes never leaving the table until 7pm when the box seals are broken and multi-partisan teams of citizens count all the votes until they all agree on the totals...AND TOTALS are posted, as Tom said, AT THE PRECINCT LEVEL. In this way, ballot boxes are extremely difficult if not impossible to stuff; ballot boxes may end up in the river or in the trunk of someone's car, but only after all the votes are counted. If any other computerized counting device is used as a second count, the hand count MUST be the "count of record" or the real results can easily be subverted. For the full text, see: http://www.change.org/ideas/view/return_to_citizen-run_citizen-counted_c... [195] To vote for it now, click the widget:

Be sure to come back and vote for the other EI proposals too.


The other HCPB proposal, in the Government Reform category, is called Hand Counted Paper Ballots (NOW), and reads as follows: Hand Counted Paper Ballots (NOW) The most single urgent issue confronting this country, preceding in importance all others, simply because it presupposes all other change in government, is emergent need for the return to observable voting process; and the only way to do that securely, and with voter confidence worthy of the name, is through the casting and counting of hard copy (i.e., paper) ballots, and posted at the precinct level, so as to secure the chain of custody for citizens. We have seen our democracy hijacked, de facto, by privatized voting interests, counting our votes in secret, an event that is absolute anathema to any believer in democracy, and prohibited by the U.S. Constitution, which mandates that one person shall cast a vote. Not a machine. The only way to return citizen confidence to voting, crucial to a credible and legitimate democracy, is to cast observable, palpable, ballots without the mediation of machines (or private voting criminals, ah, companies) and to have those ballots counted by fellow citizens as may be drafted at random, such as we do juries. If we do not resolve these chain of custody issues, we will not be secure in the results of our elections, nor even know who it is that controls and calculates them. We the People...must know; or change will be stillborn, void, and meaningless. -- John Ervin, Balboa, CA Dec 27 http://www.change.org/ideas/view/hand_counted_paper_ballots_now [196] This idea is currently in 46th Place in Government Reform [197] and needs 1427 more votes to make it into the second round.


Pull Out the Stops "til Midnight, Then Plan for Round 2

Dale Axelrod, a member of the EDA Communications Working Group [198], is taking the lead promoting the EI vote in the "Ideas for Change" contest. Dale writes: ". . . we need to make an diligent effort to maintain our 1st place position through tomorrow night. It looks like it's going to be neck and neck with the hardcore, internet savvy, 3rd-place proponents from now 'til midnight on the 31st. Can you email any of your private lists to vote today? (I can send you a sample email message if you'll email me directly.) Also we want to get organized now so we'll be ready when the 2nd round begins on Monday, January 5. Each qualifying idea will compete against the qualifying ideas from all other categories. The voting will end on Thursday, January 15. We need to be smart about our cyber-GOTV effort. Can you help with a second e-mail blast to your lists when the time comes, or do you have any other connections (i.e., social networking), or other ideas? Please reply via e-mail directly to me (dalea@sonic.net [179]) ASAP so we can get setup and ready to roll on January 5th. Thanks, Dale Sonoma County Democratic Central Committee, Alternate, District 2 www.ElectionDefenseAlliance.org [199] Communications Working Group ------------------ Dale Axelrod ------- Petaluma CA 94952-3212 Phones (California, USA): ----- SF Voice Mail (24 hrs): 415-824-1549 -------------------------- Mobile: 707-235-9089 Web sites ----------- www.verifygra.com [200] ------------------------- www.paperballot.info [201] ------------------------- www.caricaturist.com [202] Email ---------------- dalea@sonic.net [179]


Source: http://www.change.org/ideas [180]

What is Ideas for Change in America?

Ideas for Change in America is a citizen-driven project that aims to identify and create momentum around the best ideas for how the Obama Administration and 111th Congress can turn the broad call for "change" across the country into specific policies. The project is nonpartisan, and invites all political points of view. It is not connected to the Obama campaign or the Obama Administration.

How does it work?

Anyone can submit an idea and comment and vote on others. The top 10 rated ideas will be presented to the Obama Administration on Inauguration Day, January 20, 2009 as the "Top 10 Ideas for America." We will then launch a national campaign behind each idea and mobilize the collective energy of the millions of members of Change.org, MySpace, and partner organizations to ensure that each winning idea gets the full consideration of the Obama Administration and Members of Congress.

How are the top ideas determined?

The "Top 10 Ideas for America" will be determined through two rounds of voting. In the first round, ideas will compete against other ideas in the same issue category. The first round will end on December 31, 2008, and the top 3 rated ideas from each category will make it into the second round. The second round of voting will begin on Monday, January 5, and each qualifying idea will compete against the qualifying ideas from all other categories. Second round voting will end on Thursday, January 15.

Actions for Super Tuesday and Beyond

What You Can Do to Defend the Vote on Super Tuesday

1. Vote (on a real paper ballot whenever possible)
2. Voter Education at the Polls
3. Record Precinct Data at Close of Polls
4. Monitor the Central Count at your County Elections Department

1. VOTE

(of course!)


Voting in person in your local precinct is always the best policy. If you have the option of requesting a paper ballot in lieu of voting DRE, always vote paper, not vapor.
If you have an absentee (mail-in) ballot that you haven't already mailed, walk it in to your local polling site on election day, or take it in person to the county election department any time prior to election day.
If you are voting on an optical scan system, the most reliable way to have your vote correctly read is to
mark your vote with a firm Number 2 leaded pencil!


2. VOTER EDUCATION at the POLLS


If you can "work the polls," election day is a great opportunity for effective voter education. (See informational flyer download links).
To avoid the appearance of "electioneering" you will have to meet voters 150 feet beyond the poll entrance. (See further notes below).

Sure it can be daunting -- talking to fellow citizens about democracy, and the government we share responsibility for.
But it is necessary!

Take along a friend or two and suddenly, it's not so hard.
You will find it is one of the most satisfying civic action experiences you've ever had.
Try it -- you'll like it. Trust us on this.

INFORMATION SHEETS you can download, print, and hand out to voters:

a. How Do You Know? (handbill)
http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/HowDoYouKnow.pdf [203]

8 mini-handbills per sheet. Photocopy and slice along cutlines.
Color gets attention! Color copies cost about 50 cents. Otherwise, B&W will do.

b. VOTERS' "TOP 10" 411
What the Corporate Newsmedia Aren't Telling You About Elections and Your Vote

http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/EDA_Top10_rev020508.pdf [204]

The "Top 10" factsheet above can be printed back-to-back with the election integrity volunteer form below:
( Problem-solving Sequence: 1. Get Informed. 2. Take Corrective Action. Right? )

c. Election Integrity Volunteer Signup Sheet
http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/Volunteer_Signup_020508.pdf [205]


A Note About "Electioneering"
Some people -- including election officials -- may try to tell you what you're doing is "electioneering" and illegal. It's not.
You are informing people about the realities of computer vote counting, which is a multipartisan concern.
This has nothing to do with advocating a vote for or against any candidate or issue, therefore it IS NOT electioneering.

3. RECORD PRECINCT DATA at close of polls

Be present at 8:00 with a clipboard, notepad, pen, flashlight -- and digital camera if you have one.
Ask the pollworkers to copy or photograph the information on the pollworkers' signed summary report (sometimes called the "Blue Sheet")
that records how many voters cast ballots in the precinct; how many ballots were received, voted, or voided; how many foreign language and provisional ballots were cast; and other important information. Also ask to see and record the voter sign-in sheets (showing who voted at the precinct) and any machine trouble reports.

Watch the pollworkers print out the machine end-of-day vote reports from the voting machines. Then copy by hand, or photograph, these "poll tapes" after the pollworkers post them on the outside of the polling site.

If you can, please upload this information to the Precint Tally Capture Project: (link forthcoming)


4. OBSERVE the CENTRAL COUNT at your COUNTY ELECTION DEPARTMENT


You are a member of the voting public and have the right to observe election procedures so long as you don't obstruct the election workers.
Don't let anybody tell you any different.

Things to bring: Clipboards, notepads, pens, digital cameras, video cameras, tape recorders, cell phones, and binoculars (to see the tabulator monitor screens).

For further instructions on Central Count Monitoring, LOOK HERE [65]

ALSO See BBV and OEJC guides below for additional details about what to watch for and questions to ask.

ADDITIONAL GUIDES to ELECTION DAY MONITORING

BlackBoxVoting.org's Guide to Election Monitoring: What To Watch For [206]

Also: Download the comprehensive 2006 Citizens' Toolkit by Black Box Voting Citizen's Tool Kit [74]

Ohio Election Justice Campaign: Quarantine That Machine! [75]
(Treat election violations as a crime scene)


AttachmentSize
HowDoYouKnow.pdf [207]1.65 MB

BBV Guide to Election Monitoring: What to Watch For


BBV_What_to_Watch_ForOriginal content posted at Blackboxvoting.org [81]. Cross-posted here with full attribution to BlackBoxVoting.org.

Visit the posts under this topic at BBV to discuss Super Power Tuesday and report your own experience with issues like those discussed in this article.

LOTS MORE INFORMATION: Download BlackBoxVoting's "2006 Citizens' Tool Kit" [74] for a comprehensive guide to election integrity actions year-round.

For detailed action focused on the election cycle, download the 2008 Citizens' Tool Kit [82] edition.


WHAT TO LOOK FOR:

Journalistic malpractice
Watch for the media to announce who "wins" instead of stating "We predict (name of candidate) will win." News channels are supposed to report the news, not create the news. Results as reported by the news never match the actual results, by the way.

What to do: Object and reject premature "calls." Get the facts, however long it takes, and report them, wherever you can.

Also watch for:

"The gray pie slice" -- In New Hampshire, CNN used a gray pie slice without a name to represent Ron Paul. Other candidates, even when pie
slices were smaller, were colored and had candidate names affixed.

What to do: Record coverage start to finish to gather evidence of any journalistic malpractice.

Also watch for: Eroding vote totals. You may see candidate totals go DOWN during the count.

What to do: Record coverage start to finish.

Also watch for:
Unusual fluctuations or insufficient variations with minor candidates.
In one Minnesota district in 2004, for example, ALL MINOR CANDIDATES received the same percentages of votes, until screen shots were posted
and questioned by Internet watchdogs. Then the vote totals were spread more normally. In Florida in 2000, at one point the Socialist Worker
Party candidate had more votes dumped into his totals in a single county than he received statewide. One strategy for electronic vote
manipulation involves use of minor candidate vote bins to store votes temporarily.

What to do: Record television coverage start to finish to retain and examine later, and take screen shots of incoming AP totals from sites like http://www.politico.com [84].

WATCH FOR AND DOCUMENT VOTING RIGHTS PROBLEMS IN THREE AREAS:
- Access to voting (voter rolls)
- Fairness (deceptive practices)
- Counting the votes

ACCESS TO VOTING
Watch for: - Registrations hijacked to a different party - Omissions and improper additions to the voter rolls The new "electronic pollbooks" help to block citizen oversight and also introduce sophisticated attack vectors.

What to do:
Gather evidence: Documents, records, video, audio and photographs.
Persevere - keep gathering proof, even after the election is over.
Example: When voter registration is hijacked to a different party, there should be a paper trail. Find out your state's regulations for the paperwork
needed to change a voter's party preference. Use public records requests to request the backup documents. If they can't produce them,
expose the fraud by propagating the evidence, to blogs, legislators, citizens groups. Get your evidence to at least five different entities.
Find out if your local jurisdiction is now using electronic voter sign-in instead of observable paper pollbooks.

DECEPTIVE PRACTICES
Watch for:
Omission of candidate names on the ballot or screen; misdirection about where/when/how to vote; misleading ballot design; confusing or
misleading instructions; intimidation tactics

What to do:
Gather evidence and propagate it.

If it happens in the polling place:
Call an elections worker over and show them; then ask that they write the incident down to document it, and watch to see that they do so.
Then submit a formal public records request for a copy of the incident report and any other incident reports throughout the jurisdiction.

If it happens outside the polling place:
Video, photograph, get documents, and if you obtain evidence, propagate it to at least five entities, including Internet sites, mainstream
news, legislators, elections officials and citizens groups.

VOTE COUNTING
Watch for: Whether you can see the chain of custody; whether you can see the votes themselves being counted.

CHAIN OF CUSTODY:
The greatest risk for manipulation of the count is from inside access.
The best way to prevent vote-counting fraud by insiders is to require a fully public chain of custody. If chain of custody is not public, even
spot checks, audits and recounts will fail to ensure integrity in the election. Your ability to review chain of custody varies depending on your jurisdiction. Most locations nowadays have removed chain of custody from public view - which means citizens must go to
extraordinary lengths to learn the simplest information, if they can get it at all.

Look for:
Weak links in the chain, or "narrow spots in the pipe" where just a few people, or just one person, has access to the votes before (or shortly
after) the vote count is announced. JUST ONE BROKEN LINK means the vote count cannot be trusted.

What to do:
Get evidence of broken links, narrow spots in the pipeline, or inside-only access/oversight. Evidence means documents and videotape. Persevere
- it may take time to evaluate even one link in the chain. When you get evidence that the chain has been broken or left public view, propagate the evidence to at least five entities, like blogs, voting rights groups, open government groups, the media, and public officials. Prepare
a report with a local group of citizens, submit it to those with authority in your jurisdiction, request remediation of individual
issues before the next election.

ACCURACY OF THE VOTE COUNT Except in hand count locations, you will be unable to see your votes being counted. The counting is now controlled by government insiders and voting machine programmers. Your right to citizen sovereignty over your own government is at stake, and you have been placed in the position of trying to get circumstantial evidence to authenticate the count. This places an extraordinary and unsustainable burden on the citizenry. You can surrender the voting process to government insiders now, or you can put up a fight.

Look for:
On DRE (touch-screen, dial-a-vote) systems - observe screens carefully, watch for vote-hopping to selections you did not choose. The vote may hop to another choice immediately or after a delay, or even after you have page to a new screen.

What to do:
Stop the process immediately, call an elections worker over, see if you can replicate it, request that they write the incident down, stay and
watch while they do so, make a formal request for the public record of their incident reports and all other incident reports in your jurisdiction. Double and triple check before casting votes, and document all anomalies. (If you witness vote-hopping on a dial-a-vote system like the Hart eSlate, document it using every means necessary and contact Black Box Voting, BradBlog, and VotersUnite.)

After polls close, videotape poll closing activities and videotape the results tape and any other reconciliation forms filled out by poll
workers. If they won't let you videotape, then videotape them telling you that you cannot watch, or that you can't capture evidence of the
poll closing and counting procedures.

On optical scan systems (fill in bubble, draw arrow):
Observe whether the vote count increments when you deposit your ballot. After polls close, videotape poll closing activities and videotape the results tape from the optical scan machine and also videotape any other reconciliation forms filled out by poll workers. These should include number of ballots provided, cast, unused and spoiled, along with number of voters checked in to vote.

If you live in New York:
Most New Yorkers are voting on lever machines, which -- unlike the scanners and DREs -- are extremely difficult to tamper with in a wholesale, nontransparent way. However, many New Yorkers do not realize that customized Sequoia scanners are used to count tens of thousands of
absentee votes. Start asking questions about those votes (chain of custody, counting). Ascertain your rights to observe and examine your
computerized absentee counting system.

Also: New York public records laws include the VENDORS in freedom of information requirements.
Consider submitting public records requests directly to Sequoia Voting Systems. Ask for things like correspondence, incident reports,
invoices, contracts. These vendor-directed records requests are especially important because it looks like New York's Nov. 2008 elections will be run on Sequoia computerized systems, or something similar.

IF YOU LIVE IN GEORGIA, KENTUCKY, CONNECTICUT:
You, too, can request public records DIRECTLY FROM THE VENDOR. Let's get to work on opening them up.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ABOUT ACCURACY OF THE VOTE COUNT
Compare number of voters checked in to vote with number of votes. Note any arithmetic that doesn't add up. You may also want to visit the main elections division for your jurisdiction to observe and record procedures and activities. If you cannot view and record the computer screen, you are being blocked from viewing even circumstantial evidence of the count. Check your state election law as to whether counting votes in secret has ever been authorized. Persevere. Take as much time as it takes to gather real evidence, including evidence of efforts to obstruct your right to oversee chain of custody and counting.

Evidence means: Documents, video, audio and photos.

SURRENDER NOW OR DIG IN FOR THE LONG HAUL
The Government is currently displacing citizen sovereignty over election processes. Assert your right to sovereignty via documentation and
oversight to authenticate election procedures and results, and when your rights are obstructed, gather evidence of this and propagate it. All
evidence you acquire during the primary election cycle should be applied towards regaining citizen sovereignty over elections in the
Nov. 2008 election.

It's easy to become overwhelmed. Yet, if many different citizens simply welcome the awakening of their own civic
duty, trust to their own common sense and innate creativity, and take just one step, the next will become clear.
Trust me on this. Good luck and God bless, Bev Harris Founder - Black Box Voting

Guide to Gathering Election Evidence: A 5-page digest. Download BBV's "Gathering Evidence" [72]

Citizens' Toolkit 2008: A five-point guide to essential monitoring actions on election day Download BBV 2008 Citizens' Toolkit [85]

Citizens' Toolkit 2006: A general guide to year-round election monitoring and investigation Download BBV 2006 Citizens' Toolkit [86]


Quarantine That Machine! Treat Election Violations as a Crime Scene

QuarantineThat Machine
Subject: Treat improper voting machine functioning as a crime scene
Quarantine That Machine!


The Ohio Election Justice Campaign Announces Citizen Action To Take Back Our US Elections
If the voting machine you use behaves in an illegal manner, it should be treated as part of a crime scene. The theft of your vote is a crime by the voting machine & its vendors against YOU. Treat is as such.
What should I do, you ask?
If the touch screen voting machine you vote on in 2008, or at any time in the future, is behaving in a manner that appears illegal, it should be investigated.
What to look for, including but not limited to:
Vote Hopping -
This is when you vote for a candidate or an issue, and your vote hops and goes to another candidate or issue on the screen. We are
generally told it is a calibration problem. For the voter, this means you vote is not recorded for who or what you intended. You have been robbed.
Paper Tape records other than what you voted -
Please take the time to read the paper tape when you vote. If you find that the tape prints something other than what you voted, remember.there are many problems with the machines counting our votes in secret. There is no way to verify that the machine counted your vote as you see it on
the screen, nor as the paper tape reads. Yet, if there is a recount audit, the paper record is the voting record.

Your vote will be counted as the paper trail reads at such an audit. The paper tape should read the same information as what you voted. If you wear
glasses, bring them, some tapes are printed very light, and therefore are hard to read.

Take Action!
Tell the Poll Worker / Election Judge what happened. Let them know you want the voting machine pulled from use in the election.
IMPORTANT! Do not harm or manipulate the machine. It needs to bet in the "same condition" for any forensic investigation. Tell the poll worker not to manipulate the machine in an effort to correct the problem. The most important step of taking action is then filing a police report with local law
enforcement to document this possible case of election fraud. The statistics later will document how widespread the problem is.

Typical reactions to expect to your complaint:
The reflex action of a typical judge when told that a voting machine is malfunctioning is to try to help the voter to get the machine working properly. But, when the malfunction is a mismatch between the faceplate and the paper trail, the normal "be-helpful" response many result in the destruction of evidence in a crime scene.
Let us say that a voting machine had been reprogrammed to flip every twentieth vote from candidate XX to candidate YY. Such an occasional
"malfunction" would not provide an easy-to-detect pattern. Further, it would be reasonable to assume that such a reprogrammed machine would
also be set to discontinue using the flipping subroutine when someone tries to correct the apparent "malfunction" by, for example, canceling
and re-voting.
Therefore, it seems reasonable for Poll Workers and Election Judges to be trained on how to react when a voting
machine has a mismatch between the faceplate and the paper trail, or for a vote that hops.

(a) Have the voter move away from the machine. Thank the voter for catching the discrepancy, and explain to him/her what just happened.

(b) Place an OUT OF ORDER sign on the machine and report the "malfunction" to independent law enforcement and notify the Board of Elections or election officials in your state of the problem. Then treat the problem voting machine as evidence in a possible crime scene.

(c) Restart the voter on another machine, or on a paper ballot that will be counted, not a provisional ballot that "may" be counted.

Empowering the Voters and Poll Workers for Detecting Possible Election Fraud and Demanding Legal Investigation

A Special Note for Poll Workers and Election Officials
You are the public guardians of our elections. Please quarantine any machine for which a voter tells you of problems, asks for it to be
quarantined, or any that you are aware is malfunctioning in a suspicious manner; regardless of whether the voter knows that they may
request this. Please treat voters with respect if they ask to Quarantine The Machine, and do not push the buttons, or manipulate the
machine in any way. Treat the machine as part of a crime scene. Contact Law Enforcement to pick up the machine and investigate it, and write it
up. Let the Board of Elections, or other proper election officials above you know what has happened. A forensic examination of the machine
is needed, to study why it malfunctioned. It is our hope that law enforcement will confiscate these machines as possible evidence and
assist the public to get such a study done. These machines should not be returned to your local election officials but rather quarantined by
independent investigative authorities. We realize that there is going to be a huge problem. How do you get the existing votes out of such a
machine? It is our hope, that you will let them sit, and wait for the needed investigation.

In Ohio on December 17th, Michael W. Deemer, Chief Deputy Attorney General for Government Affairs of the Ohio Attorney General's office, and two other legal staff members were informed of the Quarantine The Machine program. His phone number is (614) 728-5462. They were asked to put something in place across the state of Ohio, and across the nation via the other state Attorneys General, to prepare for this program. A prepared written plan for law enforcement is needed, and has been requested. These proper authorities should have qualified individuals available to investigate the voting machines that are quarantined on election night. If the state of Ohio is not ready to deal with the citizen action of Quarantine That Machine, and the nations law enforcement has not been warned, you might want to call Chief Deputy Deemer and ask why.

As of this date, February 4, 2008, and according to his office staff, nothing is in place now. They have informed the OEJC they will only prepare law enforcement if the Secretary of State requests them to. The Attorney General's office has been advised by the OEJC to prepare Ohio, and to let the other Attorneys General across the nation know this is coming. Prepare your Attorney General in your state, they may not know.

For questions and press inquires, contact Paddy Shaffer, Director,
The Ohio Election Justice Campaign, http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/OEJC [208]
http://www.wakeupandsaveyourcountry.com/oejc.html [209]




Top 10 Reasons Elections Are in Trouble


CLICK HERE to DOWNLOAD [204] and print this page as an informational handout
http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/EDA_Top10_rev020508.pdf [204]


TOP TEN REASONS WHY OUR ELECTIONS ARE IN REAL TROUBLE…

What You Haven’t Read in the Paper or Heard on the News and Need To Know

10. The power elites--the big corporations and their media subsidiaries--are controlling what messages you hear about problems with our election system.

9. Democrats and Republicans have both repeatedly demonstrated that neither have the interests of democracy and its voters at heart when it comes to the electoral process.

8. HAVA, the Help America Vote Act of 2002, was promoted as the solution to the “hanging chad” problems in Florida as well as an aid to the disabled and those citizens not fluent in English. In fact, it became a “feeding frenzy” for vendors of electronic computerized election equipment who saw it as an opportunity to gain money and favor from big government contracts—and to take a direct, if covert, hand in determining who governs America.

7. Beginning in 2004, many independent studies (e.g., Princeton and Johns Hopkins Universities, NYU’s Brennan Center, Congress’ Government Accountability Office, and several Secretaries of State) have proven that all software-driven equipment used in our elections is highly susceptible to malfunction and manipulation.

6. Many people believe that a mandatory “paper trail” and a spot audit of the trail, will make electronic voting secure. But there are simply too many ways around these provisions.

5. Audits, and even recounts, now have a history of being subverted, as much as the elections they are intended to validate.

4. There is NO REASON to assume that the vote the voter thought he or she cast on a touchscreen was what was recorded inside the machine and what was printed on the paper trail. There is NO REASON to assume that the vote on a paper ballot fed into an Optical Scanner is counted as the voter intended.

3. Using the rationale that disabled people need touchscreen machines for independent and private voting ignores the fact that totally mechanical paper-based systems have been developed as alternatives to computerized equipment and are being used in some jurisdictions with equal effectiveness.

2. Corporate take-over of our democracy is occurring right under our noses. Elections are now being owned, operated, and often decided by corporations – not voters.

1. An honest election system means that the citizens can actually SEE THE VOTES BEING COUNTED, and participate in the process. Without that, the rest is just a show.

Most democracies in the world count at least the major races by hand.
It is a tried and true system, tested through the centuries.
WHY DON’T WE?

Election Defense Alliance (EDA) is a nationwide network of citizen election integrity groups and individuals
working at the national, state, and local levels to ensure that our election process is honest,
transparent, secure, subject to unambiguous verification, and fully accountable to the public.

We invite you to come work with us. http://www.ElectionDefenseAlliance.org [199]

CLICK HERE to download Volunteer Signup Form [205]
http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/Volunteer_Signup_020508.pdf [205]

Election Defense Alliance is a project of International Humanities Center

AttachmentSize
EDA_Top10_rev020508.pdf [210]297.61 KB
Volunteer_Signup_020508.pdf [211]135.74 KB

Aug. 4 Action: Study Decertification Directives and Thank Secretary Bowen!

CA Voting System Review page 080307 Send Congratulations and Messages of Support to Secretary Bowen
E-mail to votingsystems@sos.ca.gov [212] or phone (916) 651-7834
On August 3, 2007, Secretary Bowen announced her decisions regarding which systems in the review will be permitted to be used in the 2008 elections and beyond. The following documents detail Secretary Bowen's decisions.

Decertification/Recertification Decisions Issued August 3, 2007,
by California Secretary of State Debra Bowen

Diebold Election Systems, Inc.

  • Withdrawal of Approval/Conditional Reapproval [213] (.pdf, 6,734KB)

Hart InterCivic

  • Withdrawal of Approval/Conditional Reapproval for Hart System 6.2.1 [214] (.pdf, 5,886KB)
  • Voluntary Withdrawal of Certification of Hart System 6.1 [215] (.pdf, 303KB)

Sequoia Voting Systems

  • Withdrawal of Approval/Conditional Reapproval [216] (.pdf, 4,631KB)

Elections Systems and Software, Inc.

  • Rescission and Withdrawal of Approval [217] (.pdf, 303KB)




  • Voting Systems Certification

  • E-Voting - What's it all about? [218]
  • Voting Systems Frequently Asked Questions [219]
  • Overview of the Voting System Certification Process [220]
  • Ten Steps to Voting Systems Certification [221]
  • Voting System Certification Fact Sheet [222]
  • Definition of A Vote [223]

    Below are the conclusions from Bowen's three source code reports

    posted at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_vsr.htm [224]
    Thanks to Jim Soper, (Voting Rights Task Force, Alameda Co. CA) for providing this digest of the individual vendor system security reports. http://www.CountedAsCast.com [225]


    DIEBOLD, pg 65

    Our study of the Diebold source code found that the system does not meet the requirements for a security-critical system. It is built upon an inherently fragile design and suffers from implementation flaws that can expose the entire voting system to attacks. These vulnerabilities, if exploited, could jeopardize voter privacy and the integrity of elections. An attack could plausibly be accomplished by a single skilled individual
    with temporary access to a single voting machine. The damage could be extensive—malicious code could spread to every voting machine in polling places and to county election servers.
    Even with a paper trail, malicious code might be able to subtly influence close elections, and it could disrupt elections by causing widespread equipment failure on election day.

    We conclude that these problems arose because of a failure to design and build the system with security as a central focus, which led to the inconsistent application of accepted security engineering practices. For this reason, the safest way to repair the Diebold system is to reengineer it so that it is secure by design.

    We discussed a number of limited solutions and procedural changes that may improve the security of the system, but we warn that implementing any particular set of technical or procedural safeguards may still be insufficient. Similarly, fixing individual flaws in the system—even all of the issues identified in this report—may not yield a secure voting system because of the possibility that unidentified problems will be exploited. We are also concerned that future updates to the system may introduce new, unknown vulnerabilities or fail to adequately correct known ones. We
    urge the state to conduct further studies to determine whether any new or updated voting systems are secure.

    SEQUOIA, Pg 82

    We found pervasive security weaknesses throughout the Sequoia software. Virtually every important software security mechanism is vulnerable to circumvention. The integrity of elections conducted with the system depends almost entirely on the physical security of the equipment and the procedural controls under
    which election operations are conducted.

    Whether the software vulnerabilities we describe can be compensated for with procedural and physical security mitigations depends on a range of factors, most of which were beyond the scope of this study. However, we caution that mitigation will place considerable additional pressure on physical security features (such as locks and seals) and human procedures (such as two-person control by poll workers). Many of the physical security features and procedures typically used with the
    Sequoia system appear to have been engineered under the assumption that the underlying software is considerably more secure than it actually is, and thus may not provide sufficient protection in light of the vulnerabilities discussed here.

    Designing robust, practical, and effective procedures that substantially reduce the risks identified in this report would itself
    be a very complex task, requiring a broad range of computer security, physical security, legal, and operational elections expertise. As a starting point, we attempted to identify mitigation strategies for the vulnerabilities we discovered. Unfortunately, we were unable to find practical strategies that reliably prevent exploitation of some of the system’s weaknesses. Fixing some of the problems will require substantial changes to the software and the architecture. In fact, we are not optimistic that acceptable practical and secure mitigation
    procedures are even possible for some of the Sequoia system’s components and features, at least in the absence of a comprehensive re-engineering of the system itself.

    The problem is compounded by the inter-related nature of many of the vulnerabilities and the relative ease with which certain attacks can be carried out. As the table in Figure 5.2 summarized, even brief exposure of many system components to an attacker can have ramifications beyond the components themselves.

    Of particular concern is that virtually every software mechanism related to counting votes is
    exposed, directly or indirectly, to compromise through tampering with equipment that is deployed in the field. In many cases, tampering sufficient to cause compromise requires only brief physical access and may leave behind little or no evidence.

    We are regrettably unable to suggest with confidence any comprehensive strategy for mitigating the vulnerabilities in the Sequoia system that simultaneously provides a high assurance of security, maintains accessible DRE voting, and substantially incorporates existing hardware and software.

    HART, pg 87

    Although we had only limited time to review the source code of the system, our review nevertheless uncovered what we believe to be a number of significant security issues. In many cases the Hart system does not incorporate defense-in-depth principles, which may allow individual attacks to be escalated up to much broader attacks.

    The Hart software and devices appear to be susceptible to a variety of attacks which would allow an attacker to gain control of some or all of the systems in a county:

    • The Hart eScan, eSlate, and JBC devices incorporate an unsecured management capability. We believe that given brief physical access to an eScan, eSlate, or JBC device, an attacker can subvert it and overwrite the existing software with malicious software of his choice.

    • These attacks could be mounted by a poll worker or possibly by a voter while in the process of voting. The effects of such an attack are essentially permanent; once malicious software is loaded onto such a device, there is no realistic way to remove it.

    • Subversion of single polling place devices can be used to mount a variety of vote forgery and ballot stuffing attacks.

    • The mechanisms provided by Hart for detecting device subversion appear to be easy to bypass and therefore system subversion is likely to go undetected.

    • The Hart back-end SERVO software contains multiple buffer overflows which appear to be remotely exploitable by a single compromised polling place device. We have exploited one of these in our test environment and used it to install software of our choice on the SERVO machine.

    By combining the above attacks, a malicious pollworker could subvert an eScan, through that SERVO, and through SERVO all the machines in the county for the next election. We have tested what we believe to be the essential elements of this attack but not performed an end-to-end test. Furthermore, a malicious voter could subvert a single eSlate, through that SERVO, and through SERVO all the machines in a county for the next election. We have tested some but not all of the elements of this attack.

    Beyond direct system compromise, we found that Hart’s management of ballot and vote data is vulnerable to several attacks:

    • Hart’s cryptographic key management requires a county-wide symmetric key which is stored on vulnerable field devices. This key can be obtained by an attacker with brief physical access to an eScan or JBC.

    • Compromise of this single key would allow an attacker to forge both ballot information and vote results.

    • We found multiple avenues for compromising voter privacy, enabling both vote buying/coercion and wholesale information gathering attacks.

    This list does not include all the issues discovered during our review and there may be other issues that would be uncovered with further review. We encourage the Secretary of State to undertake such a review.

    We stress that due to limited time and access to Hart equipment, we did not attempt to validate all of the above issues. In the body of the report we clearly indicate the validation status of each issue. We encourage the Secretary of State and Hart to attempt such validation.

    Some of these issues can be mitigated with stricter polling place procedures. Others may be repaired with minor modifications to Hart’s systems, while yet others may require significant redesign. Providing a complete assessment of mitigation strategies was out of scope of this review, but we encourage the Hart and the Secretary of State to study
    these issues.

    We have deliberately avoided addressing the broader issue of whether or how this system should be used for voting in California. Making that judgement requires assessing not only the technical issues described in this report but also the procedures and policies with which the system is used.


    Top To Bottom Review

    To watch the archived video of the July 30, 2007, public hearing on the Top-To-Bottom Review, please click here. [226]
    To read the transcript of the hearing, please click here. [227]

    Secretary of State Debra Bowen began her top-to-bottom review of the voting machines certified for use in California on May 31, 2007. The review is designed to restore the public's confidence in the integrity of the electoral process and is designed to ensure that California voters are being asked to cast their ballots on machines that are secure, accurate, reliable, and accessible.
    Voting Systems Certification

  • E-Voting - What's it all about? [218]
  • Voting Systems Frequently Asked Questions [219]
  • Overview of the Voting System Certification Process [220]
  • Ten Steps to Voting Systems Certification [221]
  • Voting System Certification Fact Sheet [222]
  • Definition of A Vote [223]


    UC Final Reports

    The University of California has submitted the reports on the findings from the top-to-bottom review. The red team and source code team reports are separated by voting system. The accessibility report contains findings on all of the voting systems that were reviewed. The document review team submitted their reports on schedule. Their reports will be posted as soon as the Secretary of State ensures the reports do not inadvertently disclose security-sensitive information.

    UC Source Code Team Reports:

    • Principal Investigator's Statement on Protection of Security-Sensitive Information [228]  (.pdf, 13.9KB)
    • Diebold Elections Systems, Inc. [229]  (.pdf, 561KB)
    • Hart InterCivic [230]  (.pdf, 573KB)
    • Sequoia Voting Systems [231]  (.pdf, 831KB)

    UC Red Team Reports:

    • Overview by UC Principal Investigator Matt Bishop [232]  (.pdf, 303KB)
    • Diebold Elections Systems, Inc. [233]  (.pdf, 498KB)
    • Hart InterCivic [234]  (.pdf, 376KB)
    • Sequoia Voting Systems [235]  (.pdf, 108KB)


    UC Accessibility Report:

    • Accessibility Report [236]  (.pdf, 1.07MB)

    U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION1225 New York Ave. NW Suite 1100Washington, DC 20005

    For Immediate Release
    August 3, 2007

    Contact:
    Jeannie Layson
    Bryan Whitener
    (202) 566-3100

    EAC Will Post and Distribute State Reports on Voting Systems

    WASHINGTON- The United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has

    adopted a policy authorizing staff to post and distribute
    voting system reports and studies that have been conducted or commissioned by a state or local government.

    "EAC believes it is important to provide a central location for election officials to post reports about their voting systems that can be shared with election officials throughout the nation and the
    public," said Chairwoman Donetta Davidson.  "This will provide an opportunity for election officials to share critical information and good ideas.

    "As part of our role as the national clearinghouse for election information, EAC will continue to explore ways to share and distribute information about how, where and when we vote."

    The new policy is part of the EAC's clearinghouse responsibilities under Section 202 of the Help America Vote Act.  To be considered for posting on the EAC website, a state or local government must submit the report to the EAC chair or executive director and certify that the
    report reflects their experience operating voting systems or implementing EAC's voluntary voting systems guidelines.

    EAC is also operating the federal government's first voting system certification program. For information on voting system test labs, registered voting system manufacturers, voting systems that have been submitted for testing, test plans, notices of clarification, and other program-related information, click

    here.

    EAC is an independent bipartisan commission created by HAVA. It is charged with administering payments to states and developing guidance to meet HAVA requirements, adopting voluntary voting system guidelines, and accrediting voting system test laboratories and certifying voting equipment. EAC also serves as a national clearinghouse and resource of information regarding election
    administration. The four EAC commissioners are Donetta Davidson, chair; Rosemary Rodriguez, vice chair; Caroline Hunter; and Gracia Hillman.

  • Continuing: Oppose S.1487 and H.R. 811 as Written

    The Rules Committee of the US Senate will reportedly be conducting a hearing on S1487 on July 25.

    CURRENT ACTIONS for the week of July 30:

    1. Call your Senators to Oppose S. 1487 [237]
    S . 1487 is a dangerous, anti-democratic measure even worse than H. R. 811. Amend or end.

    2. Call your Representatives to Amend or Reject H.R. 811 [238]
    A well-intentioned, if misguided election reform bill that the vendors' amendments twisted into the "Voter Con" Act of 2007
    It seems beyond repair at this point.

    3. Instead, urge your Representatives to Co-sponsor the Kucinich bill [239] or push to correct the corruptions of H.R. 811 with these amendments: A Five-Point Proposal for Real Election Reform [240]

    4. California: Voting Systems Review Hearing -- Support Secretary of State Bowen in Protecting the Vote
    Click here for Action Details [241]


    Details on S.1487:

    Please contact both your US Senators (contacts below), and ask them to oppose S. 1487 as written.

    Ask your senators to read this analysis [242], and work to improve the bill.

    If the bill is not improved by amendment, Senators should withdraw their support and vote it down.

    For in-depth background and talking points, see these articles on S. 1487: http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/s1487_analysis [243]

    Senate Contacts: http://www.senate.gov/general/contact_information/senators_cfm.cfm [244]

    There are 25 areas of function, and many of them have severe problems.

    I hope that all activists can agree that this bill is the wrong way to election reform.

    I hope we can have a strong showing at the hearing next week, to demand a better bill and to make sure that our Senators understand why each of these flaws is wrong, and how to improve it.

    --Teresa Hommel

    New Jersey Should Investigate Sequoia [03.19.08]


    ACTION ALERT: New Jersey Should Investigate Sequoia and Move to Paper Ballots
    March 19, 2008

    Thanks to Kathy Dopp and John Gideon for providing the ingredients for this action alert.

    Please take a minute and fill out this email form. Also ask your New Jersey friends to call on the NJ attorney general to authorize an independent investigation into the malfunctioning Sequoia voting machines. (Princeton University Computer Scientist Ed Felten has volunteered to do the investigation for free!)
    http://www.nj.gov/lps/formmail.htm [245]

    Also ask the NJ attorney general -- who is also the chief state election official in NJ -- why she has not saved New Jersey taxpayer monies by switching to paper ballot optical scan systems to comply with legal requirement for auditing NJ elections -- rather than asking for delay after delay in meeting the legal requirements for election auditing.

    Cost comparison studies showing that the costs of all-new optical scanning equipment pays for itself in reduced election administration costs within four years and then saves lots of money.
    (See http://electionmathematics.org [246] and click on "Voting Systems" for cost comparisons)

    These news articles on the N.J. situation are forwarded from the Daily Voting News:

    NJ: Interesting Email from Sequoia
    http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=1265 [247]

    NJ: Sequoia Voting Systems Threatens Princeton Computer Scientists with Legal Action
    if they Carry Out NJ Commissioned Analysis of the Company's Touch-Screen Voting Machines
    http://www.bradblog.com/?p=5814 [248]

    NJ: Voting data test is blocked
    Manufacturer cites licensing violation
    http://www.nj.com/news/times/index.ssf?/base/news-4/ [249]
    120581310587220.xml&coll=5

    NJ: Legal threat thwarts Union voting-machine check
    http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/jersey/index.ssf?/base/news-9/ [250]
    1205818545270600.xml&coll=1

    NJ: State Senate OKs delaying vote-verification method
    The paper procedure won't be ready by the Nov. election, N.J. said.
    Touch-screens bring doubts.
    http://www.philly.com/inquirer/local/ [251]
    20080318_State_Senate_OKs_delaying_vote-verification_method.html

    NJ: E-Voting Firm Threatens Ed Felten If He Reviews Its E-Voting Machine
    http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20080317/185348564.shtml [252]

    NJ: E-Voting Vendor Threatens Princeton Computer Scientists With Legal Action
    http://chronicle.com/wiredcampus/article/2826/e-voting-vendor [253]-
    threatens-princeton-computer-scientists-with-legal-action

    NJ: Voting Machine Company Strong-Arm Tactics Succeed in Blocking New Jersey Investigation (So Far)
    http://www.bradblog.com/?p=5820 [254]

    NJ: Voting-Machine Maker to Princeton Researcher: 'Hands Off'
    http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2008/03/18/voting-machine-maker-to [255]-
    princeton-researcher-hands-off/?mod=googlenews_wsj

    Transparency Project: Now Through Election Day --Anyone Can Do This

    [This page was originally published in advance of the 2006 midterm elections, but the recommendations are perennial and the links are still good.]

    The Transparency Project is a methodology prepared by Verified Voting.org to enlist voters everywhere in taking checklists along when they go to vote at the polls, and recording what you can readily observe or learn by asking questions. Some of the checklists apply to pre- and post-election day event monitoring, and require an additional measure of preparation and commitment. But these are tasks that any voter can do.

    The purpose is to get a detailed snapshot of the state of our elections from many localities, and assemble into a big picture, utilizing large numbers of participating citizen observors.

    In addition to the state and local Election Transparency Scorecards, Pre-Election Testing and Early Voting Questionnaires, you can now download questionnaires to guide you in observing ballot accounting (reconciling the number of votes cast versus the number of voters who signed in) at the time the polls close on Election Day, and in observing auditing in areas that already have a voter-verified paper record and that plan to conduct manual audits after Election Day.

    In addition, you can also download our new Voting Process Accessibility Questionnaire, which is available in three different versions -- on the web, in text format, and in large print.

    To access the full set of questionnaires, simply go to https://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=6390.

    Not sure where to start? Begin filling out our Election Transparency Scorecards right now!
    Don't wait for Election Day in order to take action!

    You can complete the Election Transparency Scorecards for your state and county RIGHT NOW, even before Election Day. Oftentimes, you can do this from your own home as long as you can make some phone calls to your elections department. These scorecards will provide crucial background information for whatever incidents occur on Election Day.

    For example, with information from the scorecards, we'll be able to find out whether locales with LESS transparency and openness in their process have MORE problems on Election Day. Worried that you won't be able to answer all the questions on the scorecards? Don't worry -- we'll be happy to receive any information you can gather. Not a part of an election observation group? No problem -- these scorecards can be completed by individuals. Not sure if you can finish the scorecard by Election Day? That's okay too... we can still use your information even after the elections are over (but the sooner, the better!).

    If you plan to complete an Election Transparency Scorecard for your state and/or your county (or other local voting jurisdiction), please e-mail us at observer@verifiedvoting.org [189]

    and tell us which state and/or local jurisdiction you're covering. We'd like to get a scorecard in for every state in the nation, and as many counties as possible! By letting us know which you're covering, we'll be able to fill in the gaps.

    The state Election Transparency Scorecard can be downloaded at http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/downloads/ETScorecardState.pdf [256].

    The local (county) Election Transparency Scorecard can be downloaded at http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/downloads/ETScorecardLocal.pdf [257].

    Wondering what you can do on Election Day? Take the Voting Process Accessibility Questionnaire with you when you go to vote!

    When you go to vote, make it an opportunity to observe! Take our Voting Process Accessibility Questionnaire with you and use it to gather information on the level of access to the voting process for persons with disabilities. Here at Verified Voting, we want nothing less than a voting system and process that provides full access to the ballot for all our citizens, privacy and independence in casting the ballot, and an accurate count of the ballots cast. Measuring the level of accessibility will help us know where there are obstacles that need to be addressed.

    The Voting Process Accessibility Questionnaire can be downloaded at https://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=6401 [258].

    Join the Election Transparency Project discussion list -- watchthevote@verifiedvoting.org [259]!

    Verified Voting is happy to announce our new Election Transparency Project nonpartisan discussion list, watchthevote@verifiedvoting.org [259]. This discussion list was created just for you, the Election Transparency Project volunteers. By subscribing, you’ll be able to communicate easily with other Election Transparency Project volunteers and citizen observers from all over the country. The movement for free and fair elections is vibrant and alive and growing! Join the WatchTheVote list to connect with other Election Transparency Project participants!

    To subscribe to the WatchTheVote discussion list, go to http://vevo.verifiedvoting.org/mailman/listinfo/watchthevote [260].
    Nonpartisan posts related to voting and elections are welcome!

    Good news! Voter Action's legal team is here to help!

    Voter Action will be offering legal support to project participants for DRE-related voting machine problems before, on, and after Election Day via its toll-free number -- 1-888-SAV-VOTE. Voter Action's legal teams will also lend their legal eye to the information that we gather through this project. Verified Voting is grateful to have Voter Action's legal support, and happy that Voter Action is encouraging people to get out and observe through its recently announced Watch The Vote national outreach campaign.

    Wondering how to submit the data that you've gathered?

    Never fear! We'll be sending more info to your inbox soon on how to submit the data that you collect. Rest assured that it'll be simple, easy, and painless. We'll also offer some training sessions for those who choose to enter their data via our online system -- more on that soon! Remember, the info that you provide will be the springboard for reforms to the election process for years to come.

    We're counting on you to help us secure trustworthy elections for the United States. If you have any questions or concerns, please don't hesitate to contact us at observer@verifiedvoting.org [189], or at 415-487-2255. Thanks so much for your dedication and commitment to saving our democracy!

    Most sincerely,

    Courtenay Strickland Bhatia, Verified Voting President, Dr. David Dill, Verified Voting Founder, and the rest of the Verified Voting Team

    Verified Voting Foundation
    1550 Bryant St., Suite 855
    San Francisco, CA 94103
    415-487-2255 phone
    940-403-2255 fax
    http://www.verifiedvoting.org/ [190]

    Every vote must count as cast.

    CA Voting System Review Hearing July 30

    Public Hearing on California Voting System Top to Bottom Review

    Sacramento, Secretary of State office building, 11th and O Streets
    Rally and Press Conference starting 9:00 a.m.
    Formal Hearing at 10:00 a.m.

    Some Practical Preparations:

    -- Write out and practice delivering your 2-minute Public Comment statement

    "Members of the public are encouraged to submit written comments on agenda items.
    Written comment should be sent by US mail to the address above or by email to votingsystems@sos.ca.gov [212].
    Those wishing to provide oral comment at a meeting should complete a speaker's card upon arrival."

    -- Research a more in-depth critique of the voting systems components up for review [scroll down to see listing]
    Click here for comprehensive background on CA Voting System Review [224]

    -- More extended statements can also be made with prior arrangement

    "Those wishing to provide an extended statement should submit a request via the email address above or contact Lowell Finley at (916) 653-7244 at least 24 hours prior to the meeting."

    -- Download the sign template files in the attachments box at the foot of this page and print out signs to bring
    (See below for a sample)

    -- Help compile a list of reporters to send a pre-event press release

    Journalists in any media (newspaper, blog, radio, tv) for whom you have their personal, direct work address, phone, and fax
    We can probably engage the assistance of a veteran Sacramento publicity specialist who has aided CEPN actions in the past.

    -- Car Pool Arrangements

    Click here for the Sacramento Car Pool Blog [261]

    --Amtrak Train is also an option; the Capitol Corridor line runs up from the Peninsula to Sacramento.
    Click here for Amtrak ticket and route information [262]
    Click here for the Sacramento train schedule [263]
    Click to download Walking Map [264] from the Sacramento Amtrak station to the Offices of the Secretary of State (30-minute walk)


    PUBLIC HEARING

    LOCATION
    Office of the Secretary of State
    1500 11th Street
    1st Floor – Auditorium
    Sacramento, California 95814

    HEARING DATE AND TIME : July 30, 2007, 10:00 a.m.

    NOTICE


    Notice is hereby given that a public hearing will be held to give interested persons an opportunity to express their views regarding the Top-to-Bottom Review of the voting systems identified below:

    1. SEQUOIA WinEDS version 3.1.012/Edge/Insight/400-C

    a. WinEDS, version 3.1.012
    b. AVC Edge Model I, firmware version 5.0.24
    c. AVC Edge Model II, firmware version 5.0.24
    d. VeriVote Printer
    e. Optech 400-C/WinETP firmware version 1.12.4
    f. Optech Insight, APX K2.10, HPX K1.42
    g. Optech Insight Plus, APX K2.10, HPX K1.42
    h. Card Activator, version 5.0.21
    i. HAAT Model 50, version 1.0.69L
    j. Memory Pack Reader (MPR), firmware version 2.15

    2. DIEBOLD GEMS 1.18.24/AccuVote

    a. GEMS software, version 1.18.24
    b. AccuVote-TSX with AccuView Printer Module and Ballot Station firmware version 4.6.4
    c. AccuVote-OS (Model D) with firmware version 1.96.6
    d. AccuVote-OS Central Count with firmware version 2.0.12
    e. AccuFeed
    f. Vote Card Encoder, version 1.3.2
    g. Key Card Tool software, version 4.6.1
    h. VC Programmer software, version 4.6.1

    3. HART INTERCIVIC – System 6.2.1

    a. Ballot Now software, version 3.3.11
    b. BOSS software, version 4.2.13
    c. Rally software, version 2.3.7
    d. Tally software, version 4.3.10
    e. SERVO, version 4.2.10
    f. JBC, version 4.3.1
    g. eSlate/DAU, version 4.2.13
    h. eScan, version 1.3.14
    i. VBO, version 1.8.3
    j. eCM Manager, version 1.1.7

    Notice is further hereby given that the above-referenced public hearing will also give interested persons an opportunity to express their views regarding the voting system identified below:

    1. Election Systems and Software, Inc. InkaVote Plus Precinct Ballot Counter Voting System, version 2.1 (Los Angeles County)

    a. InkaVote Plus Precinct Ballot Counter with ADA unit, firmware version 1.10
    b. Unisyn Election Management System, version 1.1
    c. Ballot Generation, version 1.1
    d. Election Converter, version 1.1
    e. Election Loader, version 1.1
    f. Voter Converter, version 1.1
    g. Vote Tabulation, version 1.1

    Click here to download 2-page <"http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/ttbr_public_hearing.pdf">Hearing Agenda

    ALL ITEMS MAY BE RE-ORDERED TO BE HEARD ON ANY DAY OF THE NOTICED MEETINGS. THE ORDER OF BUSINESS MAY BE CHANGED WITHOUT NOTICE. Members of the public are encouraged to submit written comments on agenda items. Written comment should be sent by US mail to the address above or by email to votingsystems@sos.ca.gov [212]. Those wishing to provide oral comment at a meeting should complete a speaker's card upon arrival. In all cases, the presiding officer reserves the right to impose time limits on presentations as may be necessary to ensure that the agenda is completed. Those wishing to provide an extended statement should submit a request via the email address above or contact Lowell Finley at (916) 653-7244 at least 24 hours prior to the meeting. In accordance with Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, reasonable accommodations are available. Requests for reasonable accommodations should be made at least 5 working days in advance of the hearing date. To request reasonable accommodations, please call (916) 651-9163.

    More 8.5 x 11 sign templates like this are in the download attachment box below. Print as is, or have enlarged at a copy shop.

    Anyone receiving this message, feel free to forward to interested persons and lists.

    AttachmentSize
    Priceless.pdf [265]28.79 KB
    PricelessB&W.pdf [266]38.31 KB
    ThanksDebowenB&W.pdf [267]41.81 KB
    Crook_Bowen3.pdf [268]368.82 KB
    ThanksDebowenColor.pdf [269]33.03 KB
    agenda_073007.pdf [270]42.45 KB
    ThanksDebowenColor.gif [271]18.78 KB

    Vote Paper Not Vapor: Circulate the CA Tangible Ballots Initiative

    TANGIBLE BALLOT INITIATIVE NEEDS YOUR HELP NOW

    TBI Removes Direct Electronic Recording (DRE) Machines from the Legal Definition of a 'Ballot'


    Scroll down for Links, Instructions, and the TBI Pledge

    RELEASE DATE: MARCH 6, 2008

    WHAT

    The Tangible Ballot Initiative ensures by law that a paper ballot MUST be the ballot of record, and that electronic voting machines are NOT any longer considered a ballot (as they are under current law). It takes the uncertainty out of the process based on who is Secretary of State.

    WHY AND WHEN AND HOW

    There probably is nothing more significant the Election Integrity Community can do this year, as a group, in California, than working together to put the Tangible Ballot Initiative (http://www.tangibleballot.com [272]) on the ballot. To accomplish this, we have to muster every resource we can possibly engage during the next six weeks. Yes, six weeks! By April 17, 2008 our petitions must be downloaded, signed by nearly 500,000 registered voters in California and mailed for processing. The final submission ROV deadline is April 24th, but we need time for mail and processing.

    This can be done, but only with the sheer will and dedication by the election integrity community and our friends, families, allies, co-workers and groups to whom we belong. We must drive thousands of voters to the www.tangibleballot.com [272] Web site and motivate everyone to download the petition. And then, each person simply needs to obtain the maximum 17 registered voters' signatures on each petition, hold it or mail it in, and then get 17 more, etc.

    In a single weekend or two (or during a couple of work-weeks) at most, each person should easily be able to obtain between 100 and 200 signatures. Doing that is the easy part. The more interesting opportunity here is for each one of us to get a dozen or so friends, or super-market passers by, to also circulate the petition.

    This could be the seed pearl of an effective state-wide organization, and it is a magnificent opportunity to spread the word to the public about how dire the current elections situation is. By acting now, in 2008, we would take that issue national. But it has taken a lot of work to get to where we are; the necessary elements are present for success, now we need the spark of your coordinated involvement.


    DOWNLOAD the TBI CIRCULATION FORM at: http://www.tangibleballot.org/CirculatorForm1.jsp [273]

    FURTHER INFORMATION:

    Petition Circulator Do's And Don'ts
    http://www.tangibleballot.org/pdf/PetitionCirculatorDosAndDonts.pdf [274]

    Petition Circulator Legal Rules
    http://www.tangibleballot.org/pdf/PetitionCirculatorLegalRules.pdf [275]


    WHO

    We can't accomplish this as just individuals in the EI movement. There simply aren't enough of us. We need to convince neighbors and friends and family member and our civic organizations of the importance of becoming individual leaders in this effort. Let your local Kiwanis and Rotary, Lions, and similar organizations know that you are immediately available to speak on the voting machine issues, including, but not limited to, the Tangible Ballot Initiative. The truly genius part is enlisting just 10 supporters to engage 10 more voters to accomplish this. And that is the key to success. It works in nearly every organizational effort, and it can work here too. Just get ten people to get ten people and ensure follow up and the job is a success.

    Here's the math: If 100 of us committed to solicit just 10 individuals each, who would then agree to seek just 10 others each, with a goal of every person obtaining 100 signatures, we would have 1 MILLION signatures, double what we need! It sounds hard, until you ask around, and as result, realize that the people already know they are being screwed. They just want an outlet, and now we have one upon which everybody can agree; we all agree that solid ballots are key.

    NO TIME TO HESITATE

    Today, we stand at a crossroad. The crossroad between taking the lead as Election Integrity Advocates to put the Tangible Ballot Initiative (TBI) (www.tangibleballot.com [272]) on the November 4, 2008 Presidential General Election ballot, or to let the effort fail. Why is this important and why should we care?

    TBI removes electronic touchscreen machines and Direct Electronic Recording (DRE) machines from the legal definition of a 'ballot'. No more will a new Secretary of State be able to declare machines with secret software owned by corporations to be 'ballots' as has been done twice in the last decade. If we can't see and touch our ballots, how can we ever be sure our votes are counted as cast? Please take up the cause ' NOW - it can change the course of history with your help!

    Please go right away to http://www.tangibleballot.org [276]. All the tools you need are there, right now.

    Also, you are welcome to write to Harry Lehmann, at his private email, hvl[at]lehmannlaw[dot]com [277]; just be sure to put 'tangible volunteer' in the subject line, and, of course, you are welcome to write a reply back to me. We will all remain at our watch posts, doing our best over time to monitor the system. But the way things are now, with computerized election results, there is often, 'nothing to watch.' The Tangible Ballot Initiative gives us the opportunity to put our talking aside, and to take action, today. For that reason our focus now is on action. Please join me in this worthy effort.

    SPECIAL LOCATIONS SUGGESTION

    This Friday and Saturday are ORGANIC MARKET DAYS, where our signature gathering will be focused on places like Whole Foods, and Trader Joe's. This Sunday is COFFEE HOUSE DAY, where the focus is on Starbucks, Peets, and your favorite coffee spot.

    We'll keep you updated weekly on new spots, but please, please go to www.tangibleballot.org [276] right now and download your first petition. For help on any of this, call me!

    Tom Courbat
    951-677-6451


    Tangible Ballot Initiative (TBI) Pledge

    The illustration below is for EXAMPLE ONLY.

    To submit a TBI PLEDGE, go to the live fillable form located at: http://www.tangibleballot.org/CirculatorForm1.jsp [273]

    I, ____________________ have recruited ten (10) voters who have each agreed to accomplish two outcomes:

    1. Recruit 10 additional voters to accomplish outcome #2 before April 17, 2008, and
    2. Obtain signatures of 100 registered voters on the TBI petition at www.tangibleballot.com [272]

    The ten voters I have recruited are:
    Name E-mail Phone #

    1. __________________________________________________________
    2. __________________________________________________________
    3. __________________________________________________________
    4. __________________________________________________________
    5. __________________________________________________________
    6. __________________________________________________________
    7. __________________________________________________________
    8. __________________________________________________________
    9. __________________________________________________________
    10. __________________________________________________________

    I agree to work closely with these ten voters to assist them in accomplish their two goals.

    _________________________ _____________ ______________________ _____________
    Printed Name Date Email address Phone

    Please submit completed pledge forms to Harry Lehmann at hvlehmann[at]earthlink[dot]net [278]


    03/09/09 Defeat Texas Voter Suppression Bill, SB 362


    Voter Suppression Legislation: ACTION ALERT
    3/9/2009

    This Tuesday, March 10th starting at 9am, the Texas Senate will hold a hearing as the Committee of the Whole on SB 362 - Fraser and Estes, avoter suppression bill that would require strict identification requirements for voters at the polls.  According to Brennan Center reports, this legislation has the potential to disenfranchise as many as 2 million Texans.  Also, 8% of voters that have registered in Texas since 2006 were unable to provide a driver's license or state issued ID number.    
     
    The Senators and advocates that are working to fight this legislation and to protect Texans fundamental right to vote need your help!!!!
     
    How you can help:
     
    Contact your Senator.   Call, email, or fax your Senator and tell them you are opposed to Voter Suppression Legislation, specifically SB 362 by Fraser and Estes.  
     
    Register your opposition to this bill.  Please stop by the Senate chambers during the debate on the 10th and sign a card against SB 362.  Every citizen has the right to register their position on legislation during committee hearings.  Go to the Senate chambers and tell the Senate Clerk that you want to “drop a card” against SB 362.  Fill out the form and check the box that you are opposed to this legislation.  The Senate Clerk will begin taking forms at 8:00am.
     
    Give oral testimony against this bill.  If you would like to deliver testimony to the Senate you may do so.  Public testimony will begin in the afternoon and could run through the night, so be prepared to spend the entire day at the capitol if you intend to give oral testimony.  Also, you need to bring 40 copies of your statement with you.  You can sign up for testimony beginning at 8:00am with the Senate Clerk in the Senate chambers, keep in mind there may be many people wanting to give testimony so the earlier you sign in the better chance you will have of being toward the top of the list.  

    Attend the hearing in support of the Senators fighting this legislation.  There will be a lot of different groups at the Capitol on Tuesday to show their support or opposition to this legislation.  Please attend if you can.  You can watch from the Senate gallery or the Capitol Auditorium (floor E1.).  The groups in support of this legislation are holding a rally at 10am on the South Steps of the Capitol; you are encouraged to attend with signs that show your opposition to this legislation.  Please be respectful while in the Senate Chambers and gallery though.  
     
    Educate people across the state about this issue.  Please write op-eds and letters to the editors regarding the potential impact of this legislation (See information below or email

    txelectionreform@yahoo.com [279] if you need additional information).  Write articles for local newsletters and papers.  Please forward this email to everyone you know.  Texans need to know the REAL impact of this legislation.   
     
    Stay engaged and be prepared to do this all over again when this legislation is passed from the Senate to the House.  Once this passes the Senate we will need to start helping the Representatives defeat this legislation.  This could happen in a matter of weeks after it passes the Senate, so be prepared to start calling your Representatives soon.  
     

    Talking Points
     

    Voter Impersonation Fraud Doesn’t Exist – despite spending millions of dollars to investigate and stop voter fraud, the Attorney General of Texas has never prosecuted a single case of a voter impersonating another voter at the polls.
     
    Voter ID measures propose an extra hurdle for many Texans that is reminiscent of the poll tax.  The working poor and senior citizens are less likely to have a photo ID - or the time or ability to get one. In 2006, a study by the non-partisan Brennan Center for Justice found that 18% of citizens 65 and over, 25% of African American citizens, and 15% of voters earning under $35,000/year don’t have government-issued photo identification.
     
    Voter ID does not address most common election fraud or other more common election related problems.  Thousands of eligible Texans are denied the right to register to vote and many eligible voters are turned away from the polls every election.  We need to spend time ensuring that every eligible Texan has the right to vote, not wasting time and resources on addressing something that does not exist. 
     
    We have much bigger priorities in the State- healthcare, tuition deregulation, and economy.  All of these issues deserve time and resources of the Senate.  These issues impact every Texan every day.  
     
    This legislation will cost the State and Counties to implement. 

    Loss of Revenue From Issuing Free Drivers Licenses

    (No ID is free. The state has to pay for it and the potential voter will have to spend time and money obtaining the documents needed to obtain a drivers license).

    Pollworker Training

    Voter Education Costs
     
    As many as 2 million Texans could be disenfranchised:

    Women-
    Name on ID does not match voter registration including recently married, divorced, hyphenated names, and new middle names

    Older Texans -
    Lack current state issues photo identification, may have utilities and mail under relatives name

    Students-
    Out-of-state license, mail goes to university p.o. box, no utilities, attending private university

    Homeless -
    No driver's license, no mail or utility bills 

    Low-income -
    Use public transportation, move frequently and may not have bills or mail with correct address,
    DMV lacking in inner-city metroplexes


    Texans with disabilities-

    No drivers license
    Will need accessible transportation to obtain identification


    Victims of identity theft -

    Identification is stolen and may not have 2 copies of other identification at time of voting

    Natural Disaster victims -

    No identification or documents staying with relatives therefore no mail or utility statements in their name

    Recent arrivals to Texas-
    Out-of- state identification, utility bills and other mail may not be correct name at time of election


    Native American Indians-

    Lack photo identification and not likely to have government issued documentation

    Additional resources:
     
    Who Represents Me?
    http://www.fyi.legis.state.tx.us/ [280]
     
    Senators - Contact Information
    http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/Members/Members.aspx?Chamber=S [281]
     
    Representatives - Contact Information

    http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/Members/Members.aspx?Chamber=H [282]
     
    Senate Chamber Texas Capitol Location - 2E.8 (2nd floor East Wing)

    Senate Gallery - 3E.5 (3rd floor East Wing)
     
    Parking -Texas Capitol, Capitol Extension and Capitol Visitors Center

    Parking is available in the Capitol Visitors Parking Garage at 1201 San Jacinto located between Trinity and San Jacinto Streets at 12th and 13th streets. Parking is free for the first two hours and $.75 for each half hour thereafter (maximum daily charge: $6.00); accessible parking is available.  More information available from State Preservation Board’s website.
     
    State Preservation Board
    http://www.tspb.state.tx.us/spb/plan/Plan.htm [283]
     
    Help Get the Word Out to friends and family across Texas.

    We need to hear stories from people this will impact.
    Tell your family and friends to contact us at txelectionreform@yahoo.com [279]
     
    Texans Against Voter Suppression Legislation

    http://www.facebook.com/home.php?#/group.php?gid=55794930819 [284]

    William C. Velasquez Institute National Office
    206 Lombard, 1st Floor
    San Antonio, TX 78226
    (210) 922-3118
    California Office
    2914 N. Main St., 1st Floor
    Los Angeles, CA 90031
    (323) 222-2217
    Florida Office
    2646-A NW 21st Terrace
    Miami, FL 33142
    (305) 635-6965

     


     

     

    Attend Tucson Hearing on 2006 RTA Ballot Destruction --08/28/09

    Hearing to Determine Fate of Ballots in Pima Election Fraud Case
    Plaintiffs Seek Stay Order to Preserve Ballots During Appeal

    If you are in the Tuscon area, please come and rally friends to attend too.

    Friday, August 28th,  2:30 pm

    Pima County Superior Court
    110 West Congress,
    4th floor, room 472

    Tuscon, AZ
    Judge Harrington presiding

    The Hearing topic is the Pima County Republican Party's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.  The lawsuit is Beth Ford v. Democratic Party of Pima County that also includes the Libertarian and Republican Parties.  In this Declaratory Judgment action, Beth Ford, the Pima County treasurer and custodian of the RTA ballots, has asked the court for "direction" as to whether she is required to destroy the RTA ballots.

    The Democratic Party, through their attorney Bill Risner, and the Libertarian Party, will ask the judge to "stay" his order until we appeal his earlier decision in which he claimed that Arizona courts did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider allegations of fraud in any election.  Basically, the only issue that will be of interest is the decision on the stay question.  The legal issue is extremely important but will be moot if the ballots are destroyed.

    News article, with details: http://electiondefensealliance.org/Pima_RTA_Ballot_Preservation [285]

    Week of July 30: Federal Election Bills, and CA Voting System Review Hearing

    1. Nationally -- Continue messaging Congress to oppose S. 1487 and H.R. 811 as written, and advocate amendments to effect true election integrity. Click here for action details. [286]


    2. California -- Voting Systems Top to Bottom Review: Public Hearing, July 30th, Sacramento

    PUBLIC HEARING
    [ Scroll down for Complete Listing of Voting System Components on the Agenda]

    LOCATION
    Office of the Secretary of State
    1500 11th Street
    1st Floor – Auditorium
    Sacramento, California 95814

    Public Rally in Support of Secretary Bowen, starting 9:00 a.m. in front of the building

    Press Conference, 9:30 a.m.

    HEARING begins at 10:00 a.m. inside the Auditorium

    Complete Agenda and Detailed Listing of Voting System Components Presented Below (scroll down)

    Some Practical Preparations

    For those who can attend in person:
    -- Write out and practice delivering your 2-minute Public Comment statement

    If you cannot attend, you can still submit testimony:

    "Members of the public are encouraged to submit written comments on agenda items.
    Written comment should be sent by US mail to the address above or by email to votingsystems@sos.ca.gov [212].
    Those wishing to provide oral comment at a meeting should complete a speaker's card upon arrival."

    -- Research a more in-depth critique of the voting systems components up for review [scroll down to see listing]

    -- More extended statements can also be made with prior arrangement

    "Those wishing to provide an extended statement should submit a request via the email address above or contact Lowell Finley at (916) 653-7244 at least 24 hours prior to the meeting."

    -- Help compile a list of reporters to send a pre-event press release.

    Journalists in any media (newspaper, blog, radio, tv) for whom you have their personal, direct work address, phone, and fax

    -- Car Pool Arrangements
    Click here for Car Pool Blog [261]

    --Amtrak Train is also an option; the Capitol Corridor line runs up from the Peninsula to Sacramento.
    Click here for Amtrak ticket and route information [262]
    Click here for the Sacramento train schedule [263]
    Click to download Walking Map [264] from the Sacramento Amtrak station to the Offices of the Secretary of State (30-minute walk)


    AGENDA

    I. Introductory Remarks

    II. Principal Investigator Reports on the following voting systems currently certified for use
    in California:

    a. Diebold GEMS 1.18.24/AccuVote
    b. Hart Intercivic System 6.2.1
    c. Sequoia WinEDS version 3.1.012/Edge/Insight/400-C

    III. Voting System Vendor Response to Reports

    IV. Public Comment Period

    V. Adjournment

    NOTICE
    Notice is hereby given that a public hearing will be held to give interested persons an opportunity to express their views regarding the Top-to-Bottom Review of the voting systems identified below.
    1. SEQUOIA WinEDS version 3.1.012/Edge/Insight/400-C

    a. WinEDS, version 3.1.012
    b. AVC Edge Model I, firmware version 5.0.24
    c. AVC Edge Model II, firmware version 5.0.24
    d. VeriVote Printer
    e. Optech 400-C/WinETP firmware version 1.12.4
    f. Optech Insight, APX K2.10, HPX K1.42
    g. Optech Insight Plus, APX K2.10, HPX K1.42
    h. Card Activator, version 5.0.21
    i. HAAT Model 50, version 1.0.69L
    j. Memory Pack Reader (MPR), firmware version 2.15

    2. DIEBOLD GEMS 1.18.24/AccuVote

    a. GEMS software, version 1.18.24
    b. AccuVote-TSX with AccuView Printer Module and Ballot Station firmware version 4.6.4
    c. AccuVote-OS (Model D) with firmware version 1.96.6
    d. AccuVote-OS Central Count with firmware version 2.0.12
    e. AccuFeed
    f. Vote Card Encoder, version 1.3.2
    g. Key Card Tool software, version 4.6.1
    h. VC Programmer software, version 4.6.1

    3. HART INTERCIVIC – System 6.2.1

    a. Ballot Now software, version 3.3.11
    b. BOSS software, version 4.2.13
    c. Rally software, version 2.3.7
    d. Tally software, version 4.3.10
    e. SERVO, version 4.2.10
    f. JBC, version 4.3.1
    g. eSlate/DAU, version 4.2.13
    h. eScan, version 1.3.14
    i. VBO, version 1.8.3
    j. eCM Manager, version 1.1.7

    Notice is further hereby given that the above-referenced public hearing will also give interested persons an opportunity to express their views regarding the voting system identified below:

    1. Election Systems and Software, Inc. InkaVote Plus Precinct Ballot Counter Voting System, version 2.1 (Los Angeles County)

    a. InkaVote Plus Precinct Ballot Counter with ADA unit, firmware version 1.10
    b. Unisyn Election Management System, version 1.1
    c. Ballot Generation, version 1.1
    d. Election Converter, version 1.1
    e. Election Loader, version 1.1
    f. Voter Converter, version 1.1
    g. Vote Tabulation, version 1.1

    ALL ITEMS MAY BE RE-ORDERED TO BE HEARD ON ANY DAY OF THE NOTICED MEETINGS. THE ORDER OF BUSINESS MAY BE CHANGED WITHOUT NOTICE. Members of the public are encouraged to submit written comments on agenda items. Written comment should be sent by US mail to the address above or by email to votingsystems@sos.ca.gov [287].

    Those wishing to provide oral comment at a meeting should complete a speaker's card upon arrival. In all cases, the presiding officer reserves the right to impose time limits on presentations as may be necessary to ensure that the agenda is completed.

    Those wishing to provide an extended statement should submit a request via the email address above or contact Lowell Finley at (916) 653-7244 at least 24 hours prior to the meeting.

    In accordance with Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, reasonable accommodations are available. Requests for reasonable accommodations should be made at least 5 working days in advance of the hearing date. To request reasonable accommodations, please call (916) 651-9163.

    AttachmentSize
    Sacramento_Amtak_schedules.pdf [288]620.24 KB
    AmTrak_SoS_WalkMap.jpg [289]81.11 KB

    URGENT! "No on H.R. 4844!" Call Congress TODAY!

    Stealth Voter Disenfranchisement Labeled as "Federal Election Integrity Act"

    (Thanks to the National Campaign for Fair Elections (NCFE) for taking the lead on this.)

    Urgent action is needed to oppose H.R. 4844, the deceptively titled Federal Election Integrity Act of 2006. A vote is expected in the U.S. House tomorrow or Thursday. Please act now!

    Contact your Representative today to oppose H.R. 4844. [290]

    Contrary to its title, the bill will undermine the integrity of our electoral process by imposing unnecessary barriers to full participation in federal elections. The bill's requirements of proof of citizenship and photo identification as a prerequisite to voting may appear innocuous, but in reality they will disenfranchise seniors, minority voters, low income voters, students and young voters, and voters with disabilities. In addition, the implementation of H.R. 4844 places a huge burden on state governments.

    Proponents of photo identification provisions at the polls and proof of citizenship when registering to vote claim that these draconian constraints are necessary to guard against identity fraud at the nation's polling places. But there is no credible evidence that voter impersonation or non-citizen voting is anything but an anomaly. As the United States District Court found in Common Cause v. Billups (when considering a Georgia law requiring ID at the polls), photo identification requirements amount to an unconstitutional poll tax and burden the fundamental right to vote of eligible American citizens. To learn more about restrictive photo ID and proof of citizenship requirements, download the two PDF factsheets listed below.

    Urge your Member of Congress to vote NO on H.R. 4844. When you take action [290] you will be directed to the NCFE website where you can send a sample letter to your Representative or customize your letter based on our talking points and your own opinions. A fax is automatically generated and sent to the Washington, DC office of your Member of Congress.


    Urgent! U.S. House vote on photo ID this week

    Urge your Representative to vote NO on H.R. 4844, the
    so-called Federal Election Integrity Act of 2006, which would impose a
    restrictive photo ID requirement on all American voters. A vote is
    expected Wednesday or Thursday of this week in the U.S. House.



    Click here to act now! [290]



    Download and read the two PDF fact sheets below for more information.

    AttachmentSize
    PROOF OF CITIZENSHIP.pdf [291]23.07 KB
    VOTER ID.pdf [292]27.05 KB

    9/1/06 - Watch "Block the Vote" on NOW with David Brancaccio


    About the Show
    (Video will be available soon on EDA TV)
    Click here to check the OPB Schedule where you live for showtimes. [290]

    Across the nation, states have enacted new laws supposedly designed to prevent voter fraud and avoid election-day debacles. But qualified voters may also be left out in the cold, especially minorities, the poor, the elderly and the disabled. Friday, 9/1/06, this week NOW looks at several states where these new rules may keep voters away from the polls in November. Critics charge that the Bush administration is part of the problem as the U.S. Department of Justice, which is charged with protecting the rights of all voters, has signed off on a number of the new regulations.

    In Florida, new penalties that can reach up to $5,000 for registration delays or problems, which forced traditional registration advocacy groups, like the League of Women Voters, to avoid registering voters for a crucial primary.

    "The law has done harm because the League of Women Voters, as well as other organizations, were not able to register voters before the primary," said Dianne Wheatley-Giliotti, the president of the LWV in Florida. Florida Rep. Ron Reagan defends the law saying "it's to encourage people to turn them [registration forms] in on time."

    In Georgia, a new law requires residents to show photo identification before voting, blocking thousands of people who currently lack the proper ID as well as the means of acquiring it. But are these voting barriers unintended consequences or intended outcomes? Some distrust the true motives of lawmakers.

    "This is a concerted effort to make sure that certain people don't have the opportunity to vote, that they don't have the opportunity to participate in their own democracy," Georgia state representative Alisha Thomas Morgan told NOW.

    8/24/09 - Fight Back Against Election Nullification in San Diego!

    PLEASE SHARE THIS APPALLING STORY ON YOUR LISTS AND BLOGS

    Summary: It thus appears now based on the signed pleadings of the defendants in the California 50th District Election contest in San Diego (the Busby/Bilbray race) that the US media overlooked one of the great political stories of the year: A power grab by the Speaker of the House seven days after the June 6 election to terminate any further election or action in San Diego County except those actions that they choose not to attack the jurisdiction of.

    This power grab and premature election termination was accomplished by swearing in Brian Bilbray on June 13, only seven days after the election and weeks before the election was certified and before all votes were counted, and then subsequently arguing that nobody else (and especially the San Diego Superior Court) has any power or jurisdiction to do anything about it, based on the allegedly exclusive power of the House to judge the Qualifications of their Members under Art. I, sec. 5 of the US Constitution.

    The power grab became clear only a couple days ago, when the jurisdictional argument above was filed and made perfectly clear the mental state and specific intent of the defendants when Bilbray was shuttled to DC to be sworn in seven days after the election. The swift swearing took place at least 16 days prior to the certification of the election on or about June 29. But, if this swift swearing is to be given effect as the Defendant Brian Bilbray and Registrar Haas argue, then the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the House of Representatives also deprived Registrar of Voters Haas of any jurisdiction to certify results in the first place! The election was thus never legally finalized or certified, it legally "never happened."

    Thus, we have an incomplete, invalid election. The parties to the election contest now all agree, they just get there in different ways. The motion to dismiss / argument against jurisdiction of the defendants reveals the powerplay that occurred on June 13th, with the premature swearing in.

    Shades of 2000, with a selection decided in Washington DC, and the pitiful States and their citizens ordered to pipe down and "get used to it"?

    Election Nullification Argued By Election Contest Defendants
    Defendants Allege in Motion to Dismiss that Swearing-In Bilbray on June 13th or 17 days Prior to Certification Deprived San Diego Superior Court of Jurisdiction! Pre-Certification Swearing-In Means Race Never Validly Certified; In Effect Busby/Bilbray Election Decided in DC, Terminated in San Diego

    In briefs filed August 22 with San Diego Superior Court in the Busby/Bilbray election contest in California’s 50th Congressional District, the Defendants argue that the House of Representatives has exclusive jurisdiction over the qualifications of its Members under Art. I, sec. 5 of the US Constitution. But if this is indeed the case, then Registrar of Voters Mikel Haas was also without jurisdiction to certify or finalize the results, the exclusive and sole jurisdiction resting with the House of Representatives! Thus, no legal election was ever concluded or had in California’s 50th Cong. District, according to the necessary conclusion of the defendants’ arguments against jurisdiction of the Court.

    It thus appears now based on the signed pleadings of the defendants that the US media overlooked one of the great political stories of the year: A power grab by the Speaker of the House to terminate any action in San Diego County except those actions that they choose not to attack the jurisdiction of.

    A brief chronology helps to reveal the posture of the case:

    On June 6, 2006 Republican Brian Bilbray allegedly slightly outpolled Democrat Francine Busby in the special election for California’s 50th Congressional District, despite Busby’s lead in the polls going into the election. There were immediate cries of foul following the election due to major irregularities, including electronic voting machines sent out to the homes and cars of volunteers for up to 12 days prior to the election, and irregular election results like huge mega-precincts of absentee ballots where turnout was thousands of percent more than registered voters.

    On June 13, 2006, Bilbray flew to Washington, DC and was sworn in as a member of the United States House of Representatives by House Speaker Dennis Hastert.

    On or about June 30, 2006, 17 days after Bilbray was sworn in as a member of the House, Mikel Haas, Registrar of San Diego County, officially completed the audit of election results required for certification, and officially certified the election of Bilbray over Busby based on 163,931 votes cast, of which 2,053 votes were said to be cast on Diebold TSX touchscreens, and the remainder scanned via Diebold Accuvote OS computers.

    On July 31, 2006, the Contestants filed an election contest, seeking a hand recount and to invalidate the election on several grounds, not only including the affirmative evidence of irregular results, but also including the stonewalling of citizen information requests and the pricing of recounts at an estimated $150,000 that made it difficult or impossible for any citizen to tell who won the election.

    On August 22, 2006 the defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the swearing in of Bilbray deprives everyone else of jurisdiction including specifically the San Diego Superior Court because Art. I, sec. 5 of the US Constitution has been held to mean that the House and Senate are the judges of the Qualifications of their Members, one of those qualifications is supposed to be “election.”

    The facts of the case thus present unique questions of Constitutional law, that appear to be a case of first impression. In Roudebush v Hartke, the US Supreme Court held in 1972 that the State’s jurisdiction under Art I sec. 4 of the US Constitution to define the time place and manner of elections gave the States jurisdiction over the counts and the recounts of votes. But the defendants attempt to distinguish that case, because the Senate in the Roudebush case set an example of responsible constitutional behavior by awaiting the results of the Court challenge before swearing in. However, in this case, the House had no such patience, and in no uncertain terms is telling San Diego Courts and San Diego county where to go, and that is wherever those who are completely powerless as against the mighty lords of the House of Representatives go.

    In a filling in San Diego Municipal Court yesterday, attorney Paul Lehto outlined the core of the dispute in stark terms:

    Defendants are in effect arguing for the remarkable proposition that unilateral self-serving actions by a majority party in the House of Representatives to shuttle in a member of the same party can be effective, even if those actions do violence to and amount to circumvention of other sections of the US Constitution as well as the California constitution.

    These other provisions include Art I, sec 4’s requirement that States control the Time, Place and Manner of Elections, another Art. I sec. 2 requirement that elections for the House take place every two years “by the People,” and the fundamental constitutional right of the people of San Diego’s 50th Cong District to vote and to have that vote counted under both federal constitutional law as well as California’s Constitution in Art II, sec. 2.5 which states:

    ““{A voter} who casts a vote in an election in accordance with the laws of this state shall have that vote counted.” Calif. Elec. Code § 15702 further defines the scope of what “shall” be done under this constitutional provisions by defining “vote” for the express purpose of this Constitutional section as follows: “For purposes of Section 2.5 of Article II of the California Constitution , “vote” includes all action necessary to make a vote effective in any primary, special, or general election, including, but not limited to, voter registration, any other act prerequisite to voting, casting a ballot, and having the ballot counted properly and included in the appropriate totals of votes cast with respect to candidates for public office and ballot measures.”

    By including both prerequisite acts to voting as well as post-voting acts and acts of appropriate tabulation, it is clear that the full scope of counting is included within the protection of the California Constitution. This broad scope naturally includes a second counting, also known as a recount. Of course, in the electronic voting context, this “recount” would be the first real count by any human being(s).

    Lehto and Simpkins filed a withering response to this argument that the San Diego Superior Court is powerless to protect San Diego voters. They point out what the Court must conclude if it were to accept the defendants’ jurisdictional arguments:

    Clearly, the swift swearing in did not end the election in the 50th Congressional District, and it did not render everything, including the certification of results weeks later, nugatory and without “jurisdiction.” If this swearing in had this effect, then in the course of dismissing this case the Court would be bound to conclude that the certification of the results after the swearing in of Bilbray was without force and effect, without jurisdiction, and in contravention of principles of federalism, as Defendants argue. That conclusion, however, requires either an absurdity, or the conclusion that our Congressional election was canceled by decision of the Speaker of the House, before all the votes were fully counted, and well before certification.

    Ongoing interference by the House of Representatives or persons associated therewith continues. Attorney Paul Vinovich, Counsel to the House Administration Committee, Chaired by the “retiring” Congressman and architect of HAVA Bob Ney of Ohio, arranged to deliver a letter to San Diego Superior Court presiding Judge Yuri Hoffman, arguing the constitutional exclusive jurisdiction of the House.

    This type of communication with judges is forbidden, unless all other parties are involved, under the prohibition against ex parte contact with judges. In his own handwriting, Vinovich wrote on the fax cover to plaintiff’s attorney Lehto, “Letter delivered to court last evening.” Lehto received the letter via fax just before 9 a.m. Thursday morning, many hours after the letter was admittedly provided to the judge by Vinovich himself. The letter is posted here [PDF], complete with its circular and contradictory reasoning that the subsequent certification of Bilbray after the rushed swearing in confirmed the correctness of the swearing in.

    The Defendants literally argue that the Courts are powerless to stop them (i.e., the Courts are “without jurisdiction”). Friday will reveal whether the courts are indeed powerless in San Diego County. But if they are powerless, then the Registrar of Voters was also powerless to complete the election, and we have a premature termination of the election process, decided in Washington DC, and enforced on San Diego. Much like Bush v. Gore in 2000, the process of elections has been short circuited by a legal coup d’etat that makes no legal sense, but which courts may or may not have the courage to see through.

    One thing is sure. The defendants must also believe, having signed the briefs on constitutional motions to dismiss, that the certification of the election was invalid, because it occurred weeks after the swearing-in of Brian Bilbray deprived everyone except the House of Representatives of any jurisdiction to do anything. On that point of invalidity, the parties all now apparently agree.

    Well …

    Ain't that beautiful?

    HALT HOLT! H.R. 811 is the "Patriot Act of Elections"

    EDA Halt H.R. 811 Action Page

    "The Patriot Act demanded that in exchange for safety, we must give up civil rights.
    The Holt Bill demands that in exchange for a paper trail, we must transfer control of elections to White House appointees."

    Bev Harris, Founder of BlackboxVoting.org



    • UPDATE: "Floor Manager" Revision of HR 811, July 27
      Click here to download [293]
      • Click here for UPDATED text and analysis of Holt amendments [294] ("Lofgren substitute", issued May 8th)
        • Custom Letter to E-mail Congress and the Press, via the PEN. [295]

          The PEN letter generator enables you to write and send your own letter to three members of the House Committee on Administration, your own Congressional representative, a letter-to-the-editor at one or more daily newspapers in your region, and copies of this action letter to many others--all at the same time!

          The letter you will see displayed is for your information only--it is NOT the letter that is sent.
          YOU write the letter to be sent by pasting or typing in the textbox in item 3 on the submission form
          (scroll past letter to view the form).

          • Custom Letter to FAX to Congress [296].

            This option presents a finished form letter you can modify with drop-in talking points provided. Simply open up a text file or e-mail application in an adjoining window and copy and paste sections of the letter or talking points you would like to use.
            Save your finished letter and add addresses listed here [297].

            We urge you to print and FAX your letter to several members of the House Committee on Administration, and to your own Representative. Paper pouring from overheating FAX machines registers a more urgent impression on our public servants. Then give them a ring on the phone!

            • E-mail addresses, phone, and fax numbers [297]
              Contact members of the House Committee on Administration who will be marking up amendments and bringing the Holt bill, H.R. 811, to the House for a vote very soon.
            • 811 Resource Page [294] lists 811 bill text and articles revealing dangers hidden in the Holt bill and the EAC
            • 811 E-Mail Alert [290] you can send to virally multiply this message. Just copy and paste into an HTML-enabled mail message, and send to everyone in your address book.
            • Factsheets [298] you can download, e-mail, and fax to fellow citizens and members of Congress
            • Graphic message [299] you can download and fax to the committee chair


            House Vote on H.R. 811 Expected Week of July 9

    Let's greet them with whirring FAX machines pouring out citizen opposition to H.R. 811.


    Prior to Spring recess, the HCA was trying to "fast track" H.R. 811.
    An unprecedented outpouring of citizen protest stopped them in their tracks.

    Keep FAXING and pouring it on until Congress gets the message:

    END the EAC

    (Keep the unitary executive OUT of elections)

    BAN DREs

    (The Holt bill permits them)

    END SECRET COUNTS

    (The Holt bill extends federal law protection to trade-secret voting software)

    Copy and Forward this Page Widely with this Link: http://www.ElectionDefenseAlliance.org/Halt811 [300]

    AttachmentSize
    HR811_FloorManagersAmendment_072707.pdf [301]175.72 KB

    Copy, Paste, and Forward this EDA 811 E-Mail Alert

    Please Forward Widely


    ELECTION DEFENSE ALLIANCE ACTION ALERT:

    Halt Holt! Warn Congress to Block HR 811!
    H.R. 811: A Clear and Present Danger to Democracy!

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    DO YOU WANT:

    • Federal legislation that requires computerized voting in every precinct?
    • Voting machines capable of tracking your votes in a government database?
    • Four White House appointees controlling the nation’s election systems?
    • Unfunded mandates and impossible technology timelines that will throw U.S. elections into chaos?

    We’d ALL like to think that Rush Holt's bill H.R. 811, the “The Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act” is a good thing. But just like “The Patriot Act,” “No Child Left Behind,” and the “The Healthy Forests Act,” the name doesn't match the reality.

    IF IT’S SO BAD

    then why have some big names “signed on” to support H.R. 811?
    Well-intentioned groups (such as MoveOn and PFAW)--even a small number of voting activist groups--
    have been fooled by the PR spin on the Holt Bill (H.R. 811).

    H.R. 811 is being sold as “Banning Paperless Voting,”
    but here’s what's hidden in the fine print:

    HR 811 ACTUALLY REQUIRES MORE COMPUTERIZED VOTING!

    The Holt Bill opens the back door to REQUIRING computers in every polling place,
    mandating a new generation of unnecessary, unproven computerized voting technology,
    adding more secret software to our elections,
    and sending at least another $4 BILLION of our taxpayer money to the electronic voting industry
     -and-

    H.R. 811 EMPOWERS THE PRESIDENCY TO CONTROL THE NATION’S VOTING SYSTEMS!

    HR 811 gives permanent  CONTROL over THE NATION'S VOTING EQUIPMENT to the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) -- FOUR WHITE HOUSE APPOINTEES!

    TO TAKE QUICK ACTION, CLICK THIS LINK:

    http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/Halt811 [238]

    Click Link Above > See Model Letter > Copy > Paste > Personalize > Print > FAX, Phone, and E-mail to Congress

    FAX at least three House Administration Committee Members
    FAX your own House Representatives
    FAX your Secretary of State


    All Contact Information Provided at EDA Halt811 Action Page [238]

    WHAT ELSE YOU CAN DO:

    Join the Election Defense Alliance mailing list!
    Click this Link to Subscribe [302] to the EDA E-Mail Network

    Help Spread the Word

    Click this Link to Invite Friends to Subscribe [303] for Election Defense Alliance alerts like this one.

    LEARN MORE:

    [304]

    For more details on what is DEAD WRONG with HR 811, click here for the EDA 811 Resource Page [294]

    http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/hr_811_the_holt_ii_bill_to_amend_hava [294]

    For a one-page fact sheet on the dangers of EAC centralized control of federal elections, download
    http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/WhyTheEACMustBeAbolished.pdf [305]
    Our Faxes and E-mails Stopped the Fast Track Mark-up. Now let’s Stop the Bill!

    FAX Congress NOW and tell them NO! to HR 811!

    American democracy depends on every ONE of us and YOU.
    Tell our elected representatives that we DO NOT WANT H.R. 811 because we DO WANT meaningful election reform.
    True Election Reform Would Preserve and Protect, Not Threaten Our Democratic Traditions!

    • Citizen oversight of all electoral processes
    • Public ownership of any voting system
    • State sovereignty in conducting elections
    • Realistic timelines, sound fiscal policy, and ethics in election administration

    It’s not too late to get it RIGHT…
    IF WE ACT TODAY.

    TO TAKE QUICK ACTION,

    Click These Links:
    Subscribe! [302]
    Forward Widely! [303]
    Now Tell Congress NO on H.R. 811! [238]

    This flyer can be downloaded and copied from: http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/EDA_811_email_alert [306]

    EDA 811 Alert

    You can forward this alert directly to others as an e-mail message, if your browser supports a "Send this Page" function; or you can download this page from this link: http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/EDA_811_Alert [307] then copy and paste into a fresh e-mail message and send. The advantage of using this page as an action e-mail is that it conveys live links that enable others to forward and subscribe for future EDA alerts. I confirm [308] that I wish to receive election integrity news and action alerts from Election Defense Alliance. You may unsubscribe [309] if you no longer wish to receive our e-mails.


    Horiz_url_tag_375pix
    Warn Congress: H.R. 811 is The Patriot Act of Elections
    An Election Deception Too Dangerous for Democracy April 16, 2007

     

     

    (And Who Will Decide) Who Counts the Votes? [310]

     

    TAKE QUICK ACTION [311]

    SUBSCRIBE! SPREAD WORD! ACT! [312]

    PEN a Letter to Congress and Press [313]

    State, County Election Officials Oppose H.R. 811 [314]

     

    (And Who Will Decide) Who Counts the Votes?

    "The Patriot Act demanded that in exchange for safety, we must give up civil rights. The Holt Bill demands that in exchange for a paper trail, we must transfer control of elections to White House appointees." --Bev Harris, Founder of BlackboxVoting.org

    The EAC [315], created as a temporary advisory commission to implement HAVA, is in fact a federal executive commission that can at any time be converted into a federal regulatory agency by the insertion of a single line of text in any act of Congress. Regulatory powers would enable the EAC to effectively bypass Congress and create law that preempts Constitutional state sovereignty in election administration. This would allow four White House appointees to determine:
    • Which voting systems are approved for use in our elections
    • Who counts the votes, and how votes are counted
    • How recounts are conducted and outcomes decided

    This is a clear and present danger to American democracy. We cannot allow it! Halt H.R. 811!

     



     Quick Links
    • EDA Halt 811 Action [316]
    • PEN Letter Generator [317]
    • Forward This Alert [318]
    • EDA 811 Resources [319]

     

    We'd all like to think that Rush Holt's H.R. 811 bill, The Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act, is a good thing. But just like No Child Left Behind, The Healthy Forests Act, and The Patriot Act, the name doesn't match the reality.

    Well-intentioned groups such as MoveOn and PFAW--and even some voting activist groups--have been taken in by the Holt "Voter Confidence" spin. They assure us that H.R. 811 will "Ban Paperless Voting," but here's what's hidden in the fine print:

    H.R. 811 Actually Requires More Computerized Voting! The Holt bill opens a back door to permanent electronic voting in every polling place in America, by mandating a new generation of unnecessary, unproven computerized voting technology, adding more secret software to our elections, and sending at least another $4 billion in taxpayer money to the electronic voting industry.--and--

    H.R. 811 Consolidates Executive Control of Elections H.R. 811 gives permanent control over the nation's voting equipment to the Election Assistance Commission [315] (EAC) -- four White House appointees!

     
     
     


    • TAKE QUICK ACTION

     
     

    • FAX the House Committee on Administration

    • FAX your own House Representative
    • FAX your Secretary of State

    CLICK and PICK UP at the Halt 811 Action Page: [316]

     

    • PEN Tool to Write Press and Congress
    • Model Letter and Talking Points Provided
    • Downloadable Factsheets
    • E-mail, Phone, and FAX for Congress

    For more on what's DEAD WRONG with H.R. 811, see EDA 811 Resource Page [319] Thirteen Significant Problems in H.R. 811 [320] by Nancy Tobi HR 811: Ten Blunders in A Deceptive Boondoggle [321] by Bruce O'Dell Critical Annotation of H.R. 811 [322] by Bev Harris and More

       
     


    • SUBSCRIBE! SPREAD WORD! ACT!

     
     

    Join the Election Defense Alliance Mail List [323] Send a Subscription Invitation [324] Now Write, Phone, FAX Congress! [325]

       
     


    • PEN a Letter to Congress and Press

     
     

    To the Honorable: I write in opposition to the Holt Bill, H.R. 811, which promises "increased voter confidence" but actually perpetuates secret vote-counting by computers while handing centralized control of federal elections to four White House appointees. Because it requires a computerized text conversion device in every polling place, H.R. 811 would actually require electronic voting machines, effectively ruling out noncomputerized voting methods such as handcounted paper ballots. For the same reason H.R. 811 would also rule out noncomputerized voter assistive devices that provide better accessiblity features at far less cost, while avoiding the unacceptable risks of secret, computerized vote-counting. This unnecessary, unproven, as-yet nonexistent text converter device that H.R. 811 requires is a gift to the E-voting industry and an under-funded federal mandate that will impose huge cost burdens on the states. . . . read more . . . Then PEN Your Letter to Congress, the Press, and Friends--All at Once! [317]

       
     


    • State, County Election Officials Oppose H.R. 811

     

    The nation's election administrators are rising to resist Holt. [326] The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) and the National Association of Counties (NACo) issued a joint statement opposing H.R. 811 and the Senate companion bill, S. 559. [327] "This legislation would exacerbate, rather than assist states and counties in addressing these challenges which could lead to disastrous unintended consequences in the 2008 presidential election."

       
     


     
     

    Election Defense Alliance is a sponsored project of International Humanities Center, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization.

       
     

    info@electiondefensealliance.org [328]
    http://electiondefensealliance.org [329]

    510.275.5723

     

     
    Forward this e-mail to a friend [330]
    [309]
    This email was sent to dan@electiondefensealliance.org [331], by info@electiondefensealliance.org [328]
    Update Profile/Email Address [332] | Instant removal with SafeUnsubscribe [309]™ | Privacy Policy [333].


    Email Marketing [334] by

    [334]

    Election Defense Alliance | P. O. Box 75005 | Arlington Hts, MA. 02475

    Fax This Prescription for Election Protection

    On this page: TWO downloadable graphics to print, then FAX

    (Scroll down)

    1. Verifygra election prescription

    2. Who do YOU want controlling US elections?


    To download a PDF of this graphic to FAX, click here [335]

    Rep. Zoe Lofgren
    Fax: (202) 225-3336


    To download a PDF of this graphic to FAX, click here [336]

    AttachmentSize
    Verifygra_FAX_zl.jpg [337]100.92 KB
    Cronies_272kb.pdf [338]271.02 KB

    Fax, Phone, and E-mail Contacts

    How to Contact Your Congressional Representative:

    U.S. House "Write Your Representative" [339] guide to mail, E-mail and E-mail Webform communications

    U.S. House of Representatives Telephone directory [340]

    How to Contact Your Secretary of State:

    http://www.statelocalgov.net/50states-secretary-state.cfm [341]


    Members of the Committee on House Administration

    [* Use the E-mail webform if you find that the standard E-mail address (clickable in the Representative's name) returns a delivery failure message.]


    Representative Zoe Lofgren [342] (D-CA 16th) Chair, Elections Subcommittee
    Phone: (202) 225-3072
    Fax: (202) 225-3336
    Representative Vernon Ehlers (R-MI 3rd) RANKING MEMBER
    Phone: (202) 225-3831
    Fax: (202) 225-5144
    E-mail Webform: http://www.house.gov/writerep/ [343]

    Submit this State and zip code on the webform to gain access: MI 49503-2313


    Representative Susan A. Davis (D-CA 53rd)
    Phone: (202) 225-2040
    Fax: (202) 225-2948
    E-mail Webform: http://www.house.gov/susandavis/IMA/contact.html [344]
    Representative Dan Lungren (R-CA 3rd)
    Phone: (202) 225-5716
    Fax: (202) 226-1298
    E-mail Webform: http://lungren.house.gov/feedback.shtml [345]
    Representative Kevin McCarthy (R-CA 22nd)
    Phone: (202) 225-2915
    Fax: (202) 225-2908
    E-mail Webform: http://kevinmccarthy.house.gov/contact.html [346]
    Representative Michael Capuano (D-MA 8th)
    Phone: (202) 225-5111
    Fax: (202) 225-9322
    E-mail Webform: http://www.house.gov/capuano/contact/email.shtml [347]
    Representative Robert A. Brady [342] (D-PA 1st)
    Phone: (202) 225-4731
    Fax: (202) 225-0088
    E-mail Webform: http://www.house.gov/robertbrady/IMA/issue.htm> [348]
    Representative Charles A. Gonzalez (D-TX 20th)
    Phone: (202) 225-3236
    Fax: (202) 225-1915
    E-mail Webform: http://gonzalez.house.gov/feedback.cfm?campaign=gonzalez&type=Contact%20Me [349]


    Full Committee Members:
    Democrats
    Republicans
    Rep.
    Juanita Millender-McDonald
    CA-37, Chairwoman
    Rep.
    Vernon J. Ehlers
    MI-3, Ranking Member
    Rep.
    Robert A. Brady, PA-1
    Rep.
    Dan Lungren, CA-3
    Rep.
    Zoe Lofgren, CA-16
    Rep.
    Kevin McCarthy, CA-22
    Rep.
    Mike Capuano, MA-8
     
    Rep.
    Charles Gonzalez, TX-20
     
    Rep.
    Susan Davis, CA-53
     

    Subcommittee on Elections
    Members:

    Democrats Republicans
    Rep.
    Zoe Lofgren, CA-16
    Subcommittee
    Chair
    Rep.
    Kevin McCarthy, CA-22

    Subcommittee
    Ranking Member
    Rep.
    Juanita Millender-McDonald,
    CA-37
    Rep.
    Vernon J. Ehlers, MI-3
    Rep.
    Charles Gonzalez, TX-20
     
    Rep.
    Susan Davis, CA-53





    H.R. 811 Text


    Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007 (Introduced in House)


    Beginning
    [350]
    February 5, 2007
    [351]
      SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    [352]
      SEC. 2. PROMOTING ACCURACY, INTEGRITY, AND SECURITY THROUGH VOTER-VERIFIED PERMANENT PAPER BALLOT.

    [353]
      `SEC. 247. STUDY AND REPORT ON ACCESSIBLE BALLOT VERIFICATION MECHANISMS.

    [354]
      SEC. 3. ENHANCEMENT OF ENFORCEMENT OF HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002.

    [355]
      SEC. 4. EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION OF ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION.

    [356]
      SEC. 5. REQUIREMENT FOR MANDATORY MANUAL AUDITS BY HAND COUNT.

    [357]
      `SEC. 321. ESTABLISHMENT OF ELECTION AUDIT BOARDS.

    [358]
      `SEC. 322. NUMBER OF BALLOTS COUNTED UNDER AUDIT.

    [359]
      `SEC. 323. PROCESS FOR ADMINISTERING AUDITS.

    [360]
      `SEC. 324. SELECTION OF PRECINCTS.

    [361]
      `SEC. 325. PUBLICATION OF RESULTS.

    [362]
      `SEC. 326. PAYMENTS TO STATES.

    [363]
      `SEC. 327. EXCEPTION FOR ELECTIONS SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC RECOUNT UNDER STATE LAW.

    [364]
      `SEC. 328. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    [365]
    `Subtitle C--Mandatory Manual Audits by Election Audit Boards
    [366]
      SEC. 6. REPEAL OF EXEMPTION OF ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION FROM CERTAIN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS.

    [367]
      SEC. 7. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    [368]

    HR 811 Factsheets to Study and Share

    Download, read, and circulate these 1- and 2-page briefings on the false promises and dangerous deceptions of the "Increased Voter Confidence and Voting Accessibility Act" otherwise known as HR 811.

    • Why the Election Assisatance Commission Must Be Abolished [305] by Nancy Tobi



     

    These issue factsheets created by and published at

    VotersUnite.org [369]


    Participate in Protecting Our Democracy!


    Help Amend HR 811 to prohibit "electronic ballots."


    This page lists a variety of materials you can use, and actions you can
    take, to work toward informing Congress and others of the reasons why
    electronic ballots must be prohibited in the United States -- NOW.

    These materials are aimed at amending
    Congressman Rush Holt's bill ("Voter Confidence and Increased
    Accessibility Act of 2007") to ban electronic ballots.


    General Informationfor Congress and Others [370]

    Electronic Voting Does Not Serve the Disabilities Community [371]

    Electronic Voting Machines Disenfranchise Minority Voters [372]


    Take Action Now!



    Email Congress to tell them the Holt bill (HR 811) must be amended to ban DREs [373]
    Electronic voting machines (DRE) are a failed technology that disenfranchises the very taxpayers who pay for them.



    Call Congress to Ban Electronic Ballots. Let us know who you called. [374]
    This page lists all the House Members and their phone numbers.
    We're putting stars by the ones that you let us know you've called.



    Endorse our proposed amendments to HR 811 [375]
    Urge Congress to require real paper ballots, marked by voters or by non-tabulating ballot-marking devices.

    General Information for Congress and Others



    A Call for an Amendment to HR 811 to Prohibit Unverifiable “Electronic Ballots” [376]

    10-page combination of several handouts on this page, with an annotated Table of Contents.




    Why the Urgent Need to Ban Electronic Ballots? [377]

    A bullet list of the many reasons why DREs constitute a new and subtle
    form of high tech voter suppression. Links to supporting information
    are included, along with brief excerpts.
    Printable pdf without links and excerpts [378]




    Election Reform in a High-Tech World [379] - Handout
    A 2-page standalone explanation of why electronic ballots
    (electrical charges inside a computer) cannot be safeguarded the way
    paper ballots can, and how prohibiting the use of electronic ballots
    will solve practical election problems.



    The Impact of an HR 811 Amendment to Ban Electronic Ballots [380]
    A one-page list detailing the practical implications of such an amendment - what the amendment will and will not do.
    Printable pdf handout [381]



    A Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail - Not a Reliable Back Up [382]
    One-page summarizing some evidence of past failures of
    voter-verifiable paper audit trails to provide a reliable indication of
    voter intent.



    Pictorial Handout [383]

    An illustration of the most important benefit of amending Congressman
    Holt’s election reform bill to prohibit the use of electronic ballots:
    rather than counting unverified electronic ballots, voter-verified
    paper ballots would be counted for the initial tally rather than set
    aside to be possibly checked only in audits and recounts.


    Electronic Voting Does Not Serve the Disabilities Community



    Americans with Disabilities Call for Election Systems Featuring Both Accessibility and Security [384]
    A statement written by Mr. Noel Runyan, a blind accessibility
    expert, calling for voting systems that use only paper ballots. As of
    March 28, signatories include 34 leaders in the disabilities community
    and more signatures are added every day.



    Pictorial Handout [385]
    An illustration of the fact that accessibility for people with
    disabilities can be achieved without the use of electronic ballot
    systems.

    Electronic Voting Machines Disenfranchise Minority Voters



    2004 and 2006 New Mexico Canvass Data Shows Undervote Rates Plummet in Minority Precincts When Paper Ballots are Used [386]
    A report showing that the undervote rate in minority precincts
    decreased by as much as 85% when the state switched from electronic
    ballot systems to paper ballots.



    Electronic Voting Machines: New, High-Tech Ways to Disenfranchise African-Americans [387]

    2-pages of evidence that DREs are disproportionately disenfranchising African-American voters.

    Letter to Congress: Halt H.R. 811, Too Dangerous for Democracy

    Compose and FAX Letters to Tell Congress: NO on H.R. 811

    To compose your message to Congress, copy and paste the text below into the body of a new text document or e-mail message, and try to put it into your own words. To increase the persuasiveness of your letter, adapt several of the suggested talking points below in your own words. (It's much more effective to not send form letters!)

    Send copies to your own Congressional representative and to members of the Committee on House Administration, using the contact information listed here [297].
    We recommend faxing your letters as the most effective means of delivery.
    You can fax the chair of the committee this prescription for electoral integrity [299], too.


    Re: Halt H.R. 811, a Clear and Present Danger to Electoral Democracy


    To the Honorable

    I write in opposition to the Holt Bill, H.R. 811, which promises "increased voter confidence" but actually perpetuates secret vote-counting by computers while handing centralized control of federal elections to four White House appointees.

    Because it requires a computerized text conversion device in every polling place, H.R. 811 would actually require electronic voting machines, compromising noncomputerized voting methods such as handcounted paper ballots.

    For the same reason H.R. 811 would also rule out noncomputerized voter assistive devices that provide better accessiblity features at far less cost, while avoiding the unacceptable risks of secret, computerized vote-counting.

    This unnecessary, unproven, as-yet nonexistent text converter device that H.R. 811 requires is a gift to the E-voting industry and an under-funded federal mandate that will impose huge cost burdens on the states.

    H.R. 811 provides no means to enforce election laws that are being routinely violated. This hardly inspires "increased voter confidence" in elections.

    Election auditing procedures in H.R. 811--which apply to post-election results rather than to the first count--are poorly conceived and inadequate to reliably detect electronic fraud or mistabulation. This inspires alarm, not confidence.

    The EAC, created as a temporary advisory commission to implement HAVA, is in fact a federal executive commission that can at any time be converted into a federal regulatory agency by the insertion of a single line of text in any act of Congress.

    Regulatory powers would enable the EAC to effectively bypass Congress and create law that preempts Constitutional state sovereignty in election administration. This would allow four White House appointees to determine:

    * Which voting systems are approved for use in our elections
    * Who counts the votes, and how votes are counted
    * How recounts are conducted and outcomes decided

    This is a clear and present danger to American democracy. Do not allow it! Reject H.R. 811!

    True election reform that ensures, rather than threatens democratic foundations, requires

    * Public ownership of any voting system
    * Citizen oversight of all electoral processes
    * State sovereignty in conducting elections

    H.R. 811 is opposed by the National Association of Counties, the National Conference of State Legislatures, and the National Association of Secretaries of State because elections administrators in the 50 states understand the disastrous destabilizing effects H.R. 811 will have on U.S. elections. That's why they say NO to H.R. 811 -- and why you should too.

    Sincerely,




    Customize your letter by adapting several of the following talking points or adding your own.

    If you are writing a letter to the editor (LTE), the usual length limitation is about 250 words. The above letter is 308 words. The longest paragraph is 80 words, and the smallest, about 30. The average line contains 15 words, so subtracting 4 lines would yield a letter that would be within most LTE length limits.

    I am especially upset because H.R. 811:

    • Entrenches private E-voting vendors that have no business managing public elections

    • Despite its backers' claims, H. R. 811 does not eliminate DREs

    • Allows election technologies that threaten the secrecy of the ballot

    • Perpetuates the pretense of a certification process that cannot possibly assure secure or reliable voting equipment

    • Allows election reporting practices that expose election results to Internet manipulation

    • Leaves the nation exposed to risk of undetectable, outcome-alterning mass vote fraud and illegitimate government

    • Imposes mandates for unnecessary and unproven E-voting equipment at unmet cost to the states

    • Sets impossible timelines for implementing complex technical mandates

    • Centralizes control of elections under a permanent four-person board appointed by the president

    • Erodes state sovereignty as a check on federal government power

    • Maintains the unacceptable practice of electronic vote counting, a process inherently secret from the voters



    8/9/06 - Testify in Support of VotePAD at California Certification Hearing, Sacramento

    CA Elections Staff Advises Against Non-electronic Voting Alternative for Disabled
    Election activists support VotePAD as secure, low-cost, more accessible than electronic voting machines

    Date: Wednesday, August 9, 2006

    Time: Demonstration and press conference, 9:00 a.m.
    State voting system certification hearings, 10:00 a.m.

    Place: Secretary of State’s Office at 1500 11th Street, Sacramento, CA

    Event: Demonstration and press conference by California Election Protection Network prior to state voting systems certification hearing

    Subject: Vote-PAD is the first non-computerized voting assistive device to be proposed for use in California elections to enable persons with disabilities to vote independently at the polls using paper ballots. The VotePAD is being evaluated for possible use as a disability access solution in conjunction with optical scan electronic voting systems by vendors Hart (System 6.2) and Diebold (GEMS-Accu-Vote OS).

    Please see VotePAD entry under Press Releases for in-depth background with links to primary source material.
    You can also send in written commmentary for the hearing record; see address instructions below.

    CAN'T MAKE THE HEARING? SEND IN YOUR WRITTEN COMMENTS BY MAIL OR E-MAIL

    Members of the public are encouraged to submit written comments on agenda items.

    Written comment should be sent by US mail to the address (below) or by email to VotingSystemComment@ss.ca.gov [388].

    The public comment period extends 30 days past the hearing date (closes Sept. 8, 2006).

    Those wishing to provide oral comment at a meeting should complete a speaker’s card upon arrival.
    In all cases, the presiding officer reserves the right to impose time limits onpresentations as may be necessary to ensure that the agenda is completed.

    Those wishing to provide an extended statement shouldsubmit a request via the email address above
    or contact Bruce McDannold at (916) 653-7244 at least 24 hours prior to the meeting.

    * * * *

    These are the VotePAD report files you can download and study in preparation for oral or written comments to enter in the hearing record.

    Available for download at: http://ss.ca.gov/elections/elections_vs.htm [389]

    # Vote-PAD/DESI & Vote-PAD/Hart Systems: Staff Report
    # Vote-PAD/DESI & Vote-PAD/Hart Systems: Consultant's Report
    # Vote-PAD/DESI & Vote-PAD/Hart Systems Testing: Monitor Procedures
    # Vote-PAD/DESI & Vote-PAD/Hart Systems Testing: Monitor Records, Day 1
    # Vote-PAD/DESI & Vote-PAD/Hart Systems Testing: Monitor Records, Day 2
    # Vote-PAD/DESI & Vote-PAD/Hart Systems Testing: Exit Surveys, Day 1
    # Vote-PAD/DESI & Vote-PAD/Hart Systems Testing: Exit Surveys, Day 2
    # Vote-PAD/DESI Proposed Use Procedures
    # Vote-PAD/Hart Proposed Use Procedures

    9/27/06: EMERGENCY PAPER BALLOT LEGISLATION: ACT NOW!

    Something exciting is happening! Last week my colleague Brad Friedman of TheBradBlog (www.bradblog.com, this is the blog I've done some guest blogging for) blogged about his idea that Congress pass emergency paper ballot legislation in time for this November's elections. Yesterday, that idea was introduced into the Senate as the Boxer-Dodd bill, AKA The Confidence in Voting Act. This bill would provide funding to states to produce and make available paper ballots for those voters who want to use them and in case of electronic voting machine failures, such as seen around the country in the primary elections.

    After this week Congress will be in recess until after the elections. This bill needs swift action in order to pass. It has momentum. It needs your help.

    Give it your support here:

    http://tinyurl.com/ojd4r [390]

    A companion House bill has been introduced by Rush Holt(D-NJ).

    Then forward this message to your lists!

    Barbara Boxer writes about the Act:

    "The American people deserve an elections system that is beyond reproach -- a system where every vote counts and every vote is counted. That's why I've introduced new legislation, co-sponsored by Senator Chris Dodd (D-CT), to address this problem -- and I hope you'll urge your Members of Congress to support it.

    My 'Confidence in Voting Act' is simple. It urges local jurisdictions to make paper ballots available at every polling place, so any voter who wants one can use one, and so there is a back-up in case electronic voting machines fail. What's more, my legislation defrays the cost by reimbursing local jurisdictions up to $.75 for each of these contingency paper ballots produced.

    This is a win-win for local governments and for individual voters. The 'Confidence in Voting Act' will make it easier for states to do the right thing in this November's election -- and it will make the American people more confident about the outcome. Please forward an email to your Members of Congress now -- urge them to support my "Confidence in Voting Act" before Congress adjourns this week!"

    Want to do more?

    Here are some options:

    Make calls and send faxes to your Senators and Congressional Representatives. Find their contact information here:
    http://www.visi.com/juan/congress/index.html [391]

    Get paid to watch the polls! Sign up here:
    http://www.pollworkersfordemocracy.org> [392]

    Contribute to pinpointed election protection efforts here:
    http://www.velvetrevolution.us [393]

    If you're in California, Support Debra Bowen for Secretary of State! Hold a house party!
    http://www.debrabowen.com [394]

    Check out additional options to take action here:
    http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/takeaction [286]

    Remember to contact Congress about the Confidence in Voting Act and forward this email.

    Thanks for caring about the future of democracy in the U.S.!

    Emily Levy, Velvet Revolution

    Alameda County, CA: Insist on Voting Machine Security Testing

    Alameda - Sequoia Security Tests / Call, E-mail Supervisors Now / Speak Tues. Oct.10, 11 a.m.

    • Insist that they carry out the security testing of the new Sequoia voting machines that they voted for June 8.

    • 11 AM, Tuesday, October 10

    • Board of Supervisors Chambers

      Administration Building, 5th Floor

      1221 Oak Street (at 12th), Oakland

    • This is item 14 on the agenda.

    • And write a letter [395] to the board of supervisors!

    • For more information click on Security Testing [396].

    Call/Write into National Public Radio "Science Friday" and comment on "Voting Systems Update"

    FRIDAY Sept. 5 2008
    Sorry if you missed the Voting System segment of Science Friday.
    That segment of the program was over before the alert could get distributed, and the audio and blog comments for the show are not posted online until several hours after the show is aired.

    However, the audio for the program will be available for download later tonight (Fri. 9/5/) at the following link:
    http://www.npr.org/rss/podcast.php?id=510221 [397]

    Blog comments associated with the show will probably also be updated by that  time, so you will have an opportunity to add in your comments.


    Call or e-mail National Public Radio TODAY to comment on the "Voting Systems Update" topic in the Science Friday show.

    TIMES: Friday Sept. 5 at 2-4 pm Eastern, 1-3 pm Central, and 11 am-1 pm Pacific.

    This is a bonanza opportunity to access the huge National Public Radio audience to sharpen up the dialogue on computerized voting.

    Challenge the myth of "paper trails." Let the rest of the nation know just how serious our corrupted
    privatized secret vote counting electoral system really is.

    Read How to Get on Talk of the Nation (below) to improve your chances of getting on air.

    If the phone lines are busy, listen in while typing and sending in your comments by e-mail.

    SCROLL DOWN for phone #s , radio stations, E-mail addresses and directions.


    CONTACT INFO and DIRECTIONS

    E-mail your question or comment for broadcast.


    http://www.npr.org/contact/totn.html [398]

    Join the Online Discussion: Blog of the Nation http://www.npr.org/blogs/talk/ [399]

    ====================

    Phone-in: (800) 989-8255

    Our Screening Policy: Read How to Get on Talk of the Nation, an April 2006 column from NPR's ombudsman.
    http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5363084 [400]

    =====================
    Listen Live Friday: 2 - 4 pm Eastern \ 1 - 3 pm Central \ 11 am - 12 noon Pacific

    Broadcast Radio Stations (to listen by radio)

    Click here for a list of stations that carry Science Friday: http://www.sciencefriday.com/about/stations/ [401]

    ================================

    or, Listen via Internet Radio:
    Can't get it on the radio? Listen live online. Try your favorite station from these top choices or choose from the full list of stations carrying the program.

    KQED, San Francisco [402]
    mp3 [403]
    | quicktime [404]
    | real [405]
    | windows [406]

    Michigan Radio [407]
    windows [408] |
    m3u [409] |
    real [410]

    Texas Public Radio [411] windows [412] mp3 [413] |
    real [414] | quicktime [413] | .mp3/.m3u [414]

    Wisconsin Ideas Network [415]
    real [416] | windows [417] | mp3 (m3u) [418]

    WAMU, Washington DC [419] MP3 [420] | Real Player [421] |
    Windows Media [422]

    KXOT, Seattle [423] Real [424] |
    Windows Media [425]


    Voting Systems Update

    (broadcast Friday, September 5th, 2008)
    Segment produced by:  Annette Heist

    With the official presidential campaign season now fully underway, we'll get an update on voting machines around the country.

    After a problem-riddled adoption of various electronic voting systems following the 2000 election, many states are now moving towards systems that can provide a voter-verified paper trail to ensure an accurate vote.

    In some states, voting machines that are only a few years old are being sold for scrap or auctioned on Ebay.

    But are there enough of the new machines to go around -- and are some areas of the country better equipped than others?

    And what about ballot design?

    We'll talk with Larry Norden, author of "The Machinery of Democracy: Protecting Elections in an Electronic World," about voting technology around the country.

    Teachers, find more information about using Science Friday as a classroom resource in the Kids' Connection
    http://www.sciencefriday.com/kids/ [426]

    Guests

    Larry Norden
    Project director for the Voting Technology Assessment Project
    http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/the_machinery_of_democracy... [427]

    Author, "The Machinery of Democracy: Protecting Elections in an Electronic World"
    http://www.amazon.com/o/ASIN/0897335538/sciencefriday/ [428]

    Counsel, Brennan Center for Justice http://www.brennancenter.org/ [429]
    New York University http://www.nyu.edu [430]
    New York, New York

    Related Links

    * VerifiedVoting.org
    http://verifiedvoting.org/ [431]
    * Brennan Center: Better Ballots
    http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/better_ballots/ [432]
    * Federal Election Commission
    http://www.fec.gov/ [433]
    * usa.gov: voting and elections
    http://www.usa.gov/Citizen/Topics/Voting.shtml [434]
    * Voting and the election process
    http://uspolitics.america.gov/uspolitics/elections/voting.html [435]


    If you're interested, here is a similar program that was broadcast in February of this year.
    Voting Machine Update (broadcast Friday, February 1st, 2008) Click for audio file. [436]

    The election season is in full swing, with the 'Super Tuesday' primary just days away. Communities around the country have adopted different types of electronic voting machines in the hopes of avoiding another 'hanging
    chad' situation like the one that marred the 2000 presidential race. However, some communities are reconsidering their approach.

    Maryland recently announced that it would be moving away from entirely electronic systems to ones in which paper ballots are read by electronic scanners. Florida and California have also turned away from all-electronic 'touch screen' designs. In this segment, we'll check in with computer security expert Avi Rubin about how states are using electronic voting systems.

    Guests

    Aviel Rubin
    Professor, Computer Science [437]
    Technical Director, Information
    Security Institute
    [438]
    Johns Hopkins University [439]
    Baltimore, Maryland

    Related Links

    • VerifiedVoting.org [190]
    • Electronic Frontier Foundation: E-Voting [440]
    • NY Times Magazine: Can You Count on Voting Machines? [441]
    • Voting and Elections: USA.gov [434]

    Segment produced by: Annette Heist

    Reverse Mississippi's Deliberate Ballot Design Manipulation

    EDA Blog
    PER

    Action of the Day 091708 -- [prepared by the Care2 Petition Site: http://www.care2.com [442] ]

    EDA editor's note:
    We are reproducing the text of the Care2 Alert verbatim. The facts speak for themselves.

    Republican officials in Mississippi in charge of the state's election procedures have deliberately chosen to alter ballot design in violation of state law and common sense, with the predictable result that voters will be disoriented and many will probably error when voting on the U.S. Senate race.

    Denouncing the perpetrators of partisan election manipulations like this one is NOT a partisan act on our part. Election fraud, manipulation, and dirty tricks are wrong no matter who the perpetrators are -- and it is a multipartisan civic duty to put a stop to it.


    Republican officials in Mississippi must be desperate. They're pulling out the stops in election shenanigans in an attempt to confuse voters, hoping to push a close Senate contest to the Republican candidate.

    Tell the Mississippi governor:   The purposefully confusing ballot is illegal!
    http://www.care2.com/go/z/e/0Xto/wRCg/E0DA [175]

    The Republican Secretary of State decided to bury the Senate race below all local contests on the ballot.
    The race, between interim Senator Roger Wicker -- a Republican temporarily appointed to replace Trent Lott -- and former Democratic Governor Ronnie Musgrove, is expected to be close, making it one of the most important in the state.

    Not only does burying this Senate race below all the local ones confuse voters, it's a direct violation of state election law, which clearly states that federal races must be on the top of the ballot!

    Tell Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour -- who approved the ballot -- to reverse his decision in order to maintain the integrity of America's electoral process!
    Petition action link:   http://www.care2.com/go/z/e/0Xto/wRCg/E0DA [175]

    Sign the Request by Voters and Contact Your Representative

    Visit the Request by Voters page [290] on this site, where you can read a background briefing and download a copy of the Request by Voters.

    You will also find links to sign the online petition, and to send a letter to Rep. Rush Holt that the proposed Voter Confidence Act be amended according to the recommendations in the Request by Voters.

    http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/request_by_voters_to_amend_the_ho... [443]


    AttachmentSize
    request-by-voters-executive-summary.pdf [444]13.32 KB

    7/31/06 - Urge California Legislature to Pass Open Source Voting Law by Aug. 31

    Stop the madness of machine-based voting by starting with eliminating secret software. This alert comes from Alan Dechert of OpenVotingConsortium.org:

    The California State Legislature will resume business on August 7. The only way we can get our bill signed into law this year will be to inspire Debra Bowen to help "gut-and-amend" another bill. She has rarely supported gut-and-amend bills and this process is understood to be acceptable only in extraordinary circumstances. Assembly Member Jackie Goldberg wants to proceed and has phoned Senator Bowen about this.

    We believe this to be an extraordinary case that warrants this dramatic action. Arguments against our bill (by McPherson and registrars) were predicated on a claim that vendors would not comply and would leave the state.

    We knew this was nonsense and we have since proved it since Alameda County demanded and obtained Sequoia's agreement to comply (signed June 16th). Also, more revelations are coming out almost daily about problems with the vote counting process. This measure is urgently needed.

    Please cut and paste the text below, sign it, and fax it to 916-772-5301.

    NOTES:

    1) "Gut-and-amend" involves taking some other bill that is still alive, but known to be going nowhere and replacing the text. If we get this done, the revived AB 2097 will take the number of the gutted bill. So, I refer to AB 2097 only to show what the revived bill will say.

    2) The text of AB 2097 can be found here (type in "AB 2097"): http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/bilinfo.html [445]

    3) The fax number is good 24 hrs every day. If busy, try again. Late night (after 11 pm Pacific) and early morning (before 8 am Pacific) are least likely to be busy.

    DECLARATION ON TRANSPARENCY OF THE VOTE COUNTING PROCESS:

    We have the right to know how our votes are counted. We know this intuitively. It is self-evident.

    To secure this right, the law must be made clear on this point. Currently, it is too easy for governments and corporations to abridge this right. This right is routinely and systematically violated. California Assembly Member Jackie Goldberg's (D-Los Angeles) AB 2097 would require that all technical details of the inner workings of the voting machines be publicly disclosed. This law, if passed, would be an important step in the right direction and would support, supplement, and enhance other
    initiatives to establish voting system transparency nationwide.

    Time is of the essence. In what may have seemed like a fiscally prudent move, the bill was held in the Assembly Appropriations committee. Events since this happened more than two months ago have shown this to be a mistake.

    We believe Goldberg's bill must be passed now, before August 31st (end of CA legislative session).

    We call on California State Senator Debra Bowen, chairwoman of the Elections, Reapportionment and Constitutional Amendments Committee and chairwoman of the newly formed Senate Select Committee on the Integrity of Elections, to use all her powers to get this bill, or a similar bill, on the Governor's desk this year for approval.

    7/25/06 - Save the Ballots in Ohio

    Efforts to preserve Ohio ballots and other documentation from destruction are proceeding at a rapid pace in the race to beat a deadline in early September.

    Go here [446] for a link to a powerpoint presentation on this urgent matter.

    Ron Baiman, who is involved in this effort, explains as follows:

    "[The powerpoint] includes new evidence just found in Ohio. I haven't yet been able to scan in all of the supporting documentation (mostly the absentee audit and certified vote reports - but have all of this available as backup and will scan this in as soon as I can.) We need funds now to continue gathering data and trying to launch a campaign to save the ballots that will be destroyed in many counties on Sept. 3, 2006. See pictures from Darke County at the end of the spreadsheet."

    7/23/06 - Take MoveOn's Election Integrity Action Survey

    Take the Survey [447]

    Help MoveOn understand the magnitude of the crisis.

    7/21/06 - San Diego Protest Rally at RoV Office

    A rally is scheduled for 12 noon on Friday, July 21, at the San Diego County Registrar of Voters Office at 5201 Ruffin Rd. in San Diego, CA to protest the electronic voting security issues surrounding the June 6th Primary Election. All concerned citizens are urged to arrive in the parking lot at 11:30am. Participants are urged not to block the flow of traffic and be courteous to people entering and leaving the parking lot.

    The rally is being held to protest the use of insecure voting machines and to urge the registrar of voters and local officials to further investigate and consider alternatives.

    Voters are concerned because of severe security breaches in the election due to voting machine "sleepovers" and other hardware/software problems. The United States election system continues to be plagued by security issues regarding computer software and chain of custody breakdowns. Further information on this issue will be available at the rally. Please make your voice heard, voter confidence is at stake. Count the votes!

    San Diego County Registrar of Voters Office
    5201 Ruffin Rd.
    San Diego, CA

    7/19/06 - Investigate Recent Election in San Diego (CD 50)

    WED. JULY 19 Action of the Day: INVESTIGATE THE RECENT ELECTION IN SAN DIEGO!
    To California State Attorney General Bill Lockyer:

    It is critically important that the recent election in San Diego County be investigated. The election was in the 50th Congressional District and was conducted by the San Diego Registrar of Voters (ROV). San Diego ROV Michael Haas allowed the Diebold electronic voting machines to be taken home by poll workers which is a direct violation of law which automatically decertifies the machines for use in an election.

    Haas is refusing to make documents related to the election available to the public in violation of federal and state laws. Haas made the cost of a recount prohibitive by demanding $1.00 per vote in contrast to the Orange County ROV who only charges .14 cents per vote for a recount. Please investigate the many federal and state laws that have been violated by San Diego County ROV Michael Haas.

    SAN DIEGO VOTERS AS WELL AS ALL CALIFORNIANS DESERVE TO BE SURE THAT VOTES ARE COUNTED AS CAST!

    Please send this message to Attorney General Bill Lockyer at:
    Public Inquiry Unit, CA Department of Justice: piu@doj.ca.gov [448]
    Also to: bill.lockyer@doj.ca.gov [449]
    Tel: 916.444.1755
    Fax: 916.444.1757
    It is important to include your name and address

    7/18/06 Diebold Flipping Votes in Georgia Primary

    TODAY TUESDAY July 18, 2006
    Press release from the Cynthia McKinney campaign in Georgia:
    FOR IMMEDITATE RELEASE July 18, 2006
    Contact: Jocco Baccus 678-520-2088

    DIEBOLD ELECTRONIC MACHINES MALFUNCTION, VOTE FOR OTHER CANDIDATE
    (Decatur, GA) After one hour of voting, the McKinney campaign has received numerous calls that the voting machines are malfunctioning. Voters casting votes for McKinney are reportedly having their votes switched by the machines for Hank Johnson. This is not a new problem with Diebold machines. Lawyers for the campaign have been alerted and said that If this situation is not corrected, Cynthia McKinney for Congress will be forced to take additional measures.


    7/18/06 - Attend Hearing to Demand NO DIEBOLD TSx in November in San Diego

    URGENT ACTION -- San Diego County, CA: HELP PREVENT THE USE OF DIEBOLD TSx VOTING MACHINES IN SAN DIEGO COUNTY IN NOVEMBER!

    HERE'S HOW: Come to the Board of Supervisors meeting

    Tuesday, July 18 at 9:00 am
    County Administration Building
    Board of Supervisors North Chamber
    1600 Pacific Coast Hwy, Room 310, San Diego

    9:00 A.M.
    Activists will make a presentation. They need you there to show support.

    10: 30 A.M.
    Jess Durfee, Chair of the San Diego County Democratic Party, will make a public statement for the media in front of the County Administration Building.

    MAKE OUR VOICES HEARD!
    Let The Board Of Supervisors know that we demand secure elections in San Diego County.

    San Diego County Voters: Call your Supervisor
    Tell him/her you do not want these “hackable” machines to be used this November.

    Find your supervisor at: http://www.sdcounty.ca.gov/general/bos.html

    SEND DONATIONS
    Please send donations to support the "CA 50" citizen group taking on these election problems in San Diego county!

    Send online donations to: www.velvetrevolution.us/donate.php

    or by postal mail to Velvet Revolution, PO Box 9576, Wash DC 20016

    Specify donation "for CA 50."

    LEARN MORE
    Follow daily news reports and Diebold sleepover chronicle at http://www.BradBlog.com
    Visit the CA50 Citizens Action Group webpage at http://www.nosleepovers.org/

    The CA50 Action Committee is a special action group formed to deal with the voting integrity issues arising out of the Busby/Bilbray special election. CA50 is composed of a number of concerned California voters.

    Among the founding members are:
    Barbara Gail Jacobson, hand count requestor
    Judy Hess, PDA Metro San Diego Leader
    Brad Friedman of Brad Blog
    Mimi Kennedy, PDA Board Chair
    Emily Levy, California Election Protection Network

    Protect Your OWN Vote: Verify Your Registration!

    Registered to Vote?
    Are you Sure?
    Resist the Purge!

    Confirm Your Registration Status Online!
    Click the links below to be sure you know the registration deadlines and rules for your state,
    and that your name is on the voter registration roll

    Voter Registration Deadline Dates by State [450]

    Details on Registration System in Your State [451]

    Check Your Registration Status at CanIVote.org [452]

    What You Can Do to Defend Election '08 and Beyond

    Participate in the Long-Term, Year-Round Campaign for Election Integrity [453] (Overview)

    Protect Your Own Vote: Verify Your Voter Registration [454]

    Sign up for Election Verification Polling (Citizen Exit Polls) http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/evp [69]

    Be Prepared to Protest Suspect Election Returns Code Orange Rapid Response Demonstrations [77]

    Choose Your Own Election Day Action Plan [455]

    Learn How to Gather Election Evidence [456]

    Download, read, and share the 2008 Citizens' Toolkit from Black Box Voting http://www.blackboxvoting.org/toolkit.html [457]


    Choose Your Role in Election Day Rapid Response: A Six-Part Plan to Defend the Vote [80]

    Join the I-Count Corps [182] to Hand-count Paper Ballot Elections http://electiondefensealliance.org/count/signup.php [458]

    Write a Letter to the Editor (or your Representative) http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/let_people_count [459]

    Find and Join a Local Election Integrity Group Near You http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/Regional_EI_Directory [460]

    Donate Financial Support http://electiondefensealliance.org/Donate [461]


    Get involved in any of these EDA projects:

    Investigating Election Fraud [462]

     

    The Arizona Transparency Project [463]

    Election Integrity Monitoring [464]

    Election Forensic Analysis [465]

    Universal Ballot Sampling [466] Protocol for Election Verification

    Commissioning Polls and Voter Surveys [467] as Checks on Reported Election Results

    Conducting Citizens' Election Verification Polls [69]

    Training Citizens in Hand-Counted Paper Ballot Elections [468] (HCPB) via The I-Count Corps [182]

    Legal Initiatives such as the Save New York Levers Project [469]

    Legislative Analysis [470]

    Multipartisan Election Reform Advocacy [471]

    Election Integrity Broadcasts via California Public News Service [472]

    Education and Organizing at Saving America Vote by Vote [473] Screenings

    Podcasting on Election Defense Radio [474]

    Videocasting on EDA TV [475]


    Citizen Activism Tools

    Democracy is not for spectators. This is where you will find tools to help empower you, your friends and your fellow citizens take back control of our public election process.

      • Verified Voting Transparency Project: Election Monitoring Checklists [476]
      • Download the Black Box Voting Citizen's Tool Kit [74]
      • Beware These Voter Suppression and Vote-Counting Fraud Tactics [477]
      • Save-R-Vote Election Monitoring Field Guide [478]
      • Join Pollworkers for Democracy [479]
      • State Open Records Law Request Letter Generator [480]
      • "We're Counting the Votes" Kit [481]
      • New Progressive Coalition Fundraising Press Kit [482]
      • CA Election Monitoring --A Training Manual [483]
      • Communication and Framing Tools [484]
      • Get the Solarbus DVD featuring the Lou Dobbs "Democracy at Risk" Series! [485]
      • Learn the Basics [486]
      • Explore Resources [487]


    Actions for Election Day

    What You Can Do to Defend the Vote on Election Day

    1. Vote 2. Voter Education at the Polls 3. Record Precinct Data at Close of Polls 4. Monitor the Central Count at your County Elections Department

    1. VOTE (of course!) Voting in person in your local precinct is always the best policy. If you have an absentee (mail-in) ballot that you haven't already mailed, walk it in to your local polling site, or take it in person to the county election department.

    2. VOTER EDUCATION at the POLLS If you can "work the polls," election day is a great opportunity for effective voter education. Sure it can be daunting to walk up to someone you don't know, and start talking about democracy, and the government we share responsibility for. But it is necessary! Take along a friend or two, and suddenly it's not so hard. You will find it is one of the most satisfying civic action experiences you've ever had. Try it -- you'll like it. Trust us on this.

    See below for links to informational flyers you can hand out. To avoid the appearance of "electioneering" you will have to meet voters 150 feet beyond the poll entrance. (See further notes below).

     

    INFORMATION SHEETS you can download, print, and hand out to voters:

    a. How Do You Know? (handbill)

    8 mini-handbills per sheet. Photocopy and slice along cutlines. Color gets attention! Color copies cost about 50 cents. Otherwise, B&W will do.

    http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/HowDoYouKnow.pdf [203]

    b. Voters' Top 10 Questions About Elections

    What the Corporate Newsmedia Aren't Telling You About Elections and Your Vote

    http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/EDA_Top10_rev020508.pdf [204]

    c. Election Integrity Volunteer Signup Sheet http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/Volunteer_Signup_020508.pdf [205]



    A Note About "Electioneering"

     

    Some people -- including election officials -- may try to tell you what you're doing is "electioneering" and illegal. It's not. You are informing people about the realities of computer vote counting, which is a multipartisan concern. This has nothing to do with advocating a vote for or against any candidate or issue, therefore it IS NOT electioneering.



    3. RECORD PRECINCT DATA at close of polls

    Be present at 8:00 with a clipboard, notepad, pen, flashlight -- and digital camera if you have one.

    Ask the pollworkers to copy or photograph the information on the pollworkers' signed summary report (sometimes called the "Blue Sheet") that records how many voters cast ballots in the precinct; how many ballots were received, voted, or voided; how many foreign language and provisional ballots were cast; and other important information. Also ask to see and record the voter sign-in sheets (showing who voted at the precinct) and any machine trouble reports.

    Watch the pollworkers print out the machine end-of-day vote reports from the voting machines. Then copy by hand, or photograph, these "poll tapes" after the pollworkers post them on the outside of the polling site.

    If you can, please upload this information to the Precint Tally Capture Project: (link forthcoming)


    4. OBSERVE the CENTRAL COUNT at your COUNTY ELECTION DEPARTMENT

     

    You are a member of the voting public and have the right to observe election procedures so long as you don't obstruct the election workers. Don't let anybody tell you any different. Things to bring: Clipboards, notepads, pens, digital cameras, video cameras, tape recorders, cell phones, and binoculars (to see the tabulator monitor screens).

    For further instructions on Central Count Monitoring, LOOK HERE [65]



    ADDITIONAL GUIDES to ELECTION DAY MONITORING

     

    Blackboxvoting.org, The AZ Election Monitoring Project, and the Ohio Election Justice Campaign (OEJC) have issued these additional guides detailing what to watch for and questions to ask.

    Arizona Election Integrity Manual

    This is a comprehensive manual ideal for group-effort comprehensive election monitoring. It was written for use in Arizona, but the information and methodology is generally transferable to elections in any state. This manual is truly "A to Z" in its thoroughness. http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/monitoring_computerized_elections [488]

    BlackBoxVoting.org's Guide to Election Monitoring What To Watch For [489]

    Also download BlackboxVoting's 2008 Citizen Election Tool Kit [82], subtitled "Top 5 Things You Can Do to Stop Election Theft" focused on election monitoring, and the earlier 2006 Took Kit edition [74], which is a broadbased guide for year-round election integrity action.

    Two more excellent election monitoring guides used in California are also generally applicable to monitoring computerized elections anywhere (with adjustments for particular E-vendor voting systems).

    SaveRVote SaveRVote Election Monitoring Guide 2008 [490]

    CA 11th CD Election Protection Manual [483]

    Ohio Election Justice Campaign Quarantine That Machine! [75]

    (Treat election violations as a crime scene).

     

     

     

    Citizen Activism Tools

    Democracy is not for spectators. This is where you will find tools to help empower you, your friends and your fellow citizens take back control of our public election process.

    Learn the Basics

    A very well-organized, neutral, and objective presentation of computerized voting issues, questions, and answers for those new to the subject has been assembled at this website:

    http://www.votingmachinesprocon.org/ [491]




    VotersUnite.org [492] has consistently produced some of the very best original research and outstanding public education materials of the election integrity movement. Click the link below to visit the VotersUnite downloadable factsheet collection.

    Information to Work With [493]



    Verified Voting Transparency Project: Election Monitoring Checklists

    An election is a complex process that begins several weeks before Election Day and is not fully completed until several weeks after. To assure the integrity of the vote, citizens need to participate in observing all phases of the election process.

    The "Election Transparency Project" is a set of election monitoring checklists for citizens to use before, during and after the election to assess how open to public verification their local election systems are. "Transparency" is one of six election assessment projects prepared by Verified Voting.org. The other project sets address Election Administration, Election Incidents, State/Local Organizing, Voting Information, and Voting Standards.

    To access an index to the entire set of these invaluable election education resources, click here [494].

    To download copies of each of the Transparency monitoring checklists, click on the blue hyperlinked titles below,
    and check back for the forthcoming titles.

    Election Transparency Project

    OBSERVATION GUIDELINES AND QUESTIONNAIRES

    We are preparing observation guidelines and questionnaires for six different aspects of the electoral process: you can choose those that best match your schedule and interests.

    Some aspects of the electoral process can be easily observed by individuals. Others are more suited to a group effort. Both individuals and organizations are invited to participate. Please see the descriptions below for more information.

    If you plan to observe but have not yet signed up, please click here to do so. After you register, we'll automatically send you questionnaires as they become available, and later, the webpage address of the online forms so you can submit your questionnaire results.

    After you've registered, just download and print the instructions and questionnaires from this web site as they become available. The instructions and questionnaires will make clear exactly what you need to look for.

    After observation, you can easily enter your observations and notes into a web-based survey form (we’ll send you the links), or send your hard copy questionnaire to us for entry.

    The data you provide will be made publicly available – but not your name or any sensitive information. Data is redacted to prevent disclosure of personally identifying data (such as name or contact information).

    If you take photographs or video, we'd love to have electronic copies of photos, video, and other media documentation. Please send all materials to observer@verifiedvoting.org [189] -- if you have questions about what or how to send to us, just send us your question at the same email address. Be sure to tell us exactly what, when and where events occurred so we can properly document your files.

    CODE OF CONDUCT & CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT

    It is important to note that the Election Transparency Project is a non-partisan project designed to improve the electoral process and protect the right to vote. All project volunteers and staff must not disrupt the election process, and must not prevent poll workers or election officials from performing their legal duties. As an observer or volunteer in this project, it's essential that you observe all laws, rules and protocols of observation as required in your state and jurisdiction, and that you are respectful of anyone you encounter in carrying out any part of this project. It is also crucial that you refrain from wearing any buttons, t-shirts, hats or other attire which represent any political or partisan views whatsoever. Appropriate attire is recommended (e.g. business casual).

    Additionally, in the course of conducting observation, volunteers may occasionally deal with sensitive personal data, e.g., personally identifiable information of persons who experienced or reported voting problems or irregularities. It is important that every staff member and volunteer adhere to the Election Transparency Project confidentiality statement, found here [see footnote below[1]].

    As an observer, you will be asked to indicate when you submit your data that you understand and agree to the Election Transparency Project confidentiality agreement.

    PRE-ELECTION QUESTIONNAIRES

    1. ELECTION TRANSPARENCY SCORECARD - State [256] / Local [257] Grade your state and/or county’s level of openness and transparency! These questionnaires should be completed now, so that the grades are in before the election begins.

    Transparency is an important part of achieving publicly verifiable elections. It’s also necessary for citizen observation, which is a crucial ingredient for free and fair elections. Use these questionnaires to identify obstacles to transparency so that they can be corrected before future elections.

    Completing an Election Transparency Scorecard for your state and/or your local voting jurisdiction (county, parish, township) can be done over the course of several days, and can typically be done when your schedule permits, as long as you or someone in your group can make some phone calls to offices during business hours. However, for the project to be most effective, you or someone in your group must complete the Election Transparency Scorecard as soon as possible -- by mid-October at the latest. Participation in the transparency assessment can be undertaken on either an individual or a group basis.

    If you enjoy learning more about election-related laws in your state and how they are applied locally, the transparency scorecard may be of particular interest to you.

    We encourage everyone who will be observing one of the components listed below to also complete an Election Transparency Scorecard.

    2. PRE-ELECTION TESTING QUESTIONNAIRE [495] You can use this questionnaire to collect critical information on the pre-election testing (often referred to as “Logic & Accuracy testing”) of the voting machines in your area! Equipment testing occurs well in advance of the election, so call your election department now to find out the date!

    The laws governing such testing differ widely across election jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, observers are permitted and even encouraged to ask questions and make comments. In others, only silent observers of the tests are permitted. Our questionnaire is adaptable to any of these scenarios. Observing pre-election testing may take only a few hours of time, although the testing (and thus the observation) usually occurs during the business day. This questionnaire has two parts: the first part consists of questions you'll ask by phone before you attend the test, and the second part is for the day of the test. This observation can be undertaken on either an individual or a group basis.

    If you enjoy the technical side of voting-related issues, then observation of Logic & Accuracy testing may be for you! A technical background is helpful, but not necessary.

    Also, we encourage everyone who will be documenting this information to also complete the Election Transparency Scorecard - Local [257] version (described above).

    Local: http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/downloads/ETScorecardLocal.pdf [257]

    State: http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/downloads/ETScorecardState.pdf [256]

    3. EARLY VOTING / BALLOT ACCOUNTING QUESTIONNAIRE [496]
    This questionnaire will assist you in observing the ballot accounting that takes place in some jurisdictions at the close of early voting sites during each day of early voting. At the time the early voting site closed for the day, poll workers should reconcile the number of votes cast with the number of voters checking in to vote.

    This observation will take place prior to Election Day, during the period of early voting. Approximately 14 states do not offer early voting of any kind – so this project would not apply to you if you live in: AL, CT, DE, MA, MD, MI, MS, NH, NJ, NY, OH, PA, RI, SC, WA. Other states may offer either in-person absentee ballot drop-off, or actual early voting in person. For this project, we're interested in the latter. Note: the rules for observing this critical function vary from place to place. We've written an introduction and instructions to help you - read this document first!

    One advantage of participating in observation of ballot accounting is that such observation usually takes place after business hours on early voting days, and therefore may be an after-hours commitment. (Note: some locations stagger hours from one day to the next, to maximize voting participation.) This observation is recommended for groups that can cover several (if not all) early voting sites in a county, parish, or township, but individual observation is also welcome. It is important to observe on each day of the early voting period.

    This type of observation is not generally technical in nature, and is well-suited to a variety of interests.

    Leading citizen groups such as the Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition and the Voting Integrity Alliance of Tampa Bay are working hard to plan and implement early voting observation in parts of Florida. The more people that we have participating throughout the country, the more we will be able to compare and contrast various ways of implementing early voting.

    Also, we encourage everyone who will be documenting this information to also complete the Election Transparency Scorecard - Local [257] Version (described above).

    ELECTION DAY AND POST-ELECTION QUESTIONNAIRES

    4. POLL CLOSING / BALLOT ACCOUNTING QUESTIONNAIRE: [Available soon.]
    This questionnaire is similar to the early voting questionnaire, except that it involves observing ballot accounting (reconciling the number of voters checking in to vote with the number of votes actually cast) at the time of poll closing on Election Day only, rather than at the end of each day of early voting. The rules for observing this critical function vary from place to place.

    One advantage of participating in observation of ballot accounting is that such observation takes place after business hours on Election Day, and therefore is a short-term, after-hours commitment. This observation is recommended for groups that can cover several (but not necessarily all) polling places in a county, parish, or township. However, observation by an individual at a single polling place is also useful. If you are planning to serve as a pollworker or election judge, you may be ideally positioned to capture the necessary information.

    This type of observation is not generally technical in nature, and is well-suited to a variety of interests.

    In 2004, this type of observation by a leading citizen group in Florida, the Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition (MDERC), revealed a variety of discrepancies, including that the vote totals of one machine were accidentally uploaded three times into the certified count. MDERC's report, "Get It Right The First Time", was cited by the US Government Accountability Office. This is your opportunity to expand this important work into your local area.

    Also, we encourage everyone who will be documenting this information to also complete the Election Transparency Scorecard - Local [257] Version (described above).

    5. AUDIT OBSERVATION QUESTIONNAIRE: [Available soon.]
    Mandatory random manual audits are essential to protecting the vote. These audits provide a way to verify that the electronic voting systems (either DRE voting machines or optical scan voting systems) are accurately recording and counting the votes. However, there are many unanswered questions about the best ways to implement audits.

    If you live in an area that already requires both a voter-verified paper record and routine manual auditing, this is your chance to find out how those important tools are being implemented, and to collect information necessary to formulate best practices for future auditing. And if you live in Kentucky or Pennsylvania, where there is an audit requirement, but not all jurisdictions will have voter-verified paper records to audit, it will be of special interest to learn how audits are conducted.

    This observation can be undertaken on either an individual or a group basis.

    If you are interested in how the votes are accounted for and checked for accuracy after Election Day, then this is the observation for you!

    To find out whether your state requires mandatory manual audits, please visit our [497].

    Manual audit requirements in the states: http://www.verifiedvoting.org/downloads/ManualAudits-06-06.pdf [498]

    Also, we encourage everyone who will be documenting this information to also complete the Election Transparency
    -
    State [256] and/or Local [257] Version (described above).

    6. DISABILITY ACCESS QUESTIONNAIRE: [Available soon.]
    Verified Voting seeks to promote electoral reforms that will improve the transparency and accuracy of our voting process for all voters, while still preserving individual voters’ privacy and independence at the polls. One of the primary goals of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) was to ensure access to the voting process for persons with disabilities, and much new equipment has been deployed for that purpose.

    However, as with transparency, the laws on the books for accessibility do not necessarily tell us how accessible the voting process is in practice. This is particularly true for this November, since for some jurisdictions, this is the first year in which they are using voting equipment which they obtained in order to meet HAVA’s accessibility requirement.

    You can help determine the extent to which the voting process has been made accessible for persons with disabilities by filling out this questionnaire. In so doing, you’ll help identify improvements that need to be made for future elections.

    Also, we encourage everyone who will be documenting this information to also complete the Election Transparency Scorecard - Local [257] Version (described above).

    REMEMBER: In addition to completed questionnaires, Verified Voting welcomes detailed descriptions of unexpected problems and supporting material such as videotapes, photos, and the like. Electronic copy of multimedia documentation can be sent to observer@verifiedvoting.org [189].

    After you submit your observations, we hope that you'll let us know what you found useful, confusing, or missing from the Election Transparency Project observation tools, or help us by making other suggestions for improving citizen oversight of our nation's voting systems. If you register as a volunteer, the web address for an online feedback form will automatically be emailed to you at the close of the project.

    MAKE AN IMPACT!

    On the basis of the data that you gather, Verified Voting will produce one or more reports that will feature recommendations for best practices geared toward increasing both the verifiability and accuracy of our elections.

    By directly observing the electoral process, and documenting it alongside hundreds or thousands of other people nationwide, you help lay the foundation for a stronger democracy.

    Our goal is to support improvement in the administration of our elections, and to create models for effective citizen observation.

    Not signed up yet?

    Act now! Don’t wait! Sign up here for the Election Transparency Project and build a stronger democracy!

    [1] Verified Voting Foundation Election Transparency Project
    Confidentiality Agreement

    I am participating in this nonpartisan project to improve the electoral process, protect the right to vote, and ensure that every vote counts as intended by the voter. I understand that many individuals who report voting problems and irregularities might not do so if they were not assured that the information they provide will be kept confidential. I understand that project volunteers and staff are expected to keep personally identifiable information in strictest confidence. I agree not to discuss personally identifiable information of persons reporting a voting problem or irregularity with anyone other than appropriate Verified Voting staff and designated volunteers.

    Download BlackBoxVoting's Citizen Tool Kits

    Note: The 2006 edition, called "Take Back Your Elections," is a year-round guide to election integrity activism.

    There is also a 2008 edition [82] of the BBV Citizens' Toolkit that details 5 specific monitoring actions on election day.

    Both editions should be downloaded, studied, and applied to the particular purposes each serves.


    The 2006 Black Box Voting Citizens' Toolkit
    THIS TOOL KIT IS A DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE FOR CITIZENS
    Black Box Voting's full (2006) citizen's tool kit is now available in a single document. [290]

    Citizens are concerned. They want to know what they can do. Here's your chance to get started on meaningful elections reform action that will make a real difference in November.

    The above link contains all 20 stand-alone modules in one consolidated document
    (make sure you have Adobe Acrobat installed to read the pdf files. You can download it for free. [290]

    SIMPLE, EFFECTIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO TAKE BACK YOUR ELECTIONS:
    1. Pick any module.
    2. Choose any action within the module.
    3. Then just follow through on it.
    4. Every action in the Tool Kit starts another pebble rolling down the hill.

    NEW MODULE IS UP: Pertains to fundraising for local elections reform people:
    ACTIONS FOR HIGH NET WORTH INDIVIDUALS [290]

    NEW MODULE IS UP: About ACTIVATING CELEBRITIES [290] in the election oversight issue:

    Candidates in three states have already notified us that they are already making use of the module to help CANDIDATES [290] protect their own elections (The toolkit just went up a few days ago!):

    It's time for you to recognize your own power. You don't need us. You don't have to find someone to follow. When you use these tools things will happen. Pick any module. Pick a single action in it. See it to its completion. You've just opened the door to an unexpected evolution of citizenship, the likes of which have not been seen for a long, long time.

    "Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." – Declaration of Independence

    You may notice that the order of the Citizen's Tool Kit modules has changed. Select actions from any of the following, depending on your interests and skill sets:

    MOBILIZATION MODULES
    Module 1: Have a House Party
    Module 2: Organize a Town Meeting
    Module 3: Give a Speech to a Group

    CREATIVE & SPECIALTY MODULES
    Module 4: Be the Media
    Module 5: Adopt a Public Official
    Module 6: Check Out the Money Trail: Who's Getting Paid?
    Module 7: Find Out If Officials Following the Rules

    HARD CORE EVIDENCE MODULES
    Module 8: Get Public Records and Freedom of Information Documents
    Module 9: Adopt Part of an Election: Watch the System Testing
    Module 10: Adopt Part of an Election: Watch Voter Registration Lists
    Module 11: Adopt Part of an Election: Become a Poll Worker or Elections Judge
    Module 12: Adopt Part of an Election: Monitor the Voting
    Module 13: Adopt Part of an Election: Monitor the Counting
    Module 14: Adopt Part of an Election: Watch the Chain of Custody
    Module 15: Adopt Part of an Election: Audit for Accuracy
    Module 16: Legal Actions

    'PLAN B' MODULE
    Module 17: Count the Votes Yourself

    MODULES FOR CANDIDATES, CELEBRITIES, AND WEALTHY CITIZENS
    Module 18: Candidates: How to Protect Your Election
    Module 19: For Famous Voices (Action ideas for Celebrities)
    Module 20: Actions for High Net Worth Individuals

    Be part of the solution: Please sign up for the NATIONAL HAND COUNT REGISTRY: http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/board-profile.cgi?action=register [499]

    Black Box Voting is a nonprofit, nonpartisan 501c(3) elections watchdog group supported entirely by citizen donations. We refuse funds from any vendor or vested interest.

    To support Black Box Voting: click to http://www.blackboxvoting.org/donate.html [500] or send to:
    Black Box Voting / 330 SW 43rd St Suite K / PMB 547 / Renton WA 98055


    AttachmentSize
    BBV_Toolkit2008.pdf [85]336.25 KB
    Gathering_Election_Evidence_BBV.pdf [72]28.75 KB
    Citizens_Toolkit_2006_BBV.pdf [86]597.32 KB

    Beware These Voter Suppression and Vote-Counting Fraud Tactics



    THE DIRTY 30 OF ELECTION FRAUD

    30 WAYS TO STEAL AN ELECTION AND DESTROY DEMOCRACY

    This series written, produced and hosted by Network of Citizens at http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/index.htm [501]




    (1) Voter Fraud vs. Election Fraud: New Poll Taxes [502]

    (2) 2002 Help America Vote Act (HAVA) [503]

    (3) Voting Machine Vendors Policing Themselves [504]

    (4) Sproul Registration Drives [505]

    (5) Voter Rolls Purged I [506]

    (6) Voter Rolls Purged II - Accenture [507]

    (7) New Laws Discouraging Voter Registration Drives [508]

    (8) Secret Software Programs - I [509]

    (9) Secret Software Programs - II (Chuck Hagel) [510]

    (10) Paperless E-voting Machines (Ney & Abramoff) [511]

    (11) Partisan SOS 2000 - Katherine Harris [512]

    (12) Partisan SOS 2004 - J. Kenneth Blackwell [513]

    (13) Absentee Ballots [514]

    (14) Diebold Felons [515]

    (15) Provisional Ballots Rejected [516]

    (16) Caging Lists [517]

    (17) Expatriate Americans [518]

    (18) Sleepovers [519]

    (19) Mighty Texas Strike Force [520]

    (20) Phone Jamming [521]

    (21) Voting While Black [522]

    (22) Machine Shortages [523]

    (23) Spoiled Ballots [524]

    (24) Exit Polls [525]

    (25) Premature Calling of Election Winners [526]

    (26) Rigged Recounts [527]

    (27) Judicial Decisions - I (2000 - Supreme Court) [528]

    (28) Judicial Decisions - II (Bilbray/Busby; Washoe Co., NV) [529]

    (29) Media Blackout [530]

    (30) Election Day [531]





    (1) Voter Fraud vs. Election Fraud: New Poll Taxes

    Voter fraud is fraud perpetrated by individual voters, such as voting by
    illegal immigrants and voting more than once, both of which are felonies.
    The theory that voter registration drives lead to voter fraud
    is false. All sound evidence shows that voter registration drives do
    NOT lead to fraud by the voters at the polls. In addition, the notion
    that there are widespread occurrences of voter fraud is a myth. Not only is
    there a “massive void of evidence”, the existing evidence clearly shows
    that it is almost nonexistent, including voting by illegal immigrants.
    After all, why would illegal
    immigrants take the high risk of publicizing their presence by
    registering to vote? Unfortunately, when something is repeated
    often enough, even pure propaganda, it can take on the ring of truth.




    Furthermore, the great efforts being undertaken to prevent the nonexistent
    problem of voter fraud take the focus off of the very real and heavily
    documented acts of widespread election fraud that have made a mockery
    out of the democratic process of voting in America.



    Election fraud ,
    is fraud perpetrated by political candidates, parties or others
    with a vested interest in the election outcome.
    Tactics employed in election fraud include voter supression and
    disenfranchisement, stuffing of ballot boxes, and manipulation of the
    election results. Such tactics can often be done on a massive scale.


    Rather than addressing large-scale election fraud at the national level,
    Congress has chosen to focus on developing new laws that would serve to
    expand voter suppression and disenfranchisement. An example is the recent
    bill in the US House of Representatives, the Federal Election Integrity
    Act of 2006 (HR 4844). The voter identifcation requirements imposed by
    such legislation serve as a strong reminder of the poll taxes imposed
    by many Southern states in the 1950s to prevent poor and black Americans
    from voting. [532]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...








    (2) 2002 Help America Vote Act (HAVA)



    On Oct. 29, 2002, President Bush signed the Help America Vote Act.
    The stated intent of HAVA was to correct many of the problems that
    occurred in the 2000 election. In the 2004 election, people felt calmed
    by the illusion that the problems of the 2000 election were being corrected —
    while in fact the opposite was happening. Touch screen voting machines were
    touted by the industry and their lobbyists as making voting as easy and reliable
    as withdrawing cash from an ATM. Congress, swiftly authorized $3.9 million to
    upgrade the nation's election systems, with much of the money devoted to
    installing electronic voting machines in each of America's 180,000 precincts.
    But as midterm elections approach this November, electronic voting machines
    are making things worse instead of better. [533]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...





    (3) Voting Machine Vendors Policing Themselves




    According to Brian Hancock, of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission and
    Jorge Martinez of the U.S. Election Justice Department, there is NO federal
    agency with regulatory authority over the elections industry; there are NO
    government standards or restrictions on who can sell or service voting machines
    and systems; and there is NO agency or organization that even has a complete
    list of voting machine companies in the U.S. In other words, the highly-partisan
    voting machine companies are literally policing themselves. [534]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...






    (4) Sproul Registration Drives



    Sproul & Associates is a Republican consulting firm run by
    Nathan Sproul, former head of the Arizona Republican Party and Arizona
    Christian Coalition. The firm was hired by the RNC for work in swing
    states and elsewhere from September 2004 through election day, to
    register new voters. Sproul registration drives were reported in
    Pennsylvania, Oregon, Minnesota, Michigan, Ohio, Florida and Nevada.
    Tactics reported by former Sproul employees included; recruiting
    workers by fraudulently telling applicants that they would be working
    for America Votes—a legitimate non-partisan operation; telling workers
    that if they brought back a bunch of Democratic cards, they would be
    fired; destroying registration forms filled out by Democrats &
    Independents; and tricking Democrats & Independents into
    registering as Republicans. In total, the RNC paid Sproul &
    Associates $8.3 million for their efforts—making it the eighth largest
    expenditure of the 2004 campaign.
    [535]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...






    (5) Voter Rolls Purged I



    Of all the strategies used in Florida in the 2000 election, the
    most notorious was the systematic use of overly inclusive scrub lists,
    intending to purge ex-felons from the voter rolls but actually to
    disinfranchise as many Democrats—in particular, African-Americans—as
    possible. Katherine Harris, through a list compiled by DBT/Choicepoint,
    named as felons tens of thousands of Floridians with clean records,
    just because they shared a name or and address, with someone who had
    done hard time. Harris's office then purged the rolls of all those on
    the list, over 90,000 citizens, most of them entirely innocent. Nearly
    3 percent of Florida's eligible black voters were listed.
    DBT/ChoicePoint's error rate was 97%.
    [536]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...






    (6) Voter Rolls Purged II - Accenture



    The issue returned again to prominence in 2004 when Florida
    announced another planned purge, again based on a list of felons.
    Accenture, a $14 billion company that has made millions doing
    government jobs, was supposed to help Florida create a bulletproof
    felon voter list. But state elections officials scrapped the list after
    newspaper reports reported a flaw that invalidated it.The demise of the
    list, which was three years in the making, renews questions about
    Accenture's strong Republican ties and its business practices. In fact,
    the company's resume is littered with connections to drama that the
    nation's Republican leadership would rather forget: Enron, Abu Ghraib
    and mysterious Saudi businessmen. The company, once part of Enron's
    accounting firm, Arthur Andersen, jettisoned the Andersen name in 2001
    to distance itself from scandal.
    [536]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...





    (7) New Laws Discouraging Voter Registration Drives



    A number of states are adopting rules that make it hard, and
    financially perilous, for nonpartisan groups to register new voters.
    The Florida Legislature recently adopted a law imposing fines of $250
    for every voter registration form that a group files more than 10 days
    after it is collected, and $5,000 for every form that is not submitted,
    even if it is because of events beyond anyone's control, like a
    hurricane. The Florida League of Women Voters, which is suing to block
    the new rules, has decided it cannot afford to keep registering new
    voters in the state as it has done for 67 years. If a volunteer lost
    just 16 forms in a flood, or handed in a stack of forms a day late, the
    group's entire annual budget could be put at risk.
    [537]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...





    (8) Secret Software Programs - I



    The United States is one of only a handful of major democracies that allow private, partisan
    companies to secretly count and tabulate votes using their own proprietary software. Today, 80
    percent of all ballots in the U.S. are tallied by four companies—Diebold, ES&S, Sequioa Voting
    Systems and Hart InterCivic. The simple fact is, these machines not only break down regularly,
    they are easily compromised—by people inside and outside of the companies.
    [538]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...





    (9) Secret Software Programs - II (Chuck Hagel)



    In 1995, Chuck Hagel of Nebraska was the CEO of Election Systems
    and Software (ES&S), the voting machine company that would count
    the votes in his 1996 bid for the U.S. Senate. He was trailing in the
    pre-election polls to his opponent, former Gov. Ben Nelson, 65% to 18%,
    yet Hagel amazingly came from behind to win with 56% of the vote. He
    was the first Republican Senate winner in the state in 24 years. In
    both the 1996 and 2002 elections, ES&S counted 85% of the votes in
    Nebraska. Senator Hagel retains a $1 - $5 million ownership in
    ES&S’s parent company, McCarthy Group, as he contemplates a run for
    the Presidency in 2008.
    [539]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...





    (10) Paperless E-voting Machines (Ney & Abramoff)



    According to an April 2006 article in Rolling Stone Magazine,
    “Diebold paid some $275,000 to [Jack] Abramoff’s firm, Greenberg
    Traurig, with the apparent aim of keeping legislation requiring paper
    trails in the voting process from getting into HAVA. Conveniently,
    Abramoff pal [Rep.] Bob Ney [R-OH], one of the HAVA architects, blocked
    every attempt to put paper trails into law.” Since then, both Ney and
    Abramoff have pled guilty to felony charges of corruption.
    [540]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...





    (11) Partisan SOS 2000 - Katherine Harris



    Florida SoS Katherine Harris oversaw the 2000 election in Florida
    that was awash in purged voter roles, trashed “over-votes,” uncounted
    military and absentee ballots, and state financing of republican
    campaign efforts. Harris, who also served as co-chair of Bush's Florida
    campaign, gleefully purged voter roles of supposed “felons.” Following
    Election Day, Harris was instrumental in ensuring that all the Florida
    votes were NOT counted.
    [541]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...





    (12) Partisan SOS 2004 - J. Kenneth Blackwell


    In 2004, J. Kenneth Blackwell was not only Ohio's SoS, but a leader in the Bush reelection campaign.
    Under Blackwell’s guidance, Ohio experienced some of the most egregious and un-addressed election
    process failures seen to date in the age of computerized voting. Democratic precincts were severely
    underserved by voting machinery, forcing voters to wait in lines of up to 10 hours or more simply
    to cast their vote. Adjacent precincts of primarily Republican voters were well served, with
    sufficient machinery and no waiting. Blackwell is currently a Republican gubernatorial candidate
    and, as Secretary of State, in charge of running elections in Ohio.
    [541]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...





    (13) Absentee Ballots


    Mail-in voter registration forms are protected by federal law—absentee ballots are not.
    According to Palast, the number of absentee ballots has quintupled in many states,
    with the number rejected on technical grounds rising to over a half a million (526,420)
    in 2004. In swing states, absentee ballot shredding was pandemic. Absentee Ballots explained [542]
    [543]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...






    (14) Diebold Felons

    According
    to Bev Harris of Black Box Voting, managers of a subsidiary of Diebold,
    one of the country's largest voting equipment vendors, include a
    convicted cocaine trafficker, a man who conducted fraudulent stock
    transactions, and a softwareprogrammer convicted of falsifying computer
    records.
    [544]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...





    (15) Provisional Ballots Rejected

    Introduced
    by federal law in 2002 as part of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), the
    provisional ballot was designed especially for voters of color.
    Initially proposed by the Congressional Black Caucus to save the rights
    of those wrongly purged from voter rolls, it was, in swing states,
    twisted into a back-of-the-bus ballot unlikely to be tallied.
    Provisional Ballots explained [545]
    [546]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...





    (16) Caging Lists

    This
    particularly mean-spirited practice is designed to eliminate specific
    segments of the population from the voting roles. A classic example was
    during the 2004 presidential election when the Republican National
    Committee took the time and expense to send registered mailings to the
    soldier residents of an entire military base, Jacksonville Navel Air
    Station, in Florida. Not surprisingly, the mailings were returned to
    the RNC, unsigned by the addressees, since the base’s soldiers had been
    deployed overseas. RNC officials marched to election offices and
    challenged the validity of the soldiers’ voter registrations. En masse,
    the names of the soldiers were dropped from the voting roles. They were
    only allowed to vote via provisional ballots.... which would ultimately
    not be counted.
    [547]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...





    (17) Expatriate Americans

    Expatriate
    America—a global bloc some have called the 51st State—includes up to 7
    million voters. In 2002, HAVA instructed the Department of Defense to
    amplify a federal website (fvap.gov) to serve as a comprehensive
    nonpartisan clearinghouse of voting information. On August 23, 2004,
    the website suddenly went down just when the requests to register for
    the Presidential election were at their highest.
    [548]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...





    (18) Sleepovers

    The
    concept of the “sleepover “ first received widespread national
    attention after the CA House District (HD) 50 special election in July
    2006. The term “sleepover” actually refers to the act of pollworkers
    taking the election machinery home with them prior to the election, in
    some cases for longer than a week. In the close HD 50 race, in which
    Francine Busby lost to Brian Bilbrary, Diebold voting machines were
    taken home by pollworkers. San Diego County Registrar Mike Haas
    defended the process, noting that taking machinery home had been
    typical procedure for almost 40 years.
    [549]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...






    (19) Mighty Texas Strike Force

    In
    2004, the Mighty Texas Strike Force, an off-shoot of the RNC, dispersed
    about 1,500 volunteers to key battleground states to make phone calls
    to people recently released from prison, threatening them with being
    reported to the FBI and returning to jail if they voted.
    [550]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...





    (20) Phone Jamming

    On
    Election Day in November, 2002, the New Hampshire Democratic Party
    found itself suddenly unable to operate its phone lines in its GOTV
    efforts for the close Senate race between Democratic Gov. Jeanne
    Shaheen and Republican John Sununu. It was later discovered that the
    phone lines were maliciously jammed by operatives connected to the
    Republican Party. Although the perpetrators of the jamming were
    convicted of their crimes, their goal was attained. The Democrat’s
    later inability to contact their voters during the critical GOTV effort
    had an impact on the election; Shaheen lost a close election. Civil
    suits continue regarding this case, and disclosures reveal a close
    connection between the perpetrators and the White House.
    [551]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...






    (21) Voting While Black

    Almost
    40 years after enactment of the historic Voting Rights Act, many
    Americans are still subjected to threats and intimidation when they try
    to exercise their right to vote. Although voter intimidation is a
    federal crime, most violators are never punished because federal
    prosecutors do not pursue these cases.
    [552]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...






    (22) Machine Shortages

    Unequal
    distribution of voting machines has allowed partisan election officials
    to effectively deny people the right to vote. Voters in heavily
    Democratic districts faced massive lines due to insufficient machines,
    requiring voters to stand in line for hours before being able to cast
    their vote. In addition, these locations were often supplied with
    older, malfunctioning machines.
    [553]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...





    (23) Spoiled Ballots

    The
    nasty little secret of American democracy is that, in every national
    election, ballots cast are simply thrown in the garbage—over a million
    of them. Nationwide, according to the federal commission charged with
    implementing election reforms, "as many as 1 million ballots were
    spoiled [in the 2004 election] by faulty voting equipment – roughly one
    for every 100 cast."
    [554]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...






    (24) Exit Polls

    Historically,
    exit polls have proven to be very accurate, often to within ½ of 1%
    (0.005). Discrepancies between exit polls and the final vote counts is
    solid evidence that something in the election results is wrong.
    According to computer security expert Chuck Herrin, “the sudden
    unreliability of exit polls in the U.S. coincides with the use of
    paperless electronic voting machines.”
    [555]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...






    (25) Premature Calling of Election Winners



    In the early morning hours of November 8, Fox News Channel declared that the pivotal state of Florida had
    gone for George W. Bush. At 2:16 a.m. Fox announced that the Texas governor had won the state, thus securing
    the 271 electoral votes needed to win the presidential election. The other television networks followed suit
    in a matter of minutes. The call was subsequently withdrawn.The individual responsible for recommending that
    Fox call Florida for Bush was John Ellis, who led the network's decision desk. Ellis was not a disinterested
    party in the presidential election, but the first cousin of the Republican candidate and his brother, Florida
    Governor Jeb Bush. In response to the call by the networks Al Gore telephoned Bush to concede the election.
    But as Gore was on his way to deliver his concession speech, the vice president's advisors urged him to turn
    back, telling him Bush's lead had dropped to only several thousand votes. Gore phoned Bush rescinding his
    concession after the networks reversed their call, putting Florida back in the undecided category.
    [556]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...





    (26) Rigged Recounts

    Sherole
    Eaton, Deputy Director of Elections for Hocking County, Ohio testified
    in a signed and notarized affidavit regarding the 2004 presidential
    election recount that: A Michael Barbian, Jr., a representative of the
    voting machine company Triad GSI, unilaterally sought and obtained
    access to the voting machinery and records in Hocking County Ohio,
    modified the computer tabulator, learned which precinct was planned to
    be the subject of the initial test recount and made further alterations
    based on that information, and advised the election officials how to
    manipulate the machinery so that the preliminary hand recount matched
    the original machine count.
    [557]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...





    (27) Judicial Decisions - I (2000 - Supreme Court)

    The
    Supreme Court's ruling in Bush vs. Gore, which stopped the Florida
    recount and handed the presidency to George W. Bush, was one of most
    controversial rulings in the court's history. According to Alan
    Dershowitz, "The decision may be ranked as the single most corrupt
    decision in Supreme Court history, because it is the only one that I
    know of where the majority justices decided as they did because of the
    personal identity and political affiliation of the litigants ... No
    honest person can any longer trust them to do justice, as distinguished
    from politics."




    (28) Judicial Decisions - II (Bilbray/Busby; Washoe Co., NV)

    In
    the CA House District (HD) 50 July 2006 Special Election, Republican
    Brian Bilbray won a close victory over Democrat Francine Busby. But the
    issue of “sleepovers” prompted local election reform activist, to file
    a citizen’s challenge to the election, citing the violation of CA
    certification rules. Immediately after the election, and before the
    election was certified, Brian Bilbray was whisked off to Washington,
    D.C. and sworn into the office by Speaker of the House, Dennis Hastert.
    The San Diego District Court Judge declined to hear the citizen’s case,
    citing that the court lacked jurisdiction, since Bilbray was already
    sworn in as a U.S. Representative. [558]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...






    (29) Media Blackout


    The Telecommunications Act of 1996 makes it possible for one company to
    dominate 35% of a national TV market and on the local level to own 40%
    of radio stations. As a result, media corporations are gobbling up
    smaller and independent stations. The result is censorship by omission
    as commercial and partisan concerns overwhelm democratic values. The
    mainstream media’s response to any request to cover election fraud
    stories is to shut up and get over it.
    [559]

    Click here for more News and Articles on this topic...






    (30) Election Day


    Check back on Election Day for the breaking news on election fraud.







    Contact Us by email: info at networkofcitizens.org



    Home [501]



    Save-R-Vote Election Monitoring Field Guide

    This is the thoroughly documented and illustrated guide to election day monitoring by the Sav R Vote project in Riverside County, CA.

    Based on the field-tested experience of one of best election-monitoring groups in the nation, this guide provides how-to instructions on everything you need to know to organize and conduct an election day monitoring program in your home county.

    Although the legal citations in this guide refer to the California Election Code, and the voting system in Riverside County is the Sequoia Edge DRE, the general principles, methods, and model checklists offered in this guide are highly transferrable and adaptable to the monitoring of electronic voting systems anywhere.

    The entire report is available as a 1.2 MB PDF download.Click this link [560] to save the report to your computer's hard drive.

    SAVE R VOTE Election Day Notebook
    Table of Contents

    Introduction to the Project
    Title Page
    Purpose – Overview
    Chain of Custody
    Election Eve Set-Up
    Election Night Closing
    Election Results Report
    Transporting Ballots to Collection Site
    Collection Station
    Observing
    Following to Gateway (ROV)
    Election Day Observations
    Opening
    Set-Up
    First Voter
    Throughout the day
    Ballot: Card Activator, Activator Card, Provisional, and Paper
    DRE: Card stuck, calibration, security tape, and yellow button
    Printer: Paper jam (out of alignment) and used all paper
    Observation Report Forms (extras)
    Additional Information

    AttachmentSize
    Election_Monitoring_Manual_SRV_EDA.pdf [560]1.21 MB

    Join Pollworkers for Democracy


    Pollworkers for Democracy
    [290]

    State Open Records Law Request Letter Generator

    Fully Automated, Fill-in-the-Blanks State Open Records Law Request Letter Generator [290]
    CLICK the above Link to open the Letter Generator

    A quote from the site:

    Welcome to the Student Press Law Center's nationally recognized, automated open records law letter generator! Since its launch in 1997, our unique letter generator has been used tens of thousands of times to assist student journalists and other citizens obtain access to public records maintained by state or local government officials. The Student Press Law Center is happy to provide our letter generator free of charge as a public service.

    "We're Counting the Votes" Kit

    "We're counting the Votes" is a detailed guide to conducting elections the time-=honored way:

    with voter marked paper ballots, handcounted in the precincts on election night.

    Click this link to go to the Kit overview and download page: http://electiondefensealliance.org/were_counting_the_votes_kit [561]

    Based on contemporary practice in one-fourth of the voting jurisdictions of New Hampshire, and written by Nancy Tobi, EDA Legislative Coordinator and leading national proponent of hand-counted election procedures.

    Also see the companion HCPB manual for election administrators, and hand-count instructional videos, at our Hand Counted Paper Ballot section of this website: http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/topics/hcpb [562]


    New Progressive Coalition Fundraising Press Kit

    http://www.newprogressivecoalition.com/files/npc-online-press-kit.pdf [563]

    CA Election Monitoring --A Training Manual


    One American. One Vote. Counted As Cast.
    An Election Monitoring Training Manual
    [290]
    by Michelle Gabriel

    Michelle Gabriel of the Voting Rights Task Force of Alameda County, CA
    has compiled a training handbook for election monitoring based on CA
    election code, and borrowing ideas from the BlackboxVoting Toolkit, the SAV R VOTE
    (Riverside Co.) Election Monitoring Report, the DFA-NH report "We're Counting the Votes," and other sources -- and her own experience as a pollworker and election observor.

    The site includes sections for Security, Testing, Companies, Audits, Procedures, Accessibility, Registration, and Monitoring.

    DOWNLOAD THE MANUAL AND OTHER RESOURCES HERE
    PDF [290] | DOC [290]

    GUIDE TO ESTABLISHING A POLLWATCHING GROUP [290]

    WE'RE COUNTING THE VOTES [290]

    This is a work open to revision, and your comments and suggestions are welcomed and encouraged. See below for the Table of Contents.

    Michelle is seeking monitors for the CA 11th Congressional District. The 11th District covers portions of four counties in CA and is shaping up to be one of the most
    contested House races in California this November 7.

    Michelle is on the EDA Election Monitoring E-mail list.
    You can communicate with her and other members of the EDA Election Monitoring Working Group by subscribing to the E-mail list for this Working Group.

    Look for the Discussion List heading in the top left corner of pages
    in the Forums section of the EDA website.

    Follow that link to the subscription page for the EDA working Groups. Select Monitoring from the displayed list of EDA Group lists, and follow the subscription instructions.

    CA Election Monitoring Guide

    TABLE OF CONTENTS

    What can I observe -- summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
    Who can observe -- summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
    What can I reconcile -- summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
    Pre-observing preparation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
    What can I observe -- detail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

    Before the Election:

    Observing preparation and operation
    of tabulation devices programming, and testing . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
    Observing logic and accuracy testing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
    Observing absentee ballot processing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
    Pollworker training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
    Observing poll set up. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

    During the Voting

    Observing voting at the polls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
    Observing poll close. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
    After the Polls Close
    Observing chain of custody . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
    Observing central counting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
    Observe 1% manual tally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
    What can I reconcile -- detail. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
    Prioritizing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

    Election Codes for Observing and Monitoring. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
    Election Codes for Reconcile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
    Examples of problems caught. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
    How do I report an incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
    Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

    AttachmentSize
    ElectionMonitoring v1.0.doc [564]222 KB
    ElectionMonitoringV1.0.pdf [565]83.27 KB

    Riverside County, CA Election Monitoring by SAVE R VOTE

    Save R Vote Contact Info: Tom Courbat Executive director E-mail: tom68-69korea[at]thecourbats[dot].com [566]

    This project demonstrates the power of organized citizen action in the movement for election integrity. In Riverside County near San Diego, CA, a group of more than 60 citizens involved in the Temecula Valley DFA took steps to observe, record, and report on every aspect of their county's election system and functioning during the June 6, 2006 primary.

    The process revealed many alarming problems, all of which are documented in their 13-page report [567] linked below.

    Since then, SAVE R VOTE has continued to expand and refine their monitoring procedures, and most recently fielded over 100 volunteers on Super Tuesday 2008 monitoring 50 precincts in sprawling Riverside County, CA.

    SAVE R VOTE has compiled and updated their thorough training manual, which you can download from this link: http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/SaveRVote_Election_Monitoring_G... [490]

    One of the group's leaders, EDA Election Monitoring Co-coordinator Tom Courbat, spoke at DemFest in San Diego, 2006 (see EDA TV clip linked below).

    Tom has some jaw-dropping revelations about the ways Riverside election officials reinterpret the election code at their convenience; for example, making an "administrative decision" to disregard the state law requiring posting of precinct totals, and inventing another administrative fiat resulting in exposure of individual voters' ballot choices.

    Unfortunately, such violations breaching election security are common practice, not rare exceptions, and will only continue unless citizens call election administrators to public account.

    Please read about this powerful citizen effort and then take a stand for fair elections by systematically monitoring the election procedures in your county. This is a big job-- so form a group! Joining the EDA Election Monitoring Working Group is a good way to learn from others with experience.

    Join EDA's election monitoring group to find out more! [568]


    AttachmentSize
    SaveRVote_Riverside_Monitor_Rpt_071106.doc [569]439.5 KB
    SaveRVote_Election_Monitoring_Guide_2008.pdf [490]8.16 MB

    EDA Serves Public Records Lawsuit on Riverside County, CA

    County Responses to Election Records Requests  "Not Responsive, Evasive, and Unusable"


    Download EDA Complaint [570] (PDF)

    After repeated attempts to obtain election records through public records procedures were denied and evaded by the Riverside County elections department, Election Defense Alliance has filed a lawsuit in Riverside County, CA, to compel the county's registrar of voters and election department to produce all public records used to compile the officially reported voting results for the November 2008 general election.Complaint-Cover

    The legal complaint, [Case No. R1C-541239] filed in Riverside County Superior Court November 13 and served on the Riverside Elections Department on December 12, is based on the California Public Records Act (CPRA) and related statutes in the California Government Code.

    EDA maintains that all election records are -- or should be -- public documents, to be readily available for public inspection in a timely manner and in complete, usable form; otherwise the public right to verify election outcomes is effectively denied.

    EDA is seeking these records to determine (a) whether the officially reported election results were accurate and correct, and (b) whether the elections were conducted in full compliance with the California Elections Code and state and federal requirements for the certification and use of computerized voting systems.

    These laws and requirements include provisions guaranteeing the public
    access to observe election processes and verify election results.

    The lawsuit is the initial phase of the EDA Public Records Election Project (PREP).

    Members of the
    EDA PREP team collectively have experience monitoring elections and filing records requests in Riverside, Santa Cruz, and Monterey counties in California, and Pima and Maricopa counties in Arizona.

    The EDA-PREP team worked 8 months studying relevant public records law, preparing the records requests, analyzing responses and records received from Riverside County, and following through with subsequent requests to obtain records that the Riverside elections department either initially refused to provide, or failed to provide in usable form.

    Between April and October, 2009, EDA sent four separate CPRA request letters specifying the records sought in further response to Riverside County replies. Each of the request letters are attached to this article as downloadable PDF documents.


    Lawsuit Claims and Relief Sought

    EDA is seeking a judicial determination as to the legal validity of any of the exemptions the Riverside Elections Department has claimed, and whether its responses to EDA's information requests have been fully compliant with the requirements of the California Public Records Act.

    EDA Complaint is Served on Riverside County Elections Department


    Riverside election integrity activist Paul Jacobs accompanied Tom Courbat
    to the Riverside County Elections Department on Dec. 12, 2009
    to serve the summons forthe EDA lawsuit, Case No. RIC-541239.



    As declaratory relief, EDA is seeking a court ruling that the Riverside defendants violated the California Public Records Act by:
     __ failing to demonstrate that requested records are exempt;
     __ requiring the payment of fees not  permitted by law;  
    _ failing in their mandatory duties to respond to public information requests;
     __ abusing their official discretion, by failing to respond properly to public information requests;
     __ failing to provide requested records in useful form; and by 
     __ denying requests for public records without justification.

    EDA is seeking a writ of mandamus compelling the Riverside defendants to:

     __ comply with each  provision of the CPRA
     __ deliver all records responsive to the EDA CPRA requests 
     __ comply with all such election-related records requests by citizens in the future
     __ pay EDA reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of the suit pursuant to Government Code Section  6259, the Code
         of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, and other relevant statutes; and
     __ such other and further relief as the court deems just and proper.
     
    Below are a listing and description of election records EDA requested in the initial CPRA letter of April 24, 2009, and descriptions of the Riverside elections department response to each request.


    1. Ballot reconciliation spreadsheet in unlocked electronic form

    The requested "ballot reconciliation worksheet" is a compilation of the ballot statements from each precinct. These precinct ballot statements are one-page summaries signed by the precinct pollworkers detailing the number of ballots cast in the precinct, the number of voters who signed in to the poll book, and the total numbers of ballots received, voted, unvoted, and spoiled.

    Without accounting for
    all of these factors in the ballot reconcilation worksheet, it is not possible for election administrators -- or the general public -- to verify election results as true and correct.

    In response to a previous request by Save R Vote for the ballot reconciliation statement, Riverside County Registrar of Voters Barbara Dunmore had retroactively issued a policy stating that no election-related documents would be released in "alterable" format, but only in static print form.

    In its CPRA request, EDA cited sections of the California Government Code that require state agencies to provide upon public request, files in the same electronic format that the agencies have used to prepare public reports.

    Regarding Riverside's failure to provide the ballot reconcilation statement in its original form as an unlocked Excel spreadsheet, the EDA complaint states:

    "Defendants/Respondents refused to produce the spreadsheet as used claiming that EDA was not permitted to see the manner in which the calculations were made within the spreadsheet. Instead, they produced a stripped-down spreadsheet, an image of the spreadsheet as a .pdf file, and a 63-page comma delimited file which is one long string of alphanumeric characters. While comma delimited files can be interpreted by using an appropriate spreadsheet, the file itself is non-responsive. The spreadsheet as used by  Defendants/Respondents is a public record but was not produced."

    Riverside County RoV Barbara Dunmore

    2. Documents reconciling roster signatures with ballot statement

     Item 2 sought records of ballot reconciliation required by Elections Code section 15302, subdivision (b).

    3. Documents resolving any discrepancy between ballots received and ballots cast

    Item 3 sought records of the reconciliation described in Elections Code section 15302, subdivision (c).

    Items 2 and 3 were related requests for all documents which would demonstrate how the Riverside Elections Department complied with very specific canvassing procedures required by the Election Code.

    Item 2 sought records demonstrating how the elections department had reconciled  "the number of [voter] signatures on the [precinct] roster with the number of ballots recorded on the Ballot Statement."

    Item 3 sought all records demonstrating how any discrepancy encountered in fulfillment of Item 2 had been resolved thorugh comparison of the number of ballots received from each polling place with the number of ballots cast, as indicated on the ballot statement. 

    The Riverside elections department did not produce the records requested pursuant to EC subdivision (b) or (c). Instead, they produced records related to subdivision (d) which EDA did not request, and in addition referred EDA to the defective records produced in response to Item 1.  The records produced are not responsive, are evasive and unusable.

    The defendants denied the request to provide copies of precinct voter rosters, citing "voter privacy." The claim of exemption is not cited to the CPRA and is not recognized by law.

    In response to a subsequent, repeated request from EDA for the materials described in Items 2 and 3, the Riverside election department submitted what they claimed was, but was not, the same defective spreadsheet they had previously provided in response to Item 1, but with an added header row missing from the previous spreadsheet.
    The results Riverside claim can be derived from the information in either the first or second spreadsheets, cannot in fact be derived. In any event, the spreadsheet that was requested, that is a public document, was not produced. The records that Riverside elections department provided in response to Items 2 and 3 are not responsive, are evasive and unusable.

    4. Voting system audit and event logs, logic and accuracy (L&A) test results, and DRE results cartridges upload reports.
     

    In response to this request for logs from the November 2008 election, the Riverside election department referred EDA to a previous response to an unrelated CPRA request filed by Save R Vote --which was nonresponsive to EDA's request -- and otherwise denied the request by claiming that the records were no longer available "due to reconfiguration of the Sequoia Voting System for the May 19th Statewide Special Election. . . . "

    Although EDA specifically requested voting system log files in the same electronic format used by the county to generate election reports, the defendants provided these files as static paper printouts, making it difficult or impossible to use them for verifying those election processes and results. 

    The records they did provide fell far short of the request in quantity and coverage.  EDA sought records demonstrating that Riverside had performed the mandatory logic and accuracy (L&A) tests on voting system components for the November 2008 general election, which included 791 Sequoia Edge II DRE machines used for early voting, as well as the 8 Sequoia Optech 400-C central ballot scanners, and the central tabulating computer.

    The records EDA received contained L&A test results for only 143 of the 791 DREs, meaning that 648 DREs either were never tested, or that Riverside failed to provide any documentation of such tests for 82% of the voting machines used in the presidential election.

    Of the 369 pages of printed documents that Riverside County provided in response to Item 4 in the EDA CPRA request, Tom Courbat noted that "the county made no effort to clearly identify what was being sent, and in a number of instances the documents were undated and/or unsigned."  Computer audit and event logs improperly labeled as to machine or time of origin, are useless.

    In a subsequent June 15 CPRA letter following through on the Item 4 request, EDA provided very exacting instructions for producing log directories that would have provided the relevant information. Defendants ignored these instructions and instead delivered materials that are not responsive, are evasive and unusable.

    5. Election results databases

    Riverside at first declined to produce these database files, claiming that the SQL database and the
    voting records it contains, are proprietary information belonging to the Riverside County E-voting contractor, Sequoia Voting Systems, and therefore exempt from public disclosure.
    (Electronic voting vendors have consistently maintained that election databases and the records of the public vote they contain, are "proprietary information" protected as commercial trade secrets).

    Noting that there is no such exception recognized in the California Public Records Act pertaining to
    election records, EDA pressed its request, and in response, Riverside eventually produced "redacted" copies of the database files, supposedly with all proprietary information removed by Sequoia.

    The redaction process -- for which EDA was billed $105 -- destroyed the database structure, rendering the files an unusable chaos of scattered data with which it is virtually impossible to reconstruct the actual record of the vote.

    However, in initial examination of redacted database files, EDA investigator Jim March discovered remnants of SQL code that appeared to be "active" -- that is, capable of executing commands to perform operations on the voting data stored in the database.

    When EDA announced this discovery, Sequoia immediately issued a press release asserting that the code remnants mixed in with the voting data were merely fragments of its proprietary database schema, imperfectly redacted.

    However, numerous programmers who looked at the database files EDA provided for
    open public inspection, agreed that there did appear to be executable code in them. If so, this would be highly illegal under federal and state law and would immediately disqualify the Sequoia systems for use in elections.

    EDA is continuing is examination of the Sequoia code found mixed in with the Riverside election database records.

    6. Documents used to generate or validate the Statement of Vote

    In response to EDA's request for "documents used to generate or validate the data reported on the Statement of Vote," Riverside sent numbers, not the documents -- and the numbers were inconsistent with previous responses, and did not answer or enable answering questions about how the official election reports were derived from the vote data.
    Reconciliation-errors
    Working from the Riverside election department's own figures  (a massive spreadsheet titled "Audit Spreadsheet for Doug" [Kinzle, deputy registrar]) the EDA PREP team found thousands of vote count discrepancies between what the worksheet showed and what the county officially reported.

    The  screenshot to the right, showing a vote count discrepancy of 457, is an example of errors uncovered by EDA analysis of the election audit spreadsheet received from the Riverside election department.

    The larger point of EDA discovery, however, was that working from the documents the Riverside
    elections department provided in response to CPRA requests, it is impossible for the elections
    department -- or any member of the public -- to actually determine what the correct vote count is.

    In the words of the EDA complaint, "the official account of how the vote was tallied cannot by reconciled with the official published results of the elections in question."

    Why Riverside County?

    EDA chose to initiate its first legal enforcement action in Riverside County, where a history of flagrant violations has been carefully documented in every election since June 2006 by the local election integrity group, Save R Vote, an affilate of EDA organized and led by EDA Election Monitoring Coordinator Tom Courbat.
     
    Following are examples of the kinds of violations Save R Vote has observed in Riverside elections,that make it impossible to validate election results.
     
    • Refusal to post election results or ballot counts at the precincts per EC §19370 and EC §19384, making confirmation of centrally-reported vote counts impossible
     
    • Failure to reconcile the beginning count of ballots with ending count, taking into consideration voted, spoiled, canceled and unvoted ballots per EC §14405

    • Failure to reconcile the number of voter signatures in the precinct rosters with the numberof ballots recorded on the Ballot Statement at each precinct per EC §15302(b)
     
    • Refusal to allow citizens to view the central vote tabulating monitor at a legible distance as required by Condition 24 of the Secretary of State’s Recertification Conditions

    • Failure to retain electronic voting results cartridges for 22 months in federal elections
     (This is a violation not only of federal election law, but also of the Secretary of State’s Re-Certification Conditions number 27).
     
    • Refusal to release the ballot reconciliation worksheet in original Excel electronic format as required by GC
     653.9(a)(2). 

    (Refusal to release the document in the requested format severely impairs efforts to audit election
    results).
     
    These failures, refusals, and violations in Riverside County constitute a chronic pattern of the county's election officials picking and choosing which election laws and regulations to obey and which to ignore.
     
    Similar patterns of selective noncompliance and obstruction have been documented in other California counties, with especially serious violations repeatedly committed in San Diego, Los Angeles, and Santa Clara counties.
     

    Why Aren't Election Laws Being Enforced?

     
    The office of the California Secretary of State has stated that it does not have sufficient enforcement authority under state law to enforce compliance with election laws on the part of the county election department administrators.
     
    It is difficult to reconcile this claim of powerlessness, with the direct, unambiguous statute language describing secretary of state enforcement authority.
     
    However, it is true that there is very little case law in California concerning adherence to the Election Code and related statutes on the part of county election administrators.
     
    The practical effect of this vacuum in election law enforcement, is that citizens are left with no recourse but to sue in county superior courts for writs of mandamus requiring their local election officials to comply with state election laws.
     
    This is the approach that EDA has determined must be taken. If EDA prevails in this legal contest with the Riverside County registrar of voters, as we expect to, one of the counties most averse to election transparency will be under court order to provide full public access to observe election processes and full disclosure of election records,including the unredacted records of the vote. 
     
    When similar legal actions to access election records are filed in multiple counties in California, or in any other state, eventually one or more such cases will be appealed by election administrator defendants or their E-voting contractors.

    When those cases are decided in vindication of the public's right to access public election records -- as we expect they will be -- case law will be established, applying not only to the county in question, but as state law applying to every electoral jurisdiction in that state.
     
    This is how EDA forsees the election integrity movement advancing, from one legal victory to the next, one county at a time, until the record of legal precedence established in case law provides a consistent basis of enforcement that will support and defend the public's right to know how our votes our counted.
    _______________________________________________________
     


    _______________________________________________________

      Help Extend the Reach of Tactical Election Integrity Law
    by Contributing to the EDA Public Record Elections Project (PREP)
     

    Please click on this link [115]to go to the Donations page where you can find and fill in the form pictured below.

    PREP donation



     





















     
    AttachmentSize
    EDA-CPRA-Petition-for- Writ-RiversideCounty.pdf [570]653.26 KB
    EDA-CPRA_Request1_042409.pdf [571]178.72 KB
    EDA-CPRA-Request2-061909.pdf [572]156.47 KB
    EDA_CPRA_Request3_Riverside-090109.pdf [573]84.25 KB
    EDA-CPRA-Request4-Riverside-101909.pdf [574]115.32 KB
    Card_Audit_For_Doug.pdf [575]227.83 KB
    Riverside-CPRA1-Response.pdf [576]72.49 KB

    Election Monitoring Report, Riverside County CA, May 19 2009

    The following photos were taken on the night of the May 19, 2009 special election in Riverside County by Tom Courbat, as he made his rounds observing election procedures and conditions. 

    This photo guide to election monitoring explains the purpose of each election document or item pictured, commenting on recent improvements in election procedure, contrasted to the lax practices of the past, and pointing out where problems still persist.

    Tom and the SAVE R VOTE group he founded have been thoroughly monitoring Riverside County elections for the past four years. Their repeated reports documenting serious breaks in the Riverside election system finally move the county Board of Supervisors to commission a countywide elections audit. Tom served as citizen advisor to the accounting firm hired to carry out the $300,000 review, which resulted in the Riverside County Elections Department finally implementing many of the procedural safeguards SAVE R VOTE had been advocating for years.

    In the May 19th election, Tom was pleased to find Riverside's election procedures vastly improved as a result of the new policies adopted following the recommendations of the election auditing consultant and SAVE R VOTE.

    Tom notes: "Many documents now contain the date and type of election on every page for the first time, as recommended by SAVE R VOTE (SRV).  Previously, when pages were removed from a document for copying or scanning, there was no way to categorically state the page was from a specific election on a specific date."
    Ballot statement
    Ballot Statement Instruction Sheet and Ballot Statement (left and right respectively).

    Vastly improved from prior versions. The Ballot Statement is an official form required to be accurately completed by election workers following the close of polls and prior to sending all voting materials to collection centers. This form accounts for all regular and provisional paper ballots – blanks received, ballots spoiled, voted ballots, and unused ballots. It also accounts for all regular and provisional electronic ballots cast. SAVE R VOTE (SRV) had recommended numbering each line and constructing instructions accordingly. This was accomplished for the first time in the May 2009 Election.

    HOWEVER, this form omits critical information, previously recorded in prior elections until a procedural change starting with the November 2008 election. The  information that should be recorded on this form, but that is now missing, would compare information from the Voter Roster about how each voter cast their ballot, with the numbers of each type of ballot cast: electronic, electronic provisional, paper, or paper provisional. Without this comparison, there is no way to confirm that the voters who signed the roster as having cast a provisional electronic ballot, for example, actually did cast an electronic provisional ballot.  The signature counts from the Voter Roster are simply “grossed up” to the total number of ballots cast, with no reference to the numbers of each type of ballot cast. So, for example, if more people voted on paper than signed up to do so,  and fewer voted electronically than signed up to do so, the numbers could “balance” (one error offsets the other) but the discrepancy will not be noted, investigated, or reconciled. This is a step backwards. Ballot statement
    Left side is the Certificate of Completion to be signed by all precinct board members and in the center is a small box to enter the number of voters who voted in that precinct. No changes were made to this form. Right side is a new Inspector’s Election Checklist for the precinct captain (inspector) to use to make sure all functions are performed. This is a great improvement and appears to be instituted by the ROV independently. Precinct posting form
    Precinct Posting Form. Compliance with completion and posting of this form in past elections had been very poor. This form reports critical information that enables citizens to check against central tabulator reports of ballots cast per precinct. The change for the May 19, 2009 Special Election was the addition of printed instructions on the form stating where/how to post the form and where the second copy is to go. Equally important was the insertion of letters (i.e. K, T, C & D) referring to the boxes on the Ballot Statement where the information is to be taken from. For the November 2008 Election, a color-coded sample was designed, as can be seen here. Although this sample of how to complete a precinct posting form seems clear enough, compliance in the November 2008 Election was still very poor. SRV believes the lettering of the boxes in May 2009 as recommended by SRV made the biggest difference by making it explicit where 
    information was to be taken from.
      Voting Equipment Security Log
    Illustration and instructions on how to complete the Voting Equipment Security Log. Another excellent improvement, this one recommended by the Management Review firm of Best, Best & Krieger (BB&K). The use of lettering lines and boxes, recommended by SRV, makes it much easier to follow the instructions. The form on the right side of the photo contains several checkmarks, indicating the seal may have been inspected at various points during Election Day. There should be some instructions or explanation for the multiple check marks and perhaps signing with initials should be required.
    Results Cartridge
    The electronic Results Cartridge (memory card) is placed in an unsealed clear plastic pouch and placed in the Voted Ballot carton along with the voted ballots and the carbon copy of the Ballot Statement. The Voted Ballot Carton is then sealed for delivery to the central counting location.

    Ballot statement
    The Red Canvass Bag contains vote-by-mail ballots that were dropped off at the precinct, provisional ballots, the street index, and other miscellaneous ballots and documents.

    Voted Ballot Carton
    The Voted Ballot Carton is being sealed. Note that the seal has already been signed by the election board members BEFORE the carton was sealed – a big NO-NO. The Voted Ballot Carton contains the voted ballots, the Ballot Statement, and the electronic voting unit results cartridge.

    Collection Center

     Collection Center showing voted-ballot cartons and red bags delivered from the precincts. When all precincts assigned to a collection center report in, a U-Haul (or similar) van is loaded with the voted-ballot cartons and red bags and all are transported to the Central Tabulator for final processing.

    Collection Center Receiving Form
    Collection Center Receiving Form (first of two) reports the number and types of items received from the precinct inspectors including their signatures and time of delivery. Much improved following SRV report of inadequate space to 
    report problems (see next photo).
    Collection Center Exception Form
    Collection Center Exception Form (second of two) reports any variances from what is expected.
    Designed after SRV reported previous form provided no place to report exceptions including missing seals.

    Safety First
    Safety First. Much improved safety vests with reflecting tape by workers at the collection centers who then transport 
    items to the main office.
    Win EDS Reading Results Cartridges
    Win EDS report running in real time reflecting status of results cartridges read into the central tabulator. This is the first time observers were allowed to see the monitors for the central tabulators (WIN EDS and WIN ETP).
    Footage is available for further review.
      WIN ETP Reading Optech 400C Scanners
    WIN ETP report running in real time reflecting the status of ballots being read by the Sequoia Optech 400C scanners. This is again a first time that observers were allowed to see the monitors and thus the actions being taken as they occur. Video is available for further review as well. Ballot Reading Halted
    Ballot Reading Halted. This is a real-time report of a stoppage in the reading of ballots showing 4 "pending outstacks" ballots out of 70 Total Ballots. Original images can be enlarged for clarity and video is available. Central Control Sheet for Incoming Collection Centers
    Central Control Sheet for Incoming Collection Centers - This is a new document (blown up by ROV to nearly 4' high) listing all the Collection Centers and the precincts they represent. When a Collection Center reports in, the yellow box to the left is checked. This is one of a number of continuing improvements in Riverside County's chain of custody processes.

    Riverside Elections Department Heeds SaveRVote for Big Improvements

    But County Gets Negative Marks for Pushing DREs


    Coverage from Riverside Press Enterprise

    Voter Advocacy Group Praises Special Election

    By DUANE W. GANG
    The Press-Enterprise Wednesday, May 20, 2009

    A watchdog group critical of how Riverside County has handled past elections said Wednesday that Tuesday's special election vote went smoothly with added accountability.
    Temecula-based Save R Vote monitored Tuesday's election and praised Registrar Barbara Dunmore for putting a series of safeguards in place to maintain the integrity of cast ballots.
    "This was the most improved, smoothest election that I have seen in seven elections," said Tom Courbat, the group's founder.

    The safeguards came from an audit led by former district attorney Grover Trask.
    The measures include adding a redesigned ballot statement that precinct workers fill out to account for ballots and signatures, adding a form at ballot collection centers for workers to report if there is something wrong with ballot boxes and installing two computer monitors at the registrar's headquarters for observers to monitor ballot counting.

    "This proves they could do it in a big election. It didn't result in that much additional work," Courbat said. "It gives a higher degree of accountability."

    Dunmore said Wednesday that the light turnout made the election a perfect time to unveil the new measures.
    "We wanted to put them in place as quick as possible," she said. "We worked very hard on that."
    Dunmore said she is pleased to hear that Save R Vote found the improvements well executed.

    Still, the group remains critical of Riverside County for what it sees as the over use of electronic touch-screen voting machines.

    "There's an agenda here, to prove people like electronic voting when given the choice.
    It is not about liking.
    People like to drive 120 on the freeway, but it is not safe.
    You cannot adequately secure these machines."

    Secretary of State Debra Bowen decertified the use of touch-screen voting machines in 2007, citing security vulnerabilities. She then set conditions for their limited use.
    In Tuesday's election, poll workers asked voters whether they wanted to use a paper ballot or an electronic machine.

    "There's an agenda here, and the agenda here is to prove people like electronic voting when given the choice. It is not about liking," Courbat said. "People like to drive 120 on the freeway, but it is not safe. You cannot adequately secure these machines."

    Courbat criticized the county for not informing voters at polling sites that there have been issues surrounding the machines.

    Dunmore said her office must offer voters the choice. She said poll workers can't provide a history of the machines to each voter, and if voters have questions, they can contact her office. The use of electronic voting machines on Tuesday complied with election rules, she said.

    "We did see precincts where there were more votes cast on the electronic voting unit than on paper ballots," Dunmore said. "That is a choice made by the voter." On Tuesday, there were 28,148 votes cast on electronic machines, about 41 percent of the ballots cast a precincts, Dunmore said.

    Riverside County had at least three precincts, two in Corona and one in Murrieta, where all the votes were cast on the electronic machines, Dunmore said. Fifty-seven precincts didn't have any votes cast on electronic machines.

    Reach Duane W. Gang at 951-368-9547 or dgang@PE.com [577]

    SaveRVote Report Fills in Missing Pieces of the 2008 Election

    April 14, 2009

    "Missing Pieces [578]," a devastating citizen review of the 2008 presidential election conducted in Riverside County, CA, will be presented to the Riverside County Board of Supervisors and the press today at 1:30 p.m. by SaveRVote founder (and EDA Election Monitoring Coordinator) Tom Courbat.

    (Proceedings will be streamed live over the Internet via this URL:  http://bosvideo.co.riverside.ca.us/ppportal/agenda/webcast.aspx [579] ).

    Download Report in PDF [578]

    Download Photographic Slideshow [580]

    Download Precinct Analysis [581]

    IllegibleTabulatorScreenThe report, prepared by Courbat and the citizen volunteers of the SaveRVote election monitoring organization [582], documents violations of election law and egregious failures by the Riverside County Registrar of Voters, Barbara Dunmore, and her departmental staff, to secure, track, or even properly count the ballots in the November 2008 presidential election. 

    SaveRVote monitors on election day and night photographed evidence of election law violations, logged missing memory cards ("electronic ballot boxes"), and in their subsequent 5-month examination of Riverside County election records, found vote counting and ballot auditing errors in official county election reports numbering in the tens and even hundreds of thousands.

    The exhaustively documented Missing Pieces report, presented in its entirety here on the EDA website, consists of an executive summary, findings and recommendations, a slideshow of photographic evidence [580], and a spreadsheet analysis of oversized precincts [581] exceeding legal limits.

    SaveRVote concludes its report urging the Riverside County Board of Supervisors to commission an independent auditing firm to conduct a true forensic audit of the county's election canvass process, as well as a computer systems security audit of the county's Sequoia voting system by independent qualified experts.

    More than 120 citizen volunteers with SaveRVote examined 20,000 election documents in what is believed to be the most comprehensive forensic review ever performed on a single county election system.

     

    MISSING PIECES

    A Citizens’ Review of the November 2008 Presidential Election
    in Riverside County, California

    Presented on April 14, 2009
    to
    The Riverside County, CA Board of Supervisors

    Prepared by SaveRVote
    www.savervote.com [583]
    A Project of Citizens for Democracy

    A nonpartisan organization dedicated to enhancing the democratic process, working
    for an effective, open government that is committed to the common good by
    “Putting the Public back into the Public’s Business”

    For more information, Contact SaveRVote Founder, Tom Courbat, at this

    E-mail address [566], or phone 951-677-6451
     
    ==============================

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    “Past performance is the best indicator of future performance” – Executive Recruiting principle.

    SAVE R VOTE (SRV) has issued five Election Observer Reports beginning with the June 6, 2006 Primary Election to the June 3, 2008 Primary Election Every report has focused on operations related to the following three broad areas of public interest/concern:

    1.    Security (including Chain-of-Custody)
    2.    Transparency
    3.    Accountability/accuracy/auditability

    In every report, we have indicated that the vast majority of rank and file ROV employees and the thousands of volunteer precinct workers are hard working, dedicated, reliable individuals whose only failing, if one is to call it that, is that they were not adequately trained There’s a popular saying in the education field: “If the student failed to learn, the teacher failed to teach.”  Consistently every review of election systems in Riverside or throughout the state has cited lack of adequate training as one of the top problems.

    In every past SRV report, we identified serious breaches in all three of the categories listed above and in training In most instances, some changes resulted from our findings and recommendations, but many deficiencies remained and were identified repeatedly in subsequent reports Many, if not most of our previous findings and recommendations are confirmed by the very recent Best, Best & Krieger review commissioned by the Board and presented on March 3, 2009.

    SAVE R VOTE’s findings and recommendations appear in a table beginning on page 6.

    We commend the Board of Supervisors for taking two very important steps in the last two years. The first step was the appointment of a “Blue Ribbon” Election Review Committee (ERC) in December 2006. In July 2007 the ERC issued a final report containing 17 recommendations including converting immediately to a hybrid system driven primarily by a paper ballot process, and hiring an outside firm to review security procedures of the Registrar of Voters (ROV). (See  http://www.clerkoftheboard.co.riverside.ca.us/agendas/2007/2007_07_17/03.25.pdf [584] ).

    The cover letter from Committee Chair Kay Ceniceros stated, “Widely used and lauded just a few years ago, concerns with electronic voting, including its 3% error rate, have led to extensive discussion. These issues are of concern to our committee and to county voters, many of whom are concerned.”

    In August 2007, Secretary of State Debra Bowen issued a “Top to Bottom Review [235]” of findings from a team of top computer scientists she commissioned to review the security of electronic voting systems.  

    The report on the Sequoia system stated, “The threat model …assumes two classes of threats:  insiders and outsiders… Our testing identified a number of security issues that are of great concern…we were able to bypass both the physical and the software security protections of the Sequoia system.” 

    As a result, the Secretary decertified the entire Sequoia System including the voting machines, the results cartridges, the Optech 400C scanners, and the WinEDS Central Tabulator software. (See  http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/sequoia_102507.pdf [585] ).

    The Sequoia System was then immediately re-certified if and only if 41 Conditions of Certification were continuously met. (See http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/sequoia_dunmore.pdf [586]). Those conditions of certification have not been continuously met, as documented by Best, Best and Krieger and by this and previous SAVE R VOTE reports.

    The second step the Board took was to engage the services of Best, Best and Krieger (BB&K) on October 7, 2008 to “…initiate an operational review of the ROV’s election process for the November 4, 2008 Consolidated General Election…and it was agreed that Mr. Tom Courbat would act as an ‘independent reviewer to the Registrar of Voters’ operational review.’”  The Board’s decision to approve this election operation process review came on the heels of a September 16, 2008 report to the Board entitled “Broken Links” detailing SRV observations of significant security and transparency concerns and containing recommendations related to the June 2008 Primary Election and future elections.

    The BB&K report was presented to the Board on March 3, 2009 and contained 82 findings and 36 recommendations. (See http://www.clerkoftheboard.co.riverside.ca.us/agendas/2009/03_03_09/16.03.pdf [587]).

    Former District Attorney Grover Trask headed up a 36-member team that reviewed operations before, during and after the Election. While it was not termed an audit, nor did the Board or CEO request an audit per se, it was a very thorough “Operational, Security & Accountability Review of the November 4, 2008 Riverside County Election & Ballot Process” [The BB&K Review].

    As stated on page 30 of the BB&K Review, “The Audit Team did not conduct a forensic audit. With respect to transparency of the ballot reconciliation process and other canvassing processes, the specific adequacy of the procedures cannot be determined without a forensic audit.”  

    In other words, according to the 500-page BB&K review, a true forensic audit is needed to determine if the ROV is properly completing a very critical aspect of the electoral process – the canvass – a highly complex and intensive post-election process to verify and validate the election results. BB&K was not asked to validate the election results.

    There is a second critical area that was not formally within the scope of the BB&K Review. No review was conducted of audit and event logs and databases from the central tabulator, the computer-driven ballot scanners, and the voting machines (aka Direct Recording Electronic or DREs).

    Simply put, the logs reveal what processes are occurring before, during, and after the processing of the voter’s ballots, and can reveal whether tampering has occurred. This is true whether the ballot is paper and processed through the computer-programmed scanners, or electronic and processed through the DREs and ultimately through the central tabulator. The scope of the review did not specify that BB&K should attempt such a review or to determine if viruses or malicious or innocuous code had been inserted anywhere throughout the voting system.

    THE CASE FOR CONTINUOUS CLOSE SCRUTINY OF ELECTION OPERATIONS

    The importance of such a review cannot be overstated In Pima County, AZ after a court order was issued to release the audit/event logs and databases from the May 16 2005 election, reviewers found significant anomalies in the vote count related to a $2 billion public transit bond issue. Four similar bond measures had failed previously. The audit logs revealed a high likelihood that elections officials had changed the vote data on 90 voting machines’ results cartridges and illegally printed out the absentee voter results as they came in prior to the election -- violating the law and the sacred trust placed in them to keep the results secret until after the polls closed on Election Day.

    Further investigation revealed that this practice had likely been going on since 2004 until officials were confronted about it in December 2006. http://www.bradblog.com/?p=6160 [588]

    On December 20, 2006, former Monterey County Registrar of Voters Tony Anchundo pleaded “no contest” to 43 criminal counts, including charges of forgery, misapplication of funds, embezzlement, falsification of accounts, and grand theft of nearly $80,000 of county money http://www.bradblog.com/?p=3937 [589]

    Last month, in Clay County, Kentucky five Clay County officials, including the circuit court judge, the county clerk, and election officers were arrested after they were indicted on federal charges accusing them of using corrupt tactics to obtain political power and personal gain.

    (See http://www.lex18.com/Global/story.asp?S=10037216&nav=menu203_2 [590] ).
    The 10-count indictment, unsealed on March 19th, accused the defendants of a conspiracy from March 2002 until November 2006 that violated the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). RICO is a federal statute that prosecutors use to combat organized crime. The defendants were also indicted for extortion, mail fraud, obstruction of justice, conspiracy to injure voters' rights and conspiracy to commit voter fraud http://www.bradblog.com/?p=7001 [591]

    According to the indictment, these alleged criminal actions affected the outcome of federal, local, and state primary and general elections in 2002, 2004, and 2006.

    The purpose of informing your Board of these recent examples of elections operations gone very awry is to emphasize that “it can happen here”, and to suggest mitigation efforts that make it highly unlikely anything of this type will happen on your watch.

    SAVE R VOTE is in no way suggesting that illegal activities are occurring in the Riverside County ROV office However, there are insufficient controls and oversight to reveal breaches The BB&K team reported that “…gaps in the existing security and chain of custody could eventually lead to serious threats to the integrity of the County’s election system.”  Eventually could be 10 years from now, or it could be 10 days from now. SAVE R VOTE recommends a forensic audit of the canvass process and a computer systems audit by appropriate experts at the soonest possible time and recommends revenue enhancements/cost reductions to provide the financial resources to do so.

    One reason there is a belief the election system is working correctly is because no independent outside forensic experts have analyzed the post-election verification system or the logs and databases of the ROV.  We have witnessed the collapse of the financial systems in the U.S. partly due to a lack of critical outside auditing, allowing unsafe practices to eventually undermine the entire system

    Election systems are very vulnerable to tampering given the secretive nature of the private corporations that produce the proprietary software and hardware and the lack of independent scrutiny of the system. Federal and state testing of the systems is so infrequent and the ability of the voting systems companies or insiders to make uncertified modifications so great, that certifications issued years ago cannot be relied upon to ensure the integrity of the system today.

    The final report of the Baker/Carter Election Reform Commission contained a stark warning: "There is no reason to trust insiders in the election industry any more than in other industries."  That is not to say that most election officials and voting systems employees are not trustworthy, but nowhere is the phrase “Trust, but verify” more appropriate than in our electoral system

    The FAA requires that emergency parachutes be unpacked, inspected and repacked at least annually. But our voting systems only go before federal and state authorities every five or more years. If local authorities don’t take interim precautionary measures, election results could be consistently compromised and never detected.

    RisingCostsofSequoiaSystemWe recognize the severe financial constraints the county is under but citizens are entitled to know that the local election system has been scrutinized by independent outside experts on a regular basis and found to be secure from tampering. Right now there is no independent outside verification that a comprehensive system is in place to detect a well-orchestrated attack that would alter election results. Ignorance is not bliss; it is inviting disaster.

    Recommendations contained in this report could easily enhance revenues and reduce costs of operation of the ROV office, in order to implement the recommendations to engage an independent outside forensic audit and computer system security audit. We are aware that the County Information Security Office has been reviewing security elements of the ROV operations, but it is always beneficial to have a totally unbiased and independent review.

    SAVE R VOTE engaged 120 volunteers to monitor the November election process. The effort was led by former Riverside County Finance Director Tom Courbat who has an MBA in financial management and over 25 years of local government experience. Others on the team include former government officials from Los Angeles and San Diego counties in California and King County in Washington. One member of the team holds a Ph.D in economics.

    Each person donated significant time and effort to the project at their own expense. More than 100 precincts were monitored on Election Day, amounting to far more than a 10% sampling. More than 20,000 documents were examined by the team and associates over a period of five months.  The post-election document review is believed to be the most comprehensive forensic review ever performed on a single county election system.

     

    The major findings and recommendations are contained in the table on the following pages.

     


    SAVE R VOTE – Findings and Recommendations

    1.  There is no independent verification of the validity of election results.

    Engage a forensic audit of the canvass (internal verification) to validate election results and establish ongoing verification

    2.  There is no independent review of the computerized election system that would reveal false results.

    Engage an outside independent computer systems audit to assess threat levels and ensure adequate controls are in place to detect tampering at all vulnerable points

    3.  The cost of performing the 100% tally of the e-votes in February, June and November 2008 elections could approach $750,000
    Sequoia Systems is required to reimburse the county as a condition of the certification of the system.

    Aggressively pursue full reimbursement for all three elections and future elections

    4.  The ongoing costs & vulnerability of the electronic voting system far exceed the costs & security of a full paper-ballot system In November, 89% of the ballots cast were on paper.

    Transition back to a full paper ballot system utilizing DIOS (Digital Imaging Optical Scan) imaging scanners as recommended by expert Harri Hursti in 2007.

    5.  The Transparency Project in Humboldt County uses Ballot Browser (BB) & scans all ballots and posts the images to the Internet. Citizen reviewers identified a loss of 197 ballots on the certified count and a flaw in the E-Voting software.

    Seek SOS approval to implement the Ballot Browser (BB) program. It is scalable to large counties & the results provide complete transparency to citizens of the ballot tabulation process It gives citizens a higher confidence level when they can audit the results.

    6. Failure to comply with at least 8 Conditions of Certification put the County at risk of the entire Sequoia System being decertified.

    Direct the ROV to immediately comply with all Conditions of Certification and to report what actions she is taking to comply.

    7. The ROV has consistently refused to release audit and event logs and databases (no voter identification) for public scrutiny The Pima County experience illustrates the importance of making these public documents available as a fraud deterrent Monterey County recently released similar documents after careful consideration.

    Direct County Counsel to review the concept that these reports are created by a governmental body conducting the public's business (even though that body is using a proprietary system); they don't reveal anything proprietary (see GovCode 6253.9(c)); and they don't reveal anything that would jeopardize the security of a voting system (ibid.) On the contrary, close examination and analysis of audit logs might reveal breaches in or attempts to breach security.

    8. Compliance with various legal and regulatory requirements continues to be a problem Examples include not posting ballot counts at precincts, extensive delays in releasing public documents (120 days) and refusal to provide a viewable public monitor of the central tabulator. These actions project a mindset that it is acceptable to selectively comply or delay compliance; they also create the impression that the ROV has something to hide.

    Direct the ROV to be proactive in complying with all legal and regulatory requirements, whether or not she agrees with those requirements.

    9.  During the 100% tally of e-votes the ROV moved the process from a public area to a non-public area and tally teams were reduced from a mandatory size of 4 to half that size, rendering the process non-compliant Initially observers were precluded from directly viewing and hearing the process but upon complaint, these problems were resolved. State requirements specify tally processes to be conducted in full public view at all times.

    Direct the ROV to proactively pursue a policy and practice of full transparency and to conduct the tally processes with the required number of team members Two individuals cannot ensure non-collusion in the tally (vote verification) process The requirement of four is to ensure that the person reading off the votes is reading them properly and that the 2 individuals marking the tally sheets are marking them as called.

    10. It appears that the ROV issued Policy A-25 in January 2009 retroactively (to the November election) imposing a prohibition on releasing electronic documents in their original format as required by law. ROV staff wrote that this was also countywide policy.

    Investigate to determine if this policy was issued retroactively and determine if it conflicts with Government Code Section 6253.9(a) that requires the release of documents in original electronic format Inquiry to the Clerk of the Board indicated no such countywide policy exists.

    11.  SRV made an inquiry regarding an increase of nearly 20,000 counted ballots between spreadsheets received on December 11th and December 17th, both after the December 2nd certification The ROV indicated this increase was because “outstacked ballots” had been added to the count and that the addition was made prior to certification Documentation of the number of outstacked ballots was requested but not responded to by report deadline.

    Direct the CEO to investigate the addition of the 20,000 counted ballots and to determine if the explanation is supported by documentation and direct that the documentation be made public at the earliest possible date This is a prime example of the difficulty of verifying the reconciliation of the ballots on an independent basis.

    12.  The ROV withheld what is the most significant of all election-related documents -- the unlocked electronic Ballot Reconciliation spreadsheet -- until one day before this SaveRVote report to the Board was due. By doing so, the ROV severely limited time for review. The spreadsheet contained new information not previously revealed including the number of provisional ballots counted, an item necessary to reconcile the total ballot counts.

    The Board can assist in ensuring the entire election process is transparent by directing the ROV to respond timely to California Public Records Act (CPRA) requests. In this case, 120 days elapsed before the ROV released this document. The ROV’s refusal to release in a timely manner was not in compliance with the CPRA.

    13. On two occasions, December 16th and March 5th, the audit firm and SAVE R VOTE respectively requested the ballot reconciliation spreadsheet with totals in each of 30+ columns that were 721 lines long (corresponding to the number of precincts). Since the ROV refused to provide the spread-sheet in anything but a “locked” format, validation of the totals the ROV provided was labor (cost) intensive and not performed. When SRV did run totals on April 7th, it was discovered that the totals were wrong.

    Direct the ROV to provide documents requested under CPRA in the legally required electronic format. Validating data in an electronic spreadsheet can be done in a matter of seconds when provided in an unlocked format. Provision of the data in printed format (17 pages long) or PDF or otherwise locked format requires hours of unnecessary and potentially error-prone manual tallying, in this case, of up to 20,000 data elements. Withholding data is contrary to GC 6253.1(a) requiring the agency to “assist” the public in obtaining the requested information and creates the impression that the ROV has something to hide.

    14. The ROV has responded to the requirement that all voting units be stored in locked or secure locations once delivered to precincts by stating “locked storage…presents challenges …if the ‘holder of the key’ cannot be found….”  Such ‘challenges’ should have a ‘Plan B’ solution as opposed to reluctance to seek locked storage.

    Direct the ROV to proactively initiate ‘Plan B’ approaches so there is a way to release machines from secure storage on Election Eve/Election Day Securing the machines from tampering is critical to ensuring a credible election outcome.

    15. SAVE R VOTE was able to verify that roughly 1/3 of the precinct postings were completed and were accurate. There is a long history of reluctance/refusal by the ROV to comply with precinct posting requirements. This is a critical “check and balance” against the computer generated numbers that is lost without compliance.

    Direct the ROV to review the precinct information and identify those precincts where no or inaccurate information was posted. Focus enhanced training on those precinct inspectors if they return in that capacity in future elections. Emphasize strongly to new precinct workers how critical this is to the validation process.

    16.  The Ballot Processing Audit Form (BPAF) is not a useable tool in any useful way for a two-card ballot.

    Develop a process to batch the two cards separately from each other to achieve accurate counts, and develop a BPAF to accurately account for a two-card ballot election.

    16a.  There is no central capture of anomaly data from each and every batch to compare and perform audit functions upon.

    Such central capture and analysis of precinct to precinct anomaly data should begin immediately.

    17.  The precinct sizes are substantially oversize for good election management, disaster recovery, and demographic purposes in general ?Election Code Section 12223 establishes a maximum of 1,000 registered voters per precinct as of 88 days prior to elections. After adjusting for voter registration surges up to E-15, the last day to register, it appears that as many as 211 precincts are too large, with 149 preceincts rated “critical” and 35 "in crisis.” Two precincts had more than 3,000 registered voters. See spreadsheet [581] for details.

    Hold off on any precinct adjustments, except those necessary to comply with boundary changes and to comply with state law. Reduce precinct sizes substantially when re-drawing boundaries at decennial redistricting in 2011. SRV understands that the ROV intends to significantly reduce the number of precincts for the May 19, 2009 election due to anticipated lower turnout. It should be noted that this “rejiggering” of precincts will likely cause considerable confusion for voters who are used to going to the same precinct election after election.

    18.  Meaningful observation of canvass activities has improved significantly but is still inconsistent from election to election and from tally to tally.

    The BB&K report recommends that “the ROV adopt rules and procedures that will ensure that the public can at all times meaningfully observe the process for both the 1% and 10% tally.” – emphasis by BB&K in 12/18/08 memorandum.

    19.  During the 1% and 10% tallies, SRV observed erasures being made on tally sheets (contrary to law) and an absence of supervisors’ recording of ongoing issues regarding balancing problems as required by law. When SRV asked to see the supervisors’ notations of issues raised and resolved, they were informed no such documents were being maintained.

    There should never be erasures on tally sheets – it defeats the purpose of independent tallying/verification of election results Forensic examination revealed examples of erasures and changing of totals This practice should be stopped immediately and supervisors should record all issues related to the tallies on “event sheets” or similar documents to ensure a clear trail of how tally problems were addressed and resolved.

    20.  SRV reviewed more than 300 Election Officer Comment Sheets wherein precinct workers and supervisors provided their perspective on what the key issues were at the polls A summary of key findings is attached at page 12.

    The ROV routinely reviews these reports and implements those suggestions that are feasible We encourage the ROV to continue this important practice.


    CONCLUSIONS

    SAVE R VOTE continues to provide citizen-based real-time and forensic monitoring and review of ROV operations Unfortunately the more we look, the more issues we find that impact on the security, transparency, and accuracy/accountability/auditability of operations in Riverside County It is our sincere hope that the combination of recommendations from BB&K and SAVE R VOTE will be implemented in a professional and meaningful manner.

    We regret that the process is as confrontational as it is. We recognize that no one appreciates being put under a microscope, but the importance of the integrity of the electoral process demands a high degree of citizen oversight. The volunteer citizen observers bring a level of insight to the ROV and the Board and the citizens of Riverside County that cannot be duplicated at any price. We serve willingly with the sole goal of achieving secure, accurate, and transparent elections for the citizens of Riverside County

    Relevant documents follow including a photo illustrating how the computer housed in a scanner cabinet can appear to be fully secured but actually unlocked and very unsecure. Hence the need to “trust, but verify.”

    We look forward to presenting our findings to the Board on Tuesday, April 14th, 2009 at 1:30 pm.

    [Additional evidentiary exhibits follow]


    SECURITY:
    When “sealed” doesn’t mean secured (or locked)

    Seals like this are placed over all keyholes to ensure no one can access the cabinet of the high- speed Sequoia 400-C Optech Scanner, used to count the ballots.  Inside the “locked” cabinet is the computer or “brains” of the unit, where programming changes can be made (altered) to instruct the scanner to count every 10th vote for Bob as a vote for Roger, for example.  Thus it is critical that the seal be placed over a locked access point.

    taped lockDuring a test of the security and operational integrity of the unit, it was discovered that the cabinet was not locked, yet the seal gave the appearance that it was. 

    In this example, a person could have accessed the computer inside, made the type of change mentioned above, and re-secured the unit.  In theory, the tape (seal) would have shown the word “Opened” or a series of dots. 

    However, until SAVE R VOTE questioned the existence of a log regarding replacement seals, no recording of such information was taking place.  The log was implemented right after SAVE R VOTE asked to see the log.  Without logs, anyone with access can do anything with impunity and not be caught.

    Loose doors that appear secured give a perfect opportunity to change election results without a trace.

    After witnessing this security gaffe, SAVE R VOTE asked that ROV staff take 10 seconds and “wiggle” each of the doors on each of the other seven (7) high-speed Optech ballot scanners/counters.  ROV staff refused to perform that simple test that would have revealed if other counting units were similarly unlocked.

     

     

     

     

     

     


    Election Officers’ Comment Sheet
    Overview

    The Election Officers’ Comment Sheet provides a first-hand report from volunteer poll workers responsible for an individual precinct Save R Vote requested to view these documents at the desk in the lobby of the Registrar of Voter’s office The comment sheets had been pulled from the spiral-bound precinct booklets by ROV staffMore than 300 images were photographed from the pages provided Select comments were then transcribed from these images for this report.

    Several themes emerge from reviewing these documents.

    Training:  Although a DVD provided by the Registrar of Voters to poll workers was generally commended, several election officers suggested that the training classes needed improvement. Notes reflect that inadequately trained poll workers allowed dozens of voters to cast ballots without signing the precinct roster voters (Precinct 11418).

    Provisional Ballots: Numerous precincts ran out of paper provisional ballots by mid-afternoon Precinct 11521 reported mistakenly providing regular voters with provisional ballots for the first two hours.

    Vote By Mail: Many notations of VBM voters claiming they never received election material (Precincts 11707, 14007).

    Paper Ballots: The unusual ballot design continues to befuddle voters Election officers provided suggestions to improve signs instructing voters how to mark the ballot (Precincts 11402, 30934, 35732).

    Electronic Voting: The comments show a voter and poll worker preference to bring back the familiar voting machines Some election officers made notations when the units needed paper changes, experienced printer problems or other malfunctions with voting units Precinct 11104 reported that the audio would not work on their Assistive Voting Unit for a visually impaired woman, but the woman was able to vote thanks to a magnifying glass Precinct 21111 noted: “Voters had a hard time reading the font on the veri-vote machineFont needs to be bolder and more senior-citizen friendly.”

    Registration/Precinct Changes: Typos, mix-ups with registration include voters changed to VBM, who did not request the change Voters accustomed to voting at the same precinct for years were switched to other precinctsPrecinct 14007 reported:

    “Large # of voters are listed as "Vote by mail" but they did not request that nor received a ballotLarge # of voters received sample ballot with this as their polling place but they were not listed on the roster.”  Precinct 51014 noted: “Several people (30 or 40) have been dismayed that they have voted at this precinct for years and their names are left out of our roster.”

    Conclusions: Poor training and changes in registration status and polling location instigated by the Registrar of Voters frustrated and possibly disenfranchised a significant number of voters and contributed to a widespread increase in the use and depletion of provisional ballots Voting machines are preferred when the alternative is a nonconforming paper ballot design and poll workers receiving inadequate training also prefer the voting system that are more familiar to them It is noteworthy that a voter that really could have used the assistance of a voting device ended up relying on a magnifying glass to vote and as noted from a different precinct, due to the small print on the VeriVote printers, visually impaired voters are unable to verify their ballot choices were recorded as selected.

    -- End of Report --

    Download Report in PDF [578]

    Download Photographic Slideshow [580]

    Download Precinct Analysis [581]

     


     

    Help Us Make SaveRVote a Model for the Nation

    SaveRVote is an EDA affiliate organization [592], working with EDA to develop election monitoring methodology for adoption by citizen election integrity groups across the nation.

    If you would like to support this important work with a tax-deductible financial contribution, you may earmark a donation for the Election Monitoring Curriculum Project on the EDA donation page [593].

    edalogo

    Election Defense Alliance is a sponsored project of International Humanities Center, a 501(c)(3) organization

     

    AttachmentSize
    SaveRVote_Nov08_Election_Report_RiversideCo.pdf [578]4.43 MB
    MissingPieces_Evidence_Slides.pdf [580]2.6 MB
    Riverside_Oversized_Precincts.xls [581]187.5 KB

    Save R Vote Report Prompts Audit of Riverside Co. Election Department

    Riverside County (CA) Board of Supervisors today ordered
    an immediate probe of the Riverside County election department
    after recently hearing the
    SAVE R VOTE report [594] on the June 3, 2008 election deficiencies.


    This is a sweeping victory for SAVE R VOTE and the Election Integrity movement and an opportunity to learn much more about the election process and to help us to help others.

    My thanks to all the members and supporters of SAVE R VOTE, many who have worked tirelessly for three and a half years. We are finally being heard. This has the potential to be a model for other counties in CA and throughout the U.S.

    But then, we need to see how comprehensive and sweeping the audit will be. I suspect there will be a lot more revealed than SAVE R VOTE could have EVER uncovered on our own.

    Stay tuned!

    -- Tom Courbat
    Executive Director, Save R Vote
    EDA Coordinator for Election Monitoring

    =========================

    NEWS COVERAGE Announcing Audit

    California News Service (CANS)
    : A County Launches Election Probe Of Registrar Of Voters Office


    LISTEN to CANS radio story [595]

    READ CANS news article [596]

    The Desert Sun
    – Former DA Hired to Oversee Audit of County’s Registrar of Voters Office
    www.mydesert.com/article/20081007/NEWS01/81007040/-1/rss [597]

    The Press Enterprise
    – Former DA to Oversee Vote Audit

    http://www.pe.com/localnews/inland/stories/PE_News_Local_S_audit08.3de8db1.html
    [598]
    ABC Ch3 – KESQ-TV – Palm Springs
    – Election Probe Begins During Early Voting

    http://www.kesq.com/global/story.asp?s=9141827 [599]

    =========================

    Download the Save R Vote Report on the CA June 08 Primary Election that Prompted the Audit:

    "Broken Chains of Custody [594]"

    CA News Service Report on the Riverside Audit: Audio download and Print Report

    http://www.publicnewsservice.org/index.php?/content/article/6673-1 [596]

    Read More About the Save R Vote Election Monitoring Project:

    http://electiondefensealliance.org/SaveRVote [582]

    Save R Vote Poll Watcher's Guide -- an Election Monitoring Training Manual

    http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/SaveRVote_Election_Monitoring_Guide_2008.pdf [490]

    AttachmentSize
    Broken_Chains_of_Custody_SRV_0608.pdf [594]2.98 MB

    SAVE R VOTE Report: Election Found Expensive, Insecure, Illegal, Unqualified and Unaudited (Tom Courbat; 7/11/06)

    On Tues. July 11, 2006 the SAV R VOTE Election monitoring project delivered its report on election violations documented during the June Primary election, to the Riverside County Board of Supervisors. Reports were then issued to the media at a press conference immediately following.

     

    Click here to go to SAVE R VOTE video [600]

    Click to download SAVE R VOTE Report PDF [601] Word [602]

    This is almost certainly the most thoroughly documented citizen observation of an election ever assembled. The Riverside Registrar of Voters persisted in numerous violations of the state Elections Cod--including denying access to observe electoral processes--even after these violations were brought to her attention by the citizen observors. The SAV R VOTE monitoring project was organized and managed by Tom Courbat and DFA-Temecula Valley. Tom and the report co-authors (below) are members of California Election Protection Network (CEPN). Tom is also the Coordinator of the Election Monitoring Working Group of ElectionDefenseAlliance.org. SAVE R VOTE: Riverside County Board of Supervisors Presentation 7/11/06 Members of DFA-TV have been coming to these chambers for the past two years in the interest of improving the integrity of elections in Riverside County. Just as Ellen Terich promised you earlier this year, we are not going away. After our recommendation to form a year-round Citizenís Independent Voting Integrity Commission was declined, DFA-TV initiated the SAVE R VOTE project to monitor the June 6 primary election. With $500 and 50 trained volunteers, SAVE R VOTE monitored 8 polling places to determine the integrity of the countyís $15 million electronic voting system that was purchased in a no-bid, sole source contract against our strong objection. Until this year, there has been no outside independent assessment of the countyís electronic voting system. God only knows what went on during the past 5 years. Our sole objective is ensuring that the election process is transparent, secure and accurate. What we observed is that Riversideís election system is none of those things. The Registrar of Voters is going to give you a rosy report of a successful election, but the details of that report coupled with critical lapses in chain of custody reported by our observers provides a more onerous perspective. Itís really hard to find a more egregious affront to the will of the voter than the fact that voters who requested paper ballots to avoid voting electronically were asked to insert the completed ballot in an envelope without using the inner sleeve that protects voter anonymity on absentee ballots. The envelope revealing the voterís name and other information was opened at the Registrarís office, where an election worker copied votes from the paper ballots and entered them into a DRE voting machine. And we have no way of knowing that the votes were entered accurately. At a parking lot site where electronic voting cartridges and the VeriVote printers from dozens of precincts were delivered after the polls closed to be transported to the Gateway office for tallying, SAVE R VOTE observers witnessed understandably tired, frustrated poll workers unpacking bags and cartridges from secure containers to speed up the process so they could go home. One poll worker was in such a hurry, she took off from the polling place to the collection center without the tub of printers and had to go back and retrieve it. The election night chaos SAVE R VOTE observers witnessed helps explain how 17 voting cartridges went missing after the close of polls. The Registrarís office failed to create and maintain a ìperpetual chain of custody record for all of the memory cards used with the systemî as required by the National Association of State Election Directors on March 22, 2006. The GAO and various panels recommend best practices to secure electronic voting equipment, but the county that was first to utilize electronic voting seems to be the very last to implement recommendations designed to safeguard our votes. The delays and indecision in the Registrar of Voters office cost taxpayers more than $6 million. Had the county simply accepted upcoming changes in election law and retrofitted the existing Edge I machines with VeriVote printers like other counties did, instead of resisting compliance, the county would not have been pressured to buy all new voting machines at the last minute. This county inexplicably has chosen to spend well over $30 million on electronic voting machines that citizens avoid in increasing numbers. Since the inception of electronic voting, the use of paper absentee ballots has substantially increased. Of the polling places observed by SAVE R VOTE, very few voting machines recorded more than 40 votes, yet independent observers recorded an equipment failure rate approaching 20 percent. The Registrarís report is far different from ours, as once again the equipment is represented as nearly flawless. SAVE R VOTE evaluation forms showed a much higher percentage of problems with voter activation cards, touchscreen responsiveness and printers than reflected in the Registrarís. Voters who experienced difficulty entering votes with their finger were offered a stylus, but the precincts didnít have enough to go around. These inconveniences drive more voters away from the polls in favor of the simplicity and familiarity of paper absentee ballots. The concerns and recommendations DFA-TV has brought to this board on repeated occasions are now being reported in the mainstream media by the likes of Roger Hedgecock, Lou Dobbs and broadcast professionals. Multiple independent reports tell you the exact same thing we have been professing these past 2 years. The recent Brennan report received national attention in the press for concluding that an electronic election can be hacked by just one person and the report prescribes independent audits as a safeguard against corruption. The GAO report on electronic elections suggests independent observation of the election process as a step toward establishing the integrity of elections. It is interesting that the Registrarís report to you today is dated June 30, 2006, yet on page 12; the report states that election totals on the countyís web site were amended on July 5 due to a discrepancy. These discrepancies do not instill confidence in Riversideís election system. Arbitrary directives that allowed photography, but prohibited tripods question the logic behind election procedures that still remain seriously flawed after 37 electronic elections. The question the Board may want to consider is would you rather initiate an independent audit of Riversideís electronic election system on your own or wait until it is required by a court order? An independent audit of Riversideís election system is a wise investment compared to funding a legal defense. The county has spent more than 30 million taxpayer dollars on electronic voting in 6 years and the county is past due for a complete professional independent outside audit of the system and an analysis of the cost verses benefits. As concerned taxpayers of Riverside County, we respectfully request a complete independent, outside financial audit of the Registrar of Voterís office that includes the amount spent on purchase and maintenance of electronic voting equipment, software and firmware since inception in the year 2000 up to June 30, 2006, along with a cost comparison estimate (including cost per voter) had the county continued with the tradition and security of paper ballots. This audit should separately include tracking the costs and trends for absentee ballots throughout this time period. As citizens who have seen first hand the voting systems problems of this county, we request an independent, outside process audit of the RoVís election policies, procedures and compliance with state election code and federal laws including recommendations of actions to implement prior to the November General Election. This should include an in-progress election audit during the 2006 November General election with additional findings and recommendations for improvements following the audit of the election. The county has spent $30 million on this voting equipment ñ weíd like to find out if it has major weaknesses that can compromise an election. While the county has embarked on the second generation of DRE touchscreen voting machines in 6 years, how is it the optical scanners that process nearly half the votes in the county have not been replaced since the 1980ís? These scanners are in fact so old that the manufacturer (DFM) refuses to submit them for federal certification, and has threatened to discontinue support if the county demands it. As taxpayers, we demand accountability. Thirty million dollars would go a long way to build additional jail or put more law enforcement officers on the street, but instead the county has insisted on giving all that money to Venezuelan-owned Sequoia Voting Syteems without seeking competitive bids. The original justification for the switch to electronic voting was that the county would save $600,000 in annual election printing costs, but in the past 6 years, the cost of procuring and maintaining an electronic voting system has averaged over $5 million per year. DFA-TV has repeatedly come to you offering options, while the Registrar of Voters comes to you with last minute proposals to spend huge sums of money to keep the electronic voting train running. DFA-TV pointed out the need for a performance clause (the proposed system was uncertified, contrary to what the RoV testified to) in the February 2006 purchase contract between the county and Sequoia Voting Systems and we have demonstrated errors in the Registrarís reports and shown a greater familiarity with election law than the person you rely on to run that office. Elections can no longer be trusted to one person or one office, because the complicated technology now in place requires an interdisciplinary approach. To preserve the integrity of the process you now need experts in finance, computer programming and electronic security, just for starters. The leap in technology requires a team approach and whatever electronic voting provides in expediency, it comes at great expense. The Board of Supervisors has authorized a huge expenditure for a convoluted electronic voting system based solely on the in-house recommendations of county executives with no independent outside consultation (except for Sequoia). DFA-TV has proven the value of input from independent outsiders and therefore our third formal request is for the county to establish a year-round citizenís independent voting integrity commission to review electoral operations in the county and make recommendations to the Board. The commission should be comprised of one member appointed by each county Central Committee Chair from each political party and 5 members from the election integrity community. We are eager to work with the county to ensure that Riverside Countyís election process is transparent, secure and accurate. We prefer to assist in an advisory position rather than an adversarial role. Auditing something the county has spent well over $30 million on in 6 years makes a lot of sense. The complexity of electronic election systems and changing laws begs for a year-round county commission to assure the public that the process is open, honest and accurate. We respectfully request you schedule an open workshop meeting before August first with representatives from the Board of Supervisors, the Registrar of Voters, SAVE R VOTE and members of the public to discuss implementing these 3 recommendations vital to election integrity.


    SAVE R VOTE: Report on the June 6, 2006 Primary Election

    Click here [603] for a PDF version of the report.

    The SAV R VOTE Riverside County Election Monitoring Report

    Citizens in Riverside County formed a task force of 70 volunteers to monitor every aspect of the June primary election in Riverside, CA -- from preparation of the machines and voting registration lists and absentee ballot mailing weeks in advance of the election, through detailed point inspections of the counting, to monitoring of the 1% manual audit tally and reconciliation of all vote reports to produce the final canvass.

    This is an eye-opening account of official obstructions to citizen participation and observation of our electoral process, as well as overt violations of state election laws, that are more outrageous, and more common in practice, than you would like to believe.

    Highly recommended as a guide for citizens in any county in the U.S., about how to monitor an election, what to look for, and what you need to know about the laws upholding your right to know how our elections are being conducted.

    To download the report, click on the link in the box labeled Attachment immediately below this post.

    AttachmentSize
    SRV_Riverside_fullreport_071106.pdf [604]152.82 KB

    Riverside County, CA Citizens Observe 1% Manual Tally Election Audit on (Tom Courbat; 6/13/06)

    These photos were taken yesterday, Tuesday, June 13th. We had 10 observers to observe the 5 tables of 4 counters each for the 1% manual tally. Yesterday in Riverside was very unlike our experience in San Diego County's Mayoral recount last year where we were allowed to stand directly behind the counters and view what they were viewing, hear what they were saying, and record what we saw. Cameras and video cameras on tripods were perfectly ok. In Riverside, we were told to remain behind barriers (tables set end to end) that were about 10 feet or so from the tables of those who were conducting the tally. (See the photos) They sat close together and two had their backs to us, so we could see very little. They were instructed to speak very quietly and thus we were not able to hear what they were reading or saying. We were allowed to video tape, but not with a Tripod that would have assured a steady hand so the focus on the paper trails would have been sharp enough to create a clean permanent record on tape. We were told the reason for the no-tripod rule was that it made the counters "nervous". We could video tape so long as the tally was going smoothly! Any time a problem arose, the counting team raised a plastic flag on their table signaling the need for another employee to assist in resolving the problem, and we were instructed to turn off the video tape until after the issue was resolved. We were never given a report on what the problem was, nor could we hear the discussion. When we would ask management staff to interpret what was going on, they were generally either rude or provided very short, basic and unhelpful answers. We were told we should just watch and we could learn everything we needed to know. We have some of that dialog on videotape as well. This experience was not unlike what we went through on Election Night at the Central Tabulator. We were again restricted to an area where we could not observe the data input devices and the associated error messages. We were never informed of what problems were occurring, or what was done to correct them. The monitor for the Central Tabulator was turned such that those in the Press Room could view it, but it could not be seen by the members of the EOP, submitted by the parties and groups, and approved by Barbara Dudnmore. We were specifically excluded from the press room, and the press that were in there had no cameras or video equipment, so it was another wasted day in Paradise.We have full video of everything and of nothing. It will clearly show what COULD have been taped, but for the arbitrary and capricious nature of the RoV. If someone knows how to FTP it to the Website, I will be glad to do so. In the meantime, here are some still pictures to get your juices flowin'!

    Tom Courbat, Riverside, CA

    VIDEO: See a summary of the project on EDA TV


    Click here to go to SAVE R VOTE video [290]

    The Californian: Concerned Citizens Monitor Every Aspect of Election (Paul Jacobs; 6/8/06)

    Go to original. [605]
    By Paul Jacobs / The Californian / July 8, 2006

    SAVE R VOTE's Project Director Tom Courbat [Coordinator for Election Defense Alliance's Election Monitoring Group] was finance director for the county of Riverside from 1992 to 1994. The county won awards when it trusted Courbat with its finances and county officials should support and enact his recommendations to account for our privatized votes.

    I have largely avoided the subject of electronic voting in recent columns while the SAVE R VOTE (Safe And Verifiable Elections Require Voter Observation of Touchscreen Equipment) project of Democracy for America ---- Temecula Valley (DFA-TV) has been in operation. The project report will be released this week.

    In January, Jeff Stone and the other county supervisors declined DFA-TV's recommendation of forming a citizen's voting integrity commission, so it became necessary for citizens to independently organize an unofficial observation of the June 6 primary election. The SAVE R VOTE report will be presented to the supervisors at their Tuesday meeting.

    More than 50 volunteers participated in a coordinated effort exercising their legal right to observe the electoral process. Individuals and members of various civic groups monitored eight polling places, working together toward a solitary goal of protecting and preserving our democracy.

    Virtually every aspect of voting was evaluated, from early voting at The Promenade mall to the roving voting vehicle. Polling places were monitored from election-eve setup to closing on Election Day. Voting cartridges and the new VeriVote printers were followed from the polling place to the pickup location for delivery to the Registrar of Voters office. A portion of the counting of early, absentee, paper, provisional and electronic ballots was observed.

    I have been involved in the SAVE R VOTE project and privy to a preview of some of the data collected. The report reveals that although voter turnout was extremely low, the failure rate of the brand-new voting and printing machines approached 20 percent. While it was reported that most poll workers diligently handled Election Day activities, there were egregious gaps in the chain of custody of election cartridges after the polls closed, including the disappearance of 17 voting cartridges that were accounted for days later.

    Registrar of Voters Barbara Dunmore has been resistant to allowing citizens access to the counting of our votes. Even the legally required election panel is kept at a distance that denies meaningful observation of election workers sitting at tables auditing our votes. Dunmore's arbitrary rules prohibited the use of tripods, but allowed for the videotaping of the verification process until workers came across a problem and raised a flag at their table, at which point the camera was to be shut off.

    It was relatively easy for the grassroots group to recruit poll watchers from all walks of life and different political persuasions because the inherent importance of protecting our votes and ensuring that election laws are followed is not lost on most people. The level of voluntary public participation in this civic effort confirms that election integrity is now a mainstream issue that will not go away.

    SAVE R VOTE's Project Director Tom Courbat was finance director for the county of Riverside from 1992 to 1994. The county won awards when it trusted Courbat with its finances and county officials should support and enact his recommendations to account for our privatized votes.

    The SAVE R VOTE project demonstrates that the people have the power to take the matter of election integrity into their own hands. Citizens will stand to protect this democracy when officeholders fail their essential obligations.
    ______________________

    Paul Jacobs of Temecula is a regular columnist for The Californian.
    Contact: TemeculaPaul[at]aol[dot]com [606]

    Riverside RoV Concedes, DREs Are on the Way Out

    Riverside County Board of Supervisors

    September 29, 2009

    (Partial transcript of board meeting)

                 Re: November 2008 Election and Electronic Voting – Item 3.66

     Supervisor Buster: It [decertification] was a big blow to many of us who invested in this [$30+ million for e-voting machines] and I think to the public to see most of the use snatched away from us now. And as I pointed out to her now, somewhat inconsistently, if the touchscreens are so potentially dangerous or so potentially unreliable then why is it that the Secretary of State continues to allow one, one per voting place resulting in our 72,000 voters using it as a matter of fact. And then having to do the extra manual tally with all its extra costs and then not getting reimbursed for that. It seems to me there’s a big gulf between the county voters here a growing proportion of them and the representation they are getting from our Secretary of State. She should have come down here and talked to us before she rescinded the use of these machines. And she should be more responsive to the numerous voters, the thousands of them who want to use these machines and she should be explaining to us what now can we do with these thousands of machines that are sitting on the shelf. Shouldn’t we be using those as voters demand and ask for them as evidenced by those 72,000 people crowded in at the one sole machine they were allowed to use? Shouldn’t we try to rework the old system in whatever fashion so we can satisfy this voters’ urge?

     ”…and they continue to be used because the voters choose them in large numbers here in Riverside County. So I think we ought to extend an invitation to Secretary Bowen to come to the county, particularly around election time or during the election and get an idea of what are issues are regarding the continued use of our touchscreen machines, if only to reimburse us for the extra cost of the manual tally.

     ROV Dunmore: “…so the further contradiction is you can only have one per polling place but you can have an unlimited amount at early voting sites. And that early voting program is what really cost the county the majority of the $400,000. In May we did not have early voting sites and I believe that our tally, of course it was a lower turnout, was about $29,000 for which we billed Sequoia also and have not received any payment. But it’s getting more difficult in the arena of electronic voting, and if I may expand for just a moment, what we do for early voting is that we cut up the receipts so we can do a stack and sort method. All these are for one candidate, all these are for another candidate, and then we can count them. New recount regulations that are set to go into effect very soon do not allow us to cut up the tapes anymore. That we have to keep them on a single roll, which will make the 100% manual tally of any early voting unit take much longer than it did in November. I brought this up with the Chief Deputy Secretary of State Evan Goldberg and he said well I’ll make a note of that but it ended up in the recount regulations in any event. So it is getting more difficult for us to use electronic voting in an early voting venue.

    Riverside Election Timeline

     Supervisor Buster: Sometimes you have to balance these risks that experts may correctly conclude you face with the public’s desire to try to come up with some kind of a compromise on these machines and that’s what I don’t see occurring here and that disturbs me. Particularly when we’re going to other countries and we’re trying to encourage democracy there and encourage people to vote – it seems to me uh, uh, it’s a real sore spot with me that these machines were I think were peremptorily jerked and banned almost totally from our county, and then, and then to keep our interest whetted in the issue, doled out one of them completely inconsistent too with their scientific findings of a high risk involved. So it doesn’t – what the actual results of the state actions by the Secretary of State’s office don’t make sense from any standpoint if you want to look at them.”

     Chairman Stone: “…What is Sequoia doing as our vendor to adapt their software to the mitigation measures the Secretary of State would like to see implemented in software so we can begin using these machines again? Are they actively engaged with the Secretary of State, are they actively engaged in modifying the software so that we can begin utilizing these machines again?”

    ROV Dunmore: “Well the trend of the industry seems to be moving away from electronic voting. I was at the nationwide conference in San Diego in July or August and they have all the vendors out there ES&S, Premier, Sequoia, there’s one other one that is escaping me, Dominion voting was there and they are all moving to precinct-based scan counters similar to what Sequoia now has on the market which is the Insight where you vote your paper ballot, you slide it into a slot, and it counts the marks on that right there, and they are recorded onto a cartridge, similar to our DREs, and the cartridge is brought back to our office and counted, uh, processed.

    Now, the twist that the industry is going in right now is that all the new precinct-based optical scanners are taking a picture of the ballot. So not only do you have the ballot, but now it’s taking a picture of the ballot and you have the cartridge and that is Sequoia’s new product, how Dominion Voting is coming at it, and also Premier. And so I think that they have saturated the market with electronic voting units, um, there is no more market for them. I talked with Jack Blain, the president of Sequoia at that particular conference – he was trying to sell me on their new product which is this precinct optical scanner that takes a picture. I said well how much will you give me for my DREs if I take this to my board? He said well there’s not much of a market for those these days. So, so, um, I hope that answers your question. I don’t not believe they have anything in Federal testing at this point to um remedy the software that is currently on them and I believe it’s because across the nation the doors are really being shut toward electronic voting. It’s not – to go through the certification process is a very very expensive process

    Chairman Stone: But they’re already certified by the Federal government. Has the Federal government expressed the issues the Secretary of State has with respect to Sequoia software?

    ROV Dunmore: Uh, with regards to that, our Secretary of State requires that they go through the federal testing and get a federal cert number before she will even test it here. Any issues that were brought up at the federal level, and I’d have to go research those, if there were any, have been remedied and they were given a cert number for the current software that we’re using. But they don’t have anything, I don’t believe, in the testing at the federal level right now. Again, it’s very expensive and if there’s not a market for it they’re likely not willing to invest in putting that forward.

    Chairman Stone: “—the federal government didn’t have any issues with the integrity of the Sequoia voting system, otherwise they would not have given a certification for it. So here we have one person in the state of California that stands in the way of comprehensive, accurate voting devices that have never had any legal challenges that have resulted in a fraud. We’ve had machines that have cut costs, expedited results to the electorate so they can see the results of elections, so because of ONE PERSON we are withheld from using these machines that are federally certified. So, if we have a new Secretary of State, and I believe she’s up for reelection at this time, those machines could be recertified by a new Secretary of State, and we could utilize those machines without any problems, is that correct?”

    ROV Dunmore: Yes

    Chairman Stone: Thank you Barbara.

     

    AttachmentSize
    Riverside-Co-BOS-ROV-transcript-092909.pdf [607]120.73 KB
    Riverside-Elections-Timeline.png [608]166.25 KB

    Communication and Framing Tools

    These are helpful tips, charts, linguistic or graphic tools, articles to help you transcend the partisan rhetoric and get people talking about the civic issue of our election integrity crisis.

    Conservative Empathy

    Conservative Empathy [609]

    Myth Breakers (Brief)

    Myth Breakers in brief [610]

    Myth Breakers (Full)

    Myth Breakers [492]

    Questions to Ask Your Election Official

    E-voting questions [611]

    Twenty Amazing Facts

    Twenty Amazing Facts [612]

    Get the Solarbus DVD featuring the Lou Dobbs "Democracy at Risk" Series!

    Get the FREE DVD: Lou Dobbs' Democracy at Risk DVD from SolarBus!

    We hear it all the time -- "If all this is really going on with our election system, why isn't the media talking about it? Surely there are some good reporters out there who would want to expose the problems with electronic voting, if it's as bad as you say."

    Well we have an answer for those questions now. It IS as bad as we say, and the media IS covering it. And better yet, we can hand them a free copy of this DVD and let them see for themselves!

    Lou Dobbs does the 6:00 pm new on CNN, primetime on "the most respected name in news." So when they cover a story, it's not by mistake. And when they cover a story over 20 times in the last couple months, they are obviously showing their concern about a very important topic.

    Many of the CNN segments on this DVD can also be viewed online in our Multimedia Room

    Those who watch Lou Dobbs on CNN know that occasionally he will latch on to an issue and keep covering it until it's resolved, because of its importance to our nation. As an example, Lou has been focusing attention on the lack of border security for months if not years. His focus on this issue has helped force legislators and voters to address the problems at the border and today there is legislation pending in Congress to do just that.

    In a similar way, the regular segment "Democracy at Risk" on Lou's show has tenaciously reported on the severe problems with electronic voting - the lack of security on the systems, the unacceptable error rate on the machines, and the questionable practices of the private companies who make them. Every time a new independent study exposes problems with the machines, or an actual election experiences trouble (which is quite often), Lou and Kitty Pilgrim, a regular journalist on his program, are there to report it to the American people.

    Lou and Kitty deserve a lot of credit for being the only ones in the "mainstream" media for reporting on this. Those of us in the "other" media salute them for helping inform the public on this issue that is vital to our democracy. Their coverage has given more credibility and recognition to our ongoing fight for open and fair elections.

    CLICK HERE FOR MORE INFORMATION [290]

    Explore Resources

    Click this link EDA Resources [613] and learn more about the election integrity crisis in our country.

    Join a Working Group

    PARTICIPATE * COLLABORATE * CONTRIBUTE

    Election Defense Alliance is about citizens taking action to restore honest elections.
    We welcome your contributions of ideas and resources. Our website is built so that anyone who registers for an EDA website account may upload content to the webpages. (See "Add Site Content" in the left side column of any page). page.) We invite you to do even more.

    By joining a Working Group you will have read and write access to the Working Group forums where you can participate in all phases of political campaign work with other citizen activists from around the country. You will also have a voting voice in deciding EDA policies. (Please see our statement of Governance under "About Us").

    Click here for an overview of EDA Working Groups [290]
    To join an EDA Working Group, please click here. [614]

    All Elections Are Local: Join an Election Integrity Group Near You

    Send Page To a Friend [1]

    A core concept we have at EDA is that all elections are local. There is no substitute for taking action in the precincts and counties where you live and vote.

    Our goal at EDA is to build local-to-national collaboration among regional election integrity groups acting locally but also with collective strategy for effecting national outcome. This collaboration we speak of is not one-way and top-down, but two-way and interactive.

    Local groups have invaluable direct experience that can be synthesized and applied at a national level.

    A national group can develop research, legal, media, and fundraising capacities that are beyond the scope of smaller local groups.

    We encourage you to go get active with a local or regional election integrity group where you live -- and then put that experience to work at a national level as well, by becoming an active member of an EDA Working Group [615]. Everything that you learn and do on the local level can be leveraged for double-duty, working with EDA to build a collaborative national effort.

    To find a state or regional election integrity group near you, see this directory:
    http://electiondefensealliance.org/regional_election_integrity_organizations [5]
    If you know of additional groups not listed here, please send us their contact information.


     

     

    Contribute Financial Support



    Election Defense Alliance depends on your financial support to continue this important work.


    See your dollars at work for election integrity [616]

      
      
    Write checks ppayable to:  CICJ-Election Defense Alliance
       Mail to:  Election Defense Alliance   PO Box 750057 Arlington Hts, MA. 02475

    Add Content to the EDA Site

    Everyone who has established an EDA website account is invited to post content to this site -- especially election integrity news or information resources pertinent to your county or state that we might not otherwise be aware of.

    Please take a few minutes to read these instructions on posting site content. Print and follow the steps below. Practice posting a new page and you will find the process is actually simpler than it looks.

    Posting content to the EDA website requires an active EDA Web Account.
    If you do not yet have an EDA web account, you can establish one by clicking on the JOIN link [617] in the main menu bar on any page.
    NOTE: You must be logged into your existing EDA website account to access posting links included in this guide.

    How to Add Content:


    1. Log in to Your EDA Web Account
    (Access links you will need to follow these directions WILL NOT APPEAR unless you are logged into your existing EDA web account).

    2. Go to the Story Content Editor, here:  http://electiondefensealliance.org/node/add/story [618]

    Our content creation editor works much like any word processor or blog program. It has a rich-text, visual interface with a toolbar palette. The content editor is defaulted to the Rich Text mode. Remain in the Rich Text (default) mode.
    (Exception: Inserting video embed codes. See under VIDEO below.)

    Three Main Content Types:

    TEXT:  Render your text content in plain text format before copying and pasting into the content editor.
    Then use the editor tool palette to add formatting details (headlines, bold, etc.)

    IMAGES: Use the "File attachments" link below the editing box to upload image files from your computer. The images will be assigned an URL on the EDA site. Copy that URL and use the Image tool in the editing palette to insert the images
    into the article.

    VIDEO: To insert a video embed code into your article:
    1. Click the Source tool button in the tool palette to temporarily switch to plain text editing mode. 
    2. Paste  your embed code in the desired location.
    3. Click the Source button again to return to rich text editing mode.

    Pre-publication Review:

    Postings will go into a review queue. Prior to publishing, an EDA web administrator will review the content, correct any formatting problems, and assign an URL and menu location, then publish your article live to the website.

    Have posting questions? Need assistance?  E-mail Admin[at]ElectionDefenseAlliance[dot]org

    How to Upload Video to You Tube

    How to Upload E I Videos to YouTube.com

    1.Get a YouTube Account 2. Post Your Own Videos, or Links from the EDA TV Video Collection

    by Jeremy Lewis

    Step 1. Create an account by clicking "Sign up" (the link is near the upper right hand corner of the page)

    Step 2. Click on "My Account"

    Step 3. Click "Upload New Video". Before you get to upload your first video it will ask for email confirmation. You will receive an email with a confirmation link. After clicking the link it will take a few minutes for their server to recognize that your account has been confirmed.

    Step 4. Click "My Videos"

    Step 5. Click "Upload Video"

    Step 6. Fill out the Video Form, be sure to include tags (key words related to the video)
    Example of tags: Election integrity, Electronic voting, Election Defense Alliance

    Step 7. Click "Continue"

    Step 8. Choose a file by clicking "Browse"

    Step 9. Make sure Broadcast is set to "Public"

    Step 10. Click "Upload video"

    * More help with YouTube.com can be found at http://www.google.com/support/youtube/ [619]

    * Note:
    Maximum file size 100 MB.
    Maximum length: 10 minutes.

    Videos can be split up into parts.
    With organization authorization EDA can apply for a Director Account http://www.youtube.com/director [620] that would allow for unlimited media length.



    Upload New Unfiled Content Here

    Using the "add child page" link at the foot of these instructions, you will be able to file articles or other content you are recommending for the website, in a pre-publication queue. A site administrator will review your item, check the formatting, assign it a topic classification and a page address, and then send you an e-mail with a link to your article.

    Below is an abbreviated review of the posting instructions you have just read on the preceding page [621]. You may wish to print those instructions, or these below, before beginning to assemble your content for posting.

    When you have finished composing and submitting your page to the pre-publishing queue, please also send an e-mail to Admin(at)electiondefensealliance(dot)org [622] to let the site administrators know there is a new item awaiting review and placement.

    To begin, click the "add child page" link at the bottom of this page. This will open the text creation editor. You will be presented with text boxes to fill in with a title, file location ("parent"), and the main content ("body") of your posting item.

    For Parent, open the drop-down menu list, search and select the item "Upload New Unfiled Content Here"

    After entering your title and body text, click the blue drop-down link "Input format" immediately beneath the Body text entry box. Select the "Full HTML" option.

    Further down the page, find another blue drop-down link that says "Publishing options," and select "In moderation queue."

    If there is a file attachment that accompanies your post, such as a PDF or an image file, click the blue drop-down link that says File Attachments below.

    (If you need to review the more detailed instructions for posting content or uploading attachments, you can click here to read "Add Content to the EDA Site" [621]).

    After completing your post, send an e-mail note to the site administrators, including the URL (page address) of the post you have created.

    To learn the URL of your post, click the "view" tab (at the top of the page, above the Title box) and then look at the browser address window at the top of your screen.


    BlipTV Test page

    This is to test the "share" link from Blip TV,

    Clegg Throws the People Under the Bus


    Michael Collins [623]

    "I genuinely believe it is the national interest, in the interest of everybody in Great Britain, first to use this opportunity to usher in a new politics after the discredited politics of the past." Speaking to rally for proportional representation: Nick Clegg, May 8 [624]

    Nick Clegg and the Liberal Democrats have long argued that they have the answer to representing the true will of the public in elections - proportional voting. The "winner-take-all" voting system which awards just one representative per district was to be replaced [625] by one that elected one member per district in a more equitable fashion and additional members of parliament on a regional basis in proportion to votes cast. The Liberal Democrats and Clegg argue that this approach voting lets each major faction gain some representation.

    Ordinary politician that he is, Clegg abandoned the proportional approach for a Tory offer which is not proportional at all. The Liberal Democrats are floating the idea that this is some sort of breakthrough [626] despite the fact that the Tory version of alternative voting produces results [627] similar to those the Liberal Democrats seek to remedy.

    Clegg's cave-in on proportional voting is not just about some future reform. Through his alliance with Conservatives, he embraced a governing partner that is at odds with his purported views [628] and those of his party. He has chosen to ignore the majority will of the voters.

    The Liberal Democrats are supposedly a clean energy party. They advocated an elimination of income tax for the lowest paid workers. Educational equality and equal rights for minorities were key themes of their campaign. Protecting "front line" government services for citizens was stressed. Clegg even promised to break up the "big banks." These positions are much more consistent with the Labour Party than they are with Prime Minister David Cameron's Conservatives. Yet Clegg joined the Conservatives to form a governing coalition.

    The following chart shows the proportional choice of the voters. Combining the Liberal Democrats and Labour, an ideologically contiguous alliance, 52% of voters prefer moderate to liberal policies while just 36% chose the Conservative approach.

    What excuse does Clegg have for this alliance?

    The excuse that all politicians have for their frequent betrayal of rank and file party members and voters: Clegg chose the most convenient path to power, in this case David Cameron's Conservatives.

    So now we have someone who had a "different way [629] of doing things," who offered "change for real, change for good," then turns into nothing more than a capitulating lackey when offered a seat at the main table. What will happen to "front line" social services in Great Britain as the Conservative program advances? How well will the majority of people fare in a coalition lead by the servants of the financial elite? If Clegg is willing to roll over on the cherished position of election reform, what else will he sacrifice?

    Clegg is just another politician who holds forth promises for the general well being of the majority while effortlessly conspiring in the background to serve the interests of power and the great concentrations of capital.

    This should have been abundantly clear when he made what some said was a grandiose proposal [630] on April 25. He said that if Labour finished third in the popular vote, he would seek a coalition with the Conservatives. Clegg and the Liberal Democrats finished third but that didn't stop him from abandoning a progressive alliance representing 52% of the voters. He made the deal anyway and his party endorsed it.

    Clegg is not alone

    Clegg is not a special figure for ridicule or approbation; he's all too typical of the political leadership in the industrialized world that fiddles while Rome burns. He and the others promise progress and greater opportunity to the people, some times even a fair deal or "level playing field," but deliver ever increasing rewards to their very few wealthy patrons while the many struggle and suffer.

    Their arrival was anticipated in 1925 by T.S. Elliot in The Hallow Men [631]:

    We are the hollow men
    We are the stuffed men
    Leaning together
    Headpiece filled with straw. Alas!
    Our dried voices, when
    We whisper together
    Are quiet and meaningless
    As wind in dry grass
    Or rats' feet over broken glass
    In our dry cellar

    Shape without form, shade without colour,
    Paralysed force, gesture without motion;

    Those who have crossed
    With direct eyes, to death's other Kingdom
    Remember us -- if at all -- not as lost
    Violent souls, but only
    As the hollow men
    The stuffed men.

    END

    This article may be reproduced in whole or in part with attribution of authorship and a link to this article.

    Previously: British Elections: The Leaders' Debate - Foreign Affairs [632] and British Election Leaders' Debate - The Grand Betrayal [633]

    Example of a Pending Post

    What Happened to My Article?

    Condensed Review of Story Upload Procedure at EDA Website

    1. Click the "Add Content to Public Pages" link found in the "Create Content" menu in the lefthand column

    2. Read that first page of instructions, and click the link at the foot of that page that says "Upload New Unfiled Content Here"

    3. On that second page, read the review of procedures, then click the "Add Child Page" link at the foot of the page.

    4. You will arrive in the content editor, which by default is set to file your story in the Upload New Unfiled Content queue.

    5. When done composing your article, click the Submit button. Your unpublished article will be stored in a content queue for web admin. review and publishing.
    (Your file will not be saved unless and until you click Submit.)

    Please DO NOT check the "Publish" box. Leave that step for the administrators to complete when they assign menu placement for your story.

    6. Finish by sending an e-mail with the URL of your post to Admin(at)electiondefensealliance(dot)org.
    That way we know that your story is waiting for review and publication.

    An administrator will check the formatting, assign your article to a subject area and topic heading on the website, and send you an e-mail with the link to your newly-posted article.


    Example: Newly Created Content in Moderation Queue

    The sample posting (below) was created by the steps outlined in the preceding instruction pages. After you submit new unfiled content to the pre-publication queue in this section ("Upload New Unfiled Content Here") a site admin will check the formatting, place the file in a content area, and switch publication on.

    NOTE: This file is for demonstration purposes only. Ordinarily you would not see this file, because files in the moderation queue are not visible on the site until they are switched to "publish" by a site admin.

    Send an e-mail to Admin(at)electiondefensealliance(dot)org to be sure we know your content is in the moderation queue.


    Please Forward Widely


    ELECTION DEFENSE ALLIANCE ACTION ALERT:

    Halt Holt! Warn Congress to Block HR 811!
    H.R. 811: A Clear and Present Danger to Democracy!

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    DO YOU WANT:

    • Federal legislation that requires computerized voting in every precinct?
    • Voting machines capable of tracking your votes in a government database?
    • Four White House appointees controlling the nation’s election systems?
    • Unfunded mandates and impossible technology timelines that will throw U.S. elections into chaos?

    Exit Poll Effort Mobilizing in Iran

    Was the Iranian election stolen? There have been numerous highly suspicious circumstances reported that strongly suggest that possibility-- and the government lockdown on the press and violent suppression of dissent only intensify that suspicion. Clearly, millions of Iranians are convinced they've been defrauded.

    When in doubt, count. A global NGO called Avaaz (the word means "voice") is rapidly mobilizing resources for an exit poll of Iranian voters and a media effort to publicise it -- working with an international polling firm to do a telephone survey of Iranian citizens to ask how they voted.

    Avaaz writes: "Public polling in Iran is heavily restricted, and no-one else is mobilizing fast enough to fund an international exit poll. It's urgent that we pitch in. A telephone poll won't be 100% accurate, but the difference between opposition and government claims is massive -- a rigorous poll can show which claim is remotely near the truth.

    Unlike Western organizations, Avaaz's global network has a strong membership in Iran and across the Middle East. Backed by a respected polling firm, our effort will be harder to dismiss by Iranian conservatives. We'll send the poll results to the media and help our members in Iran to rapidly and virally spread the news despite the regime's blackout."

    Avaaz is calling for 10,000 people worldwide to pitch in a small amount each to raise $119,000 in the next 72 hours to fund the telephone exit poll. Follow this link to support the Iranian exit poll and pass it along to others: https://secure.avaaz.org/en/iran_vote_truth/  [634]

    mass protest in TehranWe at Election Defense Alliance are in favor of this idea -- having organized and conducted exit polls ourselves in the U.S. 2006 midterm and 2008 presidential elections. And we know that it is crucially important to act quickly before perceptions are fixed and the momentum of events forecloses any possibility for a re-examination of the count.

    "Confronted by a growing crackdown, millions of men and women are protesting across Iran, sparked by outrage at the mounting evidence that the Ahmadinejad government may have rigged and stolen Thursday's election. This is a crucial moment for Iran and the world. We can help by urgently organising a rigorous "exit poll" of Iranian citizens by telephone to ask how they voted, publiczsing the results  and helping spread the news in Iran.

    Over a third of the votes are at stake. Our poll can establish whose claims are credible. If we can reach $119,000 in the next 24 hours, we can release the results before the Guardian Council's review of the results is complete; and if we raise more, we can expand this campaign. We urgently need 10,000 of us to pitch in with a small amount each."

    Support the exit poll now using this secure link:  https://secure.avaaz.org/en/iran_vote_truth/?cl=255588905&v=3506
    [634]
    "The conservative Guardian Council, headed by a key Ahmadinejad ally, is reviewing the vote over the next 9 days. Our poll can be ready before they give their verdict, to counter any further rigging and the violent purge that could follow. There is a real possibility that democracy will prevail.


    Ultimate power in Iran lies with Ayatollah Khamenei, who may have backed the rigging -- but he is hired and fired by the Assembly of Experts, chaired by ex-President Rafsanjani who has condemned vote-fixing. If Rafsanjani and allies can get enough votes on the Assembly this week, they can press to re-open the results, even to remove Khamenei from power.

    A scientific opinion poll could be a powerful piece of evidence. In the next 72 hours, the Iranian people will try once again to be heard."

    Sources:

    1. The Guardian: "Iran's regime cracks down on opposition and media", 16 June 2009
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/16/iran-protests-election-recount [635]

    2. Al-Jazeera: "Supreme Leader Under Pressure", 15 June 2009
    http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/06/2009616184556951795.html [636]

    3. Juan Cole: "Evidence that the Iranian Presidential Election Was Stolen", 13 June 2009
    http://www.juancole.com/2009/06/stealing-iranian-election.html [637]

    4. Analysis by a polling expert of "fishy numbers" in the results announced by the interior ministry:
    http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/06/iran-does-have-some-fishy-numbers.html [638]

    5. One of many active live-blogs: http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com [639]

    6. #IranElections   Live, unfiltered updates via Twitter from Iran and around the world
    http://twitter.com/#search?q=%23iranelection [640]

    IRANIAN ELECTION TIMELINE

    Friday June 12 – Iran’s incumbent president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, claims 63% of the vote in the presidential election, a result disputed by his main opponent, Mirhossein Mousavi. Ahmadinejad is proclaimed victor that very night.

    Thousands take to the streets in protest at the results and clashes break out with security forces.
     
    Saturday June 13 – More than 100 members of the reformist Mosharekat party are arrested then released. Among them is Mohammed Reza Khatami, brother of former president Mohammed Khatami.
     
    Sunday June 14 – Mousavi announces he has formally appealed against the result of the election to the Guardian Council to get the election annulled, as protests and clashes with security forces continue.

    Monday June 15 – Hundreds of thousands of pro-Mousavi supporters take part in a huge rally in central Tehran. At least seven people are killed according to state media.
     
    Tuesday June 16 – State television says the rival camps staged more mass rallies in the capital, while the authorities announce restrictions on foreign media, including banning them from covering "unauthorised" rallies. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, says there should be a partial recount if required.  

    Attending an international security conference in Russia, President Ahmadinejad says "the age of empires has ended."
      
    Wednesday June 17 – Mousavi repeats call for new election, while urging supporters to hold a march and a day of mourning on Thursday for protesters slain in clashes. As two more prominent Mousavi supporters are arrested, Iran’s foreign ministry accuses some international media of becoming the "mouthpiece of rioters."

    Tens of thousands of Mousavi supporters defy a ban on opposition gatherings and take part in a "silent" protest, marching through central Tehran. State television broadcasts brief footage of the rally.
     
    Thursday June 18 – Throngs of Mousavi supporters march through Tehran in a rally attended by the reformist presidential candidate, before dispersing quietly, witnesses say. The three defeated candidates in the election cite 646 violations in the June 12 poll, according to electoral watchdog the Guardians Council.
     

    I Posted. What Now?

    When you have succeeded in creating a new content item, and are viewing the preview page, you will see it has a pinkish background color; this indicates the file is in the moderation queue and not viewable on the website yet, until it is placed under a menu heading and switched on to "publish" by a site administrator.

    While looking at your finished work in preview, notice that the URL, or path description, of the file you have created will be displayed in the location bar of your browser.

    Drag your mouse to select and copy that address showing in the location bar, and paste that address into an e-mail message addressed to Admin(at)electiondefensealliance(dot)org along with a note listing your name, e-mail and/or phone number. This is to notify an admin that your page is in the moderation queue awaiting action.
    If you have a particular page location in mind for placing your item, mention that in your note, too. Thanks for contributing.

    google8da379da43f82117.html


    google8da379da43f82117.html


    google8da379da43f82117.html
    This is an SEO test page





    NOV 7 Election Day Announcements

    Go to the Nov. 7 Election Day Announcement Page and Follow Links [641]

    AttachmentSize
    Vigil2b.pdf [642]105.83 KB

    Election Day Voter Checklist


    http://www.protectmyvote.org/voterchecklist_printable.php [643]

    From http://www.ProtectMyVote.org/ [644]

    Voter Checklist for Election Day

    1. Register to vote if you've not done so already. Find out your state's voter registration deadline beforehand.

    2. Check with your local Elections office to verify you are still registered
    to vote one week before your state registration deadline. If you're
    not on the list, please re-register.

    3. Bring your photo ID and sample ballot (which you received
    by mail) - with you to your poll location. ID requirements vary by state.

    4. Ask to vote on a paper ballot, if your polling place has paper ballots.

    5. Report any problems to these hotline numbers and ask for help if
    needed:

    Call Toll Free 1-(866) OUR-VOTE / 1-(866) 687-8683 for English and español.

    Call Toll Free 1-(888) VEY-VOTA / 1-(888) 839-8682 para la ayuda en español.

    6. If you plan to vote absentee, and you have the time, check with your
    local elections office first, to find out if you can drop off your ballot at
    your regular polling location on Elections Day. Ask the poll worker for a receipt.

    ProtectMyVote.org recommends that you drop off your Absentee ballot on Election Day rather than mailing it in. Make sure the signature on the front of the envelope matches the absentee ballot inside. If you drop off your absentee ballot at your polling place or the local elections office, remember to take a photo ID with you just in case. Make sure your absentee ballot has the correct 2008 date on it. If it doesn't, call your local party office or a hotline immediately.

    Election Preparedness Kit

    Want to avoid another election disaster? The last few elections
    have been plagued by unnatural events including electronic voting
    machine malfunctions and voter disenfranchisement. So we've compiled
    this Election Preparedness Kit with three easy steps you can take to
    protect this election from wide-spread disaster.
    Click here [645] to open a new e-mail and invite your friends.

    Emergency Alert Message Tree.
    On Election Day we
    might need to call election officials to insist on extra ballots, or
    correcting machine problems reported by voters. Put in your cellphone
    number, and if something comes up on Tuesday we can send you a short
    text message with info on how to speak out. (through our partners at
    Working Assets)

    First Name
    Last Name
    Email *
    Cell Phone *
    Zip Code *






    Know where to vote.
    Polling places change like the weather. Be sure to go to the right poll
    the first time. Click here to find your correct polling place and get
    there early to ensure your vote.

    http://www.vote411.org [646]


    National Voter Assistance Hotline.
    Write down this number (1-866-OUR VOTE) and take it with you to the
    polls. If you see or encounter any problems on Election Day, call
    1-866-OUR VOTE. Trained volunteers will be staffing this nonpartisan
    effort to provide voter assistance and protect voter rights.


    Home [647] | Who We Are [648] | Contact [649] | Privacy Policy [650]   

    TrueMajorityACTION.org, 191 Bank Street, Third Floor, Burlington, VT 05401 (802) 860-6858


    Video the Vote

    Video the Vote info coming soon.

    AttachmentSize
    VideotheVote.jpg [651]40.45 KB

    Volunteer for Election Day Rapid Response

    Election Defense Alliance has a coordinated, six-part plan for citizen direct action to defend the vote in the November midterm elections. The tactical components of the EDRR plan are:

    1. Election Monitoring. Teams of trained citizen observors will monitor polls and central counting centers to document and report violations of election law, including illegal obstruction of the public's right to observe the count, failure to publicly post precinct results, and violations of election security provisions, including voting machine use procedures required as conditions of certification. Monitoring volunteers, contact Tom Courbat [566]

    2. Pre-Emptive Legal Intervention. Election monitoring teams will be accompanied by lawyers with pre-prepared court orders to enforce compliance with election laws, including public right to observe the count, public posting of precinct results, and strict adherence to election security protocols which if breached, render the voting machines out of compliance and the election results suspect and unverifiable. Legal volunteers, contact Dan Ashby [652]

    3. Exit Polling.Citizen-commissioned exit polls can provide an independent check on the validity of reported election results. The most competitive House, Senate, and statewide contests are where the threat of covert election fraud is predictably the greatest. The cost of covering the most crucial races that will determine the composition of Congress, is about $400,000--a substantial but achievable sum considering the stakes.
    To donate, please go to the Independent Exit Poll donation page [653] and send your contribution immediately. Arrangements must be made within days. To volunteer to help with the exit polls, sign up at http://ElectionDefenseAlliance.org/EVP [654]

    4. Election Data Analysis. EDA will manage an election-day data analysis operation that compares historical voting data, voter opinion tracking polls, and citizen-commissioned exit polling data, to the officially reported election results from selected, highly competitive House, Senate, and statewide races. The official election results will be processed through a battery of multiple analytic computer programs for rapid, real-time flagging of suspect patterns suggesting fraudulent manipulation of the official vote totals. Findings will be communicated via conventional press releases as well as the EDRR communications network of websites, Internet radio, and community access television networks. Data Analysis volunteers: Contact Dale Tavris [655]

    5. Communications. Throughout election day and night, activity at polls and election counting centers will be thoroughly documented by teams of correspondents recording and uploading live video, audio, photo, and text reports via wireless communication devices (e.g., video-enabled cellphones) to EDA and other E I web portals, bypassing the corporate newsmedia to bring breaking news of voter suppression, obstruction, security breaches, and indications of electronic vote theft direct to the public, while it is happening. To participate in shaping net-mediated communication tactics, contact Dan Ashby [652].

    Conventional press release and publicity methods will complement Net distribution. We need experienced publicists and newswriters. To help with print and radio promotion, contact Info@ElectionDefenseAlliance.org [656]

    6. Demonstrations. Public demonstrations will be organized at central counting locations, commencing at the close of polls and continuing throughout election night and beyond, demanding verified proof of reported election results. The demonstrations will be covered live via web portals and public radio and TV networks, interspersed with updates from the Election Data Analysis project reporting suspect election totals and directing increased protest turnout to those locations.
    If you have experience organizing public demonstrations, or contacts with groups who do, please send message to Info@ElectionDefenseAlliance.org [656]

    The above tactics in isolation are limited or useless, but in combination, they are powerful. Many other local, regional and national groups have independently developed similar or complementary plans to those listed above. These efforts will have greatest effect if they are coordinated and focused to direct mass public attention to election obstruction and electronic fraud as it is happening.

    The more volunteers and donated funds we have, the greater our chance of arresting electronic fraud and voter suppression.

    We need: Organizers, publicists, fundraisers, programmers, webmasters, video and radio correspondents, writers and graphic artists, event managers, MONEY, [461] and hundreds of citizen patriots to volunteer for election day monitoring, communications, and demonstrations.

    Send inquiries and offers of assistance to Info[at]ElectionDefenseAlliance[dot]org [657] and check the "Take Action" menu link on this website for forthcoming directions and updates.

    Click here to display a one-page EDRR overview that can be downloaded and copied for wide public distribution. [658]

    Help Amend or End HR 550

    What's wrong with the Holt Bill in three easy bullets
    Common Cause, MoveOn.org, TrueMajority, VerifiedVoting.org, and many other large election reform groups are pushing - and pushing hard - for passage of HR550 (the Holt Bill), national legislation aimed to amend the Help America Vote Act. The bill is being sold as a way to put "auditable paper trails" into national law. Sounds like a great idea. But many activists disagree with the approach to support "paper trails" that might be audited when what we want are real paper ballots that are - not might be - counted.

    The other problem with HR550 is that it is about much more than paper trails. Read below the dangerous details that the groups pushing for passage of HR550 "as written" aren't talking about.

    The democratic processes of the American Republic are based on decentralized power. Centralized power led to the American Revolution. Centralized power is the antithesis of a government of the people, by the people, and for the people.

    1. Centralization of Executive Power—White House Control over Counting the Votes: HR550 extends beyond the existing expiry date the power and authority of the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), establishing a Presidential Commission authorized to control the counting of votes in every election--federal, state,and local--in the nation.

    2. Centralization of Executive Power—Crony Appointments: The potential for stacking of the EAC is evident in the scenario already played out under the current Administration. In early 2006, the Bush White House made numerous recess appointments, putting political cronies into positions of power and authority without any Congressional oversight or checks and balances. Of the eight recess appointments made on January 4, 2006, three were Commissioners to the Federal Election Commission. Two of those appointed Commissioners are known for their opposition to voting rights and clean elections. The third is a political crony of Senate Minority Leader Reid of Nevada. (Nevada is now positioned to take a lead role in the Democratic presidential nomination process. For this privilege, Nevada has promised to play the nomination process by Party
    rules, financed by the Casino industry.)

    3. Centralization of Executive Power—Regulatory Authority: Federal regulatory authority means the federal entity preempts state and local authorities. The EAC was created as an advisory commission with one exception: it was granted regulatory authority over the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA). The EAC has been steadily positioning and even suing to assert its regulatory authority in other areas under its domain. Even if it does not succeed through litigation, the EAC could, with the insertion of a single line of text in ANY congressional act, become regulatory. This is how the FEC gained regulatory powers. A regulatory EAC means that a Presidential Commission—potentially stacked with political cronies—would have legal decision making and enforcement power over the following areas, for every state in the nation:

    • Which voting systems are approved for use in our elections
    • Who counts the votes in every election
    • How votes are counted in every election
    • How recounts are administered and how their outcomes are determined

    A recent editorial in the New York Times, entitled "Strong Arming the Vote" (August 3, 2006) describes how the Department of Justice under the Bush Administration has been heavily involved in partisan ploys to negate necessary checks and balances in election practices. HR 550, if passed as written, will establish a whole new arm of Executive power with dangerous authority to subvert the entire democratic process of elections that supports our system of government. It would result, in effect, in a bloodless coup.

    People often ask, so what DO you support?

    Here's an amended bill that might gain grassroots support:

    We, the grassroots, can support the Holt Bill when it is amended to remove those dangerous provisions that centralize Executive power and expand Judicial election decision making authority. A Holt Bill that amends HAVA and provides real solutions to the problems in our election system need only include three items:

    • The incontrovertible and legally defensible system of verifiable elections through the use of real, voter-marked and verifiable paper ballots (as distinguished from paper trails)
    • The elimination of secret vote counting through the use of black box voting products.
    • An extension of all HAVA mandated deadlines pending a complete independent investigation, analysis, and audit of HAVA monies distributed and spent on electronic voting systems, the outcomes thereof, with said investigation including information on the most advanced system of checks and balances for elections: hand counted paper ballots.

    What can you do?
    Contact your Congressional representatives [659]and tell them to amend or end HR550.

    Share Resources and Ideas

    If you have materials or resources to contribute to this effort, we would like to hear from you. The EDA site is built so that anyone who opens a web account can contribute information to the website. Even a few hours a week can be a big contribution. With hundreds of contributors monitoring elections in their states and uploading information, this EDA website can accumulate and focus the combined knowledge of election integrity activists around the nation.

    In addition to news contributions, perhaps you have experience in election monitoring, fundraising, publicity, website programming, data analysis, graphics, or other skills or ideas you wish to contribute.
    To get started, set up an EDA Web account [660]. Once you have a web account, you can then proceed to sign up for an EDA Working Group [614], or you can contact us [342] to discuss any other ways you would like to help.

    All content on this site © 2006-2012 by each individual author, All Rights Reserved.

    Election Defense Alliance is a program of Columbus Institute for Contemporary Journalism, a nonprofit organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the IRS Code.

    Fair Use Policy |
    Site Meter

    website stats

    Powered by Drupal, an open source content management system

    Source URL (retrieved on 09/28/2015 - 11:37am): http://electiondefensealliance.org/?q=take_action

    Links:
    [1] http://ui.constantcontact.com/sa/fp.jsp?plat=i&p=f&m=oe9l9vbab
    [2] http://www.ElectionDefenseAlliance.org/Join
    [3] mailto:info@ElectionDefenseAllance.org
    [4] http://electiondefensealliance.org/what_you_can_do_defend_election_08
    [5] http://electiondefensealliance.org/regional_election_integrity_organizations
    [6] mailto:Info@ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
    [7] http://freespeechforpeople.org/resources
    [8] http://www.freespeechforpeople.org/user/register
    [9] http://freespeechforpeople.org/about
    [10] http://freespeechforpeople.com/sites/default/files/fsfprelease%2012110a.pdf
    [11] http://www.citizensamendment.org/amendment
    [12] http://freespeechforpeople.org/sites/default/files/SC%20Ruling%20Citizens%20United.pdf
    [13] http://media.libsyn.com/media/radioornot/1-21-10_Citizens_United_v_FEC_confe%20rence_call.mp3
    [14] http://www.freespeechforpeople.org/taxonomy/term/4
    [15] http://www.acslaw.org/node/15156
    [16] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-cobble/people-corporations-not_b_431366.html
    [17] http://www.freespeechforpeople.org/node/34
    [18] http://www.freespeechforpeople.org/acsbrief
    [19] http://www.freespeechforpeople.org/sites/default/files/Clements-%20Making%20Democracy%20Work-%20League%20of%20Women%20Voters%20Concord%20Carlisle.pdf
    [20] http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=112714052
    [21] http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/09/05/corporate_free_speech_since_when/
    [22] http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/22/opinion/22tue1.html
    [23] http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126023967777081231.html
    [24] http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-youn10-2010jan10,0,3374783,print.story
    [25] http://www.freespeechforpeople.org/node/29
    [26] http://www.freespeechforpeople.org/node/30
    [27] http://citizensamendment.org/sites/default/files/11-9-09-CU.pdf
    [28] http://freespeechforpeople.org/contact
    [29] http://www.peaceteam.net/action/pnum1029.php
    [30] http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/77349-grayson-believes-congress-can-pass-new-campaign-finance-law
    [31] http://www.peaceteam.net/action/pnum1030.php
    [32] http://apps.facebook.com/fb_voices/action.php?qnum=pnum1029
    [33] http://apps.facebook.com/fb_voices/action.php?qnum=pnum1030
    [34] http://www.peaceteam.net/bumper_stickers.php
    [35] http://www.millionfaxmarch.com/in.htm
    [36] http://www.movetoamend.org/learn-more
    [37] http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-205.pdf
    [38] http://www.movetoamend.org/learn-more#anchor-one
    [39] http://www.movetoamend.org/learn-more#anchor-two
    [40] http://www.movetoamend.org/learn-more#anchor-three
    [41] http://sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Portal:Corporate_Rights
    [42] http://www.wilpf.org/docs/ccp/corp/ACP/Personhood_Talk.pdf
    [43] http://ultimatecivics.org/spresent.html
    [44] http://www.democracysquare.org/files_public/TNIyearb05us.pdf
    [45] http://www.californiademocracy.org/corporations/resource/environ.pdf
    [46] http://www.nancho.net/bigbody/chrtink1.html
    [47] http://www.libertytreefdr.org/publications/manski_essence_of_the_corporation
    [48] http://reclaimdemocracy.org/personhood/#significant
    [49] http://www.californiademocracy.org/corporations/resource/timeline.pdf
    [50] http://jackson.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=72&Itemid=77
    [51] http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=205
    [52] http://www.nomorestolenelections.org/resources/voter_bill_of_rights
    [53] http://www.poclad.org/bwa/Spring08.htm#pinkoleo
    [54] http://www.celdf.org/HomeRule/JAllenSmithMunicipalGovernment/tabid/227/Default.aspx
    [55] http://www.poclad.org/bwa/fall98.htm
    [56] http://www.democracysquare.org/publications/video_extending_democracy
    [57] http://votelocalcontrol.org/sopoci-belknap.htm
    [58] http://wallstreetwatch.org/
    [59] http://freespeechforpeople.org/
    [60] http://act.credoaction.com/pollworkers/index.html
    [61] http://videothevote.org
    [62] http://electiondefensealliance.org/evp
    [63] http://electiondefensealliance.org/VoterReports
    [64] http://electiondefensealliance.org/protect
    [65] http://www.electiondefense.net/instructions_for_data_collection_at_central_counting_location
    [66] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/code_orange
    [67] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Be_Pollworkers_FP.rtf
    [68] http://www.videothevote.org/
    [69] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/evp
    [70] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/VoterReports
    [71] http://www.ElectionDefenseAlliance.org/Protect
    [72] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Gathering_Election_Evidence_BBV.pdf
    [73] http://electiondefensealliance.org/election_day_watchlist
    [74] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/download_the_black_box_voting_citizens_tool_kit
    [75] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/quarantine_machine
    [76] http://electiondefensealliance.org/election_data_analysis
    [77] http://electiondefensealliance.org/code_orange
    [78] http://electiondefensealliance.org/?q=Unprovable
    [79] http://www.StandingforVoters.org
    [80] http://electiondefensealliance.org/election_day_rapid_response
    [81] http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/board-auth.cgi?file=/1954/71690.html
    [82] http://www.blackboxvoting.org/toolkit2008.pdf
    [83] http://www.blackboxvoting.org
    [84] http://www.politico.com
    [85] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/BBV_Toolkit2008.pdf
    [86] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Citizens_Toolkit_2006_BBV.pdf
    [87] mailto:Info@electiondefensealliance.org
    [88] http://electiondefensealliance.org/email_network_plan
    [89] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/CA_fraudcomplaint_form.pdf
    [90] mailto:Elections@sos.ca.gov
    [91] mailto:Info@ElectionDefenseAlliance
    [92] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/CA_Co_votesystems070308.pdf
    [93] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org
    [94] mailto:joanne@etcnys.org
    [95] mailto:info@etcnys.org
    [96] mailto:info@elections.state.ny.us
    [97] http://ihcenter.org/groups/re-mediaetc
    [98] http://electiondefensealliance.org/?q=codeorange/signup.php
    [99] http://peter@peterbcollins.com
    [100] http://www.peterbcollins.com/3-13-09/
    [101] http://www.peterbcollins.com/you-can-help/
    [102] http://green960.com/cc-common/podcast/single_podcast.html?podcast=peterbcollins.xml
    [103] http://www.krxa540.com/component/content/article/5-listen-on-the-internet
    [104] http://www.peterbcollins.com/
    [105] http://www.peterbcollins.com/i-made-a-tough-decision/
    [106] http://fullofit@peterbcollins.com
    [107] http://www.Verifygra.com
    [108] http://feeds.feedburner.com/EDA-Newsfeed
    [109] http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/EDA-Newsfeed/~6/1
    [110] http://feedburner.google.com/fb/a/headlineanimator/install?id=54ho7elo03ddp4poomgtka5u9k&w=1
    [111] http://www.springwidgets.com/widgets/view/54050/?param_param=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.electiondefensealliance.org%2Frss.xml&param_compactView=false&param_blurbLength=512&param_style_borderColor=0x0000CC&param_style_brandUrl=http%3A%2F%2Fdownloads.thespringbox.com%2Fhosted_content%2Fimages%2F8ca8d4d0a5211c020c74968c5f44ed30.jpg&width=175&height=218
    [112] http://www.change.org/electiondefensealliance/projects/view/general_operations_fund
    [113] http://www.change.org/electiondefensealliance/projects/view/arizona_transparency_project
    [114] http://k5cyz.tk
    [115] https://secure.groundspring.org/dn/index.php?aid=28156
    [116] http://k5cyz.tk/
    [117] http://twitter.com/Dan_EDA
    [118] http://electiondefensealliance.org/Riverside_Missing_Pieces
    [119] http://www.flipvideospotlight.com/
    [120] http://electiondefensealliance.org/?q=../save_ny_levers
    [121] http://markcrispinmiller.com/2009/07/mcm-and-andi-novick-speak-on-voting-in-ny-on-79.html
    [122] http://nylevers.wordpress.com/
    [123] http://markcrispinmiller.com/
    [124] http://www.wheresthepaper.org/ny.html#WhyKeepLevers
    [125] http://lever-voting-machines.blogspot.com/
    [126] http://www.866ourvote.org/state/
    [127] http://change.gov/page/s/yourvision
    [128] http://www.paperballot.info/
    [129] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/PB Verified Elections 2010.pdf
    [130] http://electiondefensealliance.org/NC_straight_ticket_confusion
    [131] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Avoid_StraightParty_Brief_Alter.pdf
    [132] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Straight_Party_Complete_Study_Alter.pdf
    [133] http://voteprotect.org
    [134] http://www.votersunite.org
    [135] http://www.votersunite.org/info/newMexicophantomvotes.asp
    [136] http://www.USCountVotes.org
    [137] http://www/sos.state.nm.us/Election/cntyindx04.html
    [138] http://www.kintera.org/TR.asp?ID=M720815188130589636584265
    [139] http://www.kintera.org/TR.asp?ID=M720815438130589636584265
    [140] http://www.kintera.org/TR.asp?ID=M720815268130589636584265
    [141] http://www.kintera.org/TR.asp?ID=M720815448130589636584265
    [142] http://www.kintera.org/TR.asp?ID=M720815328130589636584265
    [143] http://www.youtube..com/watch?v=2CVMoLjOtP4
    [144] mailto:
    [145] http://groups.yahoo.com/group/electionreform/
    [146] http://www.ellenbrodsky.com
    [147] http://archive.constantcontact.com/fs020/1101317662862/archive/1102907343042.html
    [148] http://electiondefensealliance.org/catalog/election_integrity_books
    [149] http://electiondefensealliance.org/catalog/digital_video_disk
    [150] http://electiondefensealliance.org/Store
    [151] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/EDA_button_0.jpg
    [152] mailto:Orders@ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
    [153] http://www.VoteNow2006.net
    [154] http://www.millionphonemarch.com/in.htm
    [155] http://arizona.typepad.com/blog/pima.html
    [156] http://electiondefensealliance.org/blog/eda
    [157] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/press_accounts_pima_supervisors_release_vote_databases
    [158] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W9iXJahaGmk
    [159] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/David_Jefferson_Declaration.pdf
    [160] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Tom_Ryan_Declaration.pdf
    [161] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Brennan_Center_Delaration.pdf
    [162] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/EDA AUDIT AZ letter press info Jan 8 2008.pdf
    [163] http://www.pima.gov
    [164] http://www.tucsoncitizen.com/daily/opinion/73553.php
    [165] mailto:letters@tucsoncitizen.com
    [166] http://www.tucsoncitizen.com/daily/local/73589.php
    [167] http://www.elections.state.ny.us/CountyBoards.html
    [168] http://www.congress.org
    [169] http://re-mediaetc.blogspot.com/
    [170] http://www.ElectionDefenseAlliance.org/save_ny_levers
    [171] http://electiondefensealliance.org/MCM_Moyers_Journal_pbs
    [172] http://tinyurl.com/ymgazd
    [173] http://tinyurl.com/ybcngh
    [174] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Barbour_v_Berger_order.pdf
    [175] http://www.care2.com/go/z/e/0Xto/wRCg/E0DA
    [176] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/PB Verified Elections 2010-2.pdf
    [177] http://www.change.org/ideas/view/move_the_country_towards_transparent_election_systems
    [178] http://www.change.org/ideas?order=top#listSection
    [179] mailto:dalea@sonic.net
    [180] http://www.change.org/ideas
    [181] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/petitions/pnum777.php
    [182] http://electiondefensealliance.org/count/signup.php
    [183] Mailto:bodell@wellcom
    [184] http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=6409
    [185] mailto:bodell@well.com
    [186] http://verifiedvoting.org/audits
    [187] http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/downloads/AuditQ-Machine.pdf
    [188] http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/downloads/AuditQ-Precinct.pdf
    [189] mailto:observer@verifiedvoting.org
    [190] http://www.verifiedvoting.org/
    [191] http://www.Change.org
    [192] http://www.change.org/ideas/faq
    [193] http://www.change.org/electiondefensealliance
    [194] http://www.change.org/ideas/browse/other
    [195] http://www.change.org/ideas/view/return_to_citizen-run_citizen-counted_citizen_monitored_elections
    [196] http://www.change.org/ideas/view/hand_counted_paper_ballots_now
    [197] http://www.change.org/ideas/browse/government_reform
    [198] http://electiondefensealliance.org/communications
    [199] http://www.ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
    [200] http://www.verifygra.com
    [201] http://www.paperballot.info
    [202] http://www.caricaturist.com
    [203] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/HowDoYouKnow.pdf
    [204] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/EDA_Top10_rev020508.pdf
    [205] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/Volunteer_Signup_020508.pdf
    [206] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/BBV_election_monitoring
    [207] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/HowDoYouKnow.pdf
    [208] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/OEJC
    [209] http://www.wakeupandsaveyourcountry.com/oejc.html
    [210] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/EDA_Top10_rev020508.pdf
    [211] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Volunteer_Signup_020508.pdf
    [212] mailto:votingsystems@sos.ca.gov
    [213] http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/diebold.pdf
    [214] http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/hart.pdf
    [215] http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/hart_6.1.pdf
    [216] http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/sequoia.pdf
    [217] http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ess_rescission_withdrawal.pdf
    [218] http://electiondefensealliance.org/elections/voting_systems/e_voting_factsheet.pdf
    [219] http://electiondefensealliance.org/elections/voting_systems/voting_systems_faq.pdf
    [220] http://electiondefensealliance.org/elections/voting_systems/overview_of_the_vsys_certification_process.pdf
    [221] http://electiondefensealliance.org/?q=voting_systems/ten_steps_to_vsys_certification.pdf
    [222] http://electiondefensealliance.org/?q=voting_systems/vs_factsheet.pdf
    [223] http://electiondefensealliance.org/?q=voting_systems/uniform_vote_count.pdf
    [224] http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_vsr.htm
    [225] http://www.CountedAsCast.com
    [226] http://www.calchannel.com/search.php?date=073007&source=All&type=All&title=&Search=Submit
    [227] http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/hearing_transcripts_073007.pdf
    [228] http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/State_of_protect%28DW%29.pdf
    [229] http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/diebold-source-public-jul29.pdf
    [230] http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/Hart-source-public.pdf
    [231] http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/sequoia-source-public-jul26.pdf
    [232] http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/red_overview.pdf
    [233] http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/red_diebold.pdf
    [234] http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/red_hart_final.pdf
    [235] http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/red_sequoia.pdf
    [236] http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/accessibility_review_report_california_ttb_absolute_final_version16.pdf
    [237] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/S1487_hearing_072507
    [238] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/Halt811
    [239] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/h_r_6200_the_paper_ballot_act_of_2006
    [240] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/five_point_proposal
    [241] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/ca_voting_system_review_hearing_july_30
    [242] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/whats_wrong_with_s1487_hommel
    [243] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/s1487_analysis
    [244] http://www.senate.gov/general/contact_information/senators_cfm.cfm
    [245] http://www.nj.gov/lps/formmail.htm
    [246] http://electionmathematics.org
    [247] http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=1265
    [248] http://www.bradblog.com/?p=5814
    [249] http://www.nj.com/news/times/index.ssf?/base/news-4/
    [250] http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/jersey/index.ssf?/base/news-9/
    [251] http://www.philly.com/inquirer/local/
    [252] http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20080317/185348564.shtml
    [253] http://chronicle.com/wiredcampus/article/2826/e-voting-vendor
    [254] http://www.bradblog.com/?p=5820
    [255] http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2008/03/18/voting-machine-maker-to
    [256] http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/downloads/ETScorecardState.pdf
    [257] http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/downloads/ETScorecardLocal.pdf
    [258] https://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=6401
    [259] mailto:watchthevote@verifiedvoting.org
    [260] http://vevo.verifiedvoting.org/mailman/listinfo/watchthevote
    [261] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/Sacramento_Car_Pool_Blog
    [262] http://www.capitolcorridor.org/stations/
    [263] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/Sacramento_Amtak_schedules.pdf
    [264] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/AmTrak_SoS_WalkMap.jpg
    [265] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Priceless.pdf
    [266] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/PricelessB&W.pdf
    [267] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/ThanksDebowenB&W.pdf
    [268] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Crook_Bowen3.pdf
    [269] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/ThanksDebowenColor.pdf
    [270] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/agenda_073007.pdf
    [271] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/ThanksDebowenColor.gif
    [272] http://www.tangibleballot.com
    [273] http://www.tangibleballot.org/CirculatorForm1.jsp
    [274] http://www.tangibleballot.org/pdf/PetitionCirculatorDosAndDonts.pdf
    [275] http://www.tangibleballot.org/pdf/PetitionCirculatorLegalRules.pdf
    [276] http://www.tangibleballot.org
    [277] mailto:hvl@lehmannlaw.com
    [278] mailto:hvlehmann@earthlink.net
    [279] mailto:txelectionreform@yahoo.com
    [280] http://simplesend.com/simple/t.asp?S=211&ID=24897&NL=4839&N=32888&SI=1900054&URL=http://www.fyi.legis.state.tx.us/
    [281] http://simplesend.com/simple/t.asp?S=211&ID=24897&NL=4839&N=32888&SI=1900054&URL=http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/Members/Members.aspx?Chamber=S
    [282] http://simplesend.com/simple/t.asp?S=211&ID=24897&NL=4839&N=32888&SI=1900054&URL=http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/Members/Members.aspx?Chamber=H
    [283] http://simplesend.com/simple/t.asp?S=211&ID=24897&NL=4839&N=32888&SI=1900054&URL=http://www.tspb.state.tx.us/spb/plan/Plan.htm
    [284] http://simplesend.com/simple/t.asp?S=211&ID=24897&NL=4839&N=32888&SI=1900054&URL=http://www.facebook.com/home.php?#/group.php?gid=55794930819
    [285] http://electiondefensealliance.org/Pima_RTA_Ballot_Preservation
    [286] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/takeaction
    [287] mailto: votingsystems@sos.ca.gov
    [288] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Sacramento_Amtak_schedules.pdf
    [289] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/AmTrak_SoS_WalkMap.jpg
    [290] http://electiondefensealliance.org/?q=http
    [291] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/PROOF OF CITIZENSHIP.pdf
    [292] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/VOTER ID.pdf
    [293] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/HR811_FloorManagersAmendment_072707.pdf
    [294] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/hr_811_the_holt_ii_bill_to_amend_hava
    [295] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/petitions/pnum616.php
    [296] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/811_congress_formletter
    [297] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/HCA_Contact_info
    [298] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/811_factsheets
    [299] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/811_Fax
    [300] http://www.ElectionDefenseAlliance.org/Halt811
    [301] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/HR811_FloorManagersAmendment_072707.pdf
    [302] http://visitor.constantcontact.com/email.jsp?m=1101317662862
    [303] http://ui.constantcontact.com/sa/fwtf.jsp?m=1101317662862&a=1101615769838
    [304] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/abolish_eac
    [305] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/WhyTheEACMustBeAbolished.pdf
    [306] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/EDA_811_email_alert
    [307] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/EDA_811_Alert
    [308] http://visitor.constantcontact.com/c.jsp?t=1101615769838.preview.SUBSCRIBER.SEQNO.38110118123.2&m=1101317662862&wl=F&id=preview
    [309] http://ui.constantcontact.com/d.jsp?p=un&m=1101317662862&ea=dan%40electiondefensealliance.org&se=100&t=1101615769838&lang=en&reason=T&id=preview.1101317662862
    [310] mailbox:///Users/DAN/Library/Mozilla/Profiles/Dan%20Ashby/2nomuw0x.slt/Mail/mail.2xtreme-1.net/Inbox?number=399770310#column
    [311] mailbox:///Users/DAN/Library/Mozilla/Profiles/Dan%20Ashby/2nomuw0x.slt/Mail/mail.2xtreme-1.net/Inbox?number=399770310#article1.bg1
    [312] mailbox:///Users/DAN/Library/Mozilla/Profiles/Dan%20Ashby/2nomuw0x.slt/Mail/mail.2xtreme-1.net/Inbox?number=399770310#article1.bg2
    [313] mailbox:///Users/DAN/Library/Mozilla/Profiles/Dan%20Ashby/2nomuw0x.slt/Mail/mail.2xtreme-1.net/Inbox?number=399770310#article2.bg1
    [314] mailbox:///Users/DAN/Library/Mozilla/Profiles/Dan%20Ashby/2nomuw0x.slt/Mail/mail.2xtreme-1.net/Inbox?number=399770310#article3.bg1
    [315] http://rs6.net/tn.jsp?t=ohkvw5bab.0.0.oe9l9vbab.0&ts=S0238&p=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.electiondefensealliance.org%2Fabolish_eac
    [316] http://rs6.net/tn.jsp?t=ohkvw5bab.0.0.oe9l9vbab.0&ts=S0238&p=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.electiondefensealliance.org%2FHalt811
    [317] http://rs6.net/tn.jsp?t=ohkvw5bab.0.0.oe9l9vbab.0&ts=S0238&p=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.electiondefensealliance.org%2Fpetitions%2Fpnum616.php
    [318] http://rs6.net/tn.jsp?t=ohkvw5bab.0.0.oe9l9vbab.0&ts=S0238&p=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.electiondefensealliance.org%2FEDA_811_email_alert
    [319] http://rs6.net/tn.jsp?t=ohkvw5bab.0.0.oe9l9vbab.0&ts=S0238&p=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.electiondefensealliance.org%2Fhr_811_the_holt_ii_bill_to_amend_hava
    [320] http://rs6.net/tn.jsp?t=ohkvw5bab.0.0.oe9l9vbab.0&ts=S0238&p=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.electiondefensealliance.org%2F13_problems_Holt811_Tobi
    [321] http://rs6.net/tn.jsp?t=ohkvw5bab.0.0.oe9l9vbab.0&ts=S0238&p=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.electiondefensealliance.org%2Fhr_811_ten_blunders
    [322] http://rs6.net/tn.jsp?t=ohkvw5bab.0.0.oe9l9vbab.0&ts=S0238&p=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.electiondefensealliance.org%2Fson_of_holt_no_better
    [323] http://rs6.net/tn.jsp?t=ohkvw5bab.0.0.oe9l9vbab.0&ts=S0238&p=http%3A%2F%2Fvisitor.constantcontact.com%2Femail.jsp%3Fm%3D1101317662862
    [324] http://rs6.net/tn.jsp?t=ohkvw5bab.0.0.oe9l9vbab.0&ts=S0238&p=http%3A%2F%2Fui.constantcontact.com%2Fsa%2Ffwtf.jsp%3Fm%3D1101317662862%26a%3D1101615769838
    [325] http://rs6.net/tn.jsp?t=ohkvw5bab.0.0.oe9l9vbab.0&ts=S0238&p=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ElectionDefenseAlliance.org%2FHalt811
    [326] http://rs6.net/tn.jsp?t=ohkvw5bab.0.0.oe9l9vbab.0&ts=S0238&p=http%3A%2F%2Felectiondefensealliance.org%2F2007%2F04%2Fstate_county_resistance_slowing_rush_to_h_r_811
    [327] http://rs6.net/tn.jsp?t=ohkvw5bab.0.0.oe9l9vbab.0&ts=S0238&p=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.electiondefensealliance.org%2Fstate_county_811_opposition
    [328] mailto:info@electiondefensealliance.org
    [329] http://rs6.net/tn.jsp?t=ohkvw5bab.0.0.oe9l9vbab.0&ts=S0238&p=http%3A%2F%2Felectiondefensealliance.org
    [330] http://ui.constantcontact.com/sa/fwtf.jsp?m=1101317662862&ea=dan%40electiondefensealliance.org&a=1101615769838&id=preview
    [331] mailto:dan@electiondefensealliance.org
    [332] http://ui.constantcontact.com/d.jsp?p=oo&m=1101317662862&ea=dan%40electiondefensealliance.org&se=100&t=1101615769838&lang=en&reason=T&id=preview.1101317662862
    [333] http://ui.constantcontact.com/roving/CCPrivacyPolicy.jsp?id=preview
    [334] http://www.constantcontact.com/index.jsp?cc=news05
    [335] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/Verifygra_FAX_zl.jpg
    [336] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/Cronies_272kb.pdf
    [337] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Verifygra_FAX_zl.jpg
    [338] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Cronies_272kb.pdf
    [339] http://www.house.gov/writerep/wyrfaqs.shtml#listrep
    [340] http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/mcapdir.html
    [341] http://www.statelocalgov.net/50states-secretary-state.cfm
    [342] http://electiondefensealliance.org/?q=mailto
    [343] http://www.house.gov/writerep/
    [344] http://www.house.gov/susandavis/IMA/contact.html
    [345] http://lungren.house.gov/feedback.shtml
    [346] http://kevinmccarthy.house.gov/contact.html
    [347] http://www.house.gov/capuano/contact/email.shtml
    [348] http://www.house.gov/robertbrady/IMA/issue.htm
    [349] http://gonzalez.house.gov/feedback.cfm?campaign=gonzalez&type=Contact%20Me
    [350] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110QL6DsP:e0:
    [351] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110QL6DsP:e344:
    [352] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110QL6DsP:e3571:
    [353] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110QL6DsP:e3710:
    [354] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110QL6DsP:e11720:
    [355] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110QL6DsP:e35685:
    [356] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110QL6DsP:e37714:
    [357] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110QL6DsP:e38186:
    [358] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110QL6DsP:e38553:
    [359] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110QL6DsP:e42352:
    [360] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110QL6DsP:e44997:
    [361] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110QL6DsP:e48565:
    [362] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110QL6DsP:e49980:
    [363] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110QL6DsP:e52084:
    [364] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110QL6DsP:e54356:
    [365] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110QL6DsP:e54902:
    [366] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110QL6DsP:e56023:
    [367] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110QL6DsP:e56638:
    [368] http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c110:1:./temp/%7Ec110QL6DsP:e57109:
    [369] http://www.votersunite.org/info/HR811AmendmentResources.asp
    [370] http://www.votersunite.org/info/HR811AmendmentResources.asp#general
    [371] http://www.votersunite.org/info/HR811AmendmentResources.asp#disabilities
    [372] http://www.votersunite.org/info/HR811AmendmentResources.asp#minorities
    [373] http://capwiz.com/pdamerica/issues/alert/?alertid=9406781&type=CO
    [374] http://www.votersunite.org/takeaction/ban-e-ballots.asp
    [375] http://www.votersunite.org/info/HR811EssentialRevisions.htm
    [376] http://www.votersunite.org/info/InfoPacket-BanningE-ballots.pdf
    [377] http://www.votersunite.org/info/2007ElectionReform.asp
    [378] http://www.votersunite.org/info/2007ElectionReform.pdf
    [379] http://www.votersunite.org/info/ElectionReformInHi-TechWorld.pdf
    [380] http://www.votersunite.org/info/BanE-ballotAmendmentImpact.asp
    [381] http://www.votersunite.org/info/BanE-ballotAmendmentImpact.pdf
    [382] http://www.votersunite.org/info/vvpatNotReliableBackup.pdf
    [383] http://www.votersunite.org/info/amendHR811orNot.asp
    [384] http://www.voteraction.org/Accessible_AND_Secure_Voting.htm
    [385] http://www.votersunite.org/info/amendHR811orNot.asp#accessible
    [386] http://www.votersunite.org/info/NM_UVbyBallotTypeandEthnicity.pdf
    [387] http://www.votersunite.org/info/E-ballotsDisenfranchiseAfricanAmericans.pdf
    [388] mailto:VotingSystemComment@ss.ca.gov
    [389] http://ss.ca.gov/elections/elections_vs.htm
    [390] http://tinyurl.com/ojd4r
    [391] http://www.visi.com/juan/congress/index.html
    [392] http://www.pollworkersfordemocracy.org
    [393] http://www.velvetrevolution.us
    [394] http://www.debrabowen.com
    [395] http://www.countedascast.com/alameda/letter.php
    [396] http://www.countedascast.com/alameda/securitytesting.php
    [397] http://www.npr.org/rss/podcast.php?id=510221
    [398] http://www.npr.org/contact/totn.html
    [399] http://www.npr.org/blogs/talk/
    [400] http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5363084
    [401] http://www.sciencefriday.com/about/stations/
    [402] http://www.kqed.org/radio/about/index.jsp
    [403] http://www.kqed.org/listen/live/mp3/kqedradio.pls
    [404] http://www.kqed.org/listen/live/qt/kqedradio.qtl
    [405] http://www.kqed.org/listen/live/real/kqedradio.ram
    [406] http://www.kqed.org/listen/live/wm/kqedradio.asx
    [407] http://www.michiganradio.org/
    [408] http://ummedia02.rs.itd.umich.edu/miradio
    [409] http://umtv-live.rs.itd.umich.edu/wuom/miradio32k.m3u
    [410] http://ummedia05.rs.itd.umich.edu/wuom/miradio.ram
    [411] http://www.tpr.org/
    [412] http://www.tpr.org/audio/kstx.asx
    [413] http://www.tpr.org/audio/kstx.pls
    [414] http://www.tpr.org/audio/kstx.m3u
    [415] http://www.wpr.org/regions/wau/
    [416] http://www.wpr.org/ideas-live.ram
    [417] http://www.sciencefriday.com/
    [418] http://wpr-ice.streamguys.net/wpr-ideas-40.m3u
    [419] http://www.wamu.org
    [420] http://www.wamu.org/audio/wamu.m3u
    [421] http://www.wamu.org/audio/wamu.ram
    [422] http://www.wamu.org/audio/wamu.asx
    [423] http://www.kxot.org
    [424] http://www.kxot.org/real.ram
    [425] http://www.kxot.net/kxot.asx
    [426] http://www.sciencefriday.com/kids/
    [427] http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/the_machinery_of_democracy_voting_system_security_accessibility_usability_a/
    [428] http://www.amazon.com/o/ASIN/0897335538/sciencefriday/
    [429] http://www.brennancenter.org/
    [430] http://www.nyu.edu
    [431] http://verifiedvoting.org/
    [432] http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/better_ballots/
    [433] http://www.fec.gov/
    [434] http://www.usa.gov/Citizen/Topics/Voting.shtml
    [435] http://uspolitics.america.gov/uspolitics/elections/voting.html
    [436] http://www.sciencefriday.com/program/archives/200802011
    [437] http://www.cs.jhu.edu/
    [438] http://web.jhu.edu/jhuisi/
    [439] http://www.jhu.edu/
    [440] http://www.eff.org/issues/e-voting
    [441] http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/06/magazine/06Vote-t.html
    [442] http://www.care2.com
    [443] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/request_by_voters_to_amend_the_holt_bill
    [444] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/request-by-voters-executive-summary.pdf
    [445] http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/bilinfo.html
    [446] http://www.baiman.blogspot.com
    [447] http://political.moveon.org/memberfeedback/index2.html?id=8245-6611391-s.FdWqM8b.fZeQBvlh157A&t=1
    [448] mailto:piu@doj.ca.gov
    [449] mailto:bill.lockyer@doj.ca.gov
    [450] http://www.canivote.org/#
    [451] http://www.votesmart.org/voter_registration_resources.php
    [452] http://www.canivote.org/
    [453] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/long_term_campaign
    [454] http://electiondefensealliance.org/protect_your_own_vote_verify_your_registration
    [455] http://electiondefensealliance.org/election_day_action_plan
    [456] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/election_evidence
    [457] http://www.blackboxvoting.org/toolkit.html
    [458] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/calendar
    [459] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/let_people_count
    [460] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/Regional_EI_Directory
    [461] http://electiondefensealliance.org/Donate
    [462] http://electiondefensealliance.org/pima_election_database_release_ruling
    [463] http://www.alternet.org/democracy/92366/?page=entire&ses=43da1a7d441cc25377984e10107d6aba
    [464] http://electiondefensealliance.org/monitoring_computerized_elections
    [465] http://electiondefensealliance.org/landslide_denied_exit_polls_vs_vote_count_2006
    [466] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/upspr
    [467] http://electiondefensealliance.org/?q=<a href=
    [468] http://electiondefensealliance.org/topics/hcpb
    [469] http://electiondefensealliance.org/save_ny_levers
    [470] http://electiondefensealliance.org/hr_811_the_holt_ii_bill_to_amend_hava
    [471] http://electiondefensealliance.org/paper_ballot_plank
    [472] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/Public_News_Service_EDA
    [473] http://www.stealingamericathemovie.org/
    [474] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/election_defense_radio
    [475] http://electiondefensealliance.org/edatv
    [476] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/verified_voting_transparency_project_election_monitoring_checklists
    [477] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/beware_these_voter_suppression_and_vote_counting_fraud_tactics
    [478] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/save_r_vote_election_monitoring_field_guide
    [479] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/pollworkersfordemocracy
    [480] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/state_open_records_law_request_letter_generator
    [481] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/were_counting_votes_kit
    [482] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/new_progressive_coalition_fundraising_press_kit
    [483] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/ca_election_monitoring_a_training_manual
    [484] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/framing
    [485] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/solarbus_dvd_democracy_at_risk
    [486] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/votingmachineprocon
    [487] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/resources_jump
    [488] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/monitoring_computerized_elections
    [489] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/BBV_election_monitoring_what_to_watch_for
    [490] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/SaveRVote_Election_Monitoring_Guide_2008.pdf
    [491] http://www.votingmachinesprocon.org/
    [492] http://www.votersunite.org/
    [493] http://www.votersunite.org/info.asp
    [494] http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?list=type&type=73
    [495] http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/downloads/Pre-electionLAQ.pdf
    [496] https://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/downloads/EarlyVotingQ.pdf
    [497] http://www.verifiedvoting.org/audits
    [498] http://www.verifiedvoting.org/downloads/ManualAudits-06-06.pdf
    [499] http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/board-profile.cgi?action=register
    [500] http://www.blackboxvoting.org/donate.html
    [501] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/index.htm
    [502] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%281%29
    [503] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%282%29
    [504] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%283%29
    [505] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%284%29
    [506] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%285%29
    [507] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%286%29
    [508] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%287%29
    [509] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%288%29
    [510] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%289%29
    [511] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%2810%29
    [512] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%2811%29
    [513] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%2812%29
    [514] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%2813%29
    [515] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%2814%29
    [516] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%2815%29
    [517] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%2816%29
    [518] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%2817%29
    [519] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%2818%29
    [520] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%2819%29
    [521] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%2820%29
    [522] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%2821%29
    [523] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%2822%29
    [524] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%2823%29
    [525] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%2824%29
    [526] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%2825%29
    [527] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%2826%29
    [528] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%2827%29
    [529] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%2828%29
    [530] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%2829%29
    [531] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/30ways.htm#%2830%29
    [532] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/Dirty30_day1.htm
    [533] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/Dirty30_day2.htm
    [534] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/Dirty30_day3.htm
    [535] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/Dirty30_day4.htm
    [536] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/Dirty30_day5.htm
    [537] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/Dirty30_day7.htm
    [538] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/Dirty30_day8.htm
    [539] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/Dirty30_day9.htm
    [540] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/Dirty30_day10.htm
    [541] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/Dirty30_day11.htm
    [542] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/AbsenteeBallots.pdf
    [543] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/Dirty30_day13.htm
    [544] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/Dirty30_day14.htm
    [545] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/ProvisionalBallots.pdf
    [546] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/Dirty30_day15.htm
    [547] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/Dirty30_day16.htm
    [548] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/Dirty30_day17.htm
    [549] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/Dirty30_day18.htm
    [550] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/Dirty30_day19.htm
    [551] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/Dirty30_day20.htm
    [552] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/Dirty30_day21.htm
    [553] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/Dirty30_day22.htm
    [554] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/Dirty30_day23.htm
    [555] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/Dirty30_day24.htm
    [556] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/Dirty30_day25.htm
    [557] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/Dirty30_day26.htm
    [558] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/Dirty30_day28.htm
    [559] http://www.networkofcitizens.org/election/Dirty30_day29.htm
    [560] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Election_Monitoring_Manual_SRV_EDA.pdf
    [561] http://electiondefensealliance.org/were_counting_the_votes_kit
    [562] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/topics/hcpb
    [563] http://www.newprogressivecoalition.com/files/npc-online-press-kit.pdf
    [564] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/ElectionMonitoring v1.0_0.doc
    [565] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/ElectionMonitoringV1.0_0.pdf
    [566] mailto:tom68-69korea@thecourbats.com
    [567] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/SaveRVote_Riverside_Monitor_Rpt_071106.pdf
    [568] http://electiondefensealliance.org/election_monitoring
    [569] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/SaveRVote_Riverside_Monitor_Rpt_071106.doc
    [570] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/EDA-CPRA-Petition-for- Writ-RiversideCounty.pdf
    [571] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/EDA-CPRA_Request1_042409.pdf
    [572] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/EDA-CPRA-Request2-061909.pdf
    [573] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/EDA_CPRA_Request3_Riverside-090109.pdf
    [574] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/EDA-CPRA-Request4-Riverside-101909.pdf
    [575] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Card_Audit_For_Doug.pdf
    [576] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Riverside-CPRA1-Response.pdf
    [577] mailto:dgang@PE.com
    [578] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/SaveRVote_Nov08_Election_Report_RiversideCo.pdf
    [579] http://bosvideo.co.riverside.ca.us/ppportal/agenda/webcast.aspx
    [580] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/MissingPieces_Evidence_Slides.pdf
    [581] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Riverside_Oversized_Precincts.xls
    [582] http://electiondefensealliance.org/SaveRVote
    [583] http://www.savervote.com
    [584] http://www.clerkoftheboard.co.riverside.ca.us/agendas/2007/2007_07_17/03.25.pdf
    [585] http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/sequoia_102507.pdf
    [586] http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/sequoia_dunmore.pdf
    [587] http://www.clerkoftheboard.co.riverside.ca.us/agendas/2009/03_03_09/16.03.pdf
    [588] http://www.bradblog.com/?p=6160
    [589] http://www.bradblog.com/?p=3937
    [590] http://www.lex18.com/Global/story.asp?S=10037216&nav=menu203_2
    [591] http://www.bradblog.com/?p=7001
    [592] http://electiondefensealliance.org/affiliations
    [593] http://electiondefensealliance.org/donate
    [594] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Broken_Chains_of_Custody_SRV_0608.pdf
    [595] http://www.publicnewsservice.org/mp3.php?f=rss-6673-1.mp3
    [596] http://www.publicnewsservice.org/index.php?/content/article/6673-1
    [597] http://www.mydesert.com/article/20081007/NEWS01/81007040/-1/rss
    [598] http://www.pe.com/localnews/inland/stories/PE_News_Local_S_audit08.3de8db1.html
    [599] http://www.kesq.com/global/story.asp?s=9141827
    [600] http://electiondefensealliance.org/SaveRVoteVideo
    [601] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/SRV_Riverside_Monitor_Rpt_071106.pdf
    [602] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/SRV_Riverside_Monitor_Rpt_071106.doc
    [603] http://electiondefensealliance.org/?q=files/SRV_Statement_Riverside_071106.pdf
    [604] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/SRV_Riverside_fullreport_071106.pdf
    [605] http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2006/07/09/opinion/jacobs/18_45_537_8_06.txt
    [606] mailto: TemeculaPaul@aol.com
    [607] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Riverside-Co-BOS-ROV-transcript-092909_0.pdf
    [608] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Riverside-Elections-Timeline_0.png
    [609] http://www.chuckherrin.com/ConservativeEmpathy.htm
    [610] http://www.votersunite.org/info/ElectronicVotingInBrief.pdf
    [611] http://www.chuckherrin.com/evotingquestions.htm
    [612] http://nightweed.com/usavotefacts.html
    [613] http://electiondefensealliance.org/resources
    [614] http://electiondefensealliance.org/working_group_registration_procedure
    [615] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/working_groups_overview
    [616] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/donations/dollars_at_work
    [617] http://ElectionDefenseAlliance.org/Join
    [618] http://electiondefensealliance.org/node/add/story
    [619] http://www.google.com/support/youtube/
    [620] http://www.youtube.com/director
    [621] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/add_content
    [622] mailto:Admin@electiondefensealliance.org
    [623] http://electionfraudnews.com/MichaelCollins.htm
    [624] http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/Archived-Content/Nick-Clegg-Addresses-Proportional-Representation-Protest-Crowd-Outside-Liberal-Democrat-Meeting/Video/201005215628178?lpos=Latest+Video_7&lid=VIDEO_7556443_Clegg+Addresses+Protest+Crowd&videoCategory=Lates
    [625] http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/votingsystems/systems4.htm#AV+
    [626] http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/cleggs-dream-is-realised-with-a-place-in-the-heart-of-the-new-government-1971396.html
    [627] http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/votingsystems/systems2.htm#AV
    [628] http://www.libdems.org.uk/our_manifesto.aspx
    [629] http://www.libdems.org.uk/what_we_stand_for.aspx
    [630] http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/apr/25/nick-clegg-coalition-conservatives
    [631] http://poetry.poetryx.com/poems/784/
    [632] http://agonist.org/leadersdebate
    [633] http://agonist.org/leadersdebate3
    [634] https://secure.avaaz.org/en/iran_vote_truth/?cl=255588905&v=3506
    [635] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/16/iran-protests-election-recount
    [636] http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/06/2009616184556951795.html
    [637] http://www.juancole.com/2009/06/stealing-iranian-election.html
    [638] http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/06/iran-does-have-some-fishy-numbers.html
    [639] http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com
    [640] http://twitter.com/#search?q=%23iranelection
    [641] http://electiondefensealliance.org/national_election_day_vote_vigil_poster
    [642] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Vigil2b_0.pdf
    [643] http://www.protectmyvote.org/voterchecklist_printable.php
    [644] http://www.protectmyvote.org/voterchecklist.php
    [645] mailto:?subject=Election Preparedness Kit&body=Hello, Want to avoid another election disaster this year? The last few elections have been clouded by unnatural events including electronic voting machine malfunctions and voter disenfranchisement. So TrueMajorityACTION has compiled this Election Preparedness Kit with three easy steps you can take to protect this election from wide-spread disaster. Check it out by clicking the link below. http://www.truemajorityaction.org/takeback/survival_kit.php
    [646] http://www.vote411.org
    [647] http://www.truemajorityaction.org/index.php
    [648] http://www.truemajorityaction.org/who/
    [649] http://www.truemajorityaction.org/contact.php
    [650] http://www.truemajorityaction.org/privacy.php
    [651] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/VideotheVote.jpg
    [652] mailto: Dan@ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
    [653] http://electiondefensealliance.org/independent_exit_polls
    [654] http://ElectionDefenseAlliance.org/EVP
    [655] mailto:dale.tavris@fda.hhs.gov
    [656] mailto: Info@ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
    [657] mailto:info@ElectionDefenseAlliance.org
    [658] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/EDRR_flyer.pdf
    [659] http://www.house.gov/
    [660] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/join