
Three large private corporations provide the systems that count more than 90% of Americas votes. The corporations, through their board members, have serious economic and political conflicts of interest. The largest companies, Diebold, ES&S and Sequoia gained some start up capital from right-wing billionaires such as Howard Ahmanson, and also have employees with criminal records related to computer fraud.
From "Whoscounting.net" [1]
There are four Big Daddies in the manufacture of our Election equipment in America:
Diebold Election Systems, E.S.&S., Sequoia Voting Systems, and Triad.
Diebold and ES&S together count 80% of our electronic vote. ES&S is the number one with two-thirds of the vote counting software and the biggest supplier of touch screen machines. Sequoia - with one-third of the voting machines on the market - is usually regarded as number two. Or Diebold. Depends who you ask. There is cloaked secrecy surrounding ownership and details about the companies, but investigative research scraping the tip of the iceberg has discovered enough to set anyone’s hair on fire...
In December 2003, Ohio - of all places - conducted a comparative study of four electronic voting systems’ vendors. The figures were revealing; ES&S led the pack with a total of 17 general security risks found, but had the lowest number of “very high security risks”-- only one, and that was the feature that could add multiple votes to the final count without warning. Diebold and Sequoia tied for second worst, each with 15 reported general risks. Five of Diebold’s were rated “very high” and 3 of Sequoia’s. Ironically, Hart Intercivic, one of the lesser used systems, rated well with only 10 general risks, however 4 of those were identified as ”very high risk.”
You may be surprised to learn that there is currently NO Federal Agency that has regulatory authority or controls over the multi-billion dollar elections industry. There are NO government standards or restrictions on who can sell and service voting machines and voting systems. Virtually anybody with money and know-how can get into the business of counting our vote! This might help explain why we keep running into criminals, political candidates, defense contractors, and other odd bedfellows in the mix when we examine the rosters of our election companies.
They are privately owned companies, some by foreign nationals, with multi-million dollar contracts, haunted by the presence of convicted felons in high places, dummy front companies, even mob connections. Yes, the people involved in the Corporations counting our American vote could be cast members in any given episode of the Sopranos. Companies shuffling name changes, “shared” executives moving back and forth between them, sales representatives from New Jersey crime families bribing public officials, ex-felons writing computer code.... it’s anything but boring being in the electronic vote industry.
Republican Computer expert, IT Auditor Chuck Herrin proclaims, “I am by trade a professional white-hat Hacker.. .so I know how easily systems can be breached, especially by insiders. Roughly 80% of all computer crimes are perpetrated by insiders, so that’s the best place to look first. When the insiders also write the code and roll out the machines… there’s NO QUESTION that they have too much power and should not be trusted---whether they support my party or not. It’s called ‘segregation of duties’ and it’s vital for system integrity.”
[2]
It matters who is doing the counting. In the US, four major companies with ties to the Republican Party do the vast majority of the counting on trade secret software.
About ES&S [3]
Election Systems & Software, Inc. Company Profile - Yahoo! Finance [5]
ES&S - Products & Services
http://www.essvote.com/HTML/products/electronic_voting.html
[6]
ES&S - Products & Services: Automark
http://www.essvote.com/HTML/products/automark.html [7]
ESS Automark VVPB system [7]
ES&S - Products & Services
DecisionOne - Services, Telework Planning [8]
ES&S Role in Election 2004
ESS iVotronic Counted Votes Several Times [9]
Verified Voting: ES&S iVotronic [10]
Miami-Dade ESS Machines 2003 Report [11]
Hagel’s ethics filings pose disclosure issue [12]
Wichita Co. TX ESS screwups [13]
WISH-TV - Indianapolis, IN - Excerpts from Interview with Election Systems & Software (ES&S) Executive [14]
WISH-TV - Indianapolis, IN - Marion County Election Board Demands Answers from ES&S [15]
Company to pay for election problems | IndyStar.com [16]
This section is devoted to system documentation for Diebold/Premier voting machines with some generic exceptions that would be relevant to Diebold/Premier machines.
Examples of content to be uploaded and shared from this location via downloadable file links (see at base of article) include:
Operator manuals
State-certified use procedures
Voting system contracts
Election audit logs and incident reports
Private and state-commissioned external reviews of voting system performance and vulnerabilities
Vendor correspondence with state and local election officials
Relevant legal actions
Proposed legislation with a bearing on the vendor's election products and services
Vendor-specific news articles
A brief description of what each document is appears below and before the URL address listing.
1. PhD Students from Univ. of Conn. show how The Diebold AccuVote Optical Scan can be rigged undetectably
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
UCON_seeA-tamperEVoting.pdf [23] | 1.21 MB |
This section is devoted to system documentation for Sequoia voting machines with some generic exceptions that would be relevant to Sequoia machines.
Examples of content to be uploaded and shared from this location via downloadable file links (see at base of article) include:
Operator manuals
State-certified use procedures
Voting system contracts
Election audit logs and incident reports
Private and state-commissioned external reviews of voting system performance and vulnerabilities
Vendor correspondence with state and local election officials
Relevant legal actions
Proposed legislation with a bearing on the vendor's election products and services
Vendor-specific news articles
This video is an interview with Debra Bowen where she says machines should never go home with workers. Posted 10-2-07.
This very short video from the CA NAACP Conference in Manhattan Beach on October 27th,2007 SOS Bowen repeats "no sleepovers" will be allowed.
QUICK DESCRIPTIONS:
1. The Redline document shows the CA SOS Decertification/Recertification Document revised in October 2007 w/changes
2. The Sequoia Appendices contain several hundred pages of specific requirements & procedures ROVs must follow-2007
3. Lowell Finley issues additional conditions including security bags for DREs dated 11-29-07
4. Required procedures for CA ROVs to follow to maintain certification of Sequoia Systems 8-31-07
5. Form to be completed and submitted to SOS on all DRE problems effective 2-5-08
6. SOS Bowen - "Recertification of the Sequoia System...will...be revisited...[if] conditions are not being met."
7. RivCo ROV reports only 15 of 720 DREs had ANY problems in 2/5/08 Presidential Primary Election
8. Sequoia AVC Edge DRE - 124 pg. operators manual from 2001 - much still applies today
9. EAC declares Sequoia used illegal double testing w/Systest & iBeta 11-20-07
10. HAVA Section 3.2.1 Error standards for all voting machines 1 in 500,000 - if not met - HAVA $$ in danger
11. RivCo ROV Letter of Denial of central count viewing and WinEDS server re 11/7/06 election
12. Desert Hot Springs Election -Denial of audit logs of 3-6-07 RivCo election
13. HAVA Implementation according to CACEO - CA Association of Clerks & Elections Officials -Scott Konopasek 4/05
14. Sequoia RivCo Contract - 2-7-06 - Amendment to original contract of 2000- sole sourced
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
sequoia_redline.pdf [24] | 66.86 KB |
Sequoia CA Procedures - Appendices Aug '07.pdf [25] | 4.37 MB |
Sequoia MODIFIED procedures approval 11-29-07 incl security bags.pdf [26] | 19.49 KB |
Sequoia CA Procedures - Ch 1-11 Ver2.01 8-31-07.pdf [27] | 1.68 MB |
Sequoia procedures - incident_report.pdf [28] | 400.04 KB |
SOS Clarification_of_Voting_System_Certification.pdf [29] | 114.34 KB |
Voting System Report to SoS from RivCo ROV 3-4-08.pdf [30] | 666.15 KB |
Seq_AVC-Edge_op-man.pdf [31] | 5.14 MB |
Sequoia illegal double testing Systest & iBeta 11-20-07.pdf [32] | 2.08 MB |
error-rates-HAVA.pdf [33] | 64.79 KB |
Denial of central count viewing and WinEDS server.pdf [34] | 46.86 KB |
Desert Hot Springs Election of 3-6-07 - ltr from Dunmore.pdf [35] | 144.36 KB |
County Guide to implement HAVA.pdf [36] | 1.99 MB |
14- Sequoia RivCo Contract - 2-7-06.pdf [37] | 3.35 MB |
under construction
Links:
[1] http://www.whoscounting.net/TheCompanies.htm
[2] http://www.whoscounting.net
[3] http://www.essvote.com/HTML/about/faq.html
[4] http://www.onlinejournal.com/evoting/042804Landes/042804landes.html
[5] http://biz.yahoo.com/ic/103/103102.html
[6] http://www.essvote.com/HTML/products/electronic_voting.html
[7] http://www.essvote.com/HTML/products/automark.html
[8] http://www.decisionone.com/d1m/services/planning/plan_telework.shtml
[9] http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=5788
[10] http://verifiedvoting.org/article.php?id=5165
[11] http://66.102.7.104/search?q=cache:4Dbm3JyK8uMJ:www.miamidadeig.org/reports/voting%20final%20report.pdf 100 550 600 "ES&S"&hl=en&lr=lang_en
[12] http://www.hillnews.com/news/012903/hagel.aspx
[13] http://www.timesrecordnews.com/trn/cda/article_print/0,1983,TRN_5784_4226503_ARTICLE-DETAIL-PRINT,00.html
[14] http://www.wishtv.com/Global/story.asp?S=1647611
[15] http://www.wishtv.com/Global/story.asp?S=1808590
[16] http://www.indystar.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060823/NEWS01/608230477
[17] http://www.news.diebold.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=5006
[18] http://www.diebold.com
[19] http://www.diebold.com/150
[20] mailto:christopher.bast@diebold.com
[21] http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/09/judge-to-consider-blocking-merger-of-two-voting-machine-makers.html
[22] http://www.ajc.com/business/justice-dept-review-of-138396.html?cxntlid=daylf_tpcr
[23] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/UCON_seeA-tamperEVoting_0.pdf
[24] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/sequoia_redline.pdf
[25] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Sequoia CA Procedures - Appendices Aug '07.pdf
[26] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Sequoia MODIFIED procedures approval 11-29-07 incl security bags.pdf
[27] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Sequoia CA Procedures - Ch 1-11 Ver2.01 8-31-07.pdf
[28] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Sequoia procedures - incident_report.pdf
[29] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/SOS Clarification_of_Voting_System_Certification.pdf
[30] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Voting System Report to SoS from RivCo ROV 3-4-08.pdf
[31] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Seq_AVC-Edge_op-man.pdf
[32] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Sequoia illegal double testing Systest & iBeta 11-20-07.pdf
[33] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/error-rates-HAVA.pdf
[34] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Denial of central count viewing and WinEDS server.pdf
[35] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Desert Hot Springs Election of 3-6-07 - ltr from Dunmore.pdf
[36] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/County Guide to implement HAVA.pdf
[37] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/14- Sequoia RivCo Contract - 2-7-06.pdf