ES&S Caught with Uncertified Machines in CA; Decertification May Result

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Original article published at Bradblog.com:  http://www.bradblog.com/?p=4985

ES&S Facing Massive Fines, Possible Decertification in CA for Use of Uncertified Modifications to Voting Systems
Illegal Changes to Company's AutoMARK Ballot Marking Device Could Bring $10,000
Fine Per Machine, Full Refund of Purchase Price, Prohibition from Doing Business in State of California...

By Brad Friedman from St. Louis, MO...

ES&S, the country's largest distributor of voting machines, looks to be in a lot of trouble in California. A public notice from the CA Secretary of State's office was posted this morning by Thad Hall of CalTech announcing that the company "has violated" CA Elections Code by modifying "hundreds of units of a version of the AutoMARK ballot marking device" without certification or permission of the Secretary of State...

CA Source Code Reports Are Dire -- Bowen's Decisions Due Today

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VS Review page 080307

Below are the conclusions from Bowen's three source code reports

posted at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_vsr.htm
Thanks to Jim Soper, (Voting Rights Task Force, Alameda Co. CA) for providing this digest of the individual vendor system security reports. http://www.CountedAsCast.com

Public Comment Still Being Accepted

Comments e-mailed to votingsystems@sos.ca.gov or phoned into voicemail at (916) 651-7834 will still be considered in advance of the certification decisions Sec. Bowen will announce later this afternoon. (Thanks to Jennifer Kidder of VRTF for this info).

UPDATE on today's Sacramento press conference regarding Secretary of State Debra Bowen's voting system certification decisions...
We do not have an exact time yet, but it will be in the p.m. and not a.m.
Thank you for your patience,

Nicole Winger
Deputy Secretary of State, Communications
Office of California Secretary of State Debra Bowen


DIEBOLD, pg 65

Our study of the Diebold source code found that the system does not meet the requirements for a security-critical system. It is built upon an inherently fragile design and suffers from implementation flaws that can expose the entire voting system to attacks. These vulnerabilities, if exploited, could jeopardize voter privacy and the integrity of elections. An attack could plausibly be accomplished by a single skilled individual

Riverside Activists Prevail -- County to Dispose of DREs

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Guest BLOGGED BY Tom Courbat ON 7/13/2007 2:46PM at BradBlog.com http://www.bradblog.com/?p=4816   
'Blue Ribbon' Committee to Riverside County, CA Board of Supes: Dump DRE Touch-Screen Voting Systems!
Enormous Victory as Dogged Citizen Advocacy Finally Pays Off!
Committee Also Recommends Security Audit of Registrar's Office in First County in America to Move to Touch-Screen Voting Systems

Guest Blogged by Tom Courbat of SAVE R VOTE

ED NOTE: Courbat and his band of intrepid Election Integrity advocates are owed a huge debt of thanks and an enormous congratulations for their effort. This recommendation, and indeed the creation of the "Blue Ribbon" commission itself, only came about due to the dogged, week-in, week-out, year-in, year-out persistence of Tom and the Riverside County advocates of SAVE R VOTE.
We're happy to run his first-hand, guest blog contribution on this tremendous victory, as Courbat's group and efforts serve as a role model for citizens in every county in the nation. --- BF

Dump the DREs and Minimize Additional Outlays To Go To Paper Ballots

Next Tuesday, July 17, 2007, the Riverside County, California Board of Supervisors’ hand-picked “Blue Ribbon” Elections Review Committee will present the Board with recommendations to “Move as quickly as possible to a hybrid voting system…on paper ballots…counted by optical scanners.”

For Riverside County, the first in America to move to touch-screen electronic voting systems, the importance of their findings cannot be understated.

Alameda Court Orders New Election as Remedy for Destroyed Vote Data

"Judge Smith's decision in the recount suit vindicates a fundamental right reserved long ago by the People of California to ferret out possible fraud or error in election results," noted counsel for the voters Gregory Luke. ". . . The decision is a firm rebuke to the culture of secrecy that has taken hold in too many election offices around the country."


PRESS RELEASE
For Immediate Release
June 12, 2007

Tentative Ruling Finds that County Officials Destroyed Voting Records from Election
Conducted on Diebold Electronic Voting Machines

Election Results May Be Nullified and County Ordered to Conduct Re-Vote on Ballot Measure at Next General Election; Hearing on the Tentative Ruling Tomorrow

OAKLAND, CA - Superior Court Judge Winifred Y. Smith issued a tentative ruling that the Alameda County Registrar of Voters and Alameda County "have engaged in a pattern of withholding relevant evidence and failure to preserve evidence" necessary to conduct a recount of a hotly contested Berkeley ballot measure. As a result, the Court has signaled its intention to void the election and order the County to place Measure R back on the ballot for a re-vote at the next general election.

Judge Smith will issue a final ruling after the Court hears oral arguments tomorrow (Friday, July 13, at 9:30 a.m. at the Wiley Manuel Courthouse, Department 114, 661 Washington Street, Oakland).

"Judge Smith's tentative ruling confirms our contention that Alameda County violated its duty to preserve the critical voting machine data that was the focus of this recount lawsuit and election contest," said Gregory Luke of Strumwasser & Woocher LLP, attorney for the plaintiffs who sought the recount of the vote on Measure R.

Riverside County (CA) Panel Recommends Dumping DREs

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Riverside_071307
Original Riverside Press Enterprise article at http://www.pe.com/localnews/inland/stories/PE_News_Local_H_vote13.400853f.html

Optical Scan, Precinct Posting, Video Cameras Among Recommendations

Tom Courbat, founder of SAVE R VOTE, an elections integrity group that has pressed the supervisors to abandon the touch-screen machines, called the panel's recommendations "very bold ... something they knew the Board of Supervisors did not want to hear."

By KIMBERLY TRONE and RICHARD K. DEATLEY
The Press-Enterprise, 10:00 PM PDT on Thursday, July 12, 2007

Riverside County, the first in the state to use electronic touch-screen voting machines, should return to a paper-based voting system, a panel appointed by the Board of Supervisors has recommended.

The Sequoia Voting Systems machines in use by the county since the 2000 presidential elections haven't gained voter confidence and have failed to meet expectations of reliability and cost savings, the five-member panel found.

The panel found no evidence of any errors or defects in the county's touch-screen system, however.

Michelle Shafer, vice president of communications for Sequoia Voting Systems, said late Thursday that she could not comment on the recommendations until she'd had an opportunity to review them.

The decision about whether to scrap the electronic system rests with the county supervisors, who will discuss the recommendations Tuesday. The county has spent about $25 million on electronic machines since putting them to use. The cost to replace them is not yet known.

The Case for Hand-Counted Paper Ballots

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THE CASE FOR HAND COUNTED PAPER BALLOTS

by Richard Hayes Phillips, Ph.D.

February 21, 2007

I remain an advocate of paper ballots, counted by hand, at the precinct level, in full public view, on Election Night, no matter how long it takes. Here is an outline of my reasons:

1. Without PAPER BALLOTS, no election results can be verified by auditors.
“Voter-verified paper trails” do not suffice, because:

(a) not all voters will take the extra time to “verify” each and every vote for a multitude of offices and initiatives;

(b) there is no way to ensure that the vote count reported by the machine actually matches the “paper trail” without looking at the paper record;

(c) contentious court cases will be required in order to look at the paper record during the brief time period when an election can be challenged; therefore

(d) the unverified machine count will likely become official; and

(e) auditing the poll books and voter signature books can only verify the accuracy of the total number of ballots cast, and cannot detect alteration of the vote count for individual candidates.


2. The ballots must be COUNTED BY HAND.

We have examined tens of thousands of ballots from the 2004 general election in Ohio, and have found large discrepancies, errors, and outright fraud that were not detected by the machine counts, including:

(a) hundreds of consecutive ballots cast for the same presidential candidate;

(b) inexplicable voting patterns, such as half of the gay marriage supporters voting for Bush;

(c) outright alteration, such as marks for certain candidates covered with white stickers;

(d) “duplicate” ballots without original “voided” ballots to match them;

(e) unused ballots missing or destroyed;

(f) ballots cast in the wrong precinct, with a different ballot rotation;

(g) far more, or far fewer, voted ballots than the official number of ballots cast;

(h) thousands of “absentee” ballots identified in the same handwriting, with the same writing implement;

(i) absolutely blank ballots substituted for ballots cast by voters;

(j) thousands of ballots punched in advance for third-party candidates, causing voters to spoil their own ballots by casting overvotes, found almost exclusively in heavily Democratic inner-city precincts.


3. The ballots must be counted AT THE PRECINCT LEVEL, because:

(a) hand counting of paper ballots is not manageable at the county level;

(b) the counting takes place before “chain of custody” issues have arisen;

(c) all ballots will be counted in the correct precincts.


4. The ballots must be counted IN FULL PUBLIC VIEW, because:

(a) nothing else will restore public confidence in the veracity of the vote count;

(b) public monitoring of the actual counting of ballots is an exciting opportunity for citizens to engage in participatory democracy; and

(c) if observers are limited to persons residing in the precinct being counted, contentious challenges from partisan lawyers can be averted.


5. The ballots must be counted ON ELECTION NIGHT, NO MATTER HOW LONG IT TAKES, because:

(a) again, the counting takes place before “chain of custody” issues have arisen;

(b) the voters have already endured a lengthy campaign, and can wait a while for the unofficial results;

(c) the right of voters to have their votes counted correctly, the first time, trumps the desire of election workers to go home early; and

(d) if election workers are tired after a long day, a new team can be brought in to count the ballots.


EAC Takes Aim at Paper Ballots

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May 30, 2007

"So what did the techno-advisory group come up with
in their recommendations for dealing with the "problem" of handling and counting paper ballots?

Paper ballots must now all be technology-enabled. . . 'machine readable.'

Let's think about this for a moment."

By Nancy Tobi

I went to Washington, DC last week. Our nation's capital. I wish I could say that I went solely to enjoy the warm and nourishing hospitality of my food and lodging angel, Arlene. Or that I went to enjoy the May roses not found in New England until much later in the summer. I wish I could say that I went to embrace the massive willow oak in the park outside the congressional office buildings, or that I went just so that I could lie on my back on the grass in the park and feel the rays of the DC sun melt into my face.

CA 50 Plaintiffs Petition CA Supreme Court for Review

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
April 27, 2007
Contact Linda A. Poniktera - 619.987.7200
Plaintiffs Petition California Supreme Court
On Ruling In California’s 50th District Election Contest


Petition Seeks To Confirm Courts' Jurisdiction Over Elections And Continuing Importance Of Voting Rights

San Diego, CA April 27, 2007 –
In a press conference today near the San Diego Convention Center, the nonprofit legal firm Psephos announced that plaintiffs Gail Jacobson and Lillian Ritt have petitioned the California Supreme Court regarding the Jacobson v. Bilbray election contest requesting discovery and a recount of the vote in the June 2006 special election in California’s 50th Congressional District. The election was terminated via a premature swearing-in only 7 days after the June 6, 2006 election although the Congressional Record stated that 68,500 votes were still uncounted and the election was not yet completed or certified.

State, County Resistance Slowing Rush to H.R. 811

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Originally published at: http://thehill.com/leading-the-news/election-officials-predict-chaos-pro...

"Wait a Minute-- Counties Have Something to Say"

Election Officials Predict Chaos, Protest Reform Bill

By Heidi Bruggink
April 12, 2007

Eyeing the passage of Rep. Rush Holt’s (D-N.J.) election reform legislation, election officials are protesting what they believe is a poorly planned, even dangerous, set of changes.

The Voter Confidence and Increased Accountability Act of 2007, which boasts more than 200 bipartisan cosponsors, appeared to be sailing toward confirmation before Congress adjourned for Easter recess. However, the House Administration Committee vote was postponed unexpectedly after election officials from across the country testified before the Elections Subcommittee and scores of others contacted their representatives predicting problems that could make the 2000 and 2004 elections “look like the proverbial walk in the park.”

Disability Voter Advocates Call for Ban on DREs

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Originally published at BradBlog.com: http://www.bradblog.com/?p=4270

BLIND AND DISABLED VOTER ADVOCATES, GROUPS CALL FOR 'IMMEDIATE BAN' OF DRE VOTING SYSTEMS!

Two Different Statements from Civil Rights Leaders Call for Discontinuation of Insecure, Unverifiable, Disenfranchising DRE/Touch-Screen Voting Technology Both Destroy Myth of Need to Sacrifice Verifed Ballots for Accessibility...

"Electronic ballot systems such as DRE machines, are neither fully accessible nor secure and accurate methods of recording, tallying, and reporting votes ... [They] are inappropriate for use, because these systems make it impossible for voters to verify that their votes will be counted as cast." - Statement released today by DISABLED VOTER ADVOCATES

Hallelujah! Voters with disabilities are finally beginning to speak out against the use of Direct Recording Electronic (DRE, often known as "touch-screen") voting systems! After years of DRE supporters, and indeed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002, using the canard that blind and disabled voters must use DREs to vote privately and independently, a number of leaders in the disabilities community are speaking out against their having been used as a wedge to force the nationwide implementation of such disenfranchising, dangerous voting systems! Two different landmark statements on the issue have now been released, The BRAD BLOG has learned.

One statement [PDF] released last week by the Disability Law Center and the ACLU speaks in support of the decision by the Massachusetts Secretary of State to approve the use of ballot marking devices, as opposed to DREs, for use by the state's disabled voters. The second, released today to The BRAD BLOG in advance of Congressional subcommittee hearings tomorrow, is signed so far by more than 20 leaders of the blind and disabled communities and calls for "an immediate ban" on DRE voting systems.

Like the release from the Disability Law Center, the newly released statement crushes the long-overused myth that such unsecure, disenfranchising, failed technology is required for disabled access to private, independent voting. (The complete statement is posted at the end of this item.) "Providing secure voting machines for voters with disabilities is part and parcel of protecting [disabilities voters'] rights to equal access to the ballot and to having their votes reliably counted," said Stanley J. Eicher, Executive Director of the Disability Law Center in their March 5th statement. "We must debunk the myth that we have to choose between accessible voting and verifiable voting. Democracy requires that we have both." - Stanley J. Eicher, Exec. Dir. of the Disability Law Center "The decision by the Secretary shows that it is both possible and essential to build common ground between the disability rights community and the growing number of citizens who are concerned that many of the proposed new technologies are subject to tampering and error," said Eichner, adding notably, "We must debunk the myth that we have to choose between accessible voting and verifiable voting. Democracy requires that we have both." The statement today from the disabilities advocates calls for a nationwide ban on the use of DRE technology. "Electronic ballot systems such as the direct record electronic (DRE) machines...now in use," the statement reads, "have quickly proven to be neither fully accessible to all voters nor secure and accurate methods of recording, tallying, and reporting votes. While the goal of private voting has been achieved by some voters, this has often been without meaningful assurance that our votes have been counted as cast." The disabilities leaders go on to point out that verification of ballots and the accuracy of their tabulation need not be sacrificed for accessibility or privacy. A similar point was at the heart of a report recently released by one of the letters authors, blind technology expert, Noel H. Runyan. His report, published simultaneously by both Demos and VoterAction.org, concerns the failure of DRE systems to meet both HAVA requirements and the accessibility and verification needs of disabled voters. More from the statement today describing DRE electronic balloting systems as "inappropriate for use" and calling on "all disability rights groups, other civil rights groups, election protection groups, and elected officials to recognize the necessity for an immediate ban" on such dangerous, unreliable and unsecure technology: It is now clear that in order to guarantee reliability and security in our elections, it is necessary for the voter to be able to truly verify the accuracy of his or her ballot--the ballot that will actually be counted. The only voting systems that permit truly accessible verification of the paper ballot are ballot marking devices. These non-tabulating devices, either electronic or non-electronic, assist the voter in marking and verifying votes on paper ballots that can either be optically scanned or hand-counted." ... We leaders and members of the disability rights community assert that neither accessibility for all voters nor the security of the vote can be sacrificed for the sake of the other. Fortunately, true accessibility and election security can both be achieved; there is no inherent incompatibility between voting system accessibility and security. We recognize that electronic ballot systems are inappropriate for use, because these systems make it impossible for voters to verify that their votes will be counted as cast. We call upon all disability rights groups, other civil rights groups, election protection groups, and elected officials to recognize the necessity for an immediate ban on any voting system that fails to meet the twin requirements of full accessibility and election security. This new and most welcome statement from this particular community is in stark contrast to the only other major voices previously allowed to testify to Congress on such matters, such as the National Federal for the Blind (NFB) and the American Association of Disabled People's (AAPD) Jim Dickson. Despite both of those groups having received large donations from voting machine companies such as, Diebold, Inc., both have been granted extraordinary access to Congressional members and have leveraged that access to call for the use of DRE systems for their communities (and even paperless ones at that.) The NFB received $1 million from Diebold, and Jim Dickson's group, though he lied to The BRAD BLOG about it previously, received at least $16,000 from the voting machine vendors according to the New York Times. We are happy to see new, uncompromised voices from this important community finally speaking up and adding their concerns to others such as Johns Hopkins computer scientist Avi Rubin who testified last week that DRE systems, with or without a so-called "voter verified paper audit trail", is "not a reasonable voting system." It would be nice if Runyan and some of the other signatories were invited to testify before Congress as well, and equally nice if Congress held hearings devoted to the issue of the safety, accuracy and accessibility of DRE systems before moving forward on Election Reform bills such as Rep. Rush Holt's HR811 which unfortunately falls short of banning DRE technology in American democracy. NOTE: We will be Guest Hosting Cynthia Black's Action Point this Sunday 3/18/07 @ 3pm ET (12noon PT) on Phoenix's Air America/NovaM affiliate 1480 KPHX. We hope to have Runyan as one of our featured guests. The complete statement from the disabilities leaders, including Runyan and many others, follow in full below... Americans with Disabilities Call for Election Systems Featuring Both Accessibility and Security Voters with disabilities, sensory impairments, and special language needs have long been disenfranchised in large numbers as a result of lack of access to the voting process. For many of us, the passage of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 held tremendous hope and promise for secure and reliable voting, a guarantee that every voter would have access to the voting process. Electronic ballot systems such as the direct record electronic (DRE) machines (formerly called "touch screens") now in use have quickly proven to be neither fully accessible to all voters nor secure and accurate methods of recording, tallying, and reporting votes. While the goal of private voting has been achieved by some voters, this has often been without meaningful assurance that our votes have been counted as cast. Additionally, many other voters have been disappointed and frustrated because we have not been able to vote privately and independently as we had hoped and as voting-system vendors had promised. It is now clear that in order to guarantee reliability and security in our elections, it is necessary for the voter to be able to truly verify the accuracy of his or her ballot--the ballot that will actually be counted. The only voting systems that permit truly accessible verification of the paper ballot are ballot marking devices. These non-tabulating devices, either electronic or non-electronic, assist the voter in marking and verifying votes on paper ballots that can either be optically scanned or hand-counted. (Some DRE voting machines that have already been purchased may be adapted to be used as acceptable ballot marking devices, assuming their accessibility can be preserved or improved.) The technology for inexpensively providing good accessibility to voting systems has been commonly available for more than a decade, and it can and should immediately be required for and applied to all modern voting systems. This is clearly illustrated by the report "Improving Access to Voting: A report on the Technology for Accessible Voting Systems," by Noel Runyan, (WORD | PDF | large-print | braille) posted at VoterAction.org and Demos.org. Design of new systems must include, from the beginning, accommodations to allow private and independent voting by individuals with a broad range of access needs. These systems must simultaneously ensure secure elections. We leaders and members of the disability rights community assert that neither accessibility for all voters nor the security of the vote can be sacrificed for the sake of the other. Fortunately, true accessibility and election security can both be achieved; there is no inherent incompatibility between voting system accessibility and security. We recognize that electronic ballot systems are inappropriate for use, because these systems make it impossible for voters to verify that their votes will be counted as cast. We call upon all disability rights groups, other civil rights groups, election protection groups, and elected officials to recognize the necessity for an immediate ban on any voting system that fails to meet the twin requirements of full accessibility and election security.


List of signatories as of 3/14/07 (affiliations are listed for identification purposes only):
Noel Runyan, Voting access technology engineer and author of "Improving Access to Voting"
Roger Petersen, member, Santa Clara County Advisory Commission for Persons with Disabilities and Santa Clara County Voter Access Advisory Committee
Bernice Kandarian, President, Council of Citizens with Low Vision International
Robert Kerr, ACB Maryland
Shawn Casey O'Brien, KPFA-FM in Los Angeles, and California Secretary of State's Ad Hoc Touch Screen Task Force member
Suzanne Erb, Chairperson of the Philadelphia Mayor's Commission on Disabilities
Mike Keithley
A. J. Devies, Past President, Handicapped Adults of Volusia County (HAVOC); Charter Member, Daytona Beach Mayor's Alliance for Persons with Disabilities; Disability Consultant and Board Member, Florida Fair Elections Coalition
Marta Russell, independent journalist and author
Judith K. Barnes, Life Member, Council of Citizens With Low Vision; Former President, Silicon Valley Council of the Blind George Moore, Accessibility Advocate, Californians for Disability Rights
Mike May, President, Sendero Group
Margaret Keith, VP, Monterey Co. Chapter, Californians for Disability Rights
Adrienne Lauby, Host/Producer, Pushing Limits, disability program on KPFA fm
David Andrews
Jean Stewart, Writer
Ruthanne Shpiner, Pushing Limits Radio 94.1 FM, Northern California ADAPT
Mike Godino, President, American Council of the Blind of New York, Systems Advocate, Suffolk Independent Living Organization
Louis Herrera
Dawn Wilcox, BSN RN, Past President Silicon Valley Council of the Blind, Board member CCCLV

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