Published on Election Defense Alliance - public site (http://electiondefensealliance.org)

Resources

Collections of content by media category and links to further resources.

50 States Directory

Scroll down for State folders. Everyone is encouraged to file election integrity news, announcements, and resource links as guides to citizen action in your home states.

Content Suggestions: Links to state elections codes and secretary of state websites; court cases; investigation reports; announcements of public hearings and demonstrations; and meetings and programs of your local election integrity groups.

For help uploading content to the public pages, click here [1]

NATIONAL DIRECTORY of REGIONAL ELECTION INTEGRITY GROUPS


Click here for listing of Regional Electoral Integrity Organizations in U.S. [2]

[ If you don't see your local group listed here please send us a note at Info[at]ElectionDefenseAlliance[dot]org [3]
and we will add your group to the listing. ]

NATIONAL GUIDES AND INTERACTIVE MAPS

National Map: Types of Voting Equipment by State [4]

National Atlas Multilayer Mapping Utility [5]

Info Please [6]

Black Voter Network's Organization List [7]

Verified Voting's Interactive Map for Voter Resources [8]

Find out who represents you in Congress [9]

Election Guide from NOW with David Brancaccio [10]

Washington Post's Key Race Map [11]

STATE GUIDES AND MAPS

Regional Election Integrity Organizations

This list is in constant development.
Please recommend additions and corrections to this list by sending notes to
Info(at)ElectionDefenseAlliance(dot)org [12]

Or, you may also directly post a listing for your own state or county election integrity organizations.
[Click here for Add Content instructions [13]].

We also welcome you to self-nominate you local organization as an EDA affiliate [14].

Alaska
Arizona

California

Colorado

Connecticut

Florida

Georgia

Hawaii

Illinois

Indiana

Iowa

Louisiana

Maine

Maryland

Massachusetts

Michigan

Minnesota

Missouri

Montana

New Hampshire

New Jersey

New Mexico

New York

North Carolina

Ohio

Oklahoma

Oregon

Pennsylvania

Texas

Utah

Vermont

Virginia

Washington

West Virginia

Alabama

Alabama Voter Registration Information

Alabama Voter Registration

Attached below is a downloadable PDF copy of Alabama Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls—and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted—will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day—including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond. Information was current as of November 2005.

IMPORTANT:  Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

Alaska

Alaska Voter Registration Information

Attached is the Alaska Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT:  Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

Arizona

Arizona Voter Registration Information

Attached is the Arizona Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT:  Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.

Comprehensive AZ Election Monitoring Manual

EDA is pleased to present for general public access, possibly the most thoroughly detailed election monitoring manual [134] in the country. The primary author, Mickey Duniho, is a member of the Arizona Election Transparency Project and of AUDIT-AZ, an EDA affiliate organization co-founded by EDA Investigations Co-Coordinators John Brakey and David Griscom.

This manual was commissioned and published by the Election Integrity Committee of the Arizona Democratic Party.

Although prepared with specific reference to Arizona election law and procedure, this manual can be recommended as a guide to election monitoring anywhere in the US. This is because the electronic voting systems in use in the vast majority (well over 90%) of U.S. electoral jurisdictions overwhelmingly determine the conduct of elections, and vary only in slight details between the various E-voting vendors.

Whether or not every voting system feature or electoral procedure described in this manual correlates to a feature or procedure in your local electoral jurisdiction, this manual identifies the kinds of voting process information that must be checked and shows you where, when, and how to find and monitor these points in any computerized election process.

We present the table of contents of this manual to give you an idea of the depth of detail.

Please download and distribute the entire manual [135] (in PDF format) to your local teams of citizen election monitors.

We recommend that local groups modify sections of this manual to reflect election law and procedure that may differ in your state, and then upload these modified state editions to the appropriate state folder in this 50 State Directory.


Arizona Democratic Party
Election Integrity Manual for County Chairs

Table of Contents

Chapters

1. Introduction to Election Systems

a. Components of the elections process
i. Voter registration
ii. Voter ID
iii. Casting the ballot
iv. Counting the vote
b. Party roles and election integrity structure
c. Risk assessment

2. Breaches of Election Integrity

a. Bureaucratic problems
i. Inadequate physical security
ii. Inadequate bookkeeping
iii. Inadequately trained poll workers
iv. Lack of transparency

b. System failures
i. Registration errors
ii. Ballot errors
iii. Early voting problems
iv. Polling place problems
v. Counting problems

c. Vintage intentional methods
i. Deny poor people the opportunity to register
ii. Purge valid voters from the registration rolls
iii. Direct voters to the wrong polling places
iv. Require ID at the polls
v. Prepare false early ballot entries
vi. Stuff the ballot box at the polls
vii. Render valid ballots unreadable or unacceptable
viii. Replace batches of valid ballots with fake ones

d. Modern technological intentional methods
i. Program computer to count incorrectly
ii. Change the totals in the computer after scanning ballots
iii. Report fraudulent results from polling places

3. Your rights and responsibilities

a. Statutory rights and responsibilities
i. Review voter registration lists
ii. Conduct logic and accuracy tests
iii. Appoint Election Board members
iv. Appoint observers to watch every step of ballot processing
v. Randomly select precincts and races to be audited
vi. Appoint audit workers to hand count some of the ballots
vii. Supervise the audit

b. Actions not legally specified but desirable and useful
i. Obtain copies of computer logs, election department reports, databases
ii. Analyze all the data collected by observers and from the Elections Department
iii. Ask questions about any procedure that seems incorrect or insecure

4. People involved in ensuring election integrity

a. Election Boards-paid employees of the County elections department
i. Accuracy Certification Board
ii. Poll workers-Inspectors, Marshals, Judges, Clerks
iii. Early Boards
iv. Duplication Boards
v. Receiving Boards
vi. Inspection Boards
vii. Provisional Boards
viii. Write-in Boards
ix. Audit Board

b. Election Observers – for every Board

c. Other election integrity people
i. Recruiters
ii. Coordinators
iii. Planners
iv. Liaisons
v. Researchers

5. Ensuring election integrity at the polls
a. Voters rights and likely problems
b. Poll watchers’ limitations
c. Getting help
d. Recruiting and training poll watchers

6. Ensuring election security

a. Security of ballots
i. Accounting for ballots printed and delivered to the County
ii. Accounting for ballots used
iii. Accounting for ballots not used
iv. Transporting ballots from one location to another
v. Other chain of custody issues
vi. Tamper-revealing seals

b. Security of election machines
i. Physical Security
ii. Checking the software on the election machines

c. Security of the central count system
i. Early ballot counting computer security
ii. Computer audit logs
iii. Security camera monitoring and logs
iv. Party observers’ role in maintaining security

d. Security of vote-total reports printed before the end of Election Day
i. Being alert to anything and everything coming out of the printer
ii. Sealing early reports and recording seal numbers
iii. Checking all seal numbers after Election Day

e. Security of the audit
i. Sealing early ballots selected for audit and recording seal numbers
ii. Checking all seals after Election Day
iii. Precinct-level report of votes BEFORE selection of precincts for audit
iv. Selecting the precincts and races to be audited
v. Selecting the early ballots to be audited
vi. Checking precinct-cast ballot bag tamper-revealing seals
vii. Checking seals on touch-screen voting machine cartridges

7. Ensuring election integrity-data collection and analysis

a. Collecting data
i. Recording ballots at every step of the process
ii. Recording seal numbers on boxes of ballots
iii. Recording times
iv. Recording names of people performing different tasks
v. Recording seal numbers used on computers, storage containers, rooms

b. Analyzing the data
i. Comparing numbers of ballots at different stages of the election
ii. Comparing seal numbers from different stages of the election
iii. Looking for odd events (e.g., extra early reports, unneeded database actions)
iv. Comparing early ballot numbers with precinct-cast ballot numbers
v. Checking the database after the election is over

Appendices

A. Arizona Election Day Manual
B. Consolidated Arizona Election Calendar
C. Count Chair Election Integrity Checklist
D. Observer Guidelines
E. Sample log forms for observers

Lawsuit Exposing Vote-Rigging in Pima County

URGENT: Action Alert

Help Pima County Democratic Party Attorney Bill Risner
Make the Case for Election Integrity

Attend Hearing 9AM Tuesday June 12th
Pima County Superior Court 110 West Congress, 6th Floor

The Pima County Democratic party lawsuit vs the Board of Supervisors is about the broader issue of Election Integrity not to change the outcome of a single election.

o The County in its latest filing continues to claim rights to secrecy and charge that our technical representatives, Jim March and Mickey Duniho are NOT experts.

* The County is asserting that election insiders, despite evidence of misconduct not yet explained, are the experts who have rights not to be challenged by any outsiders.

* The County filed for a stay to stall the lawsuit citing that the evidence of county election department employee misconduct had been turned over to the Attorney General's Office for investigation.

* The lawsuit would be on hold indefinitely until that investigation was complete even though election problems need a remedy before any more elections are conducted.

* Fifty people attended the last hearing on short notice. We must pack the courtroom June 12 to support Bill Risner. This case was featured last Friday on Arizona Illustrated
http://kuat.org/misenplace.cfm?ID=625 [136]

* During Last weekend's interviews with John C Scott on 1330 AM and Emil Franzi on KVOI 690 AM Bill Risner and Party Vice-Chair Jeff Rogers convincingly educated the general public about why every citizen should understand that it is vigilance and public oversight of all political parties during every election is what makes our votes matter in Arizona.

For more on this investigation, see http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/arizona_election_wars [137]

Arkansas

Arkansas Voter Registration Information

Attached is the Arkansas Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT:  Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.



California

CA Hearing on ES&S Uncertified Machine Violations, 9/20/07

PUBLIC HEARING

LOCATION

Office of the Secretary of State
1500 11th Street
First Floor – Auditorium
Sacramento, California 95814

HEARING DATE AND TIME

September 20, 2007, 10:00 a.m.

NOTICE

Elections Code section 19213 provides that a voting system or part of a voting system which has been approved by the Secretary of State shall not be changed or modified until the Secretary of State has been notified of the change in writing and has determined that the change or modification does not impair the accuracy and efficiency of the voting system or part of a voting system sufficient to require a reexamination and re-approval of that system or part of a system.

Elections Code section 19214 authorizes the Secretary of State to seek injunctive and administrative relief when a voting system has been compromised by the addition or deletion of hardware, software, or firmware without prior approval. Elections Code section 19214.5 authorizes the Secretary of State to seek monetary damages and other relief for an unauthorized change in hardware, software, or firmware to any voting system certified or conditionally certified in California.

Election Systems & Software, Inc. (ES&S) has violated Elections Code section 19213 by deploying for use in polling places in several California counties hundreds of units of a version of the AutoMARK ballot marking device that was changed and modified from the version approved by the Secretary of State, without notifying the Secretary of State and without a determination having been made by the Secretary of State that the change or modification does not impair the accuracy and efficiency of the AutoMARK sufficient to require a reexamination and re-approval of the AutoMARK or the voting system of which it is a part.

Accordingly, pursuant to Elections Code section 19214.5(b) and Government Code section 6064, notice is hereby given that a public hearing will be held to give interested persons an opportunity to express their views regarding the intention of the California Secretary of State to seek administrative relief against Election Systems & Software, Inc., pursuant to Elections Code sections 19214 and 19214.5(a), seeking any or all of the relief specified in section 19214.5(a), including the following:

(1) Monetary damages from the offending party or parties, not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per violation. For purposes of this subdivision, each voting machine found to contain the unauthorized hardware, software, or firmware shall be considered a separate violation. Damages imposed pursuant to this subdivision shall be apportioned 50 percent to the county in which the violation occurred, if applicable, and 50 percent to the Office of the Secretary of State for purposes of bolstering voting systems security efforts.

(2) Immediate commencement of decertification proceedings for the voting system in question.

(3) Prohibiting the manufacturer or vendor of a voting system from doing any elections-related business in the state for one, two, or three years.

(4) Refund of all moneys paid by a locality for a compromised voting system, whether or not the voting system has been used in an election.

(5) Any other remedial actions authorized by law to prevent unjust enrichment of the offending party.

Manual Tallies in California: An Observor Checklist


Observing Manual Counts – A Checklist and Questionnaire
Prepared by the California Voter Foundation

www.calvoter.org

California voters have the right to observe manual counts, which take place after the election and before the results are certified.  The purpose of the manual count is to publicly verify the accuracy of software vote
counts.  Counties comply with the manual count law by publicly counting a subset of ballots selected by hand and comparing the hand-counted totals to the software vote counts.

Under state law, counties must conduct their manual counts within a four-week period after Election Day.  In smaller counties, the entire process is often completed in one day, and usually occurs shortly after the election.  In larger counties, the process can take several days and sometimes does not begin until a week or two after Election Day.

I. SIGN UP AS AN OBSERVER

Contact the county elections office [138]
and inform the staff that you want to observe the manual count.  Be sure to provide your name and contact information so the staff can easily notify you.  (You do not have to reside in the county whose
manual count you wish to observe.)

  Ask the county to provide you with any written procedures in advance of the manual count.

Q: 
Did the county election staff fulfill your request to be
notified?  How far in advance of the manual count start date and
time were you notified?

Q:  Were you provided with written procedures for the manual count?

II. RANDOM SELECTION PROCESS

California law requires each county to select one percent of its precincts at
random and manually recount the ballots from those precincts (Elections
Code Section 15360).

  Ask the county staff what method the counties will use to select precincts to count at random.

  Ask when and where the random selection process will take place so you  can observe it.

Q: 
What method did the county use to randomly select precincts (i.e.
a  software program, rolling of dice, drawing numbers, etc.)?

Q:  Did you find the selection process to be random?  Were you able to observe this process?



III. GETTING STARTED

  Bring a notebook for taking notes.  Some counties will also allow you to photograph the manual count while it is in progress.  A calculator may also be useful.

Take note of which precincts were selected for the manual count.

Ask the county to provide you with a statement of the vote tallies in the precincts so you are able to compare those numbers with the hand-counted totals.


If any forms are used to facilitate the manual count, ask if you can be provided with a copy.

Q: When you arrived at the manual count location, were you asked to sign in?
Did you have to provide any identification?
What security requirements or restrictions, if any, were in place?

Q: Who was your contact person at the election office who facilitated your manual count observation?

Some counties hand count all types of ballots cast in a precinct, including absentee and provisional ballots.  Other counties exclude absentee and provisional ballots from the hand count.

   Ask the county staff if absentee and/or provisional ballots are included in the manual count.

Q: Did the county include all ballot types in the manual count?  If not, what kind of ballots were included?

IV. THE MANUAL COUNT IN ELECTRONIC VOTING COUNTIES

State law requires that results from electronic ballots must be verified
during the manual count using the voter-verified paper audit trails.
(Election Code Section 19253).

Q: Did the county use the voter-verified paper trails to perform the manual count?

Q: If the paper records were stored on one long spool, did the county use
any special devices to help manual counters manage and scroll through
the paper records?

According to state law, the purpose of the manual count is “to verify the accuracy of the automated count.” (Election code section 336.5).  With electronic voting, some interpret this to mean that the voter verified paper records should be compared to the electronic results recorded by the electronic voting machines.  Others interpret this to mean that the paper record tallies should be compared to the results generated by the software that produces the overall vote totals.

Q: In your observation, were the paper records compared to results from electronic voting machines (such as printouts of vote-totals produced from the machines at the close of polls) or results generated by the software that produces the overall vote totals (such as the semi-official canvas)?

Q: How much time did you spend observing the manual count?

Q: Can you give an estimate of how long it took the county to manually count a single precinct?

 

V. VERIFYING THE VOTE COUNT

Q: Did you witness any discrepancies between the manual count and the automated count? 

Q:If there were discrepancies, was the cause determined?  If so, what caused the discrepancy?

Q: Overall, based on what you saw, how confident are you that the county’s vote count is accurate?

Please share any other observations you made during the day.  The California Voter Foundation values your input.  Please send your manual count observations via email to kimalex@calvoter.org [139], or via fax, 530-750-1799.  Thank you!

Alameda County Actions -- Voting Rights Task Force




Voting Rights Task Force

VRTF [140]

Sequoia Security Testing [141]

Whitewash [142]

Letter [143]

Alameda County [144]


Phone Banking for Debra Bowen [146]

  • Tuesday evenings, 6 - 9 pm

  • United Democratic Campaign
    1936 University Ave,Berkeley

    (between Milvia and M.L. King)

  • Click here [147] for details.

Alameda - Sequoia Security Tests / Speak to the Supervisors Tuesday Morning

  • Insist that they carry out the security testing of the new Sequoia voting machines that they voted for June 8.

  • 11 AM, Tuesday, October 10

  • Board of Supervisors Chambers

    Administration Building, 5th Floor

    1221 Oak Street (at 12th), Oakland

  • This is item 14 on the agenda.

  • And write a letter [148] to the board of supervisors!

  • For more information click on Security Testing [149].

Election Monitoring Course : Observing And Reconciling The Count

  • Wednesday, October 11-- 6:45 P.M. to 9 P.M.

  • Grand Lake Neighborhood Center
    530 Lake Park Avenue,Oakland

    (1 block east of Grand Lake Theater)

  • This is a free course.

  • For more details, click here [150].

Voting Rights Task Force (VRTF)

Web Sites Authored by VRTF Members

For further information, email Jim Soper at :
OpenVoting@aol.com [159]


CountedAsCast.com/vrtf.php (October 8, 06)

CA Secretary of State Race is a Contest for Election Integrity

Original article published by California Progress Report [160]

Debra Bowen: A Powerhouse California Secretary of State Rather Than an Appointed Placeholder

Bowen
Will Have to Overcome Money Disadvantage and a Determined Republican
Effort to Keep Schwarzenegger Appointed Incumbent McPherson

142-bowen.gif

By Frank D. Russo

There is no question that State Senator Debra Bowen would make one
of the greatest Secretary of States that California has seen and would
make sure that every vote is counted, accurately and fairly, a concern
on the minds of many voters. She has a record of accomplishment she can
point to as a California legislator since 1992 and has authored many of
the laws that she would be enforcing. She has served as Chair of the
Senate Elections, Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments
Committee and is regarded as an expert in government reform, consumer
protection and privacy rights, environmental conservation, and open
government.

She just received a ringing endorsement by the San Jose Mercury News
"Bowen better suited to be secretary of state: Legislator's skepticism needed in move to electronic voting." [161]

She is also the only woman on the ballot for any of the California
State Offices from Governor through all the down ticket races. And
she's a Democrat in a Democratic state.

She faces two major problems: A concerted effort by Republicans to
retain this office and a money disadvantage in an important but
relatively low visibility race. Arnold Schwarzenegger, who appointed
McPherson to this position when Kevin Shelley resigned has been helping
behind the scenes and McPherson had $1 million in the bank as of the
last reporting period ending September 30, 2006, much of it from the
usual Republican suspects--insurance companies, the RJ Reynolds Tobacco
Company, pharmaceutical giant Eli Lilly, energy companies--and some
folks who you would expect to be supporting a Democrat but hedged their
bets when it looked like McPherson would be the favorite to win. You
can bet there will be more last minute money from Republican sources
before the election.

But McPherson has upset many voters and organizations concerned
with the accurate counting of votes. In the spring, he
certified Diebold voting machines without proper hearings [162]
and documentation. Bowen called him on it. In the latest survey, the
Los Angeles Times poll, Bowen had the edge by 35 to 33% with a huge
undecided segment of likely voters.

This is a big state and it
usually takes a lot of money--a lot more than the million McPherson has
to be able to communicate with the voters. In the same filing period,
Bowen has only $365,000 in the bank. But the one area that cannot be
discounted is the loyal following she has from many of the netroots. It
was the word of mouth from the grassroots and electronic version of
this from the internet that propelled Bowen to a landslide win in the
June Democratic primary. At this time in the primary race, polls showed
her trailing with a large undecided vote.

Her record should speak for itself. Just take a look at some of the
bills she authored in this last session that on election matters that
became law:

• Voting Systems Standards (SB 370) Requires
elections officials, when doing the 1% manual recount required by law,
to use the paper ballots produced by electronic machines.

• Voter privacy
(SB 1016) A three-part bill that: 1. Protects the confidentiality of
voter signatures by making signatures confidential the same way Social
Security numbers and driver's license numbers on voter records are
protected. 2. Protects the confidentiality of initiative petition
signatures by requiring initiative proponents to train signature
gatherers on keeping signatures confidential. 3. Helps people
registering to vote protect their privacy by putting clear disclosures
on voter registration forms telling people they only have to give a
driver’s license OR a Social Security number, not both; the phone
number and e-mail address on the form are optional, not mandatory;
victims of domestic violence have a right to keep their data
confidential; and voter data can be released to political campaigns,
journalists, researchers, and elections observers.

• Safe At Home Program (SB 1062) Under current law,
only domestic violence and stalking victims are allowed to enroll in
the Secretary of State’s “Safe At Home” confidential address program,
which allows people to receive mail at a confidential address set up
and maintained by the Secretary of State. This bill allows sexual
assault victims to enroll in the program as well.

• Voting Systems Standards (SB 1235) This expands
last year’s SB 370 (Bowen). The manual count law requires the votes in
1% of the precincts (with some exemptions) selected at random to be
counted manually and matched against the results from the electronic
tabulator. This bill requires: 1) All “early voting” center and
absentee votes to be included into this tally; 2) The precincts to be
included in the 1% count to be randomly selected by a random generated
number method or based on regulations drafted by the Secretary of
State; 3) A five-day public notice of when and where the precincts for
the 1% audit will be selected and of the audit itself; and 4) The
results of the audit to be made public.

• Voting System Standards–Recounts (SB 1519)
Requires the Secretary of State to set up standards for how recounts
are to be conducted. There is no state law or regulation on how exactly
recounts are conducted. Instead, the procedures (which vary by voting
system) are laid out in an informal “best practices” manual between the
Secretary of State and the counties. This bill requires the Secretary
of State to create official rules and standards, so everyone (including
the public) will know how it’s done and it won’t vary from county to
county.

• Voting System Standards–Absentee Ballots (SB
1725) Requires counties to “track” absentee ballots so a voter can call
in (or log onto a web site) and check to see if their ballot arrived.
Bowen said at the time: “Nearly 47% of the people who voted in the June
primary did so by absentee ballot, yet unless they dropped their ballot
off in person, they have no idea if it arrived by the 8:00 p.m.
Election Day deadline. Nearly every county already puts bar codes on
absentee ballot envelopes so they can sort and track them more easily,
so using that existing system to let voters find out if their ballot
arrived in time to be counted is a cost-effective way to keep voters
involved and informed." A great idea.

• Voting Machine Inspection (SB 1747) Right now,
the law restricts the ability of people to inspect voting machines,
limiting it to county central committees who can send in “data
processing specialists or engineers.” This bill expands it to every
qualified political party, removes the requirement that they be “data
processing specialists or engineers,” and permits up to 10 people from
a “bonafide collection of citizens.”

• Voting System Standards–Paper Trail (SB 1760)
Precludes the Secretary of State from certifying any voting system
unless the paper ballots and the accessible voter-verified paper audit
trail (AVVPAT) retain their integrity and readability for 22 months.
That’s how long, under current law, elections officials are required to
retain these documents. This has been informally referred to as the
“Elephant Gestation Bill,” since 22 months is the gestation period for
a baby elephant.

Bowen has been a pioneer on many other voting reforms. In 1993 and
1995, for instance, she authored bills to allow any voters to sign up
for permanent absentee ballots, which ultimately became law in 2001.

Spread the word about Bowen to your friends and other voters any way
you can. This may be a squeaker of a low visibility race and there will
be a drop off as many will not bother to cast a ballot for this office.
Go to Bowen's website [163] for more information. She even has a blog [164] where you can get to know her better.

CA Voting Systems: Overview of Red Team Reports

Overview of Red Team Reports

Matt Bishop, Principle Investigator, University of California, Davis

1.0. Executive Summary

The California Secretary of State entered into a contract with the University of California to test the security of three electronic voting systems as part of her top to bottom review.
Each “red team” was to try to compromise the accuracy, security, and integrity of the voting systems without making assumptions about compensating controls or procedural mitigation measures that vendors, the Secretary of State, or individual counties may have
adopted. The red teams demonstrated that, under these conditions, the technology and security of all three systems could be compromised.

[Continued below]

Links to TTBR Overview, Red Team Reports, News Accounts


Voting System Review, main page [165], CA Secretary of State website

Read the full 12-page Red Team Overview [166]

Click these download links to retrieve Red Team reports on each vendor system reviewed:

Diebold [167]
Hart InterCivic [168]
Sequoia [169]

For news accounts of the CA Voting System Top to Bottom Review ("TTBR") click here: TTBR News Stories [170]

[Overview, continued]


2.0 Goals

In May 2007, the California Secretary of State began a study of all electronic voting systems currently certified in California. This “top to bottom review” (TTBR) was to determine whether the systems currently certified should be left alone, or specific procedures required to provide additional protections for their use, or the machines simply decertified and banned from use.

As part of this study, the Secretary contracted with the University of California to conduct a “red team” review of the systems. The specific goal of the Red Team study was “to identify and document vulnerabilities, if any, to tampering or error that could cause incorrect recording, tabulation, tallying or reporting of votes or that could alter critical election data such as election definition or system audit data.” ([1], p. 5).

A red team study, also called a penetration study, examines a system from the point of view of an attacker, and analyzes the system to determine how secure it is against an attack. Such a study requires establishing several parameters:

• The specific goals of the system: what is it to do?
• The threat model: with whom or what are the testers concerned?
• The information to be made available to the testers: how much do they know at
the start?
• The environment in which the system is used: what policies and procedures are to
be applied?
• The specific “rules of engagement”: what are the team members allowed to do?

For this TTBR, the specific goals of each system are to record, tabulate, tally, and report votes correctly and to prevent critical election data and system audit data from being altered without authorization. The threats were taken to be both insiders (those with
complete knowledge of the system and various degrees of access to the system) and outsiders (those with limited access to the systems). As a result, all information available to the Secretary of State was made available to the testers.

The testers were told to assume that the environments in which the systems were used would vary, and that the testers could do whatever they thought necessary to test the machines. The testers therefore assumed the attackers would include anyone coming in contact with the voting systems at some point in the process – voters, poll workers, election officials, vendor employees, and others with varying degrees of access [18].

In developing attack scenarios, the red teams made no assumptions about constraints on the attackers. We recommend that future Red Teams should adopt a similar attitude. The testers did not evaluate the likelihood of any attack being feasible. Instead, they
described the conditions necessary for an attacker to succeed. This approach had several benefits:

• The testers could focus on the technology rather than on the policies procedures, and laws intended to compensate for any technological shortcomings.

• In California, specific procedures for controlling access to the election systems and for setting up, using, and storing the election systems is a local matter. As there are 58 different counties, there are at least 58 different sets of procedures. It was impractical for the red team testers to evaluate them.

• If a problem is discovered, the people who know the law and election policies and procedures can modify their policies and procedures appropriately to attempt to address the problem.

• Finally, the effectiveness of the policies and procedures used to control and protect the election systems depends on their implementation. Policies and procedures that look effective on paper may be implemented poorly, rendering them ineffective. It was impractical to evaluate this aspect of the policies and procedures.

Therefore, the results of this study must be evaluated in light of the context in which these election systems are used. This emphasizes a key point often overlooked in the discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of electronic voting systems: those systems are part of a process, the election process; and the key question is whether the election process, taken as a whole, meets the requirements of an election as defined by the body politic.

The participants in this study hope our work contributes in some measure to answering that question. . . . [Continued]

California and Federal Legal Research Guide


CA_Fed_Legal_Researchhttp://www.publiclawlibrary.org/links.html [171]

Spanish [172] | 

Italian [173] | 
Portuguese [174] | 
German [175] | 
French [176] | 
Japanese [177] | 
Korean [178] | 

Legal Links

These legal links are divided
into categories to help the researcher find the information
he or she requires. General Legal
Research [179] links connect you to several websites that are
good at organizing law-related information by subject. These
websites are often a good starting point for the beginning
researcher. Links are then divided into California
legal research [180] and Federal legal research [181].
See the Mini Research Class [182] page
for more information on where to start your research. For
local law questions involving a city or county, refer to the
Local links [183]. If you are looking for
an attorney, consult with the Legal
Directories [184] links. And, finally, if you are looking for
court forms, or court rules, check the links provided under
Forms and Rules [185] links.

General Legal Research:

Cornell Law School's Legal Information Institute
This
site is useful for researching your legal issues. The site contains
many "Law About" topic entries with general background information on
different legal subjects and a few "Topical Libraries" on issues such
as social security and legal ethics. The site is especially useful for
searching for United States Supreme Court opinions, Federal Circuit
court opinions, and the United States Code.
http://www.law.cornell.edu/ [186]

FindLaw
This site contains
many subject guides to specific areas of law, links for finding
lawyers, and law related news and information. For California users,
the site contains California judicial opinions from 1934 forward. The
site is a product of Thomson/West, a legal publishing company.
http://www.findlaw.com/ [187]

California Resources:

California Legislature
Find your California senator or assemblyperson by zipcode. Links to all member's webpages.
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/yourleg.html [188]

California Constitution
Keyword
searchable version of the text of the California Constitution. Users
may also view the Constitution in a table of contents format.
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/const.html [189]

California Codes (statutes) online

Unannotated version of the current text of California's state
statutes. Users may display the text in a table of contents
or search by keyword.

http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/calaw.html [190]

California Code of Regulations-the laws from California's state agencies
The
text of the regulations of California's state agencies. Users may view
a listing of state agencies, view contents, or search the entire 28
titles (with the exception of Title 24, the building codes).
http://www.calregs.com/ [191]

Updates to the California Code of Regulations/Regulatory Notice Register

Site contains notices of proposed action by state regulatory
agencies to adopt, amend, or repeal regulations contained
in the California Code of Regulations.

http://www.oal.ca.gov/notice.htm [192]

California state homepage-many links to law and government information sources
Includes
links to all California State administrative agencies, courts, and the
legislature. Use the state phone directory to contact any state
official.
http://www.ca.gov/state/portal/myca_homepage.jsp [193]

California Legislative Information (bills, analysis, committee reports)
The
official site of the legislative branch of California enables users to
find bill information from the state assembly and state senate from
1993 to the current legislative session. Bill information includes the
status, history, votes, analyses, and any veto messages. Users may
search the site by bill number, author, keyword, or simply view an
index of authors and bill numbers. Various legislative publications are
also on this site, including state agency reports mandated by the
legislature.
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/ [194]

California Courts and case law finders-California
judicial opinions from 1850-to the present. Click on the opinions link
from the Judicial Council's site. On FindLaw, navigate to US Law: cases
and codes and select California.
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov [195] 
http://www.findlaw.com/ [196]

California Secretary of State
Find
many forms used in business filings and a wealth of information on
California businesses by accessing the site's Business Portal. Find the
forms and fees for forming a California corporation, limited liability
partnership, and more. Search for the status of a business entity to
find out who owns the business and who to serve as the agent for
service of process. Obtain access to UCC filings.
http://www.ss.ca.gov/ [197]

California Courts Self-Help Center
Site
contains forms, rules, links to courts, and the self-help center for
all California courts. Fill out forms on line for various types of
cases. Get detailed information on how to proceed with your case. Find
links that will help you complete your case without an attorney.
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp/ [198]

California state agencies-link to the state agency index
http://www.ca.gov/state/portal/myca_homepage.jsp [199]

California Attorney General opinions
California
Attorney General opinions from 1986 to the present. The attorney
general provides advisory opinions to state, local officials, or
government agencies on matters of law that arise in the course of their
duties.
http://caag.state.ca.us/opinions [200]

Federal Resources:

Federal Legislators-Senate and House Member Search
Identify and contact federal officials using this website.
http://www.congress.org/congressorg/home/ [201]

United States Constitution

Online text versions of the United States Constitution.
The GPO version has additional analysis and interpretation
done by the Congressional Research Service.

http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/constitution.table.html [202] 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/constitution/ [203]

United States Code

These sites provide searchable versions of the United States
Code. Codes can be searched by keyword, title, or section
number.

http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/ [204] 
http://uscode.house.gov/about.htm [205] 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/uscode/search.html [206]

Thomas (federal legislative information)

Congressional bills, Congressional Record, committee
reports and more. Users may track bills as they move through
the House and Senate, read and download the text of pending
bills and see how their representatives and senators vote.
The search feature allows users to look for bills by name,
number, subject, sponsor and other criteria. The site contains
bill summaries from 1973 to the present; bill text from 1989
to the present; public laws from 1973 forward; the Congressional
Record from 1989 to the present; committee reports from
the 104th Congress to the current Congress; and historical
documents and presidential nomination information.

http://thomas.loc.gov/ [207]

GPO Access (access to federal administrative law and information)
Code of Federal Regulations, Federal Register

Full text of the Federal Register from 1994 forward. Full
text of the Code of Federal Regulations from 1996 to
the present.

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/index.html [208] 
http://www.regulations.gov/ [209]

Federal Agency index
http://www.washlaw.edu/doclaw/executive5m.html [210]

Federal administrative agency opinions
Search for federal agency opinions by agency or by subject.
http://www.lib.virginia.edu/govdocs/fed_decisions_agency.html [211]

Supreme Court of the United States
Access
the official site of the United States Supreme Court. Find information
on cases pending in front of the court, schedules for argument on
various pending cases, and the full text of the court's rules. The site
also contains opinions of the court from 1991-2001 in their bound
volume format; a case citation-finder; and the slip opinions of the
2001-current terms.
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ [212]

Federal Judiciary Homepage
Detailed links to all federal courts, federal court publications, and information on the federal judiciary.
http://www.uscourts.gov/ [213]

Federal Case law
FindLaw
contains United States Supreme Court opinions from 1893-current. Users
may search by name, citation, or keyword search the text. Federal
Circuit court opinions may be accessed through Cornell's Legal
Information Institute.
http://www.findlaw.com [214] 
http://www.law.cornell.edu:9999/USCA-ALL/search.html [215]

Pacer (Public Access to Court Electronic Records)
Electronic (for fee) access to U.S. District, Bankruptcy, and Appellate court records.
http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov [216]

Local Law:

Seattle Public Library site linking to municipal law-nationwide
Links to city and county codes available online from municipalities across the nation.
http://www.spl.org/default.asp?pageID=collection_municodes [217]

UC Berkeley Institute of Governmental Affairs-links to California local law resources
Local codes, ordinances, and charters from California local governments.
http://www.igs.berkeley.edu/library/calcodes.html [218]

Legal Directories:

California State Bar website-attorney finder and records of attorney discipline
Link
to California attorney information using the member search feature.
Also the site provides links to attorney referral services statewide,
and lists of state certified specialists.
http://www.calsb.org/ [219]

Martindale Hubbell Lawyer Locator
Find
attorneys by location, area of practice, and many other criteria such
as the language they speak, where they went to school, etc. This site
provides rating information for attorneys.
http://www.martindale.com/xp/Martindale/home.xml [220]

West's Legal Directory
Online attorney directory.
http://lawyers.findlaw.com/ [221]

Finding Law Schools, Law Library Catalogs Online, and California Public Libraries
http://www.washlaw.edu/lawschools.html [222] (law school finder)
http://www.washlaw.edu/lawcat/ [223] (law library catalogs online)
http://www.library.ca.gov/html/main.cfm [224] (California Library Directory)

Forms and Rules links:

LexisOne
LexisOne provides
many links of use to the legal researcher. Among those links provided
are some to free legal forms and also forms for purchase. LexisOne
allows users to purchase access to Shepard's to update their legal
research. The site also provides access to free case law (five years of
state and federal court opinions; United States Supreme Court opinions
from 1790). This site is operated by LexisNexis, a legal publishing
company.
http://www.lexisone.com [225]

I-CAN! Legal Modules
I-CAN!
is a web-based system that helps users create court paperwork and
educate themselves about how to proceed in their own legal matters. The
site contains a video guide that helps the user select and fill out
appropriate court forms in civil matters such as Domestic Violence,
Unlawful Detainer, Paternity, and more. I-CAN! is free of charge and is
available in English, Spanish, and Vietnamese. I-CAN! was developed by
the Legal Aid Society of Orange County and was sponsored by
organizations including: Legal Services Corporation, Judicial Council
of California, State Bar of California, Orange County Superior Court,
Orange County District Attorney, Orange County Public Library System,
Disneyland, City of Irvine, and the City of Fullerton.
http://www.icandocs.org/newweb/ [226]

State Judicial Council Forms-California
Official site for California's Judicial Council forms. Fill out online or print.
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/forms/ [227]

Forms from the Feds
Links to
downloadable federal agency forms, listed by agency. Useful place to
access forms from the INS, Copyright Office, and more.
http://exlibris.memphis.edu/resource/unclesam/forms.html [228]

USCourtforms.com
Links to
over 60,000 court forms nationwide. Some free forms are available and
many are interactive forms that may be filled in online.
http://www.uscourtforms.com [229]

California State Court Rules
Links to California Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal, Trial Court and Local court rules.
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/rules/ [230]

Court Rules-Law Library Resource Xchange
Links to over 1,400 sources for state and federal court rules. Browse or search by keyword.
http://www.llrx.com/courtrules/ [231]


California Voter Registration Database

California regulations and implementation of the centralized state voter registration database mandated by HAVA.

California Election Reform News, February 11, 2007

California:

- Symposium with Steven Freeman, Paul Lehto & others, Oakland, Feb. 17, 2007
- Debra Bowen sworn in as California Secretary of State
- Lowell Finley appointed Deputy Secretary of State

National:

- Sen. Feinstein holds hearing on Election Integrity
- Rep. Holt's election protection bill, H.R. 811
- Diebold - security key reproduced from photo on website!
- Sequoia - easy to pick the lock.

===================================================================

California:

- Symposium with Steven Freeman, Paul Lehto & others, Oakland, Feb. 17, 2007

The Election Defense Alliance is sponsoring a symposium Sat., Feb. 17
at the Rockridge Library, from 10:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. It is titled:
"Are We a Democracy? Vote Counting in the United States"
Speakers will include Dr. Steven Freeman, author of "Was the 2004
Presidential Election Stolen?", Attorney Paul Lehto, Dr. Joshua
Mitteldorf, and others.

http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/Oakland_Symposium [232]

- Debra Bowen sworn in as California Secretary of State

Videos of the ceremony at:
http://www.debrabowen.com/inauguration [233]
Also included in a video, "Inaugurating Change", by Eon Productions (27
min.):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TYUv0-_oxCU [234]

- Lowell Finley appointed Deputy Secretary of State

Debra Bowen has appointed Lowell Finley as Deputy Secretary of State
in charge of voting system certification. He is the cofounder of
Voter Action, which is involved in suits in 10 states, including
the suit in Sarasota, Florida over the 18,000 undervotes in the
Congressional race.

http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2007/1/9/22729/17873 [235]
http://www.bradblog.com/?p=3999 [236]

National:

- Sen. Feinstein holds hearing on Election Integrity

Senator Diane Feinstein is now chair of the U. S. Senate
Committee on Rules and Administration, which has jurisdiction
over elections. The committee had a hearing titled:
"The Hazards of Electronic Voting: Focus on the Machinery of Democracy"
ON fEB. 7. For a list of witnesses and statements, see:

http://rules.senate.gov/hearings/2007/020707hrg.htm [237]

The committee is accepting comments from the public.
To send comments to the committee, send them to:

Adam_Ambrogi@rules.senate.gov [238]
Natalie_Price@rules.senate.gov [239]

Send them by Monday, Feb. 12 (sorry for the late notice).

- Rep. Holt's election protection bill, H.R. 811

Rep. Holt's bill is titled the "Voter Confidence and Increased
Accessibility Act of 2007". It already has 183 cosponsors. In the
previous Congress, Rep. Holt's H.R. 550 had 222 cosponsors (215
votes needed to pass a bill), but the House leadership would not
let it come to a vote. H.R. 811 is a lot better than H.R. 550 was,
but still has problems. Common Cause, People for the American Way,
and others are promoting it without regard for the problems, or
possibly hoping they will be fixed in committee. The best description
of the problems is at:

http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/board-auth.cgi?file=/1954/46667.... [240]

Scroll down past the cosponsors, and you will see links to the list
of problems with Rep. Holt's staff answers, plus other people's
comments.

- Diebold - security key reproduced from photo on website!

Diebold electronic voting machines use a memory card to store programs
and vote totals. This card is locked. However, Diebold had a picture
of the key on its web site which a blogger used to create an actual
key, which worked when tested on a real Diebold voting machine!
(Actually, since Diebold uses only one key model, the key would open
any Diebold voting machine anywhere in the country).

http://www.computerworld.com/blogs/node/4438 [241]

- Sequoia - easy to pick the lock.

A Princeton professor bought five Sequoia voting machines from
a government auction for $82, and a student picked the lock in
7 seconds!

http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/index.ssf?/base/news-11/1171172999136630.x... [242]

--------------------------------------------------------------------

If you want to subscribe or unsubscribe to this newsletter, send
mail to jerry@berkeley.edu [243]. This newsletter is issued infrequently,
so it won't fill your mailbox.

California Voter Registration Information

Attached is the California Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day - including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT:  Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected. Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, other will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form.



Contract Provision for Public Disclosure of Voting System Software

The following contract provision, recently approved by the County of San Francisco
in negotiation with Sequoia Voting Systems, is presented here as an
example for implementing similar full software disclosure clauses in any contracts
with vendors providing electronic voting systems for public elections.

EDA does not endorse electronic voting systems; we're in favor of a complete transition
to hand-counted paper ballots (HCPB). But we do believe that full disclosure of any software
in any voting system is necessary, and must be paired with concurrent code verification
for the disclosure itself to constitute any meaningful public check on software-mediated voting processes.

Electronic voting is an existing fact; full-disclosure of voting system software is a minimal starting point--not a final solution-- for restoring some degree of public accountability and transparency to the privatized, secret-software voting systems that are already installed and operating in more than 96% of U.S. voting jurisdictions.

The following document was provided by Brent Turner.

Brent Turner is a California voting activist who works with Open Voting Consortium and The San Francisco Election Integrity League (SFEIL.org)
and was directly involved in getting the San Francisco County Board of Supervisors to approve this contract provision in their negotiations with Sequoia for an optical scan voting system for the City and County of San Francisco.

Brent is also an active participant in the Legislative Working Group of EDA.

Form Contract Provision for Public Disclosure

Section ___: Public Disclosure of Technology Required.

Prior to the delivery of any products, Vendor shall submit proof of
Public Disclosure in a form satisfactory to the City. At a minimum,
Vendor will affirm that it (1) has entered into an agreement for a
term concurrent with this agreement with the California Secretary of
State, the Open Voting Consortium, or other similar third party for
public access to the technology used in the subject products; (2) that
the disclosure is freely available through that third party to the
public at no cost; (3) the disclosure contains complete documentation,
including software source code of all hardware and software components
created or modified for the voting application; (4) the disclosure of
commercial off the shelf (COTS) components by manufacturer, model, and
revision; and (5) the disclosure of all product data sheets, manuals,
and other publicly available documentation for unmodified COTS
components.

Vendor is not required to provide hardware to the public for testing
purposes; however, the technology disclosure package shall be
sufficiently detailed such that competent engineers with the correct
tools can fully recreate the hardware and software systems.

In the event that the Public Disclosure Service becomes unavailable
from Vendor's provider, Vendor shall provide City proof, within 30
days of unavailability that Vendor has contracted with another third
party public disclosure service provider for disclosure as provided
herein for the remainder of the term of this agreement.

*************************

The following is a policy statement from the Open Voting Consortium, sent to the San Francisco County Elections Commission members, in advocacy for inclusion of the above software disclosure clause in the pending voting systems contract between San Francisco County and Sequoia.

DRAFT FROM OVC, JAN 22, 2007

SAN FRANCISCO POLICY ON DISCLOSURE OF VOTING SYSTEM TECHNOLOGY

Citizens have the right to know how their votes are counted. Technology
shall not be used in a voting system that interferes with this right to
know.

"Publicly Disclosed" technology refers to hardware and software whose design
details have been made public, freely available for public inspection. In
addition, the vendor of publicly disclosed technology grants the right to
the public to test the technology and publish the test results.

The technology disclosure package is an electronic file that contains all
the documents required to show exactly how the system works.

Voting system technology includes components specifically designed or
modified for the voting application, as well as components that are general
purpose commodity items (sometimes called COTS for
"commercial-off-the-shelf"). The vendor is not expected to reveal the inner
workings of unmodified COTS components. However, all unmodified COTS
components must be identified by manufacturer, model, and revision. In
addition, all product data sheets, manuals, and other publicly available
documentation should be included for unmodified COTS components in the
technology disclosure package.

All hardware and software components created or modified for the voting
application must have complete documentation, including software source
code, in the technology disclosure package.

"Open Source" technology refers to Publicly Disclosed technology where
additional rights have been conferred to the public. These additional rights
that go with open source software include the right to [1],

- Run the program for any purpose (not just testing)

- Adapt the program for your needs

- Freely redistribute copies

- Make improvements and release the improvements to the public

Open Source has additional features and benefits compared to Publicly
Disclosed source. Open Source enables [2]:

- Ensure interoperability

- Avoid vendor lock-in

- Avoid imposing technology decisions on the citizenry

- Drive cost effectiveness

- Enhance efficiency and service levels

- Ensure future access to information

- Ensure a level playing field for competition

- Maximize freedom of action, ensure flexibility

The City and County of San Francisco prefers "Open Source" -- and will
support efforts to reach this goal -- but requires, at a minimum, Public
Disclosure of all voting technology. The vendor is not required to freely
provide hardware to the public for testing purposes, but the technology
disclosure package shall be sufficiently detailed such that competent
engineers with the correct tools can fully recreate the hardware and
software systems.

All contracts that include the purchase of voting equipment executed by the
City and County of San Francisco shall include provisions for Public
Disclosure of Technology; specifically, the vendor must make arrangements to
have a complete technology disclosure package available for free public
download on Public Disclosure website, such as Open Voting Consortium, or
the California Secretary of State, or any other third party offering to make
publicly disclosed technology available for free download to the public. In
the event that the Public Disclosure service becomes unavailable from the
vendor's provider, the vendor agrees to make arrangements for Public
Disclosure with another entity within 30 days from the time the service
becomes unavailable from the original Public Disclosure service provider.

[1] Definition from Free Software Foundation

http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html [245]

[2] IBM presentation on Open Computing, Open Standards and Open Source
Recommendation for Governments

http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/ad/ibm-oss.pdf [246]


Guide to CA Election Monitoring

Michelle Gabriel of the Voting Rights Task Force of Alameda County, CA
has compiled a training handbook for election monitoring based on CA
election code, and borrowing ideas from the BlackboxVoting Toolkit, the SAV R VOTE
(Riverside Co.) Election Monitoring Report, the DFA-NH report "We're Counting the Votes,"
other sources -- and her own experience as a pollworker and election observor.

You can view and open, or download and save the Election Monitoring Guide by clicking on the
file links you see immediately below, under the heading Attachments.
The guide is available in Word and PDF versions.

This is a work open to revision, and your comments and suggestions are welcomed and encouraged.
See below for the Table of Contents, and below that, click the attachment link to open the whole file.

Michelle is seeking monitors for the CA 11th Congressional District.
The 11th District covers portions of four counties in CA and is shaping up to be one of the most
contested House races in California this November 7.

Michelle is on the EDA Election Monitoring E-mail list.
You can communicate with her and other members of the EDA Election Monitoring Working Group
by subscribing to the E-mail list for this Working Group.

Look for the Discussion List heading in the top left corner of pages
in the Forums section of the EDA website.

Follow that link to the subscription page for the EDA working Groups.
Select Monitoring from the displayed list of EDA Group lists,
and follow the subscription instructions.

CA Election Monitoring Guide

TABLE OF CONTENTS

What can I observe -- summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Who can observe -- summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
What can I reconcile -- summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Pre-observing preparation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
What can I observe -- detail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Before the Election:

Observing preparation and operation
of tabulation devices programming, and testing . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Observing logic and accuracy testing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Observing absentee ballot processing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Pollworker training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Observing poll set up. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

During the Voting

Observing voting at the polls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Observing poll close. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
After the Polls Close
Observing chain of custody . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Observing central counting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Observe 1% manual tally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
What can I reconcile -- detail. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Prioritizing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Election Codes for Observing and Monitoring. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Election Codes for Reconcile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Examples of problems caught. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
How do I report an incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44


Joint Legislative Panel Hears of Widespread Failures in CA Primary

In response to widespread election breakdowns across California during the February 5th Primary Election, an unprecedented Joint Legislative Hearing heard testimony for more than five hours in Los Angeles Friday, March 7 concerning error-ridden voter registration rolls blocking eligible voters from voting, shortages of provisional ballots disenfranchising thousands, lax or nonexistenct ballot custody measures, and most notoriously, a completely avoidable, known ballot design issue that ended up voiding the candidate choices of 12,000 voters.


VIDEO: Tom Courbat, director of Save R Vote (and also EDA Coordinator for Election Monitoring) addressed the Joint Legislative hearing in Los Angeles, March 7, about problems he observed in Riverside County in the Feb. 5 primary election.
In addition to photo-documented evidence of election security violations, Tom told the panel that the state is failing to allocate adequarte resources to enforce existing election laws, and that the EI advocates who are doing the state's work to identify and document election problems need to be accorded more direct participation in investigatory hearings, instead of being relegated to the end of the agenda and limited to 60 seconds of speaking time.
Joining Secretary of State Debra Bowen on the hearing panel were the chairs of three California State Senate and Assembly committees charged with oversight of elections: Assemblymember Curren Price, Chair of the Assembly Elections and Redistricting Committee; Senator Ron Calderon, Chair of the Senate Elections, Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments Committee; and Senator Jenny Oropeza, Chair of the Senate Select Committee on Integrity of Elections. Two other senators, Mark Ridley-Thomas and Dean Flores rounded out the panel.

Foremost in the witness role were the Acting Registrar of Voters for LA County, Dean Logan, and former Registrar Conny McCormack, who hand-picked Logan as her successor. Other invited speakers were Contra Costa County Clerk Steve Weir, President of the California Association of County Elections Officials (CACEO), and representatives of the League of Women Voters, Common Cause, and California Voter Foundation.

More than 50 election integrity advocates turned out to give their testimony, but were scheduled at the very end of the hearing and in all but a few cases were allotted only 30 to 60 seconds each to speak.

The largest (known) disenfranchinsing incident in the state was the "Doubl